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A.1 PURPOSE AND SCOPE
This attachment provides an evaluation of the radiological and non-radiological risks
associated with the transportation of naval spent nuclear fuel and test specimens that originate from
Navy and commercial shipyards, prototypes, and related Department of Energy laboratories. This
evaluation covers all past shipments through May 1995 and shipments planned in the 4Q-year period
from June 1995 through the end of 2035. This attachment evaluates the radiological risks associated
with the five alternatives described in Section 3.

A.2 BACKGROUND
The transportation of naval spent nuclear fuel and test specimens covered in this attachment
falls into the following four categories:

•

Shipments of Naval Spent Nuclear Fuel from Shipyards and Prototypes

•

Transfers of Naval Spent Nuclear Fuel to Storage Following Examination

•

Transfers of Naval Test Specimen Assemblies Between the Examination Facility and the
Test Reacto r Area

•

Shipments of Naval Test Speci mens to Examination and Testing Facilities.

Each category is described in more detail below .

A-vii

VIII

Volume I. Appendix D

A-I

Volume I, Appendix D

A.2.1 Shipments of Naval Spent Nuclear Fuel from Shipyards and
Prototypes
Since 1956, spent nuclear fuel has been removed from Navy nuclear·powered ships and
prototypes as a routine part of their operational cycle. The spent nuclear fuel has been transported to
the Expended Core Facility (ECF) for examination and eval uation. ECF is part of the Naval Reactors
Facility (NRF) within the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (lNEL). The examinations of the
spent nuclear fuel and irradiated test specimens have provided and will continue to provide
engineering data for materials and designs used in technology development for naval nuclear reactors.

PUGET SOUNO NAVAL SHIPYARD
BREMERTON. WASHINGTON

n

In the past, shipments have originated fro m two prototype sites, nine shipyard locations, and

PORTSMOUTH NAVAl SHIPYARD

the Shippingport Atomic Power Station (SAPS), located in Shippingport, Pennsylvania. The two

r....

KITIERY. MAINE (

/'

KENNETH A. KESSELRING SITE

prototype locations are the Kenneth A. Kesselring Site (KSO), located in West Milton, New York and

WEST MIL TON. NEW YOr
K.R INOSOR SITE OPERATION

the Windsor Site Operation (WSO), loc.ted in Windsor, Connecticut. The nine shipyard locations are

SHIPPINGP6RT ATOMIC J
POWER STATION
~.

Newport News Shipbuilding (NNS), located in Newpo rt News, Virginia; the Norfolk Naval Shipyard

SHIPPINGPORT. PENNSYLVANIA

(NOR), located in Portsmouth , Virginia; the Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard (PHNS), located in Pearl

NEWPORT NEWS SHIPBUILDING
NEWPORT NEWS, VIRGINIA

WINDSOR. CONNECTICUT

ELECTRIC BOAT
GROTON. CONNECTICUT

NORFOLK NAVAl SHIPYARD
PORTSMOUTH, VIRGINIA

Harbor, Hawaii ; the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard (PNS), located in Kinery, Maine; the Puget Sound

f'

Naval Shipyard (PSNS), located in Bremerton, Washington; the Charl eston Naval Shipyard (CNS),
located in Charleston, South Carolina; the Mare Island Naval Shipyard (MINS), located in Vallejo,

CHARLESTON NAVAL SHIPYARD
CHARLESTON, SOUTH CAROLINA

California; the Electric Boat Division of General Dynamics (EB), located in Groton, Connecticut, and
Ingalls Shipbuilding (lNGL), located in Pascagoula, Mississippi . Figure A·I provides a map of the
United States showing the transportation origins fo r naval spent nuclear fuel. No future shipments

PEARL HARBOR NAVAL SHIPYARD
PEARL HARBOR. HAWAII

fro m the Electric Boat Division, Ingalls Shipbuilding, and Shippingport Atomic Power Station
facilit ies are planned . The Mare Island Naval Shipyard , Charleston Naval Shipyard, and Windsor
Sit~

Operations facili ties are being phased out.

•

ORIGI N

The naval spe nt nuclear fuel has been shipped in M·130. M·140, M·I60, and S2W/S2Wa
shipping containers. Only the M·130, M·140, and M-I60 shipping containers will be used in the
future . A detailed description of the shipping containers to be used for naval spent nuclear fuel
shipments from shipyards and prototype sites is provided in Sectio n A.4. 1.

Figure A-I. Transportation o rigins for naval spent nuclear fuel.
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The naval spent nuclear fuel is primarily shipped by rail. However, for the two prototype
sites, rail spurs to the sites are not available. Therefore, the shipping containers are transported by
heavy-lift transporter to a nearby commercial rail line where the containers are then transported by
rail. For the Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard, the containers are transported by ship to the Puget Sound
Naval Shipyard where the containers are then transported to ECF by rail. Since 1956, 599 containers
of naval spent nuclear fuel have been shipped to ECF. An additional 16 containers of spent nuclear
fuel were shipped (12 from Shippingport Atomic Power Station to Hanford and 4 from ECF to
Hanford); however, these shipments are covered by the DOE historic shipment calculations in
Appendix I, Volume 1 of this Environmental Impact Statement. Table A-I provides a list of these
shipments made by year and originating facility .

A.2.2 Transfers of Naval Spent Nuclear Fuel to Storage Following
Examination
In the past, following examinations at ECF, the spent nuclear fuel has been prepared and
transferred to the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant (lCPP), also located on the INEL. A detailed
description of the operations performed in the Expended Core Facility is provided in Attachment B.
Naval spent nuclear fuel is currently being held at ICPP until permanent disposition becomes possible.

Since 1956, approximately 5400 transfers of naval spent nuclear fuel have been made from
ECF to ICPP in shipping casks transported by truck dedicated to performing only such shipments
(exclusive-use). For alternatives inVOlving continued transfers to storage, the transfers would be
made in the NFS-IOO, Peach Bottom, and Large Cell casks in exclusive-use trucks. A detailed
description of the shipping casks used for naval spent nuclear fuel transfers to storage is provided in
Section A.4.2.

A.2.3 Transfers of Naval Test Specimen Assemblies Between the
Examination Facility and the Test Reactor Area
In addition to naval spent nuclear fuel from ships and prototypes, irradiated test specimen
assemblies (fuel and non-fuel) have also been transported to ECF for examination. Test specimens,
which are constructed of plant materials, reactor structural materials, and fuels used in naval reactor
Volume 1, Appendix D
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Table A-I. Number of past naval spent nuclear fuel containers shipped to ECF by origin .
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Year

EB

1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980

I

SAPS

KSO

MINS

PHNS

PSNS

Origin
NNS PNS

WSO

NOR

INGL

I
I

2

5
3
2
2
4
2
2
8
4
4
2
2
2
2
4

2
0
5
7
5
5
42

I

2

I

I

I

I

I

2

I

2

2

I

33
I

I

2

I

I

I
I

3
2

TOTAL
I
I

I

4
3
7
2
4
2

6
4
7
4
3
I

2

I

I
I
I
I

I

2

2
4
2
2
8
2
6
6
4
2
4
2
6

8
2
4
32
4
2
4
2
2
2
2
4

3
3
2
2
2
3
4
2
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3
2
2
2

4

4
2

I

2
2
2
2
"2

4

I

I

I
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I

1

2
2
2
2
2

23
17
22
49
20
15
21
22
19
24
15
18
5
14

Table A-I (Cont).
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Year

EB

1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994(1)
1995(1)

>
"0
"0
('I)

::l
C.

>C.
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TOTAL
EB
SAPS
KSO
MINS
PHNS
PSNS
NNS
PNS
eNS
WSO
NOR
INGL
(I)

=
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SAPS

KSO

MINS

PHNS

PSNS

I
I

2

3
7

1

3
3
2
48

23

21

2
1
4
4
4
4

I
I
I

10

2
2
2

3

4
2
84

6
6
2
4
4
5
7
4
7
8
I

Origin
NNS PNS

4
6
4
4
2
4

4

eNS

3
3
2
2
2
2
2
3
2
4
I

12
5

WSO

NOR

INGL

8
10

18
20
8
15
13
17
18
28
18
23
22

I

2
2
6
4
4
3
7
4

4

4

16

3

I

20

115

Electric Boat Division of General Dynamics
Shippingport Atomic Power Station
Kenneth A. Kesselring Site Operations
Mare Island Naval Shipyard
Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard
Puget Sound Naval Shipyard
Newport News Shipbuilding
Portsmouth Naval Shipyard
Charleston Naval Shipyard
Windsor Site Operations
Norfolk Naval Shipyard
Ingalls Shipbuilding

Shipments in these years cover those authorized by the court injunction.

TOTAL

150

43

72

3

10

10

599

plants are tested and qualified to characterize their performance for the lifetime of the plant. Part of

only origins for future shipments. Figure A-2 provides a map of the United States showing the

this qualification program is to perform various irradiation lests of the materials for lifetime effects

transponation origins and destinations for the test specimen shipments.

prior to cenification. Along with those tests are pre- and post-examinations that provide the
necessary data for subsequent analysis of the material in question. This work is considered a

Since 1956. approximately 850 shipments of naval test specimens have been made between

fundamental requirement for the design and safe operation of naval reactor plants. Therefore. the

ECF and on- and off-site testing and examination facilities. in shipping containers transponed by

transfers of test specimen assemblies to the examination facil ity and shipments of the test specimens to

exclusive-use truck. The shipments have been made in NRBK-4I. -42. -43. and -44 shipping

the test facilities are included in the transponation evaluation. The test specimens have been

containers and the WAPD-39 and -40 shipping containers. For alternatives involving future

assembled into test specimen assemblies and irradiated at the Test Reactor Area (TRA) on the INEL.

shipments of this type. the shipments would be made in the NRBK-41 and WAPD-40 shipping

The irradiated test specimen assemblies are returned to ECF for disassembly and examination .

containers. A detailed description of the shipping containers used to ship irradiated test specimens
between off-site facilities and the examination facility is provided in Section A.4.4.

Since 1956. approximatel y 3600 transfers of naval test specimen assemblies have been made
between ECF and TRA in shipping casks transponed by exclusive-use truck. For alternatives

A.3 ALTERNATIVES TO BE EVALUATED

involving future transfers of this type. the transfers would be made in the NR-I . ATR-2. NR-3.
NR-4. and Test Train casks . A detailed description of the shipping casks used to transfer irradiated
test specimen assemblies is provided in Section A.4.3.

A detailed description of the alternatives is provided in Section 3. The specific impacts on
each of the four types of naval shipments (described in Section A.2) are described below for each
alternative.

A.2.4 Shipments of Naval Irradiated Test Specimens to Examination
and Testing Facilities

A.3.1 Alternative 1 - No Action

Following disassembly and examination of the test specimen assemblies at ECF. some

Under this alternative. after implementation. there would be no funher shipments of naval

specimens are shipped to off-site facilities for funher testing or examination. These tests and

spent nuclear fuel from the shipyards and prototypes. The Expended Core Facility would be shut

examinations are generally very specialized and ECF does not have the capability to perform them or

down. Naval spent nuclear fuel would be stored at a facility at the site where it was removed during

cannot perform them in a timely manner due to other examination priorities. Specimens are also

reactor servicing. with the exception of naval spent nuclear fuel removed at Newpon News

shipped back to ECF for examination or funher irradiation at TRA .

Shipbuilding. a commercial shipyard. which would be transponed to Norfolk Naval Shipyard for
storage. All naval spent nucle3l" fuel currently at ECF would be transferred to ICPP prior to the start

Test specimen shipments have been shipped to or from several laboratories and test facilities.
They are the Benis Atomic Power Laboratory (Benis). located in West Mifflin. Pennsylvania; the

of the 4O-year period with the exception of the fuel saved for future examinations. referred to as
reference specimens. The reference specimens and the naval spent nuclear fuel which originated at

Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory (KAPL). located in Niskayuna. New York; the Oak Ridge National

the prototype sites at NRF would be shipped from ECF to ICPP sometime during the 4O-year period.

Laboratory (ORNL). located in Oak Ridge. Tennessee; the Argonne National Laboratory (ANL)-East.

The TRA facility would perform any work associated with the assembly. disassembly. and routine

located in Argonne. Illinois; the Battelle Memorial Institute. located in Columbus. Ohio; the Chalk

examination of the test train assemblies; therefore. no transfers would be required. Specimens

River Nuclear Laboratories. located in Chalk River. Ontario. Canada (I shipment only); the Hanford

shipped off-site would remain at the destination following examination. Table A-2 summarizes the

Site. located in Richland. Washington; and the ANL-West. Central Facilities Area (CFA). TRA. and

shipments for the No Action alternative.

ICPP facilities. all located on the INEL. Based on current schedules. Benis and KAPL will be the

A-7
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Table A-2. Summary of shipments for the No Action alternative.
Type of Shipment
Shipments of Naval Spent Nuclear Fuel from Shipyards and
Prototypes
- Shipyards and Prototypes to ECF
- Newport News to Norfolk
Transfers of Naval Spent Nuclear Fuel from ECF to ICPP
Transfers of Naval Test Specimen Assemblies Between ECF and
TRA

/\

Shipments of Irradiated Test Specimens Between Off-Site
Facilities and ECF
- Shipments from ECF
- Shipments back to ECF

None
Yes
Reference Specimens and
Prototype Only
None

Yes
None

KNOLLS ATOMIC POWER LABORATORY
NISKAYUNA. NEW YORK

•

ANL-W. ICPP. TRA. CFA.
INEL. IDAHO

ANL-E
CHICAGO. ILLINOIS

• •

BAnElLE MEMORIAL INSTITUTE
COLUMBUS. OHIO

•

:r

BEnlS ATOMIC POWER lASORATORY
WEST MIFFLIN. PENNSYLVANIA

)

A.3.2 Alternative 2 • Decentralization
As described in Section 3.4, this alternative also involves storage of the naval spent nuclear
fuel near the point of origin. An evaluation of each of the three subalternatives defined in Section 3
was performed . The impact of the transportation related to each subalternative is briefly described
below.

OAK RIDGE NATlONAlLABORATORY
OAK RIDGE. TENNESSEE

A.3.2.1 Alternative 2a . Store Naval Spent Nuclear Fuel at or Close to Locations Where
Removed Without Examination. From the standpoint of transportation, this subalternative is
equivalent to the No Action alternative.

A.3.2.2 Alternative 2b - Examine a Limited Amount of Naval Fuel in the Puget Sound
•

Naval Shipyard Water Pit Facility and Store All Naval Fuel at Navy Facilities. For this

ORIG IN ANDIOR DESTINATION

alternative. the Expended Core Facility at NRF would be shut down and only high priority spent
nuclear fuel would be transported to the Puget Sound Naval Shipyard for examination. For the naval
spent nuclear fuel, approximately 10 percent of the total spent nuclear fuel for the 40-year period
would be shipped . Following examination. the fuel would remain at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard .
As in the No Action alternative, only the reference specimens would remain at ECF after June 1995.
Figure A-2.

Transportation origins and destinations for test specimen shipments.

Ten percent of the reference specimens would be transferred from ECF to Puget Sound Naval
Shipyard . The remainder of the reference specimens and the naval spent nuclear fuel which

A-9
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originated at the prototype sites at NRF would be transferred to ICPP. The TRA facility would

Table A-4. Summary of shipments for the Decentralization - Full Examination alternative.

perform any work associated with the assembly, disassembly, and routine examination of the test
Type of Shipment

specimen assemblies; therefore, no transfers would be required. Shipments of test specimens to
off-site facilities for specialized examinations would continue. Test specimens shipped off-site would
remain at the destination following examination. Table A-3 summarizes the shipments.

Table A-3. Summary of shipments for the Decentralization - Limited Inspection alternative.

Shipments of Naval Spent Nuclear Fuel from Shipyards and
Prototypes
- Shipyards and Prototypes to ECF
- Newport News to Norfolk
Transfers of Naval Spent Nuclear Fuel from ECF to ICPP

Yes
To Norfolk from ECF
NRF Prototypes

Transfers of Naval Test Specimen Assemblies Between ECF and
TRA

Type of Shipment
Shipments of Naval Spent Nuclear Fuel from Shipyards and
Prototypes
- Shipyards and Prototypes to Puget Sound
- Newport News to Norfolk
Transfers of Naval Spent Nuclear Fuel from ECF to ICPP
Transfers of Naval Test Specimen Assemblies Between
Puget Sound and TRA
Shipments of Irradiated Test Specimens to Off-Site Facilities
- Shipments from TRA
- Shipments back to TRA

Approximately 10%
of spent fuel
Yes
Reference Specimens and
Prototype Only

Shipments of Irradiated Test Specimens to Off-Site Facilities
- Shipments from ECF
- Shipments back to ECF

Yes

Yes
None

A_3.3 Alternative 3 - 1992/1993 Planning Basis

None
This alternative plans on making the same types of shipments described in Section A.2 of this
attachment. The only difference is that some of the historical origins of naval spent nuclear fuel and
Yes
None

some destinations for the test specimen shipments will not be used. Table A-5 summarizes the
planned shipments for this alternative.

A.3.2.3 Alternative 2c - Examine All Naval Spent Nuclear Fuel at the INEL and Return to

Table A-S. Summary of shipments for the 1992/1993 Planning Basis alternative.

Navy Facilities for Storage. For this alternative, all naval spent nuclear fuel would be shipped to
Type of Shipment

ECF and examined as it has been in the past. Only non-<iestructive examinations would be

storage in the same type of container with the exception that naval spent nuclear fuel which originated

Shipments of Naval Spent Nuclear Fuel from Shipyards and
Prototypes
- Shipyards and Prototypes to ECF
- Newport News to Norfolk

Yes
No

at Newport News Shipbuilding would be shipped to Norfolk Naval Shipyard for storage. New

Transfers of Naval Spent Nuclear Fuel from ECF to ICPP

Yes

equipment would have to be designed and procured to handle the spent nuclear fuel which returns to

Transfers of Naval Test Specimen Assemblies Between ECF and
ATR

Yes

performed . The spent nuclear fuel would be returned in the same condition as originally shipped .
Following examination, the fuel would be returned to the originating shipyard or prototype site for

the shipyard . As in the No Action alternative, only reference specimens would remain at ECF after
June 1995. The naval spent nuclear fuel which originated in the prototype sites at NRF (AIW and
S5G) would be transferred to ICPP. Transfers of the irradiated test specimen assemblies would

Shipments of Irradiated Test Specimens to Off-Site Facilities
- Shipments from ECF
- Shipments back to ECF

continue, along with the shipments of test specimens from ECF to off-site testing or examination
facilities . Specimens shipped off-site would remain at the destination following examination. Table
A-4 summarizes the planned shipments for this alternative.
A-II
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Yes
Yes

A.3.4 Alternative 4 • Regionalization

assembly shipments would be shipped between TRA and the alternate site. The test specimen
shipments would originate at the centralization site and all specimens would ultimately return to that

As described in Section 3.4, this alternative would distribute existing and new spent nuclear

site for storage.

fuel between various sites either on the basis of the fuel type or on the basis of dividing storage
between the eastern and western par;,; of the United States. An evaluation of each of the options for

A.4 GENERAL DESCRIPTIONS

this alternative described in Section 3.4 was performed . The impact of the transportation related to
each option under this alternative is briefly described below.

The following general information is common to all of the alternatives evaluated.

A .3.4.1 Altemative 4a • Regionalization Using Storage at Three Sites. From the standpoint

A.4.1 Spent Nuclear Fuel Shipping Containers

of transportation of naval spent nuclear fuel and test specimens, this alternative is equivalent to the
1992/1993 Planning Basis alternative.
For naval spent nuclear fuel , the M·130, M-I40, and M-I60 shipping containers would be

A.3.4.2 Altemative 4b . Regionalization Using Storage at Two Sites. This alternative would
utilize an existing DOE site in the eastern part of the United States and another existing DOE site in
the western part of the country for storage of spent nuclear fuel. From the standpoint of
transportation of naval spent nuclear fuel and test specimens, this alternative is equivalent to the

used for all alternatives. The shipping containers are primarily transported by railcars used only for
this purpose as part of general-use freight trains. Section A.2. 1 describes the special circumstances
where the shipping containers are transported by ship or heavy-lift transporter. A brief description of
each shipping container follows .

Centralization alternative at each of the DOE sites because the Navy would operate a facility for
examining naval spent nuclear fuel at only one of the DOE sites and the naval spent nuclear fuel

A.4.1. 1 M-130 Shipping Container. The M-130 shipping container is a large, lead-lined, steelshelled shipping container that is transported in the vertical position on a depressed center railcar

would be stored at the same site where it was examined.

(Figure A-3). The major components of the M-130 shipping container include the shielded container,
closure head, and dust cover. Module holders are installed inside the container to hold the irradiated

A.3.S Alternative S • Centralization

fuel modules in place and can be modified to accept different sized fuel modules. The container is
shipped dry with the exception of a small amount of residual water. Cooling fins on the outside of

This alternative considers consolidating all naval spent nuclear fuel and test specimens at the

the container are designed to dissipate the heat generated by the spent nuclear fuel.

INEL, Hanford Site, Savannah River Site, Oak Ridge Reservation, or Nevada Test Site.
Centralization at INEL is identical to the 1992/1993 Planning Basis alternative. For the other
centralization sites, the type and numb er of shipments would be identical to the 199211993 Planning
Bas is alternative with the only difference being the destination. The naval spent nuclear fuel will be
shipped to the centralization site for examination and subsequently transferred to a storage facility at
the centralization site which would be equivalent to ICPP. Naval spent nuclear fuel shipments from
Newport News Shipbuilding to Norfolk Naval Shipyard would not be necessary. As in the No Action
alternative, only reference specimens would remain at ECF after June 1995. All reference specimens
would be shipped to th e centralization site. The naval spent nuclear fuel which originated in the
prototype sites at NRF would also be transferred to the centralization site. The test specimen
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figure A-3. M-130 shipping container mounted on railcar.
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The M-130 shipping container weighs approximately 214,500 pounds in the standard loaded
configuration. The container is approximately 13 feet tall and 7 feet in diameter. The container is a
closed bottom cylindrical lead shell that is covered both on the inside and the outside with a I-inch
thick layer of steel. The lead on the cylindrical sides is about 10 inches thick and is a minimum of
9.5 inches thick on the bottom. In the standard configuration, the closure head at the top of the
container is primarily constructed of 5.25 inches of lead and 7 inches of steel.

A.4.1.2 M-140 Shipping Container. The M-I40 shipping container is a large, stainless steel
shipping container that is transported in the vertical position on a specially designed well-type railcar
(Figure A-4). The major components of the M-I40 shipping container include the shielded container,
closure head, and protective dome. Module holders are installed inside the container to hold the
irradiated fuel modules in place and can be modified to accept different sized fuel modules. The
container is shipped dry with the exception of a small amount of residual water. Cooling fins on the
outside of the container are designed to dissipate the heat generated by the fuel.

The M-I40 shipping container weighs approximately 375,000 pounds in the loaded condition.
The container is approximately 16 feet tall with a maximum diameter of 10.5 feet. The container
body is made from stainless steel forgings with 14-inch thick walls and a 12-inch thick bottom. The
closure head and protective dome have a total thickness of 17.5 inches of stainle:;s steel.

A.4.1.3 M-160 Shipping Container. The M-l60 shipping container is a large, lead-lined, steelshelled shipping container that is transported in a horizontal position on a support structure mounted
on a modified flat bed railcar (Figure A-5). The major components of the M-l60 shipping container
include the shielded container, closure head, and dust cover. Module holders are installed inside the
container to hold the irradiated fuel modules in place. The container is shipped dry with the
exception of a small amount of residual water. Cooling fins on the outside of the container are
designed to dissipate the heat generated by the fuel.
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Figure A-4. M-l40 shipping container mounted on railcar.
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Figure A-S. M-I60 shipping container mounted on railcar.
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The M-I60 shipping container weighs approximately 235,500 pounds in the loaded condition.
The container is approximately 16.5 feet long and 6.5 feet ill diameter. The container consists of two
concentric bottom closed steel cylinders with a 9.4-inch annulus between the cylinders that is filled

A.4,2 Spent Nuclear Fuel Shipping Casks for Transfers to Storage
Following Examination

with lead. The outer shell is made from 1.5-inch thick steel, and the inner shell is made from I-inch
thick steel. The bottom plate is approximately 7 inches thick, and the closure head is approximately
15 inches thick.

For naval spent nuclear fuel being transferred from the examination facility to storage (e.g.,
ECF to ICPP), the Nuclear Fuel Services Model 100 cask (NFS-IOO), Peach Bottom cask, and the
Large Cell cask will be used for all alternatives. These shipping containers are transported by

A.4. 1.4 GOllemment Escorts for Spent Nucleer Fuel. Commercial railroads, exclusive-use

exclusive-use truck. A brief description of each cask follows .

heavy-lift transporters, or exclusive-use ships are used to transport the naval spent nuclear fuel from
the prototypes and shipyards. The specific routes used to transport the spent nuclear fuel are selected

A .4 .2 . 1 NFS-100 Cesk. The NFS-IOO cask is a large, lead-lined, steel-shelled shipping cask that

by the rail or shipping companies . All naval spent nuclear fuel shipments are accompanied by

is transported in the horizontal position on a skid assembly attached to a tandem axle trailer (Figure

government escorts. The escorts perform the duties necessary to ensure the safe, expeditious

A-6). The major components of the NFS- IOO cask include the shielded cask and

transportation of the naval spent nuclear fuel.

fuel holding insert is installed inside the cask to hold the irradiated fuel modules in place. The

~Iosure

head. A

container is shipped dry with the exception of a small amount of residual water. The cask is enclosed
The government escorts receive specialized training in shipment safety procedures,

on the truck by a metal cover during shipment.

radiological controls, security, and emergency response. Routine shipment escort procedures involve
processing of authorization and shipping documentation, pre-shipment inspections, tracking shipment
progress and schedules, enroute inspections, shipment observation and surveillance, and periodic

The NFS-IOO cask weighs approximately 110,000 pounds in the loaded configuration . The
cask is approximately 10.5 feet tall and 7 feet in diameter. The cask is a closed bottom cylinder of

communication checks. The government escorts have been trained to use and are equipped with the

lead with a 0.375-inch thick steel inner shell and a 2-inch thick outer shell . The lead on the

necessary radiological monitoring equipment to verify the shipping container integrity.

cylindrical sides is about 8.75 inches thick and the leaQ on the bottom is 8.8 inches thick. The
closure head at the top of the cask is constructed of 9 .75 inches of lead and 2 inches of steel.

A large amount of the government escorts' training involves emergency response. This
training involves emergency procedures for notification of tech nical and safeguards support personnel.

A .4.2 .2 Peech Bottom Cask. The Peach Bottom cask is a large, lead-lined, steel-shelled shipping

The government escorts are equipped to immediately notify emergency assistance personnel ,

cask that is transported in the horizontal position on a skid assembly attached to a tandem axle trailer

immediately assess the containment status of the shipping container, and communicate this information

(Figure A-7). The major components of the Peach Bottom cask include the shielded cask and closure

to emergency support personnel. Depending on the situation, the technical and support personnel

heads. A fuel holding insen is installed inside the cask to hold the irradiated fuel modules in place.

may activate various emergency control centers that are prepared to provide the government escorts

The cask is shipped dry with the exception of a small amount of residual water . The cask is enclosed

wi th the necessary support to quickly and safely bring an emergency situation under control. All

on the truck by a metal cover during shipment.

rai lroads, wh ich handle escorted shipments, also have specific emergency response procedures to
safely ex pedite recovery for shipments that are involved in a rail line accident. Continually manned
railroad operat ion centers mai ntain the capability to contact personnel from a combination of
resources which provide appropriate equipment and manpower at the accident scene.
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Figure A-6. NFS-IOO cask mounted on truck.

Figure A-7. Peach Bottom cask mounted on truck .
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The Peach Bottom cask weighs approximately 68,400 pounds in the loaded configuration.
The cask is approximately 16 feet tall and 3.5 feet in diameter. The cask is a stepped cylinder of lead
with a 0.25 .. inch thick steel inner shell and a I. 75-inch thick steel outer shell. The lead on the

CASK

cylindrical sides ranges from 5.25 to 6 .25 inches thick. The closure heads on each end of the cask
are essentially identical and are constructed of 8.5 inches of steel.

A .4.2 .3 LBrgB Cell CBsk. The Large Cell cask, currently being designed for larger fuel types, will

be a large, stainless steel shipping cask that is transported in the vertical position on a low-boy tractor
trailer (Figure A-8). The major components of the Large Cell cask will include a shielded cask,
closure head, shipping cask, and external impact limiters . Fuel-holding inserts will be installed inside
the cask to hold the irradiated fuel modules in place. The cask will be shipped dry with the exception
of a small amount of residual water. Cooling fins on the outside of the shipping cask are designed to
dissipate the heat generated by the fuel.
SHIPPING

c.,,. -___

The Large Cell cask will weigh approximately 220,000 pounds in the loaded condition. The
shielded cask wiil be approximately 14 feet tall and 7 feet in diameter. The shielded cask body will

INSERTS

be a closed bottom cylinder made from stainless steel forgings with 13.5-inch thick walls and a
l3-inch thick bottom. The closure head will be a 14-inch thick stainless steel forging. The shielded
cask will be assembled to the shipping cask during transport. The shipping cask will be a 2-inch
thick aluminum closed bottom cylinder with fins extending to a total d;ameter of 93.6 inches. The
external impact limiter assemblies, located on both ends of the cask, will be constructed of encased

SHIELDED CA

bi.<Jirectional aluminum honeycomb and are approximately 10 feet in diameter. The total Large Cell
cask height will be approximately 17 feet.

A .4.2.4 Shipment Controls. All spent nuclear fuel transfers to a storage facility at the same site

as the examination facility will be accompanied by escorts. The escorts are perso nnel who are
specially ~rained to perform the duties necessary to ensure the safe transportation of the spent nuclear
fuel. The escorts are in vehicles located in front of and behind the truck carrying the shipping cask.

The esco rts receive specialized training in shipment safety procedures, radiological controls,
security, and emergency response. The escort vehicles are equipped with distinctive warning flashers,
and the escorts are capable of radio contact with each other, the driver of the transport vehicle, and
on-site emergency coordinating perso nnel.

Figure A-8_ Large Cell cask.
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A large amount of the escons' training involves emergency response. This training involves
emergency procedures for notification of site technical and safeguards support personnel. The escorts
are equipped to immediately notify emergency assistance personnel, immediately assess the
containment status of the shipping cask, and communicate this information to emergency support
personnel. Depending on the situation, the technical and support personnel may activate various
emergency control centers that are equipped with the equipment and manpower to provide the escorts
with the necessary support to quickly and safely bring an emergency situation under control.

Additional administrative controls are imposed on the transfers to further minimize risks. For
example, the transfers are not allowed to travel during heavy traffic periods such as shift changes, and
the convoy travels at reduced speeds. The route itself also enhances safety, since the route is
essentially flat and the highest possible drop distance in the event of an accident is approximately 5
meters (16.5 feet) at the location where the highway crosses a river bed .

A.4.3 Naval Test Specimen Assembly Casks for Transfers Between
TRA and the Examination Facility

For naval test specimen assemblies being transferred on-site between TRA and the
examination fac il ity, the NR- I, ATR-2, NR-3, NR-4, and Test Train casks will be used . These casks
are transported by exclusive-use truck. For off-site shipments to the examination facility at the
centralization sites , only the Test Train cask will be used . A brief description of each cask follows .

A .4.3.1 NR and ATR Casks. The NR and ATR casks are large, lead-lined , steel-shelled casks

that are transported approxi mately 10· off horizontal in a cradle assembly attached to a tandem trailer
(see Figure A-9). The major components of the casks include the shielded body, mast , and bottom
closure/shield .

The shielded bod ies of th e casks are all approxi mately 32 inches in diameter. The outer steel
shell thickness ranges from 0.5 inch 10 1.0 inch. The thickness of th e inner steel shell is
approximately 0.4 inch for each cask. The lead ranges from approximately 10 inches to II inches for
the various casks. The height of the shi elded body ranges from app roximatel y 6 feet to 12 feet. The
mast is a tower section formed of rei nforced alu minum and serves to support the structural end of the

A-25
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Figure A-9. NR/ATR cask mounted on truck .
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spedmen assemblies which requ ire very little shielding. A winch and platform are also attached to
each cask. The bottom .:Iosure/shield is constructed of 1.0 to 1.75 inches of steel and 7.0 to
8.75 inches of lead.

The NR and ATR casks range in weight from approximately 19,000 to 48 ,000 pounds. The
overall cask height ranges from approximately 20 to 30 feet.

A.4.3.2 Test Train Casks. A new test specimen container would be required to transport
irradiated test specimen assemblies between TRA and the examination facility located at the sites other
than INEL for the Centralization alternative. A new cask is currently being designed to replace the
current casks used to transport the test specimen assemblies between ECF and TRA. which are
approaching the end of their design lifetime. The basic concept for this new cask is a thick-walled,
stainless steel body with stainless steel closures on each end . Energy absorbers will be attached to the
cask to prevent damage to the test specimens . The current estimated size of this cask is 34 feet long
by 5 feet in diameter, weighing approximately 40 tons. This cask would be shipped by exclusive-use
truck.

A.4.3.3 Shipment Controls. All spent nuclear fuel transfers to an examination facility at the same
site as the irradiation facility will be accompanied by two escorts. The escorts are personnel who are
specially trained to perform the duties necessary to ensure the safe transportation of the spent nuclear
fuel. The escorts are in vehicles located in front of and behind the truck carrying the shipping cask.

The escorts receive specialized training in shipment safety procedures . radiological cont rols.
security, and emergency response. A large amount of the escorts' training involves emergency
response. This training involves emergency procedures for notification of site technical and
safeguards support personnel. The escorts are equipped to immediately notify emergency assistance
personnel, immediately assess the containment status of the shipping cask, and co mmun icate this
information to emergency support personnel. Depending on the situation, the technical and support
personnel may activate various emergency control centers th at are eq uipped with the equipment aJ'ld
manpower to provide the escorts with the necessary support to quickly and afely bring an emergency
situation under control. The escort vehicles are equipped with di st inctive warning flashers. and the
escorts are capable of radio contact with each other, the driver of the transport vehicle. and
emergency coordinating personnel .
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Additional administrative controls are imposed on the shipments to further minimize risk. For
example, the transfers are not allowed to travel during heavy traffic periods such as shift chang , and
the convoy travels at reduced speeds. The route itself also enhances safety, since the route is
essentially flat and the maximum possible drop in the event of an accident is from the bed of the truck
to the road bed.
For the Centralization alternative, the casks would be shipped off-site. In this instance, only
casks certified for over-the-road transportation in accordance with the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission regulations would be used for shipments of the test trains. No escorts or additional
administrative controls would be used .

A.4.4 Test Specimen Shipping Containers
For test specimens, the WAPD-40 and NRBK-41 shipping containers would be used to
transport the specimens between ECF and the off-site laboratories and test facilities for all
alternatives. These shipping containers are transported by an enclosed truck using a commercial
carrier. A brief description of each container follows.

A.4.4.1 WAPD-40 Shipping Container. The WAPD-40 shipping container (Figure A-IO) is a

cylindrical , lead-shielded, steel-clad container that is shipped in a horizontal position. The inner steel
shell is O.25-inch thick, and the outer steel shell is O.5-inch thick with 9.875 inches of lead shielding
in between. The container is approximately 13 feet long and 2 feet in diameter. Steel clad , leadshielded end plugs bolt onto each end , and O.5-inch thick plates are bolted over the end plugs . The
specimens are placed into special sealed inner containers prior to placement into the WAPD-40
shipping container. The weight of the container and skid assembly is approximately 28,000 pounds.
The container and skid assembly are mounted into a special holddown cradle on the tru ck. This
holddown cradle weighs approximately 5,000 pounds .

A.4.4.2 NRBK-41 Shipping Container. The NRBK-41 shipping container (Figure A-I I) is a

cylindrical, lead-shielded , steel-clad container that is shipped in the vertical position. The inner steel
shell is O.25-inch thick, and the outer steel shell is O.5-inch thick

lO inches of lead shielding in

between. The container has a I-inch thick steel plate welded to the bottom with a second I-inch thick
steel plate welded to the first plate with a O. 125-inch deep recess to provide a thermal break for the
Vol ume I. Appendix D
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bottom of the container. The container also has a 0.25-inch th ick steel outer thermal shield attached
that provides a 0. 125-inch air gap between the outer shell and the thermal shield . The container is

,.
"

approximately 4 feet tall and 2.25 feet in diameter. The container is bolted to a welded 48-inch

"

square I-beam skid that is used to distribute the container load. The specimens are placed into a
special sealed inner container prior to placement into the NRBK41 shipping container. The weight of
the loaded container is approximately 9.000 pounds.

A.4.5 Shipping Container Design Requirements
t----4--rr----+--~-r_!_--_+-- 26.5 IN.

The M-130, M-I40, M- I60, NRBK41 . and WAPD40 shipping containers have been
designed and built to meet the regul ations specified in Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations, Pan 173
(49CFR I73), entitled " Shippers - General Requirements for Shipments and Packagings" (CF R 1991).
Shipments of naval spent nuclear fuel and test specimens are further regulated by Title 10, Code of
Federal Regulations, Pan 71 (IOCFR71), entitled "Packaging of Radi oactive Material for
Transponation and Transpon ation of Radioactive Material Under Cenain Conditions" (CFR 1993).
These regulations requ ire the shipping container to meet specific criteria under normal transpon and
accide ~ t

conditions . The shipping container must be evaluated under free drop, puncture, heat, cold.

pressure, water spray, and vibration for normal conditions and a series of severe hypothetical accident
IN.

conditions with the results compared against the criteria provided in IOCFR71.

The M-130, M-I40. M-I60, WAPD40, and NRBK41 shipp ing contai ners have undergone
rigorous engineering evaluations to assure compliance with 49CFRI73 and IOCFR71 requ irements .
In addition, actual scale model or moc k-up tesls have been performed 10 verify selected engineering
evaluations . This compliance has been cenified by th e U. S. Depanment of Energy and the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission. The new Tesl Train and Large Cell casks will also be designed in
accordance with the requirements of 49CFRI73 and IOCFR71 and will undergo the same rigorous
engi neering eval uatio ns and tesling .

The safety analyses for th e NFS-IOO, Peach Bonom. NR, and ATR casks demonstrale
compliance with the requ irements specified by Ihe Department of Energy (DOE) in DOE Order
5480.3, entitled "Safety Requirements for th e Packaging and Transpo rtalion of Hazardous Malerials,
Hazardous Substances, and Hazardous Wastes " (DOE 1985) and supplemented by DOE Idaho
Figure A-II. NRBK41 shipping container.
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Safety Requirements" (DOE 1991). These requirements are similar to the requirements of IOCFR71
with the major difference being that a worst credible accident can be defined based on site-specific

The INTERLINE computer code, developed by Oak Ridge National Laboratory (Johnson
et al . 1993a), was used to evaluate the rail routes used for the spent nuclear fuel shipments.

information.
The HIGHWAY computer code, also developed by Oak Ridge National Laboratory (Johnson
The NFS-IOO, Peach Bonom, NR, and ATR casks have undergone rigorous engineering

et al. 1993b), was used to evaluate the truck routes used for the test specimen shipments.

evaluations to assure compliance with the DOE requirements . In addition, actual scale model or
mock-up tests have been performed to verify selected engineering evaluations. The shipping casks

The SPAN4 computer code (Wallace 1972) was used to perform gamma exposure rate

comply with the requirements of DOE 5480.3 and DOE ID 5480.3 and this compliance is

calculations for the various shipping containers to assess the effect of increased distance from the

demonstrated by approval from the Idaho Operations Office of the Department of Energy.

source on exposure. SPAN4 is a point kernel code where appropriate exponential kernels are

A_S TECHNICAL APPROACH· GENERAL

specifically for naval spent nuclear fuel.

integrated over a source distribution. SPAN4 was developed by the Benis Atomic Power Laboratory

Several computer codes were used to assess the radiological risks associated with the
transponation of naval spent nuclear fuel and test specimens. Specifically, the RADTRAN 4 risk

The ORlGEN2 is a computer code, developed by Oak Ridge National Laboratory
(Croff 1980), that is used to simulate radiation and decay of materials that are irradiated in a nuclear

analysis model , devel oped by Sandia National Laboratories (Neuhauser and Kanipe 1992), was used

reactor. The ORIGEN2 computer code is widely accepted in the public domain and was used to

to calculate the general population and transponation crew (occupational) radiological risks associated

independently confirm the fission product inventory for naval fuel developed using the standard Benis

with the transponation of radioactive materials. This computer code was used extensively in the

Atomic Power Laboratory method. In addition, the standard Bettis Atomic Power Laboratory method

incident-free and accident risk assessments. In some cases, other methods were more appropriate

has been used in Safety Analysis Repons for Packag ing, reviewed and accepted by the Nuclear

than the RADTRAN 4 computer code for naval spent nuclear fuel. In these cases, other calculational

Regulatory Commission.

models were used and are specifically identified.
The radiological risks associated with the transponation of spent nuclear fuel and irradiated
The RISKIND computer code, developed by Argonne National Laboratory (Yuan et al. 1993),

test speci mens have been assessed for the general population , transponation workers (occupational),

also specifically analyzes radiological consequences and health risks to individuals from exposure

and hypothetical maximum exposed individuals under incident-free and accident condit ions for the

associated with transponation. For incident-free evaluations, RISKIND uses a generic truck cask and

alternatives presented in Section A.3. The maximum consequences for an accident are also provided

does not allow adjustments for different sized casks which is not appropriate for naval spent nuclear

for each alternative. The radiation exposure to the government escons for sh ipments was considered

fuel and test specimen casks; therefore, this code was not used. RISKIND (a version which accepts

occupational in nature and was included with the transponation worker results.

fuel-specific isotopes) was fou nd to be the best code for calculat ion of the maximum individual and
general population consequences for th e acc ident scenario and was used for that purpose.

The radiological impacts are first ex pressed as the calculated total exposu re for the exposed
population, occupational workers, and the maxi mum exposed individuals . The calculated total

Several other computer codes were used to provide input for the RADTRAN 4 and R1SKIND
computer codes. The codes include INTERLINE, HIGHWAY, SPAN4, and ORIGEN2 . A
description of each computer code and how the code was used is provided below.

exposures are then used to estimate the hypothetical health effects, expressed in terms of estimated
cancer fatalities. The health risk conversion factors used in this evaluation are taken from the
International Commission on Radiological Protection (IC RP Publication 60) which specifies 0.0005
fatal cancer cases per person-rem for members of the public. 0 .0004 fatal cancer cases per
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person-rem for workers (ICRP 1991). To calculate the estimated health detriment, the calculated
exposure would be multiplied by the conversion factors of 0 .00073 health detriments per person-rem
for members of the public, and 0.00056 health detriments per person-rem for workers (ICRP 1991).

The numerical estimates of cancer deaths and other health detriments presented were obtained
by the practice of linear extrapolation from the nominal risk estimate for lifetime total cancer
mortality at 10 rad . Other methods of extrapolation to the low-dose region could yield higher or

enough to cause damage to the container or fuel inside it since the ship itself would sustain the direct
impact. This is substantiated by the fact that the impact forces to the container would be less than the
regulatory criteria. Therefore, no release would occur.

A.S.1 Technical Approach for the Assessment of
Incident·free Transportation

lower numerical estimates of cancer deaths. Studies of human populations exposed at low doses are
inadequate to demonstrate the actual level of risk. There is scientific uncertainty about cancer risk in

For incident-free transportation of naval spent nuclear fuel, the RADTRAN 4 computer code

the low-dose region below the range of epidemiologic observation, and the possibility of no risk

was used to calculate the radiological exposure for the general population and a portion of the

cannot be excluded (CIRRPC 1992). In this appendix, the doses have been provided in all cases to

occupational exposure.

allow independent evaluation using any relation between exposure and health effects .
Included in the RADTRAN 4 computer code incident-free risk calculations for transport are
Non-radiological risks related to the transportation of naval spent nuclear fuel are also

models describing (I) exposures to persons (e.g., residents) adjacent to the transport route (off-link

estimated . The non-radiological risks are associated with vehicle exhaust emission for incident-free

exposures), (2) exposures to persons (e.g., passengers on passing trains or vehicles) sharing the

transportation and fatalities resulting from transportation accidents. The non-radiological risks

transport route (on-link doses), (3) exposures to persons at stops (e.g., residents or rail and truck

associated with shipments that return empty containers to the origin are also included. Risk factors

crew not directly involved with the shipment), and (4) exposures to transportation crew members

fo r vehicle exhaust emissions and state-level accident fatality rates were obtained from

(occupational). The exposures calculated for the first three groups were added together to estimate

"Non-Radiological Impacts of Transporting Radioactive Material" (Rao et aI . 1982), "Transportation

the general population exposure estimates for rail and truck transport; the exposure calculated for the

Impacts of the Commercial Radioactive Waste Management Program " (Cashwell et al. 1986), and

fourth group represents occupational exposure to the rail crew exposures during inspections and truck

"Longitudinal Review of State-Level Accident Statistics for Carriers of Interstate Freight" (Saricks

crew during transit and inspections. Table A-6 summarizes the calculational methods used for each

and Kvitek 1994), respectively.

group for the shipment of naval spent nuclear fuel and test specimens.

The shipments of radioactive waste at shipyards are not addressed . The exposure related to
incident-free transportation would be small and would be the same for all alternatives which would

As shown in Table A-6, simple calculations were performed to account for situations where
the RADTRA N 4 computel code was not the best calculational model with respect to the

not affect the decision-making process. The consequences of an accide nt would also be insignificant

transportation of naval spent nuclear fuel. The information used in the simple calculations was based

compared to the accide nts analyzed for spent nuclear fuel.

on historical information . The results obtained using these simple calculations are expected to be
equal to or greater than any exposures which might actually occur.

For the ocean-going portion of the shipments of naval spent nuclear fuel from shipyards and
prototypes , there would be no exposure to the general population . The basis for this conclusion is
that the ship's hull provides a considerable amount of additio nal shielding and that there would be no

The maximum possible radiological exposure to an individual for the routine transport of
naval spent nuclear fuel and test specimens off-site was estimated fo r transportation workers, as well

members of the general popul ation close enough to the ship to receive appreciable ex posure during

as members of the general population . For rail shipments, the three general population scenarios

these shipments . The consequences of an accident during the ocean-going portion have also not been

were: (I) a railyard worker who might be working at a distance of 10 meters (32 .8 feet) from the

eval uated because the forces on the container during an accident aboard the ship would not be large

shipping container for 2 hours, (2) a resident who might live 30 meters (98 .4 feet) from the rail line
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Table A-6. Calculational methods used to obtain exposures for population groups of interest.

c

General Population

>

Occupational

Origin

Destination(a)

Mode

Off-Link and
On-Link

Stops

Maximum
Individual

Workers

Escorts

Kesselring
Site

Ballston Spa

Truck

(I)

(3)

(6)

(3)

(3)

Shipyard/Rail
Siding

Various

Rail

(I)

(I)

(6)

(2)

(5)

Windsor Site

Griffen Siding

Truck

(I)

(3)

(6)

(3)

(3)

Pearl Harbor

Puget Sound

Ship

N/A

N/A

N/A

(4)

(4)

ECF or
Equivalent

Various

Truck

(I)

(I)

(6)

(I)

(I)

Test
Specimen
Assemblies

TRA

Various

Truck

(I)

(I)

(6)

(I)

(I)

Test
Specimens

ECF or
Equivalent

Bettis/
KAPL, etc.

Truck

(I)

(I)

(6)

(I)

N/A

Shipment
Type

"0
"0
(1)

::s
Co
><.

a
Spent
Nuclear Fuel
to ECF or
Equivalent

Spent
Nuclear Fuel
to
Storage

Calculational Methods:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

(5)
(6)
(I )

RADTRAN 4 calculations.
RADTRAN 4 rail calculations for inspection exposure and simple calculations based on rail transportation data supplied by the government escorts
for rail transit exposure.
Simple calculation model based on truck transportation data supplied by site personnel.
Simple calculation model based on ship transportation data supplied by Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard.
Exposures based on historical TLD readings.
Simple calculation model based on scenarios provided in RISKIND.
The methods provided in this table apply to the destination for all the alternatives evaluated.

30

where the shipping container was being transponed, and (3) a resident who could be living

As noted in Table A.{i, simple methods were also used to calculate radiological exposures.

200 meters (656.2 feet) from a rail stop where the shipping container was sining for 20 hours. The

For radiological exposures to personnel at a fixed distance from the shipping container, the following

government escons and crew members from the rail , heavy-lift transponer, and ship were evaluated

equation was used .

for the transponation workers (occupational). Based on records of past esconed rail shipments. the
government escon might be the same individual for as many as two-thirds of the shipments in a

Exposures to personnel at a fixed distance from the contajner:

5-year period. The crew members were postulated to be the same individuals for all shipments in the

= N

X

NBA x T x SF x K x Tl I 0 '

4O-year period.

where:
For off-site truck shipments, the three scenarios for the general population were: (I) a person
who might be caught in traffic and located 1 meter (3 feet) away from the surface of the shipping

N

number of people

container for one-half hour, (2) a resident who might be living 30 meters (98.4 feet) from the

NBA

factor to account for exposure decrease at increased distance from the source

highway used to transpon the shipping container, and (3) a service station worker who might be

(anenuationlbuildup). (Refer to Neuhauser and Kanipe 1993.)

working at a distance of 20 meters (65.6 feet) from the shipping container for 2 hou rs. The

T

time

hypothet ical maximum exposed individual radiological exposures were accumulated over the 4O-year

SF

shielding factor

period. However, for the situation involving an individual who might be caught in traffic next to a

K

transport index to exposure rate conversion factor

truck transponing spent nuclear fuel , the radiological exposures were only calculated for one event

TI

transpon index (see Section A.7. 1.1.2)

since it was considered unlikely that the same individual would be caught in traffic next to all

o

distance from the centerline.

contai ners for all shipments. For truck shipments, the occupational maximum exposed individual is
the driver. For each of the categories of truck shipments described in Sections A.4.2 through A.4.4,

For the radiological exposures associated with the ship transpon of spent nuclear fuel from

the calculations used a single individual as the driver for all shipments made in the past. For

the Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard to the Puget Sound Naval Shipyard , the following general equations

shipments in the 4O-year period being evaluated, a singl e person was also used in the calculations as

were used:

the driver for all shipments of each category.

Exposures to personnel ahoard ship during transport:

= N x NBA x T x SF x K x TI x (I/(X, + X,)' + I/X,')

The hypothetical maximum exposed individual sce narios fo r the general population described
above were not applicable for on-site shipments of naval spent nuclear fuel and test specimens for two
reasons . The first is that there are no members of the general population in th e vicinity during the

where:

on-site shipments. The second reason is that an obstruction, if encountered, would be safely avoided
under the direction of the escons. Two alternate scenarios were developed . They were: (I) a site

X,

distance between the centerlines of the two shipping containers

employee in a disabled vehicle along the transpon route. located 10 meters (32 .8 feet) from the

X,

distance between centerline of th e nearest shippi ng container and the exposed

co ntainer and (2) a site employee trailing the slow-movi ng transpon vehicle for the entire trip . These

individual

scenarios were considered to be single-event occurrences .
Exposures to personnel aboard ship during inspections;

= (N x T x T I) + (N x NBA x T x K x SF x TI I (X, - R - I),)
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where:

R

=

effective radius to account for the exposure from the second shipping container.

Table A-7 provides an estimate of the number of people included in the analyses . To
determine this number, the basic equation used was :

(Dist:mce Traveled) x (Exposure Path Width) x (Density of People).

In each alternative, there are many shipments from several different origin/destination
combinations. Since the route would be the same for each shipment from the same origin/destination
combination, the people along the route would also not change, therefore, the distance used was from
one trip for each origin/destination combination. The exposure path width is 1.6 kilometers (1 mile),
consistent with the RADTRAN 4 computer code methodology for incident-free calculations. The
population density was calculated by summing the product of the fraction of travel times the density
in each population area (rural, suburban, and urban) . The fraction of travel and density were
obtained from HIGHWAY and INTERLINE. The total number of people was then calculated by
summing the results of all origin/destination combinations for each alternative.

Table A-7. Estimated number of people included in incident-free transportation analyses .
Number of People

Alternative
No Action

890,000

Decentralization - No Examination

890,000

Decentralization - Limited Examination

9,240,000

Decentralization - Full Examination

6 ,820,000

1992/1993 Planning Basis

7,290,000

Regionalization or Centralization at INEL

7,290,000

Regionalization or Centralization at Hanford

8,370,000

Regionalization or Centralization at Savannah River

6,950,000

Regionalization or Centralization at Oak Ridge

5 ,660,000

Regionalization or Centralization at Nevada Test Site

8,320,000
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A.S.2 Technical Approach for Transportation Accidents

The RADTRAN 4 computer code was used to calculate the radiolog ical risk to the general

where: D.

population exposure from the accident

N,

number of naval spent nuclear fuel modules shipped of fuel type c

L,.,

shipment distance for fuel type c shipped through state r

P,

frequency of traffic accidents

Pj

probability of occurrence of accident severity category j

RFj

fraction of curies released from shipping container by severity category j

population and transportation (occupational) crew under accident conditions. The RADTRAN 4
computer code evaluates six pathways for radiation exposures resulting from an accident. The six
potential pathways are:

•

•

Direct Radiation Exposure from the Damaged Container

Inhalation Exposure from the Plume of Radioactive Material Released from the Damaged
Container

•

•

Direct Radiation Expos ure from Immersion in the Plume of Radioactive Material

radiation exposure resulting from accident severity category j through pathway i in

Released from the Damaged Container

population density zone k.

Direct Radiation Exposure from Ground Deposition of the Radioactive Material Released

The accident risk evaluation was perfo rmed using neutral and stable atmospheric conditions

from the Damaged Container

(pasquill Stability Classes 0 and F, respectively). The neutral atmospheric condition results provide a

Inhalation Exposure from Resuspension of the Radioactive Material Deposited on the

neutral conditions, ignoring the lower probability of occurrence.

best estimate of the risk. Stable atmospheric conditions resulted in values approximately twice the
•

Grou nd
In addition to the estimation of the radiological risk of an accident described above, an
•

Ingestion Exposure trom Food Prod ucts Grown on the Soil Contaminated by Ground

evaluation of the consequences of an accident of the highest severity was performed . The

Deposition of Radi oactive Material Rel e><ed from the Damaged Container.

consequences, expressed as radiological exposure, are calculated for the maximum exposed individual
and the general population. Exposures to the general population were calculated for each of the three

For each pathway, a specific formula is used to determine an estimate of the radiological risk,
expressed in exposure, from that particular pathway with the total radiat ion exposure equal to the sum

population density regi ons (rural , suburban, and urban). The maximum exposed individual was
placed in the population "rea which resulted in the highest exposure.

of ihe exposure for each pathway . The total accident radi ati on exposure accounts for the probability
of an accident occurring and the probabil ity of an accident of a parti cular severity . It should be noted
L~at

all consequences are included in the risk assess ment, regardless of the probability. The general

equation for the population exposure from all pathways is:

The RISKIND computer code, mod ified by its authors to accept the fission prod uct inventory
unique to naval spent nuclea r fuel, was used to calcul ate the max imum consequences. The pathways
evaluated by RISKIND are identical to those used in the RADTRAN 4 computer code for the risk
evaluation.

D. =

E,., (N, x L .. x P, x L,j.,

(Pj

x RFj x D;j.J)
The maximum consequence evaluation prese nts the consequences for design basis accidents ,
defined as those accidents wh ich have a probability of greater than I x 10 -' per year, and beyond

Vo lume I , Appendix 0

A-40

A-41

Volume I . Append ix 0

design basis accide nts, defined as those which have a probability of I x 10-' to I x 10-' per year.

less than Pasquill Class D. Analyses performed by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric

Accidents with a probability of less than I x 10-' were not analyzed in the maximum consequence

Administration (Doty et aI . 1976) confirm that this assumption is reasonable.

evaluation.
The overall probability of the consequence of an accident for each population area was then
To determine the overall probabilities, the probability of an accident, the probability of the
consequences, fraction of travel in each population area, and probabil ity of the meteorological
conditions had to be determined .

calculated by multiplying the accident probability times the consequence probability times the fraction
of distance traveled . Starting with the highest consequences, the probabililles were then compared to
the 1 x 10-' per year criterion for the design ba<is accidents and 1 x 10-' per year criterion for the
beyond design basis accidents . If the probability was greater than 10 times the criterion (1 x 10-' or

The probability of the accident was calculated by multiplying the accident rates for each state
times the distance traveled in each state times the number of shipments . The results were summed for
each combination of origin and destinat ion for the alternative.

1 x 10-,), the most severe Pasquill Class F results were presented. If not, and the probability was
greater than the criterion (1 x 10-' or I x 10-,), Pasquill Class D was presented . If the probability
was less than the cutoff, the probabilities having the next most severe consequences were compared to
the same criterion and th is step was repeated until all consequences were evaluated . As a minimum,

As described later in Section A.7, a study performed by Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory entitled 'Sh ipping Container Response to Severe Highway and Railway Accident

the consequences resulting from release of I % of the corrosion products (pasquill Class D) were
presented.

Conditions ' (NU REG 1987) grouped accidents inte categories by strain and container mid-wall
temperatures and calculated the probabilities of accidents of each category. Section A.7 also
describes the consequences associated with each accident category for the naval spent nuclear fuel and
test specimen shipments. The probabilities were summed for the categories which have the same
consequences .

Careful attention was paid to ensure that the probabilities were not calculated for such small
categories that the resulting probabilities were less than the criterion and results would inadvenently
present less severe consequences. When the highest consequence accident did not meet the critorion,
the probability of the next highest accident was determined by summing both the accident
consequence being evaluated and the probability of the higher consequence accidents previously

The fraction of travel in each population area (rural, suburban, and urban) was obtained from
INTERLINE and HIGHWAY for each ori gin /destination combination. Each alternative consists of
many shipments from various origin/destination combinations; therefore, an overall fraction was

shown to have a probability less than the criterion. This same tech nique was applied to the fraction
of travel (urban fraction is equivalent to highest consequence, suburban fraction is next highest, etc.)
as demonstrated in the following example.

calculated . The overall fraction , by alternative, was calculated by multiplying each o rigin/destinat ion
fnction (from INTERLINE and HIGHWAY) by the number of ship ments from that particular
orig in/destination combination, summing the results and dividi ng by the total number of shipments .

Probability of the accident of Consequenc~ A
Fraction of distance traveled in rural area
Fraction of distance traveled in suburban area
Fraction of distance traveled in urban area

1.17 x 10-'
0.85
0. 11

0.04

To cal culate the probability of the meteorological conditions, Pasquill Class D was co nsidered
to be equivalent to 50% meteorol ogy; that is, 50% of the time, co nditio ns are expected to be more
severe, and 50% of the time, conditions are expected to be less severe. Pasquill Class F was
considered to be equivalent to 95% meteorol ogy ; that is , 5% of the time, it is more severe, and 95%
of the time, it is less severe. Since the difference in 50% (I chance in 2) and 95% (I chance in 20)
is a factor of 10, the probability of encountering Pasquill Class F was co ncluded to be a factor of 10

The urban fraction was multiplied by th e probability, and the resultant probability of an
accident of Consequence A in an urban area was 4 .68 x 10-'. The consequences of this accident
would not be evaluated. For the suburban area, the suburban and urban fractions were added and
then multiplied by the probability (1.75 x 10-,). Again, the consequences of this a.;cident would not
be evaluated since the probability is less than I x 10-' . Likewise, for the rural area, the rural,
suburban, and urban fractions were added and multiplied by the probability . Using this technique,
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the probabilities would indicate that the rural probability was 1. 17 • 10 - ', which is greater than the

current track conditions and has been benchmarked against reponed mileages and observations .

I • 10- ' criterion and the Consequence A results would be presented. If the fractions were used at

INTERLINE also provides the weighted population densities for rural, suburban, and urban

face value, however, the probability of an accident of Consequence A would have been 4.68 • 10- ' in

populations for each state and averaged over all states along the shipment route and the percentage of

an urban area, 1.29. 10- ' in a suburban area, and 9.95 • 10- ' in a rural area . When individually

mileage traveled in each population density. The distance traveled, weighted population density, and

compared to the I • 10- ' criterion, this accident would not have been presented for any area .

percentage of distance in each population density are input variables in the RADTRAN 4 code.

Accident results are presented for both the m.. imum .. posed individual and the general
population . These results include members of the transponation crew.

For the off-site transponation of the test specimen assemblies and test specimens, all
shipments are made by ..clusive-use truck which includes no other freight. The destinations are
ECF, Savannah River Site, Hanford Site, Oak Ridge Reservation, Nevada Test Site, Puget Sound

A.S ROUTING ANALYSIS

Naval Shipyard, Bettis Atomic Power Laboratory, and Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory for the
various alternatives. For each origin and destination pair, the potential truck routes have been

In order to assess the radiologi cal risks associated with transponation, it was necessary to

generated and analyzed using the routing model HIGHWAY .

determine route characteristics based on the origin and destination of each shipment.
HIGHWAY is an interactive computer code designed to simulate routing using the U.S.
For naval spent nuclear fuel shipments, the origin is the prototype or shipyard location where

highway system. The HIGHWAY code used for this report is the latest available from Oak Ridge

the naval spent nuclear fuel is removed from a prototype or shipboard reactor. The destination is

National Laboratory. The code is updated periodic ally as new roads are added . HIGHWAY provides

ECF, Savannah River Site, Hanford Site, Oak Ridge Reservation, Nevada Test Site, or Puget Sound

the distance between the origin and destination, the weighted population densities along the route, and

Naval Shipyard, depending on the alternative. For each origin and destination pair, the potential rail

the percentage of distance traveled in each population density, all input variables for the

routes have been generated and analyzed using the INTERLINE computer code (Johnson 1993a). For

RADTRAN 4 computer code.

shipments originating from Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard, the containers travel by ship to Puget Sound
Naval Shipyard , where they are transferred to rail for shipment to the destination following the same

For the on-site transportation , HIGHWAY only has two of the sites on the INEL . This

routes as the naval spent nucl ear fuel shipments originating from Puget Sound Naval Shipyard . The

origin/destination pair was run using HIGHWAY to determine the population densities and percentage

ship ment travel time by ocean was based on historical data on the time in transit, independent of the

of travel in each population density . The actual distance between sites on the INEL was measured.

actual route. For heavy-li ft transpo ner shipments from the Kesselring and Windsor prototype sites to
the closest rail siding, the actu al street routes and shipment duration times based on previous

A.7 INPUT PARAMETERS

shipments were used.
The major input parameters and models used to evaluate the radiological risks associated with
INTERLI NE is an interacti ve computer program designed to simulate routing using the U.S.

the five alternati ves desc ribed in Section A.3 are provided in this section. Standard RADTRAN 4

rail system. The INTERLI NE code used is the latest available from Oak Ridge National Laboratory

computer code values, as well as actual data gathered from historical naval spent nuclear fuel and test

and contains the 1990 census data. The INTERLINE data base consists of networks representing

specimen shipments, were used as the bas is for the input parameters. For those situations where

various competing rail companies in the U. S. The routes used for the transponation evaluation use

historical data were ava ilable, the actual data were used in place of the stand ard RADTRAN 4

the standard INTERLI NE model which simulates the selection procedure that railroad companies

computer code values to provide the best estimate of the radiological risks associated with each

would use to direct shipments of spent nucl ear fuel. The code is updated periodically to reflect

alternati ve.
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A.7.1 Shipments of Naval Spent Nuclear Fuel from Shipyards and

A . 7. 1. 1.3 Transportation Distances and Population Densities. Section A.6 provided a

description of the general methodology used for determining transportation distances and the

Prototypes

population densities along the transportation routes. Historical data were obtained on the distance
traveled for shipments fro m the shipyards and prototype sites to ECF. These data were averaged by
A . 7. 1. 1 Incident·free Transportation of Spent Nuclear Fuel from Shipyards end

origin and compared to the value calculated by INTERLINE. The actual data were approximately

Prototypes. This section provides the input parameters used to determine the radiological impacts

associated with the routine, incident-free (i .e., no accident) transpo rtat ion of spent nuclear fuel for
each of the five alternatives.

11 % higher than the distance predicted by INTERLINE on average. In order to provide the best
estimate exposure, which is based on the distance traveled , the INTERLINE distances were increased
by 11 % for the 1992/1993 Planning Basis alternative. One of the primary reasons the actual distances
traveled were judged to be longer than the INTERLINE prediction was the escort responsibility to

A.7. 1.1. 1 Planned Shipments. The list of planned shipments of naval spent nuclear fuel

by origin is provided in Table A-S.

avoid potential delays due to track or security problems . The shipments to the alternative sites will
also be escorted and therefore the same increased travel distance is expected . The 11 % increase in
distance traveled was also applied to all other alternatives. This technique allowed for comparison of

Table A-8. Planned shipments of naval spent nuclear fuel from shipyards and prototypes.
Origin

Genet'lling Site

Alternative
No Action, Decenlrtolization -

TOTAL

Dcstil"lliion

204

204

To Norfolk

53

54
181

To Puael Sound
T o Norfolk

East Coul

Welt Coast

NRF

No Enm
Decentnlization Limited Exam

ill

ill

234

Decentralization Full Exam

To ECF

314

261

ill

575
575
IIS0

From ECF

628

ill
522

I99V l 993 Plannin, Ba.i.,
Rc,iol'llia.tion lNEL .nd
CenlralilAlion I' INEl

314

261

575

To ECF

All other Rc,ion.llizalion .nd

314

261

578

To Rcgionala.lion or
Ccnlraliulion .ite

I'

the alternatives on an equal basis. The percentages of distance traveled in each population density
calculated by INTERLINE were applied to the distances increased by 11 %.

A . 7.1 . 1.4 Train Speed. The RADTRAN 4 computer code provides standard values for

trai n speeds that are dependent on the population density. For rural areas. the standard value is

64.4 kilometers per hou r (40 miles per hour (mph» . For suburban areas, the standard value is
40.2 kilometers per hour (25 mph), and for urban areas. the standard val ue is 24.1 kilometers per
hour (15 mph). However, naval spent nuclear fuel shipments are required to be transported at speeds
not to exceed 56.3 kilometers per hour (35 mph). Government escort logs from historical spent
nuclear fuel Shipments support use of 24. 1 kilometers per hour (15 mph). This 24. 1 kilometers per

Ccnlnlliulion Altc mativc.

A . 7. 1. 1. 2 Transport Index. Historical information from prior shipments was used to

hour (15 mph) train speed estimate was used to eval uate all five alternatives .

A.7. 1. 1.5 Train Stop Time. The RADTRAN 4 computer code provides standard values

estimate the expected external rad iation exposure rates for future shipments. This information

for train stop times that are either dependent or independent of the distances traveled . For naval

incl uded actual measured rad iation levels and the recorded Transport Indexes (fls) from past

spent nuclear fuel transported by rail. the government escorts are responsible for ensuring that the

shipments. The TI used in this anal ysis is the sum of the maximum neutron and gamma radiation

shipments are made in the most efficient and safe manner. The government escort logs for histori cal

measured at 1 meter (3.3 feet) from the surface of the cask . The Tis that were used ranged fro m 0.1

spent nuclear fuel shipments were reviewed , and actual stop times were determined to be much

to I .S.

shorter than the standard RADTRAN 4 computer code values . The recorded stop times were di vided
by the actual distance traveled from historical data over the last 3 years and an average of 0 .02 hour
per kilometer (0.032 hour per mile) was calculated . This value was used to evaluate all five
alternatives since the rail transportation of spent nu clear fu el will always be accompanied by
government escorts and all alternatives origi nate from the same locatio ns.
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A . 7. 1. 1. 6 Number of Train Crew Members. The standard RADTRAN 4 computer code
value for the number of train crew members is five . For all shipments to NRF, all rail companies

Table A-9. Transpon index to exposure rate conversion factors for the M-130, M-I40, and M-I60
shipping containers.

with the exception of Burlington Northern have two crew members during shipments, located in the
locomotive. Burlington Northern adds a third crew member in a caboose immediately behind the
government escon caboose. In the RADTRAN 4 computer code, exposure to the crew members is
not calculated since the distance to the crew members is large. In actuality, the distance to the

Container

Effective Package Dimension
(meters)

Transpon Index to Exposure
Rate Conversion Factor

M-130/M-I60

2.50 (8.2 feet)

5.06

M-I40

3.20 (10.5 feet)

6.76

Burlington Northern crew member located in the caboose is less than that used in the RADTRAN 4
computer code and therefore simple calculations were performed to determine the radiological
exposure. In addition, naval spent nuclear fuel shipments also are shipped periodically by "special
train." In the special train configuration, the two crew members in the locomotive are one car from

A.7. 1. 1.8 Train Stop Shield Factors. For train stops, the standard RADTRAN 4
computer code gamma and neutron radiation shield factors are both assigned as 0. 1. This value

the railcar with the shipping container. Historically, these shipments occur approximately 42 percent

includes the presence of substantial rail yard steel structures equivalent to approximately 4 inches of

of the time. The majority of shipments by "special " train are arranged by the railroad companies to

steel. Four inches of steel reduces gamma radiation by more than a factor of 10; however, the steel

meet railroad schedules . On occasion, the Navy requests "special" train service for shipments with

only reduces neutron radiation by a factor of approximately 2. Therefore, a shield factor of 0.5 was

high-priority examination material. Simple calculations were also performed to determine the

conservatively used for neutron radiation . In order to incorporate this shielding into the

radiological exposure during these special shipments. For shipments to the sites other than NRF,

RADTRAN 4 computer code, separate gamma and neutron radiation exposu re calculations were

there was no experience with all railroad companies which would have to be used; however, there is

performed . However, since RADTRAN 4 does not permit separate shielding factors to be used for

no reason to expect the rail companies to change their standard practices. In these cases, there would

different types of radiation, the stop times for the neutron radiation evaluations were increased by a

be two train crewmen, both located in the engine area. Fony·two percent of the shipments would be

factor of 5 to provide an equivalent increase in neutron exposure. These more realistic changes to the

shipped by special train to the alternate sites. When applicable, the third Burlington Northern crew

standard RADTRAN 4 computer code values were incorporated for all five alternatives.

member was also accounted for.
A . 7. 1. 1.9 Radiation Exposure Decrease Due to Distance. The RADTRAN 4 computer
A . 7. 1. 1. 7 Transport Index to Exposure Rate Conversion Factors. Container transpon
index to exposure rate conversion factors for the M- 130 and M- I40 shipping containers were

code provides standard values for determining the gamma and neutron radiation exposure decrease at
increasing distance from the source. For gamma radiation, the RADTRAN 4 computer code uses the

calculated using the standard equation in the RADTRAN 4 computer code. The results were

IIx' decrease due to distance. The RADTRAN 4 computer code also specifically calcul ates the

compared to detailed computer anal yses performed using SPAN4 , and the RADTRAN 4 results were

decrease in neutron exposure at increased distances. The adequacy of the RADTRAN 4 radiation

fou nd to overestimate the exposure by a factor of two to three. Using the SPAN4 computer code

exposure decrease was evaluated. The gamma radiation decrease factor used by RADTRAN 4 was

results. the effective package dimensions of the containers used in the RADTRAN 4 calculations were

consistent with the results predicted for naval fuel. The RADTRAN 4 prediction for neutron

adjusted to provide a conservative yet more realistic value of the transpon index to exposure rate

radiation slightly overpredicts the decrease in exposure at far distances for the shipping containers

conversion factor. Due to similarities in the construction and fuel shipped, the M-130 conversion

used for naval shipments. Using the same basic equat ion used by RADTRAN , a value of 2.0 x 10- 10

factor was applicable to the M-I60. The values used are provided in Table A-9 .

was used for the RADTRAN 4 constant a, in lieu of O. The value of 2 x 10- 10 produces results
which are slightl y higher than the standard method and agree with measu rements of neutron exposu re
rates from naval spent nuclear fuel shipments .
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A . 7.1.1.10 Shipment Storage Time. As noted previously, the government escorts
accompanying Ihe rail shipments of spent nuclear fuel are responsible for ensuring th at the naval spent

A . 7. 1. 1. 14 Heavy-lift Transporter Stop Time. Shipments of spent nuclear fuel from the
two prototype locations are first transported by heavy-lift transporter to the nearest rail siding.

nuclear fuel shipments are made in the most efficient and safe manner. Naval spent nu clear fuel is

Information from records of naval spent nuclear fuel shipments was reviewed to determine a realistic

not stored while being shipped; therefore, there was no intermediate shipment storage time associated

estimate of the heavy-lift transporter stop times . For naval spent nuclear fuel heavy-lift transporter

with any of the alternatives . There is also no intermediate storage time during the heavy-lift transport

shipment from the Windsor Site, a heavy-lift transporter stop time of 24 hours was used . For heavy-

shipments from the prototype sites and the ocean shipments from Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard .

lift transporter shipments from the Kenneth A. Kesselring Site, a stop time of 10 hours was used .
The heavy-lift transporter shipments from the prototypes to the rail sidings occur through suburban

A.7. 1. 1. 11 Heavy·lift Transporter Transportation Crew. Information from records of

populations only. These heavy-lift transporter stop times were used to evaluate all five alternatives.

naval spent nuclear fuel shipments was reviewed to determine a realistic estimate of the number of
people involved, the amount of time required , and the distances between individuals and the shipping

A . 7.1.1. 1S Standard RADTRAN 4 Computer Code Values Used. The following

container. The number of hours worked ranged from I to 10 and the distance from the container

standard RADTRAN 4 computer code value was reviewed and determined to reflect the best estimate

ranged from 1.5 to 91 meters (5 to 300 feet) . For simplicity , weighted averages of the number of

of cu rrent railroad industry practi ce:

hours and distances from the shipping container were calculated and are provided in Table A- IO.
•
Table A-IO. Summary of the number of people involved and distance from the container during
heavy-lift transporter shipments to the rail siding at the prototype sites.

Number of Hours
per Worker

Distance from
the Shipping Container
(meters)

Prototype

Number of People

Windsor Site

37

5 .08

25 .0 (82 feet)

Kesselring Site

36

5 .11

32 .3 (106 feet)

Number of Inspections of the Shipping Container and Railcar.

The following standard RADTRAN 4 computer code estimates of the populations that could
be affected by the shipment of spent nuclear fuel were also used for the five alternatives :

•

Number of People per Vehicle Sharing the Transport Route (On Link)

•

Traffic Count Passing a Specific Poi nt - Rural , Suburban, and Urban Zones

•

Average Exposure Distance When Stopped

•

Persons Exposed While Stopped

•

Fraction of Travel During Rush Hour, on City Streets, and on Freeways.

This information was used to evaluate all five alternatives.

A . 7. 1. 1. 12 Time to Ship by Heavy-lift Transporter. Based on discussions with
personnel at the prototype facilities who have made shipm ents and a review of record s, the average
duration of the heavy- lift transporter ship ment from the prototype sites to the local rai l siding is 2
hou rs .

A . 7. 1. 1. 16 Number of Ship Inspections. Shipments of spent nuclear fuel from Pearl
Harbor Naval Shipyard must first be transported by sh ip to the Puget Sound Naval Shipyard. Using
A . 7. 1. 1. 13 Number of Heavy-lift Transporter Inspections. The shipments are

inspected prior to eaving the prototype's site bound aries, and no additional inspections are performed
dur ing the short heavy-lift transporter shipment. As a result , there are no inspections during the
heavy- lift transpo rter shipment in the evaluatio n of the five alternatives .
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the standard values in the RADTRA N 4 computer code, the radiological exposures to the crew and
government escorts are negligible since the distances fro m these individuals to the shipping co ntai ners
are large. As a result, the rad iological exposure estimates are only expected to occur during
inspections. Based on radiation monitoring results fo r past naval spent nuclear fuel shipments, this is
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A. 7. 1. 2. 1 Accident Probability. The probability of a rail accident used for evaluation of

not real istic fo r naval spent nuclear fuel, and a separate calculational model was developed to account
for this potential radiation exposure . The model uses the stand ard point source formula (see Section

all alternatives was obtained from "Longitudinal Review of State-Level Accident Statistics fo r Carriers

A.5. 1) to calculate the crew and governm ent escort exposures during transport by ship . The model

of Interstate Freight" (Saricks and Kvitek 1994). The probabilities are provided both by state and a

took into account the ship used, transport index, transport time, distance between shipping co ntai ners ,

natio nal average. The state dependent probabilities were used for the accident risk assessment. Past

distance from the shipping co ntainers and living quarters, distance fro m the shippi ng containers and

naval spent nuclear fuel shipments have traveled approximately 2 million kilometers (1.24 million

the engine roo m, th e number of crew members and government escorts, and the time required fo r

miles) by rail without an accident, which is consistent with the national average of 5.57 x 10- '

inspections based on records from historical shipments of spent nuclear fuel. After reviewing

accident per kilometer.

histo rical shipment record s, it was determined that three different sized ships have recently been used.

A.7.1.2.2 Accident Severity Categories and Probabilities. In the "Shipping Container

The smallest one, Ship I , was used once and is not expected to be used in the fut ure. Only the oth er
two, Ships 2 and 3, would be used in the future , in equal propo rtion . Table A-II below provides the

Response to Severe Highway and Railway Accident Conditio ns" (NUREG 1987), referred to as the

information used to cal cul ate the radiological exposures resulting fro m transporting naval spent

"Modal Study," Lawrence Livermore Natio nal Laboratory categorized the potential damage to

nuclear fuel by ship . This model was used to evaluate all fi ve alternatives.

shipping containers according to the magnitude of th e therm al and mechani cal forces that could result
from an accident. The stru ctural and thermal forces were categorized into 20 regions. Given th at an

Table A-II. Parameters used to cal culate crew and escort ex posure during ocean travel from
Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard to Puget Sound Naval Shipyard.
Ship 2

II

8

9

Separation Between M-130s, XI' in feet

92

43

20

Nearest Distance to Living Quarters, X" in feet

40

80

300

Nearest Distance to Engine Room, X" in feet

20

80

300

Nu mber of Crew Members, N,

II

22

26

Number of Government Escorts (not part of crew
size), N,
Escort Inspection Time (per Escort), in hr/day

2

2

2

Table A-12. Accident severity probabilities for rail shipments.

~

"
"ii
~ ~

every 4O-foot increment from the

container centerline

'" c0

"2 .5

e;
2

input parameters used to calculate the radiological impacts for accidents du ri ng transportation of spent
nuclear fuel for evaluation of the five alternatives. The planned shipments, transportation distances,

S,
(2)

~

- S
"
S

til

.~

g
A.7. 1.2 Accident During Transportation of Spent Nuclear Fuel. This section provides th e

S,
(30)

&.§

~ .-

0 .50 for histori c
0 .25 fo r future
( 1/3) for gam ma, (2 /3) for neutron, for

Shielding Factor

and truck shi pments . Table A-12 provides th e probabilit ies for rail accidents by region.

Ship 3

Ship I

Transport Time, T , in days

Parameter

accident occurs, the probability that the accident would be in each region was calcul ated for both rail

SI
(0. 2)

R(4,1)
1.786 x 10-'

R(4 ,2)
3 .290 X 10-"

R(4,3)
2.137 X 10-"

R(4,4)
1.644 X 10- "

R(4,5)
3.459 x 10- "

R(3 , 1)
5 .545 x 10-'

R(3 ,2)
1.0217 X 10- 1

R(3.3)
0.634 x 10-'

R(3,4)
5 . 162 x 10- '

R(3,5)
5 .296 x 10-'

R(2,1)
2.7204 x 10-'

R(7. ,2)
5 .0 11 X 10- 1

R(2 ,3)
3.255 X 10- 1

R(2,4)
2.53 1 X 10- 1

R(2 .5)
1.075 x 10-'

R( I,I)
0.993962

R( I,2)
1. 2275 x 10-'

R( I,3)
7.95 11 x 10-'

R(I,4)
6 . 140 x 10-'

R(I.5)
1.249 x 10-'

TI
(500)

T,

T,

T.

(600)

(650)

(1050)

Therm al Res ponse (lead mid·thi ckness temperatu re, OF)

population densities, and th e percentages of travel in each po pulation density desc ribed in Section
A.7 . 1.1 were also used for the accident analyses . Unless oth erwi se desc ribed in this section, th e
standard values provided by the RADTRAN 4 and RISKIND co mputer codes were used.
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A . 7. 1.2.3 Naval Spent Nuclear Fuel Integrity Following an Accident. Detailed
structural and thermal analyses were performed for the ship pi ng co nt ainers used for naval spent
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nuclear fuel shipmenlS up to an equivalent strain of 30 % and mid-wall temperature of 1050 ' F. For

A . 7. 1.2.5 Plume Release Height. For the accident risk assessment. a ground level

these cases, the naval spent nuclear fu el was not damaged . For the thermal and structural regions

release was used. For the maximum consequence assessment, a plume release height of 10 meters

above 1050'F and 30 % strain, the modal study defines the upper limits as unbounded . The naval

(32. 8 feet) was used .

spent nuclear fuel was postulated to be damaged and the fission products and corrosion products
would be released in the quantities described in Table A-13 for the risk analyses.

A. 7. 1.2.6 Direct Exposure from a Damaged Shipping Container. A radiation level
following the accident at the IOCFR71 regulatory limit of I rem at I meter (3 .3 feet) from the

A . 7. 1.2.4 Release Fractions. The release fractions were derived based on the results

container surface was used .

presented in the NRC modal study (NUREG 1987) and the results of the structural and thermal
analyses described above. Although the naval spent nuclear fuel is stronger, the release fractions for

A . 7. 1.2.7 Food Transfer Factors. Food transfer factors were derived for the isotopes

the boiling water reactor (BWR), pressurized water reactor (PWR), and aluminum-clad fuel from the

related to naval spent nuclear fuel in accordance with the methods described in Nuclear Regulatory

modal study were used . From the modal study, the release fraction in lower left region R(I , I) is

Commission Guide 1.109 (NUREG 1977).

zero for the risk evaluation . For the maximum consequence evaluation, I % of the corrosion products
might be released for the lower left reg io n, R(I , I). Based on the results of the structural and thermal
analyses up to 30% strain and 1050'F mid-wall temperature, the naval spent nuclear fuel is not

A . 7.1.2.8 Distance from the Accident Scene to the Maximum Exposed Individual.
No shielding was accounted for as the plume passes for the calculation of the exposure to the

damaged ; therefore, regions R(I ,2), R( I,3), R(2, 1), R(2 ,2), R(2 ,3), R( I ,4), R(2 ,4), R(3,4), R(3,1),

maximum individual. This location was determined using R1SKIND based on the atmospheric

R(3,2) and R(3,3) do not release fi ssion products. Ten percent of the corrosion products might be

stability and plume release height used . The maximum exposed individual could be a member of the

released . In the remaining regions, 10 % of the fission products might be available fur rel ease and

rail crew or the general population.

released at the fractions specified below, also using a rel ease of 10 % of the corrosion products .
Table A-13 prov ides the release fractions used.

A.7. 1.2.9 RISKIND Population Density. The standard national average for each
population density from the RADTRAN 4 computer code was used for the RISKIND maximum

T able A- \3. Cask re lease fractions used fo r the RADTRAN 4 risk analyses.

consequences assessment (6 people per square kilometer for rural, 719 for suburban, . od 3861 for
urban) .

Release Fraction'
Corrosion

Cask Response Regi on

Inert Gas

Iodine

Cesium

Ruthenium

A.7. 1.2. 10 Radionuclide Inventory. The amount of radionuclides which would be

0.0

0.0

0 .0

rel eased from an average shipment are provided in Table A-14 . The values factor in the damage

0.0

0 .0

0.0

0.0

1.0

fraction desc ribed in Section A. 7 . 1.2.3 and release fractions descrihed in Section A.7. 1. 2.4. The

0.0

0 .0

0 .0

0.0

1.0

radionuclides listed result in 99 percent of the exposure in all pathways.

0.0

1.0

0.0

1.0

2.0 x 10 "

1.0

0.0

0.0

R( I.2), R(I,3)

0.0

R(2, 1). R(2,2). R(2 ,3)

0.0

R(I ,4), R(2.4) , R(3,4)

0 .0

0 .0

0.0

0.0

R(3. 1). R(3,2), R(3.3)

0.0

0 .0

0.0

0. 0

6.3 x 10- '

Products

0.0

R( I,I )

R( I.5 ), R(2 ,5), R(3.5)
R(4,5), R(4.1 ), R(4.2 )
R(4,3). R(4.4)

Particulates

4.3 x 10- :

2.0 x 10- >

4 .8 x 10-·

. The release fracti on represents the frac tion o f the fuel inventory available for release in the shipping container

that woul d be released into the atmosphere following an accident of the given severity.
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Table A-14. Radionuclides which would be released from an average shipment of naval spent
nuclear fuel from a shipyard or prototype.
For Accidents which Release Only
Corrosion Products

For Accidents which Release Both
Fission and Corrosion Products

Table A-IS. Planned transfers of naval spent nuclear fuel to storage.

Kr-85

9.85 x 10'

Co-58

1.61 x 10- '

No Action,
Decentralization - No Exam,
Decentralization - Limited Exam

Cs-134

3.72 x 10'

Mn-54

2.22 x 10- 2

Decentralization - Full Exam

Cs-137

3.44 x 10'

Fe-55

6.62 x 10- '

199211993 Planning Basis,
All Regionalization Alternatives,
All Centralization Alternatives

Nuclide

Activity (Ci)

Nucl ide

Activity (Ci)

10- '

H-3

1.39 x 10'

Co.{j()

3.63

Ru-l06

9.02 x 10- '

Sr-90

3.14 x 10-'

Ce- l44

4.89 x 10- '

Ni-63

1.19 x 10- '

Co.{j()

3.63

Sr-90

3.41 x

X

Pu-238

1.02 x

Pu-24 I

3.43 x

Cm-244

1.36 x

X

10-'
10- '
10- 2
10-'
10-'

NFS-IOO

Peach Bottom

Large Cell

0

0

15

0

0

14

196

64

468

A . 7.2. 1.2 Transport Index IT/). A TI of 0.3 was used for all NFS-IOO cask transfers.
This value was determined from recorded measurements over the last 3 years for the same fuel types
planned to be transferred in the future. The Peach Bottom and Large Cell casks have not previously
been used for the planned transfers and therefore historic data were not available. Based on a
comparison of predicted TI values from conservative safety analyses to the actual measured Tl's for
similar casks and fuel types, a TI of 1.0 was calculated for both the Peach Bottom and Large Cell

A.7.2 Transfers of Naval Spent Nuclear Fuel to Storage Following

casks.

Examination
A . 7.2.1. 3 Transportation Distances and Population Densities. Section A.6 provided a
A . 7.2 . 1 Incident-free Transportation of Naval Spent Nuclear Fuel to Storage. This section
provides the input parameters used to determine the radiological impacts associated with the routine,
incident-free (i.e. , no aocident) transponation of naval spent nuclear fuel to storage for each of the

description of the general methodology used for determining transponation distances and the
population densities along the transponation routes. The distance between ECF and ICPP is 9.7
kilometers (6 miles). From the HIGHWAY computer code, the transfer of naval spent nuclear fuel to
storage occurs in a rural area. As stated in Section A.3.5 , the storage facility at the alternative sites

five alternatives.

was identical to ICPP. Therefore, for the evaluation of the alternatives , the distance traveled and
A. 7.2 .1. 1 Planned Shipments. Table A-15 prov ides the number of planned transfers in

population dens ity of the ECF to ICPP transfer were also used for the evaluation of the other
alternativ

each cask.
A. 7.2. 1.4 Truck Speed. The standard RADTRAN 4 computer code speed for truck
shipments in a n.r?J popul ation is 88.5 kilometers per hour (55 miles per hour). One of the reasons
an on-site worst credible accident is less severe th an the IOCFR71 hypothetical acc ident is th at the
speed is severely limi,ed by the on-s ite transportatio n procedures. An average speed of 24 .1
kilometers per hour (15 Jr.iles per hour) was used .
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A . 7.2. 1.5 Truck Stop Time. The standard RADTRAN 4 computer code provides values

for truck stop times that are either dependent or independent of the distances traveled . The logs for

A. 7.2.1.9 Storage. There is no intermediate storage time during transfers of naval spent

nuclear fuel to its destination.

historical transfers of naval spent nuclear fuel to SlOrage were reviewed , and it was determined that
the actual stop times (10 minutes) were much shorter than the standard RADTRAN 4 computer code
values. A stop time of 10 minutes was used to evaluate all five alternatives .

A . 7.2.1. 10 Persons Exposed While Stopped. The only stop time for the transfer of

naval spent nuclear fuel to storage occurs during routine surveys at the destination entrance. This
area is well removed from highway and general population and therefore no people were considered

A. 7.2 . 1. 6 Rediation Exposure Decrease Due to Distance. The radiation exposure

decrease due to distance described in Section A. 7 . 1.1 .9 was also applied to the truck transfers of
naval spent nuclear fuel to storage.

to be exposed during the short 10·minute stop. The escorts are not present during the surveys and the
driver remains in the cab of the truck, 6. 1 meters (20 feet) from the cask during the surveys. The
people performing the surveys are badged and all exposure received during the surveys is included in
the normal occupational exposure which is regularly monitored.

A . 7.2. 1.7 Distance from Source to Crew. A dista" ce of 6 . I meters (20 feet) was

measured between the shipping cask and the driver for the exclusive·use truck transfers of naval spent
nuclear fuel shipments to storage. Two escorts, one located approximately 46 meters (150 feet) in

A. 7.2.1.11 Traffic Count Passing a Specific Point. The RADTRAN 4 computer code

uses 470 vehicles per hour passi ng the transport vehicle. Travel on the transport path is restricted to

front and one the same distance behind the transport vehicle, are also present. These data were used

INEL employees by a security checkpoint, the majo rity of INEL employees ride the INEL site buses

in the RADTRAN analyses for all alternatives .

to work, and the transfers are not made during high traffic times (i .e., shift changes when buses are
in service); therefore, using the standard 470 vehicles per hour value would be extremely

A . 7.2.1.8 Transport Index to Exposure Rate Conversion Factors. Transport index to

conservative. A more realistic estimate of 25 vehicles per hour was used .

exposu re rate conversion factors for the cas ks used for transfers of naval spent nuclear fuel to storage
were calculated using the standard equation in RADTRAN 4 . The results were compared to detailed

A . 7.2. 1. 12 Standard RADTRAN 4 Computer Code Values Used. The following

computer analyses performed using SPAN4. and RADTRAN 4 results were found to overestimate the

standard RADTRAN 4 computer code value was reviewed and determined to refl ect the best estimate

exposure. Using the SPAN4 computer code results, the effective package dimensions of the casks

of current industry practice and was consistent with historical data from transfers of naval spent

used in the RADTRAN 4 calculations were adj usted to provide a conservative yet more realistic value

nuclear fuel to storage:

of the transport index to exposure rate conversion factor . The val ues used are provided in Table
A-16.

•

Table A-16. Transport index to exposure rate conversion faclOrs for the NFS-IOO, Peach Bonom,
and Large Cell casks.

Minimum Number of Inspections .

The following stand ard RADTRAN 4 estimate of the population that could be affected by the transfer
of naval spent nuclear fuel to storage was used to eval uate the five alternatives:

Cask

Effective Package Dimensio n
(meters)

Transport Index to Exposure
Rate Conversion Factor

NFS· IOO

3.8 (12 .5 feet)

8.41

Peach Bonom

2.8 (9.2 feet)

5.76

Large Cell

3.2 (10.5 feet)

6 .76

•

Number of People per Vehicle Sharing the Transport Route (On Link) .

A . 7.2.2 Accident During Transportation of Spent Nuclear Fuel to Storage. This section

provides the input parameters used to calculate the rad iological impacts for accidents during
transportation of spent nu clear fuel to storage for evaluation of the five alternatives. The planned
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transfers, transportation distances, population densities, and the percentages of travel in each

Table A- I7. Accident severity probabilities for truck shipments.

population density described in Section A.7.2. 1 were also used fo r the accident analyses . Unless
otherwise described in this section, the standard values provided by the RADTRAN 4 and R1SKlND
computer codes were used.

~
'il

A. 7.2.2.1 Accident Probllbility. The probability of a truck accident used for evaluation of
all alternatives was obtained from "Longitudinal Review of State-Level Accident Statistics for Carriers
uf Interstate Freight" (Saricks and Kvitek 1994). The truck accident rates are state dependent. The
states in which naval spent nuclear fuel would be transferred to storage for the alternatives described
in Section A.3 are Idaho, Washington, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Nevada. The corresponding
7

accident rates for travel on rural interstates in accidents per kilometer are 2.30 x 10- for Idaho,

"~ .<:~~

S,
(30)

8.~

!'l''" c0

1! .5
a'"
u li!
5e
Vl "
e
.~

.§.

R(4, 1)
1.532 x 10- 7

R(4,2)
3.926 x 10- "

R(4,3)
1.495 x 10- "

R(4, 4)
7.681 x 10- 10

< I x 10- 16

R(4,5)

R(3, 1)
1.7984 x 10-'

R(3,2)
1.574 X 10- 7

R(3,3)
2.034 X 10- 7

R(3,4)
1.076 X 10- 7

R(3,5)
4.873 x 10-'

R(2,1)
3.8192 x 10-'

R(2,2)
2.330 X 10- 7

R(2,3)
3.008 X 10- 7

R(2,4)
1.592 X 10- 7

R(2,5)
7.201 x 10-'

R(1 , I)
0.994316

R(I,2)
1.687 x 10- '

R(1 ,3)
2.362 x 10-'

R(I ,4)
1.525 x 10- '

R(I ,5)
9.570 x 10-'

S,
(2)

s,
(0.2)

2.50 x 10- 7 for Washington, 1.83 x 10- 7 for South Carol ina, 1.48 x 10- 7 for Tennessee, and 1.57 x

10- 7 for Nevada. The values correspond to 3.70 x 10- 7 (Idaho), 4.02 x 10- 7 (Wash ington),

T,
(500)

T,

T,

T.

(600)

(650)

(1050)

7

7

2.94 x 10- (South Carolina), 2 .38 x 10- (fennessee), and 2.53 x 10- (Nevada) accidents per mile.
7

A. 7.2.2.2 Accident Severity Categories and Probabilities. In the modal study,
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory categorized the potential damage to shipping containers
according to the magnitude of the thermal and mechanical forces that could result from an accident.
The structural and thermal forces were categorized into 20 regions. Given th at an accident occurs,
the probability that the accident would be in each region was calculated for both rail and truck
Shipments . Table A-17 provides the probabilities for truck accidents by region.

Thermal Response (lead mid-thickness temperature, OF)

A.7.2 .2.3 Naval Spent Nuclear Fuel Integrity Following an Accident. Detailed
structural and thermal analyses have been performed for the casks used for Shipments of naval spent
nuclear fuel to storage. As described in Section A.4.5, these analyses are performed using a worst
credible accident which is defined based on the site specific terrain and administrative controls duri
the short on-site shipment. The probability of the wolst credible accident is equal to that listed in
region R(I,I). For accident conditions in excess of the worst credible accident , the fission product
and corrosion product release fractions described in the next section were used.

A.7.2.2 .4 Cask Release Fractions. The cask release fractions were derived based on the
results presented in the NRC modal study (NUREG 1987). Although the naval spent nuclear fuel is
stronger, the rel ease fractions for the BWR, PWR , and aluminum -clad fuel from the modal study
were used. From the modal study, the release fraction for lower left region R( I , I) is zero for the
ri sk evaluation . For the max imum consequence evaluation, 1% of the corrosion products were

released for the lower left reg ion, R(I . I) . The remaining regions used 10 % of the fi ssion products
available for release, rel eased at the fractions specified below, and release of 10% of the corrosion
products . Table A-18 provides the release fractions used . The release fracti ons in Table A-18 for the
less severe conditions differ fro m those in Table A- 13 because suppl ementary structural and thermal
analyses have not been performed for the casks discussed in this sectio n.
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Table A-IS. Cask release fractions used for the RADTRAN 4 risk analyses.

A . 7.2.2.9 RISKIND Population Density. From the HIGHWAY computer code, the

Release Fr...ction-

population density for the on-site shipment was determined to be one person per square kilometer (2.6
Corrosion

Cask Response Region

[oert Gas

Iodine

Cesium

Ruthenium

Particulates

Products

persons per square mile) in a rural area. For on-sile transportation at INEL, the population density in
the most populated sector, from 1990 census data, is 55 people per square kilometer, with the

0.0

0.0

R(t,2), R(I ,3)

9.9 x 10- )

7.S x tO o,

6.0 x 10-'

8. t x 10- '

6.0 x 10-'

1.0

R(2,1), R(2,2), R(2,3)

3.3 x 10-'

2.S x 10-'

2.0 x 10-'

2.7 x 10-'

2.0 x 10- '

1.0

per square kilometer (139 to 3326 people per square mile) used in HIGHWAY and INTERLINE.

R(I ,4), R(2,4), R(3 ,4)

3.9 x 10- '

4.3 X 10- )

2.0 x 10-'

4.8 x 10- '

2.0 x 10- '

1.0

The standard value of 6 (rural) and 719 (suburban) people per square kilometer (15.5 and 1861

R(3,\), R(3,2), R(3,3)

3.3 x 10-'

2.S

10-)

2.0 x 10- '

2.7 x 10-'

2.0 x 10- '

1.0

people per square mile, respectively) was used for the evaluation of all alternatives .

R(I,S), R(2,S), R(3,S)
R(4,S), R(4, I), R(4,2)
R(4,3), R(4,4)

6.3 x 10- '

4.3 x 10- '

2.0

4.3 :l 10-"

2.0 x 10- '

1.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

R( I,I )

X

X

10- )

0.0

majority of these people in the area 64.4 to 80 kilometers (40 to 50 miles) from the site. This
population density is just into the lower region of the suburban density range of 53.7 to 1284.7 people

A.7.2.2. 10 Radionuclide Inventory. The transfers of naval spent nuclear fuel to storage

contain the same radionuclides as listed in Table A-14. On average, there is approximately 80
• The release fraction represents the fraction of the fuel inventory available for release in the cask that would be
released into the atmosphere following an accident of the given severi ty.

percent of the activity of each radionuclide.

A.7.3 Transfers of Naval Test Specimen Assemblies Between the
A. 7.2.2.5 Plume Release Height. For the accident risk assessment, a ground level

Examination Facility and the Test Reactor Area

release was used . For the maximum consequence assessment, a plume release height of 10 meters
(32. 8 feet) was used.

A. 7.3.1 Incident-free Transportation of Naval Test Specimen Assemblies. This section

provides the input parameters used to determine the radiological impacts associated with the routine,
A.7.2.2 .6 Direct Exposure from a Damaged Shipping Container. A radiation level

following the accident at the IOCFR71 regulatory limit of I rem at I meter (3.3 feet) from the cask

incident-free (Le., no accident) transportation of naval test specimen assemblies for each of the five
alternatives.

surface was used .
A. 7. 3.1.1 Planned Shipments. Table A-19 provides the number of planned Iransfers in
A . 7.2 .2. 7 Food Transfer Factors. Food transfer factors were derived for the isotopes

each cask.

related to naval spent nuclear fuel in accordance with the methods described in Nuclear Regulato ry
Table A-19. Planned transfers of naval test specimen assemblies.

Commission Guide 1.109 (NU REG 1977).

NR/ATR

Test Trai n

No Action,
Decentralization - No Exam,
Decentralizalion - Limited Exam

o

o

Decentralization - Full Exam,
199211993 Planning Basis.
Regionalization at INEL, and
Central izalion at INEL

38

922

All other Regional ization and
Centralization Alternatives

o

960

A.7.2.2 .8 Distance from the Accident Scene to the Maximum Exposed Individual.

No shielding was accounted fo r as the plume passes for the calculation of the exposure to the
maximum individual. This location was delermined using RISKIND based on the selected
atmospheric stability and plume release height. The maximum exposed individual could be a member
of the track crew or the general population.

Volume I , Appendix D

A~2

A-63

Volume I , Appendix D

A.7.3. 1.2 Transport Index. A TI of 130.0 was used for all NR and ATR cask transfers.
This value was derived from historic measurements over the last several years. The new Test Train
casles, which are currently being designed, would have a TI of 1.0.

A . 7. 3. 1.7 Distance from Source to Crew. A distance of 3.6 meters (12 feet) was
measured between the NRIATR shipping cask and the driver for the exclusive-use truck transfers of
test specimen assemblies on-site. Two escorts, one located approximately 46 meters (150 feet) in
front and one the same distance behind the transport vehicle, are also present for on-site shipments.

A. 7.3. 1.3 Transportation Distances end Population Densities. Section A.6 provided a
description of the general methodology used for determining transportation distances and the
population densities along the transportation routes . The distance between ECF and TRA is 8.0

For off-site shipments to the centralization sites, the standard RADTRAN 4 computer code
value for the number of crew members was used (2). The value used for the distance from the crew

kilometers (5 miles). From the HIGHWAY computer code, this on-site transfer of naval test

to the centerline of the cask for off-site shipments was 5.85 meters (20 feet), based on the conceptual

specimen assemblies occurs in a rural area. For shipments from TRA to the centralization sites, the

design of the new Test Train cask.

HIGHWAY computer code was used to calculate the distance traveled, the population densities, aod
the percent distance traveled in each population density. As described in Section A.7.4.1.3 , the
HIGHWAY predicted distances for off-site shipments were increased by 3%.

A . 7.3. 1.8 Transport Index to Exposure Rate Conversion Factors. Transport index to
exposure rate conversion factors for the casks used for test specimen assembly transfers were
calculated using the standard equation used by RADTRAN 4. The results were compared to detailed

A.7.3. 1.4 Truck Speed. The standard RADTRAN 4 computer code speed for truck
shipments in a rural population is 88 .5 kilometers per hour (55 miles per hour). One of the reasons

computer analyses performed using SPAN4, and RADTRAN 4 results were found to overestimate the
exposure. Using the SPAN4 computer code results, the effective package dimensions of the casles

an on-site worst credible accident is less severe than the IOCFR71 hypothetical accident is that the

used in the RADTRAN 4 calculat ions were adjusted to provide a conservative yet more real istic value

speed is severely limited . An average speed of 16.1 kilometers per hour (1 0 miles per hour) was

of the transport index to exposure rate conversion factor. The values used are provided in Table

used for the on-site shipments . For off-site shipments to the centralization s ites , the standard

A-20.

RADTRAN 4 computer code values were used .

A. 7.3. 1. 5 Truck Stop Time. The standard RADTRAN 4 computer code provides values
for truck stop times that are either dependent or independent of the distances traveled . The logs for

Table A-20. Transport index to exposure rate conversion factors fo r the NRI ATR and Test Train
casles.
Cask

Effective Package Dimension
(meters)

Transport Index to Exposure
Rate Conversion Factor

historical on-s ite transfers of naval test specimen assemblies were reviewed , and it was determined
that the actual stop time (o ne and one-half hours) was less than the standard RADTRAN 4 computer
code values. For the alternative in which on-site transfers would continue, the one and one-half hour

NR/ATR

0.61 (2 feet)

1.70

Test Train

1.70 (5 .6 feet)

3.42

stop time was used . For the off-site shipments of test specimen assemblies to the centralization sites,
a stop time of 0 .006 hour per kil ometer (0.01 hour per mile) was used, consistent with the value used
fo r other past truck shipments outside the boundaries of DOE facil ities (see Section A.7.4.1.4) .

A.7.3. 1.6 Radiation Exposure Decrease Due to Distance. The radiation exposure
dec rease due to distance described in Section A.7. 1. I. 9 was also applied to the truck transfers of test

A. 7.3.1.9 Storage. There is no intermediate storage time during transfers of naval test
specimen assemblies .

A . 7.3. 1. 10 Persons Exposed While Stopped. The only stop time for the transfer of
naval test specimen assemblies on-site occurs during routine surveys at the a es tination entrance. This
area is well removed from highway and population and therefore no people were considered to be

specimen assemblies .

exposed during the one and one-half hour stop. The escorts are not present during the surveys and
the driver is positioned approximately 46 meters (150 feet) from the source during the surveys. The
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people performing the surveys are badged and all exposure received during the survey is included in
the normal occupational exposure which is regularly monito red. For off·site shipments, the standard

A.7. 3.2.1 RISKIND Population Densities. For the Decentralization, 199211993 Planning

Bas is, Regionalization at INEL, and Centralization at INEL alternatives, the test specimen assembly
transfers would occur on the INEL site. For these transfers, the same conditions described in Section

RADTRAN 4 computer code values were used .

A.7.2.2.9 were used. For the other Regionalization and Centralization alternative risk assessments,
A. 7.3.1.11 Traffic Count Passing a Specific Point. The RADTRAN 4 computer code

the population densities from RADTRAN 4 were used.

uses 470 vehicles per hour passing the transport vehicle. Travel on the on·site transport path is
restricted to INEL employees, the majority of INEL employees ride the INEL site buses to work, and
the transfers are not made during high traffic times (i .e., shift changes): therefore, using the standard

A.7. 3 .2 .2 Release Fractions. For the Decentralization, 199211993 Planning Basis, and

Regionalization at INEL, and Centralization at INEL alternatives, the test specimen assembly transfers

470 vehicles per hour value would excessively overestimate the number of persons involved . A more

would occur on the INEL site. For these transfers, the same conditions described in Sections

realistic estimate of 25 vehicles per hour was used for on·site shipments. For off·site shIpments, the

A.7.2.2.3 and A.7.2.2.4 were used. For the other Regionalization and Centralization alternatives, the

standard RADTRAN 4 computer code values were used .

conditions described in Sections A. 7 . 1.2.3 and A.7 . 1.2.4 were used.

A . 7. 3.1. 12 Standard RADTRAN 4 Computer Code Values Used. The following

A . 7. 3 .2.3 Radionuclide Inventory. The radionuclides which would be released from an

standard RADTRAN 4 computer code value was reviewed and determined to reflect the best estimate

average transfer are listed in Table A·21 , along with the activity. The values factor in the damage

of current industry practice and was consistent with recorded data from transfers of naval test

fractions and release fractions described in Section A.7.3.2.2 . The radionuclides listed result in 99

specimen assemblies:

percent of the exposure in each pathway.

•

Minimum Number of Inspections .

The followi ng standard RADTRAN 4 estimate of the population that could be affected by the
transfer of test specimen assemblies was used for evaluati on of the five alternatives :

•

Number of People per Vehicle Sharing the Transport Route (On Link).

A . 7.3 .2 Accident During Transportation of Naval Test Specimen Assemblies. This section

provides the input parameters used to calcul ate the radiological impacts for accidents during
transportation of naval test specimen assemblies for evaluation of the five alternatives. The planned
transfers, transportation distances , population dens ities, and the percentages of travel in each
populatio n density described in Section A.7. 3. 1 were also used for the accident analyses. Unless
otherwise desc ribed in this section. the stand ard values prov ided by the RADTRAN 4 and RISKIND
computer codes were used . All variables desc ri bed in Sectio n A.7.2.2 are applicable to these
transfers with the exception of the RISKIND population dens ity .
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Table A-21. Radionuclides which would be released from an average transfer of test specimen
assemblies.

A.7.4 Shipments of Naval Irradiated Test Specimens to Examination
and Testing Facilities

For Accidents which Release Only
Corrosion Products

For Accidents which Release Both
Fission and Corrosion Products
Nuclide

Activity (Ci)

Nuclide

Activity (Ci)

A . 7.4. 1 Incident-free Transportation of Test Specimens. This section provides the input

1-131

1.30 x 10'

Eu-156

3.75 x 10'

parameters used to determine the radiological impacts associated with the routine, incident-free (i.e.,

3.51 x 10'

Lu-l77

1.59 x 10'

no accident) transportation of test specimens for evaluation of the five alternatives .

1-132

3. 10 x 10'

Eu-152

1.41 x 10'

Eu-156

3.75 x 10'

Zr-95

1.07 x 10'

Eu-152

1.41 x 10'

Zn-65

9.80 x 10"

Zr-95

1.09 x 10'

Co-60

7.68 x 10"

9.80 x 10"

Ce-141

6 .60 x 10"

Co-60

7.68 x 10"

Eu-154

6. 15 x 10"

Eu-154

6 . 15 x 10"

Cs-136

4 .69 x 10"

Sc-46

3.25 x 10"

Sc-46

3.25 x 10"

H-3

Zn-65

Cs- 137

1.78 x 10"

1-131

2.37 x 10"

Ru-l06

3.36 x 10- '

Hf-181

2.35 x 10"

Nb-95

2.64 x 10- '

Pr-l44

2. 19 x 10 - '

Ce-l44

2. 19 x 10-'

A. 7.4.1.1 Planned Shipments. Table A-22 provides the estimated number of shipments

used in the analysis.

Table A-22. Planned shipments of naval test specimens.
NRBK-4IIWAPD-40
ICPP

PSNS

Centralization
Site

No Action
Decentralization - No Exam

29

0

0

0

320

Decentralization - Limited Exam

26

320

Alternative

BETIIS

KAPL

0

0

0

0

0

0

320

1992/1993 Planning Basis,
Reg ionalization at INEL, and
Centralization at INEL Alternatives

0

0

0

120

641

All other Regionalization and
Centralization Alternatives

0

0

29

120

641

Decentralization - Full Exam

A. 7.4.1.2 Transport Index. A TI of 0. 1 was used for all NRBK-41 and WAPD-40

shipping container shipments. These values were derived from recorded measurements over the last
several years .

A. 7.4. 1.3 Transportation Distances and Population Densities. Section A.6 prov ided a

descr iption of the general methodology used for determining trans po n ation distances and the
population densities along the transponat ion routes . Histori cal data were obtained for shipments of
test specimens . The distance traveled was averaged based on the point of ori gin and compared to the
value calculated by HIGHWA Y. The actual distance traveled was approximately 3% higher on the
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average. In order to provide the best estimate exposure, which is based on the distance traveled , the

A . 7.4. 1. 7 Storage. The test specimen shipping containers are not stored during shipment.

HIGHWAY distances were increased by 3% for al l al ternatives . This technique al lowed for
comparison of the alternatives on an equal basis. The percentages of distance traveled in each

A . 7.4 . 1. 8 Standard RADTRAN 4 Computer Code Values Used. The fo llowing

popul ation density calculated by HIGHWAY applied to the distances which were increased by the

standard RADTRAN 4 computer code values were reviewed and were determined to reflect the best

3% .

estimate of current industry practice and were consistent with historical data from shipments of naval
test specimens:
A . 7.4. 1.4 Truck Stop Time. The RADTRAN 4 computer code provides stand ard val ues

for truck stop times that are either dependent or independent of the distances traveled . The shipping

•

Truck Speed

logs for historical test specimen shipments were reviewed , and it was determined that the actual stop

•

Distance from Source to Crew

times were much shoner than the standard RADTRAN 4 computer code val ues. The recorded stop

•

Number of Crewmen

times were divided by the actual distance traveled from historical data over the last three years and an

•

Mi nimum Number of Inspections .

average of 0.006 hour per kilometer (0.01 hour per mile) was calcu lated . This val ue was used to
The following standard RADTRAN 4 estimates of th. ,"opulations that could be affected by

evaluate all five alternatives.

the shipment of test specimens were also used to evaluate the five al ternatives :
A . 7.4 . 1.5 Radiation Exposure Decrease Due to Distance. The radiation exposure

decrease due to distan ce described in Section A.7. 1. 1. 9 was also applied to the truck shipments of test

•

Persons Exposed While Stopped

specimens .

•

Average Exposure Distance While Stopped

A . 7.4. 1.6 Transport Index to Exposure Rate Conversion Factors. Container transpon

index to exposure rate conversion factors for the casks used for test specimen shipments were

•

Number of People per Vehicle Sharing the Transpon Route (On Link)

•

Traffic Count Pass ing a Specific Point - Rural, Suburban , and Urban Zones

•

Fraction of Travel During Ru,h Hour, on City Streets, and on Freeways .

calculated using the standard equation used by RADTRAN 4. The results were compared to detailed
computer analyses performed using SPAN4, and RADTRAN 4 results were found to overestimate the

A . 7.4.2 Accident During Transportation

exposu re. Using the SPAN4 computer code results, the effective package dimensions of the

parameters used to cal culate the radi ological impacts for accidents during transpon ation of test

containe rs used in the RADTRAN 4 cal cul ations were adjusted to provide a conservative yet more

specimens to evaluate the fi ve alternati ves . The planned shipments, transpo n ation distances.

realistic value of the transpon index to exposure rate conversion factor. The values used are provided

population densities, and the percent ages of travel in each popul ation density described in Secti on

o(

Test Specimens. This section provides the input

A.7 .4. 1 were also used for the accident analyses. Unl ess oth erwise described in this section. the

in Table A-23 .

stand ard values provided by the RADTRAN 4 and RISKIND computer codes were used . All th e
Table A-23. Transpon index to exposure rate conve rsion factors for the NRBK-41 and W APD-40
shipping containers.
Effective Pac kage Dimension
(meters)

Transpon Index to Exposure
Rate Conversio n Factor

NRBK-41

0.74 (2.4 feet)

1.88

WAPD-40

3.2 (10.5 feet)

6.76

Container

conditions and variables descri bed in Section A.7. 1. 2 are applicable to th ese shipments with the
exception of the Accident Probabil ity.

A . 7.4 .2 . 1 Accident Probability. The probability of a truck acc ident used for evaluatio n of

all alternatives was obtained from "Lo, gitud inal Review of State-Level Accident Statistics for Carriers
of Interstate Freight" (Saricks and Kvitek 1994). The truck accident rat es are state dependent. The
states in which naval spent nuclear fuel would be shipped to sto rage for the alternatives desc ribed in
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Section A.3 were obtained from HIGHWAY. The accident rate values are consistent with past test
specimen shipments which have traveled approximately 2.4 million kilometers (l.5 million miles)
without an accident.
A.7.4.2.2 Test Specimen Integrity Following an Accident. Detailed structural and

thermal analyses were performed for the shipping containers used for naval test specimen shipments
up to an equivalent strain of 30% and mid-wall temperature of 1050°F. For these cases, the sealed
inner container was not damaged; therefore, only the activity on the outside of the inner container,
which would be corrosion products, was released. For the thermal and structural regions above
1050°F and 30% strain, the modal study defines the upper limits as unbounded. For these cases, the
sealed inner container holding the test specimens was postulated to be damaged and the fission
products and corrosion products would be released in the quantities described in Section A. 7 .1.2.4.
A.7.4.2.3 Radionuclide Inventory. The test specimen shipments contain the same

radionuclides as listed in Table A-21 . On average, there is approximately 1.5 percent of the activity
of each nuclide.

A.8 SUMMARY OF RESULTS

A.8.1 Historical - Incident Free
This section summarizes the results of the calculations for the radiological and nonradiological impacts of the incident-free transportation of naval spent nuclear fuel and test specimens.
Table A-24 shows the radiological impact on the general population, transportation workers
(occupational), and the maximum exposed individual, and the non-radiological impact on all persons.
The radiological impact on the general population for all historical shipments is 1.95 person-rem,
wbich statistically corresponds to 0.00098 cancer fatalities in the entire population over the 40-year
period considered . The radiological impact on transportation workers for all historical shipments is
16.6 person-rem, which statistically corresponds to 0.0066 cancer fatalities. As can be seen from
Table A-24, the radiological impact to the general population is greatest for the highway
transportation of test specimens. Incident-free radiological impacts tend to be greater for highway
transportation than for rail transportation since both the general population and transportation workers
are closer to the shipping container in transit. In all cases, the maximum exposed individual is a
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Table A-24. Incident-free results for historical Navy shipments.

General Population
CoUective
Dose
(person-rem)

,2)

,3,

Estimated
Cancer
Fatalities

CoUective
Dose
(person-rem)

MEl-General Population

Estimated
Cancer
Fatalities

1.7

10- '

0 . 10

4.0 x 10- '

l.l x 10- 1

2.8

1.1 x 10. 3

0

0

3.2

1.3

It

10- 3

Naval Spent Nuclear
Fuel to ICPpI "

0. 10

5.0

It

10-'

2 .8

l.l

It

10- 3

Test Specimen
Assemblies Between
ECF and TRAIII

0.22

1.1

It

10. 4

7.6

3.0

It

10- 3

0.062

3.1

It

10- '

7.5

3.0 x 10- 3

Test Specimens(2)

0.93

4.7

It

10. 4

3.0

1.2

It

10. 3

0 .026

1.3

It

10-'

1.5

6.0

1.95

9.8

It

10- 4

16.6

6.6 x 10- 3

0.062

3. 1 x 10·'

7.5

»

0

0.033

10- 4

'0
'0

)(

Dose
(rem)

It

<

c..

Dose
(rem)

Estimated
Cancer
Fatalities

3.5

On-site
Off-site
Muimum Exposed Individual exposures are not cumulative, they are the maximum value.

~g

Estimated
NonRadiological
Fatalities

Estimated
Cancer
Fatalities

0.70

2c:
3
C1l

C1l
:::l

MEI.()ccupational

Naval Spent Nuclear
Fuel to ECP2)

TOTALf3)

,II

Occupational

2. 1

It

10- '

It

I

1.6

X

10- 2

10- 4

1.2

It

10- 2

3.0 x 10- 3

2 .8

It

10- 2

It

transportation worker, since the workers are closer to the shipment for a longer time than any
member of the general population. The maximum exposed individual for all shipments is a driver for
the trucks transferring test specimen assemblies between ECF and TRA. Under the limiting modeling
approach that the same person drove every shipment for the entire period, this person received a total
exposure of 7.5 rem over the approximate 4O-year period, or about 0.19 rem per year, which is
within DOE limits for occupationally exposed individuals. By comparison, the maximum exposed
individual for the general population received only 0.062 rem over the entire historical period, which
is much less than the exposure to the maximum exposed individual transportation worker and
corresponds to 0.0016 mrem exposure per year. It should be noted that the majority of the exposure
to the transportation worker and maximum exposed worker is already accounted for since most
transportation workers are badged and therefore this exposure is included with all other exposure they
would receive on the job. The rail employees and off-site truck drivers are the only transportation
workers who are not badged. Their exposure was calculated to be only approximately 30% of the
total .
The estimated non-radiological fatalities due to vehicle emissions is 0.028 for the entire
4O-year period.

A.8.2 Incident Free
Table A-25 provides a summary of the annual exposures and risks from incident-free
transportation of naval spent nuclear fuel and hlst specimens for all alternatives. The values are
calculated by dividing the values in Table A-26 by the 40 years evaluated to obtain the average annual
values.
The annual radiological impact on the general population ranges from 0.0085 to 0.30 personrem. The general population annual radiological risk ranges from 0.0000043 to 0.OC015 for cancer
fatalities .
The radiological impact on the transportation crew (occupational) ranges from 0.038 to 0.38
person-rem. The transportation crew annual radiological risk ranges from 0.000015 to 0.00015 for
cancer fatal ities.
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Table A-2S. Summary of annual incident-free impacts during transportation of naval spent nuclear fuel and test specimens.

General Population

<

2c:

3

Occupational

MEl-General Population

MEI-Occupational

Estimated
NonRadiological
Fatalities
(per year)

(rem/yr)

Estimated
Cancer
Fatalities
(per year)

(rem/yr)

Estimated
Cancer
Fatalities
(per year)

1.5 x 10 -s

0.00098

4.9 x 10- 7

0.0087

3.5 x 10- 6

1.5

X

10- 4

0.038

1.5 x 10- s

0.00098

4.9 x 10 - 7

0.0087

3.5 x 10- 6

1.5

X

10- 4

1.1 x 10-s

0.068

2.7 x 10- s

0.0011

5.5 x 10- 7

0.0087

3.5 x 10-6

2.2

X

10- 4

0.083

4 .2 x IO - s

0 .30

1.2 x 10- 4

0.0043

2.2 x 10- 6

0.032

1.3 x IO - s

7.5

X

10- 4

1992-1993 Planning
Basis

0.053

2.7 x IO - s

0. 18

7.2 x 10- s

0.0022

1.1 x 10- 6

0.020

8.0 x 10- 6

6.3

X

10- 4

Regionalization or
Centralization at
INEL

0 .053

2 .7 x 10- s

0. 18

7.2 x 10- s

0.0022

1.1 x 10- 6

0.020

8.0 x 10- 6

6.3

X

10- 4

Rcgionali7.ation or
Centrali7.ation at
Hanford

0. 12

6 .0 x IO - s

0.25

1.0 x 10- 4

0.0040

2.0 x 10- 6

0 .027

1.1 x 10-s

8.8

X

10- 4

Regional izatio n or
Centralization at
Savannah River

0.30

1.5 x 10- 4

0.38

1.5 x 10- 4

0.0040

2.0 x 10- 6

0. 12

4.8 x 10-s

8.3

X

10- 4

Regionalization or
Centralization at
Oak Ridge

0.28

1.4 x 10- 4

0.35

1.4 x 10- 4

0.0040

2.0 x 10- 6

0 . 10

4.0 x 10- s

7.0

X

10- 4

Region31ization or
Centralization at
Nevada Test Site

0. 15

7.5 x IO - s

0 .28

1.1 x 10- 4

0.0040

2.0 x 10- 6

0.042

1.7 x 10- s

9.3

X

10- 4

Collective Dose
(person-rem/yr)

Estimated
Cancer
Fatalities
(per year)

Collective Dose
(person-rem/yr)

Estimated
Cancer
Fatalities
(per year)

No Action

0.0085

4.3 x 10- 6

0.038

Decentralization No Exam

0.0085

4.3 x 10- 6

Decentralization Limited Exam

0.021

Decentralization Full Exam

Dose

Dose

~

<

£.
c

Table A-26. Summary of 4O-year cumulative incident-free impacts during transportation of naval spent nuclear fuel and test specimens.

3Cll

General Population

>
"0

I

0'1

0.35

1.4 x 10-'

5.9 x 10-)

0 .039

2.0 x 10-'

0.35

1.4 x 10-'

5.9 x 10-)

l.l x 10- )

0.045

2.3 x 10-'

0 .35

1.4 x 10-'

8.9 x 10-)

4.8 x IO- J

0. 17

" .5 x 10- '

0.43

1.7 x 10-'

3.0

X

10- 2

No Actio n

0.34

1.7 x 10- '

1.5

Decentralization No Exam

0.34

1.7 x 10-'

Decentralization Limited Exam

0 .83

4.2 x 10-'

Decentralization Full Exam

3 .3

1992-1993 Plann ing
Basis

2. 1

Regionali7.ation or
Centralization at INEL

2. 1

Regionalizatio n or
Centralization at
Hanford

4.7

)C.

-.J

2.0 x 10-J

Estimated
Cancer
Fatalities

Cll

>

Dose
(rem)

Collective
Dose
(person-rem)

Q.

Regionalization or
Centralization at
Savannah River

1. 7 x 10- )

Dose
(rem)

Estimated
Cancer
Fatalities

6.0 x 10- '

0 .039

1.5

6 .0 x 10- '

2.7
12

MEI-Occupational

Estimated
NonRadiological
Fatalities

Estimated
Cancer
Fatalities

:3

MEl-General Population

Estimated
Cancer
Fatalities

Collcctive
Dose
(person-rem)

"0

o

Oecupational

1.1 x IO - J

7.3

2.9 x 10- )

0.086

4.3 x 10- '

0.80

3.2 x 10-'

2.5

X

10- 2

1.1 x IO- J

7.3

2 .9 x IO - J

0 .086

4.3 x 10-'

0 .80

3.2 x 10- '

2.5

X

10- 2

2.4 x IO- J

9 .8

3.9 x IO - J

0. 16

8.0 x 10- '

1.1

4.4 x 10-'

3.5

X

10- 2

6.0 x IO- J

15

6.0 x IO - J

0. 16

8.0 x IO- J

4.7

1.9 x 10- )

3.3

X

10- 1

5.5 x IO - J

14

5.6 x IO - J

0. 16

8.0 x IO - J

4.1

1.6 x 10- J

2.8

X

10- 1

3.0 x IO- J

11

4.4 x IO - J

0. 16

8.0 x 10-'

1.7

6.8 x 10-'

3.7

X

10- 1

12

Regionalization or
Centralization at
Oak Rid ge

11

Regionalization or
Centralization at
Nevada Test Site

6.0

For all alternatives, the maximum exposed individual is a transportation worker who drives
the truck shipments. The annual radiological impact on the maximum exposed individual ranges from
0.0087 to 0.12 rem. These values were calculated based on the modeling approach that for each of
the categories of shipments described in Sections A.4.2 through A.4.4, the same person would drive
all shipments. The maximum exposed individual annual radiological risk ranges from 0.0000035 to
0.()()()()48 for cancer fatalities . The annual exposure to the maximum exposed individual of the
general population ranges from 0.00098 to 0.0043 rem for the various alternatives. The estimated
exposure and health effects to the maximum exposed individual for the general population correspond
to approximately a factor of 10 less than those estimated for the transportation worker.
The annual non-radiological risk ranges from 0.00015 to 0.00093 fatalities.
The summary of exposures and risks from incident-free transportation of naval spent nuclear
fuel and test specimens for all alternatives are included in Table A-26 for the 4O-year period.

The radiological impact on the general population ranges from 0.34 to 12 person-rem. The
general population radiological risk for the entire 40-year period ranges from 0.000 17 to 0.006 for
cancer fatal ities.
The radiological impact on the transportation crew (occupational) ranges fro m 1.5 to 15
person-rem. The transportation crew radiological risk for the entire 40-year period ranges from
0.0006 to 0.006 for cancer fatalities.
For all alternatives, the maximum exposed individual is a transportation worker who drives
the truck shipments. The radiological impact on the maximum exposed individual ranges from 0.35
to 4.7 rem. These val ues were calculated based on using the same driver for all shipments for each
of the categories of shipments described in Sections A.4.2 through A.4.4. The maximum exposed
individual radiological risk for the entire 40-year period , 1995 through 2035, ranges from 0.00014 to
0.0019 for cancer fatalities . The exposure to the maximum exposed individual of the general
population ranges from 0.039 to 0.17 rem for the various alternative . The estimated exposure and
health effects to the maximum exposed individual for the general population correspond to
approximatel y a factor of 10 less than those estimated for the transportation worker.

The non-radiological risk ranges from 0.0059 to 0.037 fatalities for the entire 40-year period.
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There are appreciable differences in exposure to the general population, transportation crew,
and the maximum exposed indiv idual among the various alternatives . Part of these differences is due
to the varying number of shipments. For example, for the Decentralization - Full Examination
alternative, all shipments of naval spent nuclear fuel are shipped to the INEL and then returned to the
shipyards and prototypes, thereby doubling the number of shipments. However, the single most
important contributor to the differences among the alternatives is the shipment of test specimen
assemblies. For the No Action, Decentralization - No Examination, and Decentralization - Limited
Examination alternatives , there are no shipments; for the Decentralization - Full Examination,
1992/1993 Planning Basis, Regionalization at INEL, and Centralization at INEL alternatives, the
exposure is min imal since the shipments remain on the INEL site. However, for the other
Regionalization and Centralization alternatives, th e test specimen assemblies would be shipped off-site
between the INEL and the alternative sites. While the exposure rates on the casks are low, the
number of shipments and the distances involved increase the radiological impact on the transportation
crew and the general population.

Tables A-27 and A-28 provide the 40-year cumulative incident-free results separately for
on-site and off-site shipments. For all alternatives, the shipments of naval spent nuclear fuel from
shipyards and protO\YPes and shipments of naval irradiated test specimens are off-site. Likewise, the
transfers of naval spent nuclear fuel to storage following examination are on-site for all alternatives .
The tr

sfers of naval test specimen assemblies are off-site for the Regionalization and Centralization

alternatives at Hanford , Savannah River, Oak Ridge, and the Nevada Test Site, otherwise they would
be on-site.

As described in Section 3.8 of the main body of this Appendix, all alternatives which do not
make use of the existing Expended Core Facility at INEL would require a transition period while new
facilities for examinati n and storage of naval spent nuclear fuel were developed. During the
transition period, approximately 80 shipments from Navy sites to ECF would be needed . These
shipments are not included explicitly in the detailed analyses; however, the appropriate number of
shipments needed by each alternative during this period is explicitly included, so the range of
environmental effects of these shipments is bounded . For example, the estimated fatalities for the No
Action, Decentralization - No Examination, and Decentralization - Limited Examination alternatives
would actually increase slightly if the transition shipments were included . The estimated fatalities for
the alternatives in which the INEL continues to receive shipments would remain the same. For the
Regionalization and Centralization alternatives at sites other than INEL, the estimated fatalities would
Volume 1, Appendix D

A-78

Table A-27. Summary of 4O-year cumulative incident-free impacts of on-site transportation.

General Population

>
I

-J

\,C)

<

2c

3

(I>

Occupational

MEl-General Population

(rem)

Estimated
Cancer
Fatalities

Estimated
NonRadiological
Fatalities

8.5 x 10- 9

0 .0017

6.8 x 10--

0

0.000017

8.5 x 10- 9

0.0017

6.8 x 10- ;

0

7.2 x 10-1

0.000017

8.5 x 10-9

0 .0017

6.8

lI.

10-1

0

0.44

1.8 x 10- '

0.062

3.1

10- '

0.43

1.7

lI.

10- 4

0

7.5 x 10- 6

0.50

2.0 x 10- 4

0.062

3.1 x 10 -'

0.43

1.7 x 10- 4

0

0 .015

7.5 x 10 - 6

0 .50

2.0 x 10- 4

0.062

3.1 x 10- '

0.43

1.7 x 10- 4

0

Regionalization or
Centralization at
Hanford

0.0024

1.2 x 10- 6

0.067

2.7 x 10-'

0.000017

8.5 x 10- 9

0.065

2.6 x 10- '

0

Regionalizat io n or
Centralization at
Savannah River

0 .0024

1.2xlO - 6

0 .067

2.7 x 10-'

0.000017

8.5 x 10- 9

0 .065

2.6 x 10- '

0

Regionalization or
Centralization at
Oak Ridge

0.0024

1.2 x 10- 6

0.067

2.7 x 10-'

0.000017

8.5 x 10-9

0 .065

2.6 x 10-'

0

RegionalizatiC'n or
Centrali7.ation at
Nevada Test Site

0.0024

1.2 x 10- 6

0.067

2.7 x 10-'

0.000017

8.5 x 10- 9

0.065

2.6 x 10- '

0

Collective
Dose
(person-rem)

Estimated
Cancer
Fatalities

Collective
Dose
(person-rem)

Estimated
Cancer
Fatalities

(rem)

Estimated
Cancer
Fatalities

No Action

0.00010

5.0 x 10- 1

0.0018

7.2 x 10-1

0.000017

Decentralization - No
Exam

0 .00010

5.0 x 10-'

0.0018

7.2 x 10- 1

Decentralization Limited Exam

0.00010

5.0 x 10-1

0.0018

Decentralization Full Exam

0 .013

6.5 x 10- 6

1992-1993 Planning
Basis

0 .015

Reg ionalization or
Centralization at
INEL

Dose

>

"0
"0
(I>

::J
0-

)C.

o

MEI-Occupational

7q

lI.

Dose

<

£.
3
('I>

Table A-28. Summary of 4O-year cumulative incident-free impacts of off-site transportation.

c:

General Population

>
I

00

o

Occupational

MEI·General Population

MEI-Occupational
Dose
(rem)

Estimated
Cancer
Fatalities

Estimated
NonRadiological
Fatalities

2.0 x 10-}

0.35

1.4 x 10- 4

5.9 x 10-'

0.039

2.0 x 10-$

0 .35

1.4 x 10- 4

5.9 x 10-'

\.1 x 10-)

0 .045

2.3 x 10- $

0 .35

1.4 x 10- 4

8.9 x 10-'

II

4.4 x 10- )

0. 17

8.5 x 10-$

0.35

1.4 x 10 - 4

3.0

X

10- 1

1.1 x 10 -'

6.8

2.7 x 10- '

0.086

4.3 x 10 -$

0 .80

3 .2 x 10- 4

2.5

X

10- 1

2. 1

\.1 x 10- '

6 .8

2.7 x 10- '

0 .086

4.3 x 10-$

0 .80

3.2 x 10- 4

2.S

X

10-1

Regio nalization o r
Centralization at
Hanford

4.7

2.4 x 10-'

9 .7

3.9 x 10 - '

0. 16

8.0 x 10- $

\.1

4.4

10- 4

3.5

X

10- 1

Regionalization or
Centralization at
Savannah River

12

6 .0 x 10- '

15

6.0 x 10- '

0 .16

8.0 x 10-$

4.7

1.9 x 10- '

3.3

X

10- 1

Regio nalization or
Centralization at
Oak Rid ge

11

55 x 10- '

14

5.6 x 10- )

0. 16

8.0 x 10-$

4.1

1.6 x 10- '

2.8

X

10- 1

Regionalizatio n or
Centralization at
Nevada Test Site

6.0

3.0 x 10- '

11

4.4

0. 16

8.0 x 10-$

1.7

6.8 x 10- 4

3.7

X

10- 1

Collective
Dose
(person-rem)

Estimated
Cancer
Fatalities

Collective
Dose
(person-rem)

Estimated
Cancer
Fatalities

No Action

0.34

1.7 x 10- 4

I.S

Decentralizat io n - No
Exam

0 .34

1.7 x 10- 4

Decentralization Limited Exam

0 .83

Dece ntra lization Full Exam

Dose
(rem)

Estimated
Cancer
Fatalities

6 .0 x 10 - 4

0.039

1.5

6.0 x 10- 4

4.2 x 10- 4

2.7

3.3

1.7 x 10- '

1992-1993 Planning
Basis

2. 1

Regionalization or
Centralization at
INEL

X

10- '

X

also remain approxi mately the same si nce the number of shipments is approximately evenly
distributed between the east and west coast origins and therefore the total distance traveled is th e

Table A-29. Summary of annual accident risk for transponation of naval spent nuclear fuel and
test specimens.

same.

General Population
Collective Dose
(person-rem/yr)

Estimated
Cancer
Fatalities
(per year)

Class D

Class D

Estimated
Traffic
Fatalities
(per year)

No Action

0.00021

1.1 x 10- 7

1.2 x 10-'

Decentralization No Exam

0 .00021

1.1 x 10- 7

1.2 x 10-'

Decentralization - Limited
Exam

0 .00043

2.2 x 10- 7

1.6 x 10-'

Decentralization - Full
Exam

0 .0028

1.4 x 10-'

2 .2 x 10-'

199211993 Planning Basis

0 .0020

1.0 x 10-'

1.3 x 10-'

Regionalization or
Centralization at INEL

0 .0020

1.0 x 10-'

1.3 x 10-'

Regionalization or
Centralization at Hanford

0 .0033

1.7 x 10-'

1.3 x 10-'

Regionalization or
Central ization at
Savannah River

0 .0210

1.1 x 10-'

1.5 x 10-'

Regionalization or
Centralization at Oak Ridge

0.015

7.5 x 10-'

1.4 x 10-'

Regionalization or
Centralization at
Nevada Test Site

0 .0070

3.5 x 10-'

1.5 x 10-'

A.S.3 Accident Risk
This section summarizes the re i1ts of the calculations for radiological and non-rad iological
risks from accidents which could oCCU! uring shipments of naval spent nuclear fuel and test
specimens. Tables A-29 and A-30 pl ,' " de the results of the accident risk assessment for each
alternative. The risks are provided for the general population in terms of exposure and estimated
cancer fatalities. The risks are presented for 50% meteorological conditions, Pasquill Stability Class
D. Table A-29 provides the risk; on an annual basis and Table A-30 provides the total risks over the
entire 4O-year period.

The annual radiological impact, from Table A-29, on the general population ranges from
0 .00021 to 0 .021 person-rem. These exposures equate to 0 .00000011 to O.()()()()II estimated cancer
fatalities . For non-radiological impacts, the estimated annual fatalities from traffic accidents range
from 0 .0012

10

0 .022 .

Th. cumulative radiological impact, from Tab'le A-30, on the general population ranges from
0 .0082 to 0.84 person-rem. These exposures equate to 0 .000004 1 to 0.00042 estimated cancer
fatalit ies . For non-radiological impacts, the esti mated fatalities from traffic accidents range from
0 .047 to 0 .84.

There are appreciable differences in exposure to the general population, transponation crew ,
and the maximum exposed individual among the various alternatives. Pan of these differences is due
to the varying number of shipments. For example, for the Decentralization - Full Examination
alternative, all shipments of naval spent nuclear fuel are shipped to the INEL and then returned to the
shipyards and prototypes, thereby doubling the number of shipments. As in the incident-free
assessment , the shipment of test specimen assembl i

is a large factor. For the No Action,

Decentralization - No Examination, and Decentralization - Limi ted Examination alternatives, there are
no shipments; for the Dece ntralization - Full Examination, 199211993 Planning Basis, Regionalization
at INEL, and Centralization at INEL alternatives, the exposure is minimal since the shipments remain
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Table A-30. Summary of cumulative accident risk over the 4O-year period for transponation of naval
spent nuclear ruel and test specimens.

No Action

General Population
Collective Dose
(person-rem)

Estimated
Cancer Fatalities

Class D

Class D

0.0082

4. 1 x 10-'

X

10- 2

0.0082

4. 1 x 10- '

4.7

Decentralization - Limited
Exam

0.017

8.5 x 10-'

6.5

X

5.5 x 10- '

the radiological impact on the transponation crew and the general population . In addition, the routes
themselves are an imponant factor. While differences in distance and population densities are
imponant, the higher risk for the Regionalization at Savannab River and Centralization at Savannab

4.7

Decentral ization No Exam

0. 11

specimen assemblies would be shipped off-site between the INEL and the alternate sites. While the
exposure rates on the containers are low, the number of shipments and the distances involved increase

Estimated
Traffic
Fatalities

X 10- 2

Decentralization - Full
Exam

on the INEL site. However, for the other Regionalization and Centralization alternatives, the test

8.6

X

River alternatives, in panicular, is due to the higher accident rates along the route taken and higher
food transfer factors for shipments through farming states with rr.uch higher ingestion rates .

10- 2
10-

1

1

Table A-31 provides the 4O-year cumulative risk, separated by on-site and off-site shipments.

As described in Section 3.8 of the main body of this Appendix, a transition period could be

199211993 Planning Basis

0.079

4.0 x 10- '

5. 1 X 10-

Regionalization or
Central ization at INEL

0.079

4.0 x 10- '

5. 1 X 10- 1
1

necessary which would requ ire approximately 80 shipments from Navy sites to ECF. These
shipments are not included explicitly in the detailed analyses; however, the appropriate number of

Regionalization or
Centralization at Hanford

0. 13

6.5 x 10- '

5.3

X

10-

Regionalization or
Centralization at
Savannab River

0.84

4.2 x 10 -'

6.0

X

10- 1

Regional ization or
Centralization at Oak Ridge

0 .61

3. 1 x 10-'

5.7

Regionalization or
Centralization at
Nevada Test Site

0.28

1.4 x 10- '

6. l x lO- 1

shipments engendered by each alternative during this period is explicitly included , so the range of
environmental effects of these shipments is bounded . The addition of the transition shipments would
increase the distance traveled for the No Action, Decentralization - No Examination, and
Decentralization - Limited Examination alternatives . Since the accident risk is proponional to the
distance traveled , the risk would increase slightly for these alternatives, which were the lowest of all

X

10- 1

alternatives. All other alternatives would remai n the same. Therefore, incorporating the transition
period would actually reduce the difference between alternatives from the standpoint of transponation
effects.

A.S.4 Accident Maximum Consequences
This section summarizes the results of the calculations of maximum consequences of accidents
which could occur during shipments of naval spent nuclear ruel and test specimens. Tables A-32 and
A-33 provide the results of the maximum consequence assessment for each alternative. The
maximum consequences are provided for the general population by population area (rural, suburban,
and urban) and the maximum exposed individual in terms of exposure. The members of the
transpon ation crew may be the max imum exposed individual.
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Table A-31. Summary of cumulative risk over the 4O-year period for transportation of naval spent nuclear fuel and test specimens

(on-site/off-site).

CoUective
Dose
(person-rem)

ON-SITE

OFF-SITE

General Population

General Population

Estimated
Cancer
Fatalities

Estimated
Traffic
Fatalities

CoUective
Dose
(person-rem)

Estimated
Cancer
Fatalities

Estimated
Traffic
Fatalities

No Action

1.3 x 10- 6

6.5

X

10- 10

6.8

X

10- 6

0.0082

4. 1 x 10- 6

4.7

X

10- 1

Decentralization No Exam

1.3 x 10- 6

6 .S

X

10- 10

6.8

X

10- 6

0.0082

4. 1 x 10- 6

4.7

X

10- 1

Decentralization Limited Exam

1.3 x 10- 6

6.S

X

10- 10

6.8

X

10- 6

0.017

8 .S x 10- 6

6.3

X

10- 1

Decentralization FuU Exam

4. 1 x 10- 5

2. 1 x 10- 1

3.2

X

10- 4

0.11

S.5 x 10- 5

8.4

X

10- 1

1992-1993 Planning Basis

1.3 x 10- 4

6.5 x 10- 1

6 .1

X

10- 4

0.079

4.0 x 10- 5

S.O X 10- 1

Regionalization or
Centralization at INEL

1.3 x 10- 4

6 .S x 1.0 - 1

6.1

X

10- 4

0.079

4.0 x 10- 5

S.O X 10- 1

Regionalization or
Centralization at Hanford

8.7 x 10- 5

4.4 x 10- 1

2. 1 X 10- 4

0. 13

6.5 x 10- 5

S .3

X

10- 1

Regionalization or
Centralization at
Savannah River

8.7 x 10- 5

4.4 x 10- 1

3.6

X

10- 4

0.84

4.2 x 10- 4

S .9

X

10- 1

Regionalization or
Centralization at
Oak Ridge

8.7 x 10- 5

4.4 x 10- 1

2.3

X

10- 4

0.61

3. 1 x 10- 4

S.7

X

10- 1

Regionalization or
Centralization at
Nevada Test Site

8.7 x 10- 5

4.4 x 10- 1

1.6

X

10- 4

0.28

1.4 x 10- 4

6.0

X

10- 1

>
I

00

VI

r-

>

'0
'0
~

::J
C.

>i.

o

Table A-32. Summary of maximum consequences (person-rem) of an accident (D"" ign "«is) .

Table A-33 . Summary of maximum consequences (person-rem) of an accident
(Beyond Design Basis).

MAXIMUM CONSEQUENCES
MAXIMUM CONSEQUENCES

DESIGN BASIS
(accident probability between I and I x 10- ')

BEYOND DESIGN BASIS
(acc ident probability between I x 10' · and I
M... imum ExpoKd

Maximum
Exposed
Individual
(rem)

Rural
(person-rem)

Suburban
(person-rem)

0.0034

0 .51

4.3

13

0.0034

0.51

4.3

13

4.3

Eltimaled

Urban
(person-rem)

Decentralization - No Exam

13

Eatimal.ed
Do..

Cancer
Fata!itiu

(rem)

Collective

Do..
(pcno..

10-,)
Urban

EatimalCd

Cancer
FlulitiCi

Co llective

Fatal

Dooe
(pc .....

C. ncets

ftm)

10. 1

23

1.2

X

10- 1

2.0 X 10. '

lS

1,3

X

10- 1

23

1.2

II:

10- 1

3.7 x 10- '

lS

1.3

X

10 - 2

II:

10' 2

2.3 x 10 - 1

1.'

1.8

9.0 x 10"

2100

199211993 PI_Min,
Ba.i.

2.2

1.1 x 10- 1

JJOO

Dccenlralization (jmitcd E1Im

Decentn.lization -

0.014

4.0

Decentralization - Full Exam

0.045

7.4

25

13

1992/1993 Planning Basis

0.045

7.4

25

13

Regionalization or
Centralization at INEL

0.045

7.4

25

13

Regionalization or
Centralization at Hanford

0.25

38

100

56

Re,lonalwtion or
Cenlnlizationat
INEL

2.2

LI x 10 - '

Regionalization or
Centralization at Savannah River

0.25

38

320

560

Rc,io.lIIliulion or
Cenltaliulion .1
H.nrord

2.2

Regionalization or
Centralization at Oak Ridge

0.25

38

320

560

Re,iolUlliulion or
Cenlnliulion .1
Sav.nnah River

Regionalization or
Centralization at Nevada Test Site

0.25

38

320

560

ftm)
X

0 .045

0 .014

Cancer

Fatalitiu

1.3

1.0 x 10-'

-

Ucimatcd

lS

2.0

Deu~nl f1Iliz.l ion

Utimaud
Collective
Do..
(pcno..

10- '

' .0
' .0

1.0 x 10-'

EIIimatcd

Eatimatcd

ftm)

0 .014

No Action

Decentralization - Limited Exam
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Run.1

Jl

NoEum
130

6.5

I.'

JJOO

1.1

130

6.5 x 10 - 1

1.7

.,00

2.1

IJO

6.5 x 10"

JJOO

1.7

4100

2.1

IJO

6 .5 x 10- 1

1.1 x 10- '

JJOO

1.1

4100

2.1

560

2.8 x 10- 1

2.2

1.1 x 10- '

JJOO

1.7

4100

2.1

1700

8.S x 10- '

Re,ionaliulion or
Cenlnliulion .t
O.k Rid,c

2.2

1.1 x 10 - '

JJOO

1.1

"00

2. 1

1700

8.S x 10-'

Re,ionalizalion or
Centnliulion .t
Nev.d. Tell Site

2.2

1.1 x 10-'

JJOO

1.1

" 00

2. 1

1100

lUx 10 - '

Full Exam

A-87

Volume I. Appendix D

For design basis accidents, th e cal cul ated exposure to th e general population ranges from 0.5\
person-rem in a rural area to 560 person-rem in an urban area . The risk associated with th ese
exposures ranges from 0.00026 to 0.28 cancer fatalities . The exposure to the max imum exposed
individual ranges from 0.0034 rem to 0.25 rem . The risk to the maximum individual ranges from
0.0000017 to 0.00013 cancer fatalities.

For beyond design basis accidents, the exposure to the general population ranges fro m 4.0
person-rem in a rural area to 4100 person-rem in a suburban area (in this case. the probability of the
accident of the same consequence in the urban area was less than \ x

1O - ~.

The risk associated with

these exposures ranges from 0.002 to 2.1 cancer fatalities . The exposure to the maximum exposed
individual ranges from 0.014 rem to 2.2 rem. The risk to the maximum individual ranges from
0.000007 to 0.001 I cancer fatalities .

The shipments of naval spent nuclear fuel from shipyards and prototypes , transfers of naval
spent nuclear fuel to storage, transfers of test specimen assemblies to the examinatinn facility , and
shipments of test specimens to test facilities were evalu ted for the maximum consequences of an
accident . Although the naval spent nuclear fuel shipments contain a higher amount of activity per
shipment, there are cases where the test specimen shipment consequences are larger. The
consequences are larger primarily due to the higher number of shipments which increases the
probabilities such that a more severe consequence is evaluated .

Tables A-34 and A-35 provide the maximum consequences, separated by on-site and off-site
shipments , respectively.

As described in Section 3.8 of the main body of th is Appendix , a transition period could be
necessary which would require approximately 80 shipments from Navy siteS to ECF. These
shipments are not included explicitly in the detailed analyses: however, the appropriate number of
shipments engendered by each alternative during this period is explicitly included, so the range of
environmental effects of these sh ipments is bounded . Since all alternatives ship the same basic fuel
types, the maximum consequences are determined by the probability of the accident which is a
function of the distance traveled. As described in Section A.8.3. only the No Action.
Decentralization - No Examination , and Decentralization - Limited Examination alternatives. which
have the lowest estimated maximum consequences. would increase the distance traveled if the
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Table A-34. Summary of maximum consequences of an on-site accident (Beyond Design Basis).

>,
00

\I:)

Suburban

Rural

MEl

Urban

Collective Dose
(person-rem)

Estimated
Cancer
Fatalities

Collective Dose
(person-rem)

Estimated
. Cancer
Fatalities

CoUect:"e
Dose
(person-rem)

Estimated
Cancer
Fatalities

Collective
Dose
(person-rem)

Estimated
Cancer
Fatalities

No Action

0.0013

6.5 x 10- 7

0.37

1.9 x 10- 4

2 .4

1.2 x 10-)

N/A

N/A

Decentralization No Exam

0.0013

6.5 x 10- 7

0.37

1.9 x 10- 4

2.4

1.2 x 10- )

N/A

N/A

Decentrali7.ation Limited Exam

0.0013

6.5 x 10- 7

0.37

1.9 x 10- 4

2.4

1.2 x 10- )

N/A

N/A

Decentralization Full Exam

0.51

2.6 x 10- 4

200

1.0

10- 1

100

5.0

10- 1

N/A

N/A

1992-1993 Planning
Basis

2.2

1.1 x 10- 1

3300

1.7

4100

2. 1

N/A

N/A

Regionali7.ation or
Centrali7.ation at
INEL

2.2

1.1 x 10- 1

3300

1.7

4100

2. 1

N/A

N/A

Regionalizat ion or
Centralization at
Hanford

2.2

1.1 x 10 - 1

3300

1.7

4100

2. 1

N/A

N/A

Regiona lization or
Centralization at
Savannah River

2.2

1.1 x 10 - )

3300

1.7

4100

2.1

N/A

N/A

Regionalizat ion o r
Centralization at
Oak Rid ge

2.2

1.1 x 10- )

3300

1.7

4100

2.1

N/A

N/A

Regio nalizat io n o r
Centralization at
Nevada Test Site

2.2

1.1 x 10- )

3300

1.7

4100

2.1

N/A

N/A

X

X

<

2-

Table A-3S. Summary of maximum consequences of an off-site accident (Beyond Design Basis).

c

3

(l>

>-,
\Q

o

MEl

Rural

Urban

Suburban

Collective Dose
(person-rem)

Estimated
Cancer
Fatalities

Collective
Dose
(person-rem)

No Action

0 .014

7.0 x 10 - 6

4 .0

2 .0

X

IO - }

2S

1.3

10 - 1

23

1.2

X

10 - 1

Decentralization No Exam

0 .014

4 .0

2 .0

X

10 - }

25

\.3 x 10 - 1

23

1.2

X

10- 1

DecentralizatiOl: Limited Exam

0 .045

2.3 x 10 - 5

7.4

3 .7 x IO -}

25

\.3 x 10- 1

130

6.5 x 10 - 1

Decentralization Full Exam

\.8

9 .0 x 10 - 0

2700

\,4

3300

1.7

130

6.5 x 10-1

1 9~ 2- 1993 Planning
Basis

\.8

9 .0 x 10 - 0

2700

\,4

79

4 .1) x 10 - 1

130

6 .5 x 10- 1

Regionalization o r
Centrali7.ation at
INEL

\.8

9 .0 x 10 - 0

2700

\,4

79

4.0 x 10 - 1

130

6 .5 x 10 - 1

Regionalization or
Centralization at
Hanford

\.8

9 .0 x 10 - 0

2700

1.4

320

1.6 x 10- 1

560

2 .8 x 10 - 1

Regio nalization or
Centralizat ion at
Savannah River

\.8

9 .0 x 10 - 4

2700

\,4

320

1.6 x 10 - 1

1700

8 .5 x 10 - 1

Regio na\izat ion or
Centralizatio n at
Oak Ridge

\.8

9 .0 x 10 - 4

2700

1.4

320

1.6 x 10- 1

1700

8.5 x 10- 1

Regiona lization or
Centra lization at
Nevada Test Site

1.8

9 .0 x 10 - 4

2700

1.4

320

1.6 x 10 - 1

1700

8 .5 x 10 - 1

7.0 x 10 - 6

Estimated
Cancer
Fatalities

Collective
Dose
(person-rem)

Estimated
Cancer
Fatalities
X

Collective
Dose
(person-rem)

Estimated
Cancer
Fatalities

transition shipments were included. Therefore, incorporating the transition period would actuall y
r"""Jce the di ffere nce between alternatives from the standpoint of transportation effects.

States population and there were about 7,400 deaths caused by traffic accidents among people of color
in the V . S. Even if all of the additional cancer deaths associated with an accident for any of the
alternatives considered for naval spent nuclear fuel management were assumed to occur only amona
people of color, that group would experience far less than one additional fatality per year. The same

A,9 EFFECT ON ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE

conclusion can be drawn for low-income groups.
The only method used to ship naval spent nuclear fuel to INEL in the past and the only
method proposed for future shipments is by rail. The only exceptions to this are that naval spent
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The Expended Core Facility (ECF) is located within the confines of the Naval Reactors
Facility (NRF) at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL) . It is a large laboratory fac il ity
used to receive, examine, prepare for storage, and sh ip naval spent nuclear fuel and irradiated test
specimen assemblies. The information derived from the examinations performed at ECF provides
engineering data on nuclear reactor environments, material behavior, and design performance. These
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data are used to develop new technology and to improve the cost-effectiveness of existing designs.
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Processing Plant (ICPP). Some naval equipment contaminated by radioactive material during use in
the fleet is refurbished for reuse.

The building which houses ECF is a concrete block stru cture approximately 1000 feet by 194
feet. This space provides offices and enclosed work areas, including an array of interco nnected
reinforced concrete water pools which permit visual observation of naval spent nu clear fuel during
handling and inspection while shielding workers fro m rad iation . Adjacent to the water pools are
shielded cells used for operations which must be performed dry . Access to ECF for receipt and
shipping of large containers is provided by large ro ll-up doors that allow rai lcar and truck entry. A
schematic view of ECF is shown in Figure B-1 and a photog raph of the water pool area is provided in
Figure B-2 .

ECF has been specificall y designed to prov ide the unique physical and administrative controls
required by the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program to ensure safe handling of irradiated and
contaminated nuclear fuels and components with a high deg ree of worker safety and protection for the

Vol ume I , Appendix 0

B-ii

Q5

B-1

Volume I. Appendi x 0

,

I

I

,

,

,

,

,

,

FI,

I

,

,

,

t

I

I

I

~

'I'
,
,
,

I t .
I
,
t
t
,
,
I

,

,
,

t
,

I

t
,
,

I
,

I
I

,

ECF RAIL SIDING

,

,
I

I
,

,

t
,

t

I
I

1

t
I

I
,

, ,
I

,

,
I

,

I
I

, ,
, , ,
I

,
I

,

•
I

,

,
I

t

,
,

,

I
I

,

, , , ,

,
I

,

I

,
,

I

,

,

I
,

,

I

t

,

t

.

, ,, ,,
t

t

,

,

,
,
,
, ,

o

SHIELDED CELLS

l

SEE FIGURE B-2

CASK REC£IPT
AND SHIPPING

AREA

WATER POOL AREA
CASK RECEIPT AND
SHIPPING AREA

r--

PROPOSED DRY CELL
FACILITY I
L-_ _.&- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .....J
I

'-":":';';';"';:;';'::':"":';';':""";';:;;;;-'-

SEE FIGURE 8-5

Figure 8-1. Schematic view of Expended Core Facility.

- - -''

- ------ ---------

:>

"0
"0

g

Figure B-2. Expended Core Facility water pool area,

Co

;;C'

o
BEST COPY AVAILABLE

- - '" r

1J!!.1i tb R

- - :...::::.-----..

*.:!"": .., -=
. so

environment. The original ECF building was constructed in 1957, and consisted of a water pool and

B. 1. 1.4 Water Pit No. 4. Operations performed in this water pool incl ude spent fuel removal

a shielded cell with a connecting transfer canal . The facility has been modified as necessary to

from transfer containers, temporary fuel storage in racks, fuel examination, and preparations for spent

accomplish the expanding mission of the facility since then, including the addi tion of three more

fuel shipments. Observation rooms are located along the nonhern wall of the water pool. This water

water pools, several shielded cells. and other capabil ities dictated by the nature of the work required .

pool also co ntains the transfer canals that would link the water pools with the proposed Dry Cell
Project, which would prepare spent fuel for shipment in a dry, enclosed environment.

B.1.1 Water Pools
B. 1. 1.5 Construction. All of the water pools are constructed of reinforced concrete in such a

The purpose of the four interco nnected water pools is to permit viewing and examination of
rad ioactive reactor compo nents and specimens while providing radiation shielding for workers.

manner that they are watenight. The water pool floors are des igned to suppon installed equipment
and shielded Shipping containers weighing up to 100 tons with a minimum base area of 8 square feet.
Water pool zone depths range from 20 feet to 45 feet. Water pool walls and floors are coated with a

Walls and stainless steel gates dixide the water pools onto smaller work areas called zones .
This panitioning makes it possible to drain a small ponion of the total water pool volume when

thermo-setting plastic coating which is highly resistant to radiation damage, is easy to decontaminate,
and serves as an extra barrier to water leakage.

facility equipment maintenance or repair is required . It also would permit isolation of an individual
zone if a leak were to develop which, combined with transfer of the water from that pool to holding
faci lities. would minimize the loss of water.

B. 1. 1.6 Water Treatment and Minimizing Radioactive Contamination. Radioactive contami-

nants which have accumulated in the ECF water pools through the introduction of corrosion products
from irradiation test assemblies and the unloading of spent fuel are removed by various filtration

B. 1. 1. 1 Water Pit No.1 . This pool is used for the removal of spent fuel from shipping contain-

techniques. The design basis for the ECF water treatment system is to allow no discharge of

ers, and for preparation of fuel and low-level waste for shipment to ICPP. It also co ntains fuel and

radioactive material to the environment, maintain water clarity, and minimize the amount of

non-fuel storage areas.

radioactive contaminants in the water.

B. 1. 1.2 Water Pit No. 2 . This water pool is used for handling irradiation test assemblies.

Various co mponents are tested for their reaction to radiation. Test assemblies returned from the

The design goals are accomplished through the use of water purification modules, water pool
surface ski mming to remove film and fl oating material , and water recycling systems. The water

Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) at INEL are unloaded from the shipping cask and disassembled.

purification modules prefilter the water to remove panicles larger than 60 microns in diameter,

Verification of test integrity and connection of electrical and mechanical monitoring devices are

remove any dissolved solids in ion-exchan~e resin beds, and remove any organic or suspended

performed .

material by absorpt ion in an activated carbon bed . Spent resin, carbon, and filter elements are
disposed of as solid radioactive waste.

B. 1. 1. 3 Water Pit No. 3. Radioactive components are separated by milling

m~chines

into smaller

units for examination in this water pool. Dimensional measuring equipment is used to examine

selected co mponents . Fuel storage racks are also located in Water Pit No. 3.

B. 1. 1. 7 Water Management. The total volume of the ECF water pools (excludi ng the two new

transfer canals that are empty) is 3.000.000 gallons. A I-inch difference in the water pool level is
equivalent to approximately 9 ,300 gallons .

Observation roo ms are located along th e nonhern wall of this water pool. These rooms are
below the level of the water surface and have viewing windows into the wate r pool. Components
may he visually exami ned and remotely handled underwater for shielding purposes from th ese rooms.
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The water pools are maintai ned at a nearl y constant level. Alarms are installed to indicate
both high and low level conditions. The total water volume is accounted for monthly. Any addition
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of water to the system is reponed to a separate NRF site organization for an independent verification

B.2 RECEIPT AND HANDLING OF NAVAL SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL

of water volume.
Water leaves the water pools via evaporation, temporary filling of sh ipping containers,

B.2.1 Receipt of Spent Fuel

decontamination of equipment. and transfers to retention basins. Th~ water pool evaporation rate has
been calculated theoretically and confirmed by experiment. Water returns to the water pools by

Nuclear-powered ship assignments for refueling, defueling, and overhaul are currently

transfers from the retention basins and by draining shipping containers. Water removed from the

performed by the six nuclear-capable public shipyards (Mare Island, Puget Sound, Pearl Harbor,

system due to evaporation and equipment decontamination is replaced by adding demineralized water.

Portsmouth, Norfolk, and Charleston) and one nuclear-capable private shipyard (Newport News). In
1993, the federal base closing commission included Mare Island and Charleston Naval Shipyards

ECF has the capability of storing 235 ,000 gallons of water pool water in three underground,

among the bases to be closed in the near future. The spent fuel is removed from nuclear-powered

steel-reinforced, concrete storage basins . Two of the vaults each have a 4O,000-gallon capacity, and

ships and loaded into shipping containers designed specifically for naval spent nuclear fuel. The spent

the third has a 155,000-gallon capacity. These basins provide the capability to replenish the water

fuel containers are loaded and sealed at the shipyard and shipped to ECF via railcars, as described in

pools and receive water pool water if draining a water pool zone is necessary.

Attachment A. A maximum of 48 containers can be staged on the rail siding at NRF outside ECF
while awaiting transfer of the spent fuel to the water pools. ECF also receives spent fuel from naval
prototype plants in a similar manner.

B.1.2 Shielded Cells
There are 14 concrete shielded cells in the facility . These shielded cells are used for

B.2.2 Handling of Spent Fuel

examination of smaller components. such as specimens which have been removed from irradiation
tests that have been exposed to a neutron flux in the ATR. and fuel and non-fuel components from the

The shipping containers are brought into the ECF building at one of the two defueling stations
and are prepared for defueling by removing the dust cover, leveling, and filling with water.

water pools .

Appropriate containments to prevent release of radioactive material are installed and the container
The shielded cells are constructed of concrete. with walls 3 feet thick to provide shielding

access plug is removed to allow access to the fuel modules.

from radiation. Ventilation in the cell bank maintains negative pressure inside the cells in relation to
the rest of the facility . This ensures that radiol ogical contamination is contained within the cells.

The containers are unl oaded at either the west end defueling station or the east end defueling
station . Regardless of the defueling station used, the fuel modules are removed fro m their shipping

All work in the shielded cells is performed remotely by equipment controlled from the cell

container one at a time using a fuel handling machine which draws the module out of the container

gallery, and is viewed through shielded lead glass windows. The windows are 3 feet thick , and

into a shielded volume, and the entire machine is transferred to the water pools. The fuel module is

provide the same shielding value as the concrete walls. The interior of the cells can also be viewed

then discharged into a receiving receptacle in the water pools. Photographs of th e two fuel handling

through wall periscopes that permit undistorted viewing of equipment and components.

machines used are provided in Figures B-3 and B-4.

Every item contai ning nucl ea r fuel received at ECF has a un ique serial number. When the
fuel is removed from its shipping container, two ECF fuel handl ers independently read the serial
number and compare it to the shipping paperwork. After th e se rial number is confirmed , th e fuel is
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Figure 8-4. M· 130 contai ner fu el handl ing machine.

Figure B-3. M· I40 container fuel handli ng machine.
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moved to a uniquely numbered storage port location . Two fuel handlers then independently verify

commercially generated low-level waste with concentrations of radioactivity greater than Class C in a

that the fuel is stored in the correct storage location. ECF has a computer-based fuel accountability

deep geologic repository, unl ess disposal elsewhere is approved by the Nuclear Regulatory Commis-

system which maintains a record o f the location and type of every piece of nuclear fuel and how

sion.

many grams of uranium are contained within the fuel. This system tracks every fuel movement
during the time that the fuel is at ECF .

Currently, a small amount (about 25 cubic meters) of greater than Class C low-level waste in
material removed from the ends of naval spent nuclear fuel modules over the years is being stored at

All naval fuel modules have metal structures which contain no fuel above and below the fuel

the Naval Reactors Facility pending availability of a disposal facility licensed by the Nuclear

region to facilitate coolant flow and maintain proper support and spacing within the reactor . These

Regul atory Commission. This material has been collected and held at the Expended Core Facility for

upper and lower non-fuel bearing structures must be removed to provide access to the fuel-bearing

many years. This practice is expected to continue over the period of time covered by this Environ-

sections to permit inspection of the module. Removal also reduces the storage space ultimately

mental Impact Statement.

required for the fuel by approximatel y 50 percent. The upper and lower non-fuel bearing structures
removed during the preparation of fuel modules are evaluated using the waste classification criteria
established by federal regulat ions in IOCFR61 and DOE Order 5820.2. These non-fuel bearing

After these upper and lower metal structures have been removed from a fuel module, a lifting
fixture is installed to facilitate handling . Prepared fuel may then be inspected immediately or it may

structures do not contain any fuel. or fission products from fuel , and therefore cannot be considered

be held for a time prior to inspection in storage racks in the water pool. In the event that the fuel is

·spent nuclear fuel. · They also do not contain transuranic elements or fission products and thus

temporarily stored while await ing inspection, spacers are placed at the bottom of the selected port in

cannot be considered high-level waste or transuranic waste. Therefore, the amounts of radioactivity

the storage rack to maintain the position of the fuel module close to the top of the rack to make

in the end boxes cause them to be classified as low-level waste. As indicated in Section 5 .2. 15 , the

movement of the module easier.

amount of low-level waste generated each year at the Expended Core Facil ity is 425 cubi c meters .
The radioactive isotopes whi ch represent 99 percent of the act ivity in this material are identified as
follows:

Visual examinations of all modules are performed to verify that the fuel has performed as
expected . As discussed in Section 2 .4.1 , about 10 to 20 percent of the spent reactor cores are
selected for more detailed exa mination or destru ctive analysis in accordance with the needs of the

ISOTOPE
Fe-55
Co-{;()
Ni-59
Ni'{;3

HALF-LIFE
(Years)

PRIMARY MODE
OF DECAY

Naval Reactors fuel development program. The more extensive examinations performed in the water
pools include measurements of key dimensions of the modules and collectio n of specimens to be

Electron Capture (x-ray)
Beta and Gamma
Electron Capture
Beta

2.73
5 .271
76,000
100

examined in the shielded cells. The specialized equipment used to perform examinations of naval
spent nuclear fuel are described in more detail in the section of this attach ment devoted to equipment.
Destructive analyses are performed at the Expended Core Facility or at other laboratories, but all
material subjected to such analysis must be removed from the spe nt fuel modules at the Expended

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission IOCFR61 identifies three classes of low-level wastes

Core Fac ility.

which are generally suitable for near-surface disposal. namely, Classes A. B, and C . Those meeting
the requirements for near-surface disposal are shipped to th e INEL Radioactive Waste Managem. nt

The last steps of spent fu el handling performed at ECF are staging the module for shipment

Complex using a shielded cask. Wastes with co ncentrat ions greater than those spec ified for Class C

and loading the modul e into th e shipping cask used to transport spe nt fuel fro m ECF to ICPP. The

for certain short- and long-lived isotopes were fo und to be not generally suitable for near-surface

spent fuel may be tempo rarily stored in the racks in th o ECF water pools until a cask beco mes

disposal . These wastes are class ified as Greater Than Class C Low-Level Radi oactive Waste. In

available to transfer th e materi al to ICPP.

May 1989. the Nuclear Regulatory Co mmission promulgated a rul e th at requ ires disposal of
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B.2.3 Shipment of Fuel to the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant

After complelion of th e final examinalion. specimens are shipped

!O

ICPP for slorage or 10

the INEL Radioaclive Wasle Managemenl Complex for disposal. Other specimens are shipped 10
A lead·filled . slainless sleel shipping cask is used 10 transport naval and prolOlype spem fuel
modules from ECF 10 ICPP. The cask is removed from ilS Iransport lruck and lowered imo the ECF

either the Benis Alomic Power Laboralory near Pinsburgh. Pennsylvania. or th e Knolls Alomic
Power Laboralory near Scheneclady. New York for more delailed examinalions.

waler pool unlil il reslS on the noor of the pool. The closure head is removed . and insertS are placed
in the cask 10 provide proper spacing of fuel and 10 mainlai n proper posilioning during Iransport of

B.4 DESCRIPTION OF MAJOR ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT

the modules. The modules are inserted into the cask. th e closu re head is reinslalled. and the cask is
lifted from the waler. The cask is drained. the eXlerior is deconlaminaled . and the cask is loaded
onlO the lruck for shipment. The Iransport of the cask 10 ICPP is described in Anachmenl A.

The normal method for moving the fuel in the waler pools 10 designaled examinalion
equipmenl areas is by use of one of five bridge cranes which move on rails localed on the lOPS of the
walls of the waler pools . The fuel is handled remolely. All fuel movemenlS are conlrolled by Irained

B.2.4 Library of Naval Reactor Components

personnel . and accounlabilily is mainlained both by compuler and by personnel using fuel Iransfer
forms.

As the firSI modules of a given fuel design are received al the Expended Core Facilil Y for
examinalion. selecled key operaling componenls are relai ned in "library" Slorage in the waler pools 10

B.4.1 Water Pool Equipment

provide a source of reference. These older componenls are kepI 10 ensure thaI there will be a
representalive ilem available 10 assisl in diagnosis of problems whi ch may occur in any operaling

ECF has unique equipmenl in the waler pools thaI has been designed for remOle operalion

power planl in the neet. The ilems chosen for this library are usually those thaI have been in service

underwaler 10 perform specific examinalions on naval spenl nuclear fuel and irradialed lesl specimens.

the longesl so thaI they display the mosl pronounced effecls of use . As th e various fuel design Iypes

Special consideralion was given during equipmenl design 10 provide for remote repair and replace-

are replaced in neel service by newer designs. fuel compo nenls relaled 10 the fuel design being relired
are removed from library slorage and shipped

!O

ICPP .

ment of co mponenlS. A descriplion of the water pool spenl nuclear fuel and irradiation test examination equipment is presented below.

B.3 HANDLING OF IRRADIATED TEST SPECIMENS

B.4 . 1. 1 Water Pool Band Saws. There are IwO und erwaler band saws in th e ECF waler pools.

These band saws are used to remove the non-fuel bearing slruclural malerial from the top and bonom
The irradialed malerials program evaluales small specimens of malerials for use in naval
reaClor syslems. The specimens are loaded in sample holders. and the holders are placed in lesl

of fuel cells in preparation for inspeclion. The fuel region of the fuel cell remains intact during the
cuning procedure.

assemblies al ECF . The assemblies are irradialed al ATR . and relurned 10 ECF for disassembly.
The specimens are cleaned. examined. reloaded in a lesl assemhly. and relurned

!O

the ATR for

B.4 .1. 2 Water Pool Milling Machines. Three milling machines in the waler pools are used 10

cominued irradialion. A Iypical specimen und ergoes several cycles of irradialion and examinalion

separale spent nuclear fuel co mponenls inlo smaller seclions for examination in the shielded cells.

over several months or years . Examinations include nondestru ctive and destru ctive tests . Dest ructive

The fuel regi on of the fuel cell remains inlacl during the machining. The mills are used to section

leslS have hislorically included seclioning of speci mens for mec hanical lesling and melallography.

spent fuel inlo pieces whi ch can be handled in the shielded cells for examinalions. such as gamma

Metallographic work was performed in Ihe ECF ha l cells in Ihe pasl and is planned to be performed

radialion measurement. or for obtaining smaller specimens for melallurgical analysis or fuel depletion

on specimens in th e future.

measurement. The mill head of the largesl milling machine can be remotely inlerchanged with a band
saw anach menl 10 convert the machine inlo a cUloff saw.
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8 .4 . 1. 3 Universal Inspection Station. This equipment is used to obtain dimensional measure·

future reference and study. Ensuring that the racks are conservatively designed to withstand any

ments using specially designed probes that are inserted in the fuel module. This equipment can

credible accident and continue to provide adequate nuclear separation are the major criteria for

position and rotate the probe in any orientation by a dedicated computer. This information is used to

storage racks .

assess dimensional changes in the fuel module.
The basic configuration of a fuel storage rack is a rectangular structural array of storage
8 .4 . 1.4 Vertical Inspection Gage. The venical inspection gage is used for obtaining dimensional

ports. Each port has a square opening, but depth is variable. All storage ports in use at ECF are

measurements or to trace the contour of the external surfaces of fuel cell assemblies or control rods.

stainless steel. Stainless steel is used exclusively to resist corrosion during the life of the storage

This information can be used to provide a three-<limensional image of the fuel cell or control rod at

racks. The storage ports are designed to withstand the weight of the heaviest fuel module which can

the end of fuel life to determine the effects of fuel element changes on the overall fuel cell assembly

be placed in the port, and the frame assembly is designed to support the entire weight of all the fuel

dimensions over fuel life and the effects of radiation on control rod dimensions over fuel life.

ports fully loaded with the heaviest fuel type.

8 .4.1.5 Video Visual Equipment. Underwater television cameras and lighting can be set up in

All the fuel racks are designed to maintain their structural integrity during a design basis

any zone in the water pools to obtain images of the external surfaces of the fuel cell assembl ies and

earthquake and to withstand the impact of a fuel module dropped onto the fuel racks . Analyses of all

control rods . These visual inspections are used to search for anomalies such as excessive corrosion or

fuel racks in the event of seismic activity has demonstrated that they will not collapse during the

wear on external surfaces. The bonom end of the fuel cell assemblies can also be inspected for fl ow

postulated earthquake. ECF also performed a full analysis of the strength of the ports if a fuel

blockage, corrosion, and wear.

module were dropped over the fuel racks, including the kinetic energy which the dropping fuel

8.4. 1. 6 Assembly and Disassembly Tables. These tables are used to assemble and disassemble

designed to withstand the energy of dropped fuel. The analysis also identified that some equipment

module would impart to the rack. It was determined that all fuel racks at ECF were adequately

irradiated test assemblies that are inserted in the ATR. There are two identical assembly and

handled at ECF was heavy enough that the racks might be deformed if the equipment were dropped.

disassembly tables installed side by side in the water pools. Each is mounted on a tilt platform that is

Thus, operating rules and procedures prohibit the movement of large loads over the fuel racks to

used to rotate the table fro m a horizontal position for test assembly and disassembly to a vertical

ensure that no accidental damage to the racks can occur.

position for loading and unloading the test assembly .
Fuel storage racks were also designed to prevent arrangement of the modules into a potential8.4. 1.7 Headwork Station. The Headwork Station provides contai nment and shielding for the

ly critical configuration. The fu el racks are designed so that each port separates the module it

." echanical connection and disconnection of components to and from the unirradiated porti on of the

contains from every other module by a distance great enough to prevent criti cality under the most

assembly and disassembly of irradiations tests fo r the ATR . There are two independent work

limiting conditions possible. To assure that onl y one piece of fuel is placed in a port, all fuel storage

stations; each consists of an elevator platform which raises the top unirradiated portion of the test

ports are equipped with lids which can be locked and sealed . Finally, the frame assemblies of all fuel

above the water surface. A containment is pos itioned above the water surface to prevent the spread

storage racks are covered with stainless steel sheeting to prevent fu el from inadvertently being placed

of contamination while the examination is performed above the water.

between fu el storage ports.

8.4 . 1.8 Fuel Storage Racks. Storage racks are required at ECF since. at times . fuel is received

into the facility faster than fuel can be prepared and shipped out of the facility . Racks are also used
to store the small amount of naval spent nuclear fu el selected fo r retention as li brary specimens for
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8.4.2 Water Pool to Shielded Cell Transfer Systems

dimensional measurements on irradiated test specimens and st ructural components removed from spent
nuclear fuel cells. The equipment is completely computer controlled and has an accuracy of 0 .00005

Components that have been removed from spent nuclear fuel cells or test assemblies can be
transferred into the shielded cells using one of the three available water pool to shielded cell transfer

inch (50 microinches). The information obtained from this equipment is used to assess the effect of
radiation on material growth and fuel burnup on swelling of specimens.

systems. The transfer systems use carts that are driven through underwater tunnels.
B.4.3.5 Fiducial Automated Measuring Machine. This machine is used to measure the distance

8.4.3 Shielded Cell Examination Equipment

between sc ribe marks that are put on some types of specimens during fabrication. The machine accurately measures the position of the scribe marks in relation to other fiducial marks on the specimen.
These data are used to assess the effects of radiation on specimen growth and distortion. as well as

ECF has specialized equipment installed in the shielded cells which is designed to perform

the effect of fuel depletion on fuel ele!!lent swelling.

examinations on fuel elements and components removed from spent fuel cell assemblies and test
specimens that have been irradiated in the ATR. A description of the major shielded cell equipment

B.4_3.6 Gamma Scan System. This system measures gamma radiation emitted by fission

follows.

products to identify isotopes present in the fuel as a result of fuel depl etion. The system is controlled
by a dedicated computer which positions the specimen, provides for data acquis ition and evaluation.

B.4. 3. 7 Electronic Balances. These are commercially available electronic balances th at have been

and provides an output of the isotppes detected by the system at each location along the axes of the

modified to operate remotely in the shielded cells. Components on these balances that are known to

specimen .

deteriorate from exposure to radiation have been replaced using materials that are less susceptible 10
radiation damage. The equipment is interfaced with computer data acquisition systems to aid the

B.4. 3. 7 Alpha Box. The Alpha Box is a carbon steel containm ent inside the shielded cells . It

operators in tracking and reducing the data. These balances are used primarily to assess weight

provides isolation within the shielded cells for fuel cutting to prevent the spread of fission products.

changes that result from corrosion testing of materials in the ATR .

This is the only location in the facility where cutting through the fuel region of spent nuclear fuel is
allowed .

B.4. 3.2 Descale Tanks. Corrosion removal is performed for test specimens that have been
irradiated in the ATR and structural components and fu el elements removed from spent nuclear fuel

8.5 FACILITY DESIGN AND INTEGRITY REQUIREMENTS

modules. These tanks use heat, chemicals , and ultrasound 10 dislodge corrosion that has accumulated
on the specimens or components. The corrosion removal aids in visual examination of these

8.5_1 Flood

specimens .

B.4 .3. 3 Bridgeport Milling Machine. This is a high-p recision milling machine that has been

A flood at ECF due to overfl ow of any source of surface water within th e INEL bound ari es is

modified fo r remote operation in th e ECF shielded cells. The mill is co ntrolled by a prog rammable

a low probability event . With the constructi on of the INEL fl ood co ntrol diversion system in 1958.

controller located in the shielded cell gallery. The Briogeport mill is used for precise machining of

th e threat o f a flood from overfl owing of th e Big Lost River_ the primary source of

non-fuel components removed from spent nuclear fuel cell assemblies.

th e INEL. has become very small.

B.4. 3.4 Specimen Coordinate Automated Measuring Machine. The speci men coordinate
automated measuring mac hine is a fully au tomated unit specifically designed 10 perform threeVolume I, Appendix D
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of the INEL. The hypothetical flood could result in a maximum water level approximately 3 feet
above the floor elevation of the ECF building. This flood is postulated to result from water flowing
over the top of the Mackay Dam and causing it to fail due to high water levels. This flood is highly
unlikely. (Koslow and Van Haaften 1986)

Regulatory Commission methodology used for commercial power plants. The beyond design basis
seismic event was based on a scenario resulting in a peak ground acceleration of 0.4 g at ECF.

B.5.3 Tornado

Dam failure due to other causes, such as seismic activity, is more likely . Although the
Mackay Dam survived the 1983 Borah Peak eanhquake without damage, it was built without seismic
design criteria. Additionally, it is not clear how resistant the dam structure is to seismic events . A
fault segment runs within 6 kilometers of the Mackay Dam.

A tornado at ECF is a low probability event. The document "Technical Basis for Interim
Regional Tornado Criteria," WASH-l3oo, provides the technical basis for Nuclear ReaclOr Commission Regulatory Guide 1.76, "Design Basis Tornado for Nuclear Power Plants." The WASH- l3oo
document identifies the probability of occurrence of a tornado at ECF to be 7.8 x 10" per year based

Flooding of the ECF building is possible should the Mackay Dam fail. Flooding of the ECF
building would not create a nuclear criticality hazard . Flooding of the building could result in the

on historical records. Regulatory Guide 1.76 identifies the maximum wind speed appropriate to ECF
to be 240 mph. Data collected by Dr. T . Fugita of the University of Chicago performed at the

release of water containing low levels of radioactive contamination to the environment and damage to

request of the DOE for the period between 1950 and 1976 indicate the probability of a tornado with

equipment in flooded areas. Following the dam break, it would take over 16 hours for the flood

winds of that speed occurring at the INEL is about 1.3 x 10"' per year. Based on a threshold wind

water to reach NRF. This is adequate time to complete emergency procedure preparations, such as

speed for tornado damage of 75 mph (refer to P. L. Doan, "Tornado Considerations for Nuclear

filling and placing sandbags, for the expected flood conditions.

Power Plant Structures, " Nuclear Safety, Volume II, No. 4) and a probability of 0.80 for the
occurrence of tornado-induced wind speeds greater than or equal to 75 mph (WASH-13oo, Table 3),
the probability of a damaging tornado occurring at ECF is 7.8 x 10"' per year x 0.80 = 6 .2 x 10"' per
year.

B.5.2 Earthquake
The ECF building structure was built in accordan ce with the Un iform Building Code for each
panicular phase of construction. Water Pit No. I , Water Pit No. 2, and Water Pit No. 3 were built

A tornado could not affect the fuel storage area in ECF in such a way that the fuel would be

rearranged into a critical configuration. The anicle by Doan cited above analyzes the effects of

to "Zone 2" earthquake req uiremen ts wh ich were judged to be appropriate und er the U.S. Geologic
Survey classification of the area at the ti me of their constru ction. Water Pit No. 4 and its two
transfer canals were built to the more restrictive "Zone 3" earthquake requirements in effect at the
time they were built.

tornados for the general case of spent fuel in water pools and concludes " ... massive loss of water due
to either tornado-induced wind forces or tornado-generated missiles cannot happen. It is credible,
however, th at a couple of feet of water co uld be lost owing to the combination of water splashing,
water entrainment, and pressure differentials. The spent fuel at the bottom of the water pools would ,
however, remain completely covered .... By the same token, the radiation dose level above the water

A seismic assessme nt has bee n performed fo r the ECF using the actual characteristics of the

surface would not increase by any meaningful amount ."

ex isting faci lity. Based on th is assessment , a des ign bas is seismic event at ECF could have a peak
ground acceleration of 0.24 g (Rizzo 1994) . Th is peak grou nd accelerati on is derived on the bas is

B.5.4 Fires

that a mo ment magni tude 6.9 seismic event centered near Howe on the Lemhi fa ult would cause a
rupture of app roximately 34 ki lometers along the Lemhi fault . The Howe epicenter is the epicenter
located closest to ECF, and 6.9 was the mo ment mag nitude of the Borah Pea:. earthquake in 1983.
This approach for postu lati ng the locatio n of the seismic event is consistent with the Nuclear
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The entire ECF facility is protected aga inst fires by one of several types of sprinkler systems.
A large, intense fire in fu el handling areas is a low probability event because of the nature of the
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materials of construction in these areas. the amounts and kinds of material present. and th e fire

identified , equipment or processes are designed, rules and procedures are formulated, and personnel

protection system. Most of the spent fuel is under many feet of water. providing additional protection

are trained to prevent occurrence of an accidental criticality.

against a fire which might invol ve fuel. Fires at other locations in the facility would be extinguished
by the sprinkler system and by manual fire protection equipment (e.g .• fire extinguishers or fire
hoses). An extensive fire involving the ECF building structure is highly unlikely because it has been

Safety analyses are performed on all fuel types and system designs where all single plausible
and unlikely accidents are considered. Conservatism is employed in establishing limits and controls,

constructed of non-combustible or fire-resistive material to the greatest extent possible, in accordance

and spent fuel is handled to the more restrictive as-built values. Then a "double accident criterion" is

with applicable Atomic Energy Commission, Energy Resource and Development Administration, and

applied to all fuel handling equipment and procedures . The double accident criterion states "Fuel

DOE design criteria.

must be handled and equipment designed so that acceptable margins to criticality exist after two most
limiting, unlikely, independent, and concurrent accidents.

B.S.S Loss of Water Pool Water

In this context, two errors in a routine

administrative procedure are considered to be a single accident, not two. ' As a result of application
of this criterion to equipment and procedures at ECF, the amount of fuel which may be handled in

Loss of all water in a section of the water pool is extremely unlikely. However, should a
heavy object be dropped onto a water pool floor , a crack could develop . If this were to occur, the

any operation is typically restricted to one quarter of the minimum amount which could achieve
criticality minus a safe margin to criticality.

cracked water pool area would be isolated and drained in a controlled manner to one of the retention
basins before a substantial loss of water to the en"ironment would occur. Even in the event that
severe damage to a water pool floor were to result in the loss of substantial amounts of water pool
water, no nuclear criticality hazard would result and no melting of fu el would occur.

All nuclear fuel operations must be performed in acco rdance with approved criticality control
procedures. Nuclear safety analyses are carefully reviewed by the responsible management and two
independent nuclear safety committees. Naval Reactors must approve each analysis before it is used.
Strict reviews and approvals are also applied to implementation of safety analyses in fuel handling
procedures.

B.6 CRITICALITY CONTROL

The successful criticality co ntrol program at ECF is also due to thorough training and superviThere has never been an inadvertent criti cality at th e Expended Core Facility. This is the
result of strict application of the following principl es .

sion of fuel handling personnel. Employees are educated concerning the principles of criticality,
associated hazards, and prevention . A system of checks to ensure that the rules and limits are stri ctly
observed is employed . It includes detailed training documentation, qualification and testing standards,

A funda mental principle of nuclear safety is Criticality Control. When a mass of nuclear fuel

a self-assessment (audit) program, and an array of accountability and nucl ear safety drills .

reaches a cond ition at which its atoms are capable of undergoing a self-sustaining chain reaction, or
splitting (fiss ioning) into new elements. th e result is called a criticality . Nuclear fission releases

B..1 PROPOSED DRY CELL FACILITY

ene rgy in the form of radi ation and heat. Controlled criticality within a shielded reactor vessel
produces energy within a confined space without harm to perso nn el or the environm ent. Although the
water pools , the shielded cells. and the ECF building are des igned to shield and contain radiation and

The Dry Cell Facility cons ists of a shielded, radiologicall y co ntrolled area with remotely

radioactive contami nation, an uncontrolled criticality (or nuclear excursion) within ECF is unaccept-

operated equipment. The faci lity is designed for a 40-year life. built o f stru ctural steel and concrete,

able, and comprehensive measu res are taken to prevent such an occ urrence. Criticality control at

and would be integ ral with the ex isting ECF bu ilding .

ECF could be described more accurately as "absolute criti cality prevention ." Condit ions are
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The major element of the Dry Cell Facility is a large reinforced concrete shielded cell with
interior dimensions of 22 feet wide by 84 feet long by 21 feet high. containing all the equipment
necessary to inspe<:t and disassemble fuel modules . The facility will have the capability to prepare
and load one fuel module per shift in a shipping cask . Based on a two shift per day operation (500
shifts per year), and a 25-percent maintenance downtime. the Dry Cell Facility yearly capacity is
expe<:ted to be 375 modules. Shielded decontamination and repair cells will be attached to the main
shielded cell to allow remote decontamination and repair of equipment used throughout ECF . Artist's
views of the Dry Cell Facility and the associated Cask Loading System are shown in Figures B-5 and
B-6.

The dry cell design incorporates 4-foot thick, radiation shielding walls constructed of highdensity and normal-density concrete. The shielding is designed to limit radiation levels in normally
occupied areas around the cell to 0. 1 millirem per hour or less . At the INEL Site boundary, there
would be no measurable elevation ahove the naturally occurring background radiation levels . The dry
cell design meets the latest seismic requirements and includes negative pressure air ventilation for
radiological contamination control. Shielded lead glass windows and viewing aids are provided as
required at the workstations . Power, lighting, and a fire suppression system are also provided.

The Dry Cell Facility is also designed to facilitate decontamination and decommissioning of
the facility at some future date. This is achieved by including cell liner contamination barriers. no
fixed embedded piping, a minimum of cracks and crevices, smooth surfaces , and wall penetrations
large enough to be radiologically surveyed to verify decontamination effectiveness.

B.8 REFERENCES
Koslow, K. N. and D. H. Van Haaften, 1986, Flood Routing Analysis Jor a Failure oj Mackay Dam.
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COMPARISON OF STORAGE IN
NEW WATER POOLS VERSUS
DRY CONTAINER STORAGE
C.1 INTRODUCTION
This attachment discusses the advantages and disadvantages of water pools versus dry
container storage should construction of additional interim storage be required . The discussion
considers the generic safety aspects of water pools and dry container storage based on evaluations
performed by the Nu clear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the Department of Energy (DOE) as
well as experience with naval spent nuclear fuel.

C.2 WATER POOLS
During the last four decades, the Expended Core Facility (ECF) at th e .daho National
Engineering Laboratory (INEL) has demonstrated the 'safety and reliability of water pools under the
cont rol of the Naval Reactors Program. Water pools have historicall y bee n the method of choice for
interim storage and fuel handling because: (I ) water has a hi gh th erm al capaci ty for th e removal of
heat from the fu el, (2) the transparency of water fac ilitates th e inspection and movement of the fuel.
(3 ) water is an excellent gamma and neutron shield . (4) water is easy to purify and recycle, and (5)

water provides a means to prevent release of radioactive material into the air.

The safety of spent fuel storage in a water pool can be co nsidered in terms of three generi c
criteri a. They are: ( I) th e integrity of spent fuel under water pool storage cond itio ns. (2) th e
stru cture and co mponent safety of th e fac ility. and (3) th e potent ial risks of acc idents and acts of
sabotage at th e spent fuel facili ty.

The NRC conducted an exte nsive investigatio n into th e storage of spent fuel and documented
the find ings in the Waste Co nfidence Decision (NU REG 1984). Based on th e techn ical evaluations
cited in th at document. th e NRC fo und th at the Zircaloy claddi ng whic h encases spent fuel is highl y
C·i
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resistant to failure under pool storage conditions and concluded that Zircaloy-clad commercial fuel

satisfied the first generic criterion. This conclusion is consistent with the extensive experience with

C.3 DRY CONTAINER STORAGE

naval spent nuclear fuel. Naval fuel is Zircaloy clad and thus is highly resistant to corrosion in
water. In addition, a Navy fuel assembly has much higher mechanical integrity than commercial fuel

Dry container storage technologies have been in use in the United Kingdom since 1972

since it is designed for military application and is capable of withstanding shock loadings which may

(MOCSG 1993). In the United States, demonstration projects have been underway since 1982.

be encountered in banle conditions.

dry container storage, multiple barriers prevent gaseous as well as paniculate fission product releases.

In

Two separate barriers must fail before fission products can be released : (I) the fuel cladding, and
The NRC also conducted an extensive evaluation of the structural and component safety of
water pools. The NRC found no reason why spent fuel storage pools would not be capable of

(2) the outer secondary seal . In addition, dry storage systems provide metal or concrete shielding to
reduce the external radiation to acceptable limits.

performing their cooling and storage functions for a number of years past the design life of 40 years
if the water pools are properly maintained; therefore, the second generic criterion would be satisfied.
This conclusion is consistent with the naval fuel experience of over 35 years of operatio ~ of the ECF.

The NRC concluded that dry container storage involves a simpler technology than that
represented by water storage systems. Water storage relies to a cenain extent upon active systems
such as pumps, renewable filters , and cooling systems to maintain safe storage. Favorable water

The risk of major accidents at spent fuel storage pools resulting in off-site consequences is

chemistry must also be maintained to retard corrosion. Dry container storage uses convective

remote because of the secure and stable character of the spent fuel in the storage pool environment,

circulation of an inen atmosphere in a sealed dry system so there is little opponunity for corrosion

and the absence of driving forces (i.e., high pressure or temperature) which might result in dispersal

(NUREG 1984).

of radioactive material (NUREG 1984). The consequences of terrorist attacks on a spent fuel storage
pool would be limited by the realities that the radioactive content of spent fuel is in the form of

The NRC also found that dry container storage of spent fuel in dry wells, vaults , silos, and

material encapsulated in high-integrity metal cladding and stored underwater in a reinforced concrete

metal casks is relatively invulnerabl e to sabotage and the forces of nature, because of the weight and

structure. Under these conditions, the radioactive content of spent fuel is relatively invulnerable to

size of the sealed, protective enclosures. which may include IOO-ton steel casks, large concrete-lined

dispersal to the envi ronment (N UREG 1984).

casks, and surface concrete silos (NUREG 1980).

These cons iderations led th e NRC to conclude that storage pools can be designed to safely

The NRC concluded that for dry interim storage, all areas of safety and environmental

wi thstand accidents caused either by natural or man-made phenomena such th at there would be no

concern (e.g., maintenance of systems and components, prevention of materi al degradation. protection

impact to the environment. Therefo re. the third generic criterion would be satisfied .

against accidents and sabotage) have bee n addressed and shown to present no more potential for
adverse impact on the environment and the public health and safety th an storage of spent fu el in water

The NRC concluded that all areas of safety and environmental concern (e.g., maintenance of
systems and components, prevention of materi al degradation. protection against accidents and

pools. This conclusio n is suppo n ed by the Organi zation for Economic Co-Operation and Development of the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA 1993).

sabotage) have been add ressed fo r water pools. and th at spent fu el can be stored with no environmental impact. This conclusion is supponed by the Organization for Eco nomic Co-Operation and
Development of the Nuclear Energy Agency (NE A 1993).

As stated earlier. naval fue l uses Zir<aloy cladding and has a much higher mechanical
integrity th an commercial fuel since naval fue l is designed for military application. Therefo re. the
generi c concl usions reached for commercial spent fuel are directly app licable to naval spent fu el.
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C.4 NON-RADIOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES OF SPENT FUEL
STORAGE

The NRC concluded (NUREG 1984) that "there are no significant non-radiological consequences due to the extended storage of spent fuel which could adversely affect the environment." The
construction of an interim spent fuel storage facility (i .e., the construction of a water pool, a concrete
pad, a building, rail spur, etc .) would have little impact on the environment. The amount of heat
given off by spent fuel decreases with time as the fuel ages and decays radioactively, and the amount
of additional energy and water needed to maintain spent fuel storage is also small.

C.s LAND UTILIZATION

With the use of water pool storage or dry c ntainer storage at an existing shipyard, land
already devoted to industrial use is planned to be used for the spent fuel storage facil ity. The amount
of land required for storage at specific shipyards is addressed in Attachment D .

C.s COST

The use of alternate sites other than INEL would involve the construction of additional storage
facilities. Both water pools and dry container storage could be used , with little environmental impact;
therefore, the relative cost between these two options could be relevant. Conceptual cost estimates
have been prepared for each storage option at each location that is being evaluated . These cost
comparisons are found in Attachments D and E.

C.7 SUMMARY

Based on the above discussion , both a new water pool and dry container storage would be
suitable for the interim storage of spent naval fuel with no important radiological or non-radiological
environmental impact. If a facility would be required to be used for the inspection of spent fuel, as
well as storage, then a water pool offers an advantage since water is an inexpensive and convenient
form of transparent shieldi ng . If it were not necessary for a new facility to be used to inspect spent
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fuel, then the cost of the facility and the amount of land required could be factors in selecting an
option.

ATf ACHMENT D - DESCRIPTION OF STORAGE OF NAVAL SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL
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0.1.1 Introduction
This attachment examines the alternative of storing naval spent nuclear fuel at shipyard and
prototype sites where the fuel is removed from the reactor plant. Water pool storage, immobile dry
storage containers, and dry storage in shipping containers are evaluated for each shipyard and

0-16
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prototype location. Under the No Action alternative, naval spent nuclear fuel would be stored in
shipping containers. For the other alternatives where naval spent nuclear fuel would be stored at
shipyard and prototype sites, the storage mode would be selected by the Record of Decision.
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Attachment C has addressed the generic safety of water pool and dry storage and concluded that both
methods would be suitable for the interim storage of naval spent nuclear fuel with very little

Title

environmental impact. This attachment addresses the design requirements, operational considerations,
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Total costs through the year 2035 (mill ions of dollars) .
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costs, and land requirements for the Puget Sound Naval Shipyard, Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard ,
Norfolk Naval Shipyard , Portsmouth Naval Shipyard , and the Kesselring Site.
The interim storage facilities for naval spent nuclear fuel at shipyards and prototype locations
would be designed to comply with applicable requirements . The storage facilities would be monitored
and maintained in compliance with Naval Reactors Program requirements for radi ation protection of
workers and the public and the environment. Specifically, ex posure to workers at the storage site
would be maintained as low as reasonably achievable and would be controlled to Naval Reactors

Program radiation exposure standards . As with current naval practices, no measurable increase in
radiation levels at the s ite boundary would result from the storage of naval spent nuclear fuel at any
alternate site.
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0.1.2 Shipping Containers

manufacturing capabilities, 3 years are required to build an M-14O container and the output capacity
is about 6 containers per year .

D. 1.2 . 1 Container Design Features. Shipping containers and immobile dry

storag~

containers

position the spent naval fuel modules within sealed structures designed to physicaliy constrain,
suppon, and remove residual heat from the fuel in an environment that prevents corrosion of the fuel.

The shipping contai ners loaded during the period preceding the Record of Decision would
also need to be modified to meet the storage container design criteria. An evaluation would be

The massive size of the containers provides not onl y strength, but also shielding against exposure to

performed to determine whether these modifications could be safely made with spent nuclear fuel

radiation from the spent fuel within.

present in the containers. In the event that the spent nuclear fuel must be removed from the shipping
containers, the containers would be unloaded and the spent nuclear fuel would be transferred into

The shipping containers might be M-14O sh ipping containers with long-lived seals suitable for

modified shipping containers at a suitable facility und er controls which would protect workers, the

storage of spent nuclear fuel for the duration of the period covered by this Environmental Impact

public, and the environment. The unloading of spent nuclear fuel from the original shipping

Statement (EIS) . A description of the M-140 shipping container is provided in Attachment A. This

containers and reloading into modified shipping containers would introduce additional spent nuclear

container is already cenified to meet the requirements of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,

fuel handling, transponation, and risks .

contained in IOCFR71, for the transponation of naval spent nuclear fuel. With install ation of a longlived seal, the M-14O container could be qualified for storage for 40 years . The shipping containers

D.1.2.2 Operations. The process of load ing spent nuclear fuel into shipping containers for storage

could either be positioned on railcars at the storage site or on concrete pads. The process of

would be similar to that used for loading M-140 shipping containers. During reactor refueling

designing the shipping container long-lived seal would commence with the Record of Decision if th is

operations, spent nuclear fuel is normall y loaded into M-14O shipping containers that are filled with

option were selected . The cost associated with the design and recenification of the shipping container

water. The spent nuclear fuel is staged in this configuration for sufficient time to ensure that heat

would range from approximately $ 1 million to $5 million. The cost to manufacture each shipping

produced by radioactive decay of fission products is adequately dissipated . When the water is

container would be about $5 million . Some uncenain.ties in estimated co!:s exist due to the fact that a

removed fro m the M- 14O container, the loaded M-140 can be shipped . After water is drained from

detailed design for the shipping container long-lived seal is not yet available.

the shipping container, it would be transponed to the storage site. The water is processed for reuse.
The transponation procedures would be essentially unchanged from current procedures except that

If the Record of Decis ion were to choose shipping containers, a more detailed eval uation
would need to be performed to determine whether it is more appropriate to modify the M-14O

containers wou ld be moved to the interim storage site instead of being shi pped to the Expended Core
Facility (ECF) at the Idaho National Engineering Laborato ry ((NEL) fo r inspection. For rail car

shipping container design or whether a new container design should be used . Since the M-14O was

storage, the railcar would be positioned in the storage area. For cases where the shipping container is

designed as a shipping container, the modifi cations th at would need to be made to conven an M-14O

stored on a concrete pad , the container would be off-loaded from the railcar or truck, positioned, and

to accommodate interim storage might involve substantial new design work and recenification for

then secured to the pad (if securing would be required). In order to acco mplish this transfer, a large

shipping.

capacity crane would be needed at each site, and the site would need to be prepared as necessary to
accommodate the mode of storage.

About 500 additio nal containers with he lding capacity equivalent to the M-140 container
would need to be fab ri cated to cover the projected reactor servicing from 1995 through 2035 . If an

0.1,3 Immobile Dry Storage Containers

alternative usi ng the shipping conta iners were to be chosen, an ex panded manufacturi ng vendor base
would need to be developed to meet the projected cont ai ner requirements. With the current

D. 1.3. 1 Container Design Features. There are currently no immobile dry storage containers

designed for interim storage of nav al spent nuclear fuel. The container design would be similar to
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0 -2

1M

0 ·3

IJO·

Volume I, Appendix 0

that of containers which are presently certified by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for storage of
spent nuclear fuel from commercial reactors. The design, approval , and construction of an immobile
dry storage container would commence with the Record of Decision if this option were selected . This
effort could require up to 5 years to complete. The cost associated with the design and approval of

OUTER ANNULUS AIR OUT1..ET

the immobile storage container would be about $2 million. The cost to construct each immobile dry

CASKUD

storage container would be about $2 million. These estimates are based on costs of commercially
available containers with contingencies added to account for additional design features that may be
required.

Two concepts for storing naval spent nuclear fuel in immobile dry storage containers have
been developed in order to provide a baseline fo r assessing the impacts. Other dry storage
approaches (such as dry storage vaults) exist and would be considered in more detail if the Record of
Decision were to choose the immobile dry container storage alternative. The first approach (referred
to as the minimum fuel loading concept) is based on the number of spent fuel assemblies stored in the
immobile dry storage container being about the same as that which is loaded into M-I40 shipping

STEEL UNER

containers. This approach results in the need for about 500 immobile dry storage containers. The
second approach (referred to as the maximum fuel loading concept) maximizes the number of fuel

CONCRETE

assemblies that would be stored in the immobile dry storage containers. The number of containers
required for the second approach is about 300.

OUTER ANNULUS

~ AIR INlET OUCT

The minimum fuel loading concept results in a container with a comparatively Simpler design,
less maintenance, and lower unit costs (- $1.9 million/container). Under the maximum fuel loading
concept, the container would need to be equipped with additional active cooling features such as water
circulation to ensure that the heat produced by radioactive decay of fission products is adequately
removed. These additional cooling features would be needed for a period of several years after the
spent nuclear fuel is removed from the reactor vessel. For the minimum fuel loading concept,
additional active cooling featu res such as recirculating water would not be required to remove heat.
As with the shipping containers, an expanded vend r base would be necessary in order to construct

OUTER ANNULUS
AIR ENTRANCE

S

the immobile dry storage conlainers at the rate they would be needed .

Figures 0- 1 and D-2 provide conceplual layouts of candidale immobile dry storage containers
fo r naval spenl nuclear fuel.
Figure D-1. Conceptual concrete immobil
Volume I, Appendix D

lry storage contai ner for naval spent nuclear fuel.
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The dimensions of the immobile dry storage container that would be used for naval spent
nuclear fuel would be approximately the same as the M-I40 shipping container (i.e., approximately
10 to 16 feet high and 8 to 10 feet wide) . The fuel spacing within the container and the container

17

itself would be designed to prevent any nuclear chain reaction, to ensure that decay heat is adequately
95tN.

dissipated, and to ensure that the spent fuel would be protected from hazards associated with natural

S EAl COVER

phenomena or human activities for each storage site.

PRIMARY COVER

0 . 1.3.2 Operations. Operations commence following the defueling of the reactor, after fuel

modules are in a suitable holding container such as an M· 130 or M-I40 shipping container. The
immobile dry storage contai ner would be positioned at the storage location. Transfer of a spent fuel
module from the holding container to the dry storage container would be accomplished one fuel
module at a time using a shielded transfer container. All fuel transfers would be cond ucted in strict
accordance with procedures which would have been written, reviewed, and approved by personnel
trained, qualified, and specifically authorized to perform such work. The transfer container would be
SHielD PLATE
An ACHMENT STUOS

68 tN .
195 IN.

- - ---1

landed on the holding container, and a module would be withdrawn from the holding container. The
module would be secured and the loaded transfer container closed, moved into position over the dry

lOIN.

storage container, and landed. The transfer container would be reopened and the module lowered and

164 IN.

seated in the immobile storage container. The transfer container would then be removed. This
process would be repeated until the container is filled with spent fuel modules. The container would
then be sealed.

Transfers of spent nuclear fuel to the immobile dry storage container would be conducted in
accordance with Naval Reactors Program requirements for radiation protection. Radiological
containment devices would be used where necessary to prevent radioactivity from spreading to the
workplace and from becoming airborne. The transfer and storage containers would contain radiation
shielding that minimizes radiation exposure to the workers during transfer and storage operations and
ensures that radiation levels at the site peri meter are indistinguishable from natural background .
11 1N.

Figure I}-Z. Co nceptual vertical metal immobile dry storage container for naval spent nu clear fuel.
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0.1.4 Water Pool Storage

0 .1.5 DeSign Basis Considerations for Storage Containers and Water
Pools

D. 1.4 . 1 Water Pool Design Features. If the Record of Decisio n were to choose the al ternative of
storing naval spent nuclear fuel in water pools, five water pools could be constru cted , one at each
designated storage site. Each water pool facility would be designed, built, and operated in accordance

The de:;ign of both the shipping and immobile dry storage containers would be in accordance
with DOE Order 6430. IA and consistent with the intent of Nuclear Regulatory Commission

with DOE Order 6430. 1A and consistent with the intent of Nuclear Regulatory Commission

requirements for independent spent fuel storage installations found in IOCFR72 and associated

requ irements in IOCFR72 and associated Regulatory Guides . The siting, design, construction, and

Regulatory Guides. Anachment F describes the exposures which would be expected during normal

approval of a water pool storage facil ity would commence with the Record of Decis ion and could take

operational exposures and the exposures calculated for hypothetical accidents that might occur during

6 to 9 years to complete. The design and construction of each water pool facility would also conform

interim storage of spent fuel at each shipyard and prototype location. The accidents that would be

with local construction standards for each site.

used to establish the requirements for the design of the interim storage facilities are discussed below.

Water pools operate by holding spent fuel modul es in a deep pool of water. The water

D.1.S.1 Design Basis Considerations for Storage Containers.

provides cooling for the spent fuel , a transparent medium for work activities, and protection from
radiation (see Anachment C). The structural materials of the fuel modules and naval fuel cladding, as
well as temperature and chemistry control of the water, would result in the spent fuel being highly

(I)

Natural Phenomena. The fuel spacing within the container and the container itself
would be designed to prevent a nuclear criticality, to ensure that heat produced by

resistant to corrosion. Corrosion-resistant racks below the water surface would be used to support

rad ioactive decay of fission products is adequately dissipated, and to ensure that the

and position the fuel modules in place for handling and to prevent a critical mass being formed. The

container would safely survive hazards associated with natural phenomena such as storms

water depth would be suffi cient to provide shielding to protect workers and the environment during

or flooding for each storage site . The shipping containers and the immobile d.y storage

module movement and storage.

containers would be designed to withstand the most severe design basis seismic event
ex pected for the storage sites . The seis mic analysis would evaluate the internal and

D. 1.4 .2 Operations. The naval spent nuclear fuel would be transferred to the water pool in a

external structures of the containers and the components associated with stability of the

suitable container, such as an M-130 or M- I40 shipping container. The fuel modules would then be

containers . The containers and associated components would be designed to protect the

transferred into the water pool using equipment and procedures th at are similar to well-proven

environment during other natural phenomena such as tornado winds. tornado missiles,

procedures used at ECF for unloading spent nuclear fuel from shipping containers. The spent nuclear

hurri canes, volcani c ac tivity, des ign basis fl oods, and very largo waves . If the Record

fuel modules would be individually lowered and secured in the storage racks located on the water

of Decision involves the need for new facilities for the interim storage of naval spent

pool floor . The use of a water pool for storage of naval spent nuclear fuel would provide an

nuclear fuel . detailed s ite-spocific seismic evaluations would be condu cted for those sites,

opportunity for limited visual inspection of the exterio r of the fuel modules after removing them from

and the results would be incorporated into the design of new facilities. The construction

the naval vessels. Th is opportun ity would not exist to the same extent for the dry storage contai ner

of any new facilities for naval spent nuclear fuel management wou ld meet strict seismic

alternatives.

stand ards for the interim storage of naval spent nuclear fuel. The design and
constru ction of these facilities to seismic stand ards which take into consideratio n the
seismic characte r of the area wou ld ensure that structures could withstand a major
seismic evenl. The adequacy of the storage facility would be documented in a safety
assessment report for each locati on.
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(2)

Man-made Hazards. The containers would be arranged to allow access for routine

seismic character of the area would ensure that structures could withstand a major

inspections. maintenance. and emergencies. This includes sufficient accessibility for

seismic event. The adequacy of the water pool facility would be documented in a safety

pressure, temperature, and radiological monitoring as well as for fire fighting equipment

assessment repon for each location.

and ambulances.

The containers would be designed to withstand a fire without losing fission product
containment . Flammable liquids and gases as well as explosive materials would be
prohibited in the storage area with the exception of fuel in motor vehicles needed to
suppon operations. Combustible materials su,h as wood, paper, and plastic would be
kept to a minimum in the spent nuclear fuel storage areas.

(2)

Man-made Hazards. The water pool facility would be designed to withstand fire
without damage to the spent fuel within the water. Flammable liquids and gases as well
as explosive materials would be prohibited in the vicinity of the storage area with the
exception of incidental quantities of flammable solvents necessary to suppon operations.
Combustible materials such as wood, paper, and plastic would be kept to a minimum in
the water pool facility.

The fuel spacing within the container and the container itself would be designed to
prevent nuclear criticality, to ensure that the heat produced by radioactive decay is
adequately dissipated , and to ensure that it would safely survive credible man-made
accidents for each storage site. Other man-made hazards such as truck accidents,
airplane crashes, and objects dropped by cranes would also be addressed in the safety
assessment repon.

The fuel spacing within the water pool would be designed to prevent criticality, and to
ensure that it would safely survive credible man-made accidents for each storage site.
Other man-made hazards such as truck accidents, airplane crashes, and crane drop
accidents would also be addressed in the safety assessment repon.

0.1.6 Shipyard and Prototype Locations

0 . 1.5.2 Design Basis Conside,ations for Wate, Pools.

This section describes conceptual locations at the shipyard and prototype sites where storage
( I)

Natural Phenomena. The spent nuclear fuel spacing within the water pool and the
water pool itself and the building support structures would be designed to prevent
criticality, to ensure that heat produced by radioactive decay is adequately dissipated, and

facilities could be located to service refuelings and defuelings of naval ships. This section also lists
land requirements for each storage method at each location, the construction cost for each method.
and the associated operating cost.

to ensure that it would protect the fuel from the hazards associated with the design basis
natural phenomena for each storage site (i.e .. seismic. tornados, missiles generated by a

0.1.6.1 Land Requifements. This section provides a summary of the land required for each of

tornado. hurr icanes. volcanic activity, maximum expected fl oods, and very large waves).

the storage methods at each of the locations where refueling and defuel ing are planned from 1995

The water pools would be equip ped with spent fuel storage racks for restraining the

through 2035 .

modules. The racks would be designed to safely survive the above hazards. If the
Record of Decision involves the need for new facilities for the interim storage of naval
spent nu clear fuel. detailed site-speci fi c seismi
sites, and the results would be incorporated

11 110

11u' io ns would be conducted for those
the design of new facilities . The

construction of any new facilities for naval spent nuclear fuel manageme nt would meet

These locations are the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard. the Puget Sound Naval Shipyard. the
Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard , the Norfolk Naval Shipyard. and the Kesselring Site. A map of each
of these sites is provided in Figures 0 -3 through 0 -7, indicati ng a possible storage location at each of
these facilities .

suitt seismic standards for the interim storage of naval spent nuclear fuel. The design
and construction of these faci lities to seismic standards which take into consideration the
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Figure D-S . Conceptual locat ion 0f the interim storage site at Kesselring Prototype Site.
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Table D-I provides a summary of the amount of land needed for each of the storage methods

Table D-2. Estimated site construclion costs (millions of dollars).

at each of the locations where storage of naval spent nuclear fuel could be located. It should be noted
that the number of containers and land required could be slightly less than identified in Table D- I as a

Immobile
Dry Storage
Containers on
Concrete Pad

Shipping
Containers on
Concrete Pad

Shipping
Containers
on Railcars

Construction and
Installation of
Water Pools

result of actions talcen during the transition period. As shown in Table D-I , storage utilizing shipping

Localion

containers on railcars would typically require dedication of the most land .

Portsmouth

11- 12

10

2

96

Puget Sound

15-16

13

5

141

6

135

Table D-I- Square feet of land required for storage facility .

Number of

Location

Immobile
Dry Storage
Containers(!)

Number of
Shipping
Containers

Immobile:
Dry Stonge
Containen{l)

Shipping
Containers

Shipping

on Concrc:tc

Containers

Pad{»

on Railcars

Water Pool
Facilitt4)

W)

( ~~

(~'>

(~'>

Porumouth

27-51

61

Puget Sound

153-206

2 19

Purl H.rbor

21 -30

42

8.000-11.000

132-219

247

49 .000-82.000

Norfolk
Kesselring

5-6

10.000-19 .000

18 .000

72.000

20.000

57.000-n

64.000

260.000

33 .000

12.000

50.000

20.000

72.000

293.000

31 .000

.ooo

1.900-2 .000

1.700

7.100

17.000

Pearl Harbor

10-11

9

Norfolk

14-17

14

Kesselring

1 ( 1)

10
~

Total

95

15

54

89
556

UlEstimate does Dot include costs associated with establishing railroad extension from the access railroad to
the storage site.

are associated with the need for a high-capacity crane. Waler pool conslruction costs include
estimates of costs for construction of the water pool , building structure, and associated support
equipment. The table shows that construction costs for a water pool facility exceed those of other
alternatives, and that shipping conlainers on railcars involves the lowest construction costs. However,

'"
01

"1

Range in required Dumber of containers is due to options in conceptual design (see Section 0.1.3 . 1).
The immobile dry storage arrangement uses the containers stored on a concrete pad in double rows with
one container diameter separation between adjacent containers. Each row is separated by a IS· foot wide
acc:essway. Range in required land area is due to options in conceptual design.
The shipping container arrangement uses the containers stored on a concrete pad in double rows with 4 feet
between adjacent containers. Each row is separated by a IS -foot wide accessway .
Tbe water pool facility consists of a building that contains adequate space to house supporting equipment
and facilities (approximately 17,000 ft~ and a water pool with adjacent work areas of sufficient size to
accommodate the amount of spent nuclear fuel expected to be stored in the facility until 2035.

the water pool facil ity construction COSIS represent a complele facility ready to hold spent nuclear fuel
fo r interim storage. The construction costs in Table D-2 for the other slorage modes represent
completed site construction without the cost of the containers (see Table D-3) to hold the spent
nuclear fuel.

Table D-3 provides a summary of the estimaled costs to build shipping containers and

0 . 1.6.2 Site Construction. Container. and Operating Costs. This section provides estimated

immobile dry storage conlainers through 2035. The table shows thaI the immobile dry storage

costs associated with each allemali ve for sloring spenl nuclear fuel at the shipyard and prototype sites.

co ntainers are the least expensive conlainers , and that the cost to build shipping containers to rest on

The major cost factors include facil ily co nslruclion or site preparalion COSIS, container costs, and

concrete pads is slightly lower than 10 rest on railcars . The difference in cost between the iwo

operati ng costs over the lifetime of th e facility . Cost estimates are based on 1995 dollars .

shipping conlainer options is due 10 the cost of a dedicaled railcar during storage . The shipping
conlainer costs in Table D-3 would be reduced by about 13 percent due 10 actions tak en during the

Table D-2 provides a summary of th e eSlimaled constru clion costs for each storage option at

trans ilion period (these actions are descrihed in Section 3.8) to ship conlainers from the shipyards to

each shipyard and prototype localion. The co nstru clion costs for immobile and shipping COnlainers on

ECF . Consequently , the tOlal costs for shipping co nt ainers on concrete pads and shipping co ntainers

co ncrete pads and shipping conlainers on railcars include estimated costs for concrele (labor and

on rail cars considering the Iransition period woul d be about 26 15 and 2760 million doll ars.

malerials), rails (for railcars), or cranes for lifting and handling COnlainers or fuellransfer containers

respectively .

(for concrete pad sto rage). The majority of th e constructio n costs for concrete pad storage options
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Table 1>-4. Estimated operating costs through the year 2035 (millions of dollars).

Table 0-3. Estimated container cost (millions of dollars).
Immobile
Dry Storage
Location

Shipping
Containers on
Concrete Pad

Containers on
Concrete Pad lll

Containers on

Immobile
Dry Storage

Rail cars'"

Containers on

Shipping

Portsmouth

55-100

319

337

Puget Sound

314406

1145

1209

Pearl Harbor

43-59

220

232

Norfolk
Kesselring
Total

271-431
10-12
693-1008

1292

1363

31

33

3007

3174

Shipping
Containers on
Concrete Pad

Shipping
Containers
on Railcars'"

II

8

180

Puget Sound

23

4

24

206

Pearl Harbor

II

3

6

180

21

4

27

206

9

2

3

16

68

Location
Portsmouth

Norfolk
Kesselring
Total

fllRange in container costs due to options in conceptual designs (see Sections 0 . 1.2.1 and 0.1.3 ,-1). The lower
end of the range represents container costs for the rn.u:imum fuel loading option (which requires fewer
containers).
Cllncludes the cost of an equal number of railcars and containers required for this option.

Table D-4 provides the estimated costs to operate a naval spent nuclear fuel storage area. The
operating costs include estimates of cost for personnel to monitor the facility, handle the spent nuclear

Concrete Pad

75

Water Pool

124
896'"

(IlFor comparison. the estimated operating cost (personnel to monitor and handle fuel and maintain the facility)
for the ICPP Building 666 for the same period is 232 million dollars.
allncludes cost to replace or refurbish railcar after prolonged storage.

0 . 7.6.3 Total Construction and Operating Costs. Table D-5 is a compilation of the data
contained in Tables D-I through D-4, and calculated based on the entire 4O-year period from the

fuel when it arrives at the facility, and maintain the facility . These estimates do not include the costs

Record of Decision (1995 through 2035). This table shows that the total costs associated with the use

associated with eventual preparation of spent fuel for shi pment to a site for disposition . Disposition

of immobile dry storage containers are the lowest of all the storage options considered except for

preparation costs cannot be estimated at this time because the method for preparing the spent fuel has

storage at Puget Sound and Norfolk where the largest amounts of spent fuel would be stored. In

not been defined . Table D-4 shows that the lowest operating costs are associated with shipping

these cases, the total costs for using water pool storage are within the same range of approximation as

containers on concrete pads and that water pool storage requires the highest operating costs.

immobile dry container storage.
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Table D-S. Total costs through the year 2035 (millions of dollars) .

The second phase would involve establishing fu ndi ng. This will take approxi mately 3 years
to complete. The third phase of the implementation period would involve fabrication of the remai ning

Immobile
Dry Storage
Containers on
Concrete Pad'"

Shipping
Containers on
Concrete Pad

on Railcars

Water Pool

Portsmouth

77· 123

332

347

276

Puge! Sound

352-445

1162

1238

347

Pearl Harbor

64-81

232

239

275

Location

Norfolk
Kesselring
Total Cost

Shipping

required containers. The estimate of the number of containers is based on the projected schedule for

Containers

naval vessel refuelings and current estimates of the amount of spent nuclear fuel that would be placed
into the containers. Although production rates for immobile dry storage containers and shipping

306-469

1310

1396

341

41

37

213

29· 31
828·1149

3077

3257

1452

containers are unknown, they can be approximated from existing production rates for M· I40 shipping
containers. With current manufacturing capabilities, 3 years are required to build an M· I40
container, and the manufacturing capacity is about six containers per year. This production rate
would need to be accelerated to 18 to 24 containers per year by increasing the number of
manufacturers and by making fab rication process improvements . If the production rate of immobile
dry storage containers and shipping containers is the same as that of M·I40 containers and production
rates can be increased as noted above, the supply of immobile dry storage or shipping containers

U1Range in total costs due to options in conceptual design (see Section 0.1.3 . 1). The lower cost is associated
with the maximum loading concept.

would meet the demand for these containers at some point after the first several years . During the

0.1.7 Time Required to Implement Each Storage Method

fuel planned to be removed from U.S. Navy nuclear·powered vessels, some other means of storing

transition period, when an insufficient number of containers would be available to store all the spent

naval spent nuclear fuol would be needed. As described in Section 3.8 of this EIS, it is expected that

If the Record of Decisio n were to choose one of the alternatives involving storage of naval
spent nuclear fuel at shipyards and prototype sites, some period of time would be required after the

a transition period of 3 years of shipping followed by 3 years of allowing naval spent nuclear fuel to
be stored in shipping containers at shipyards would provide the necessary storage space.

decision to fully implement the selected sto rage alternative. This section exami nes the time required
D. , . 7. 2 Water Pool Storage. If 6 to 9 years would be required to design, approve, and construct

to implement each storage method .

a water pool facility and this process would be initiated for each location within a year after th e
0 . 1.7. 1 Container Storage. Implementation of the alternatives involving use of immobile dry

Record of Decision, water pools would be available for storage of naval spent nuclear fu el about 7 to

storage co ntainers and shipping co ntainers could be viewed as a three·phase process. The first phase

10 years following the Record of Decision. During the trans ition period , when water pools would be

would cover the time required to design the container or co ntainer modification, to review and accept

under construction at selected locations. so me other means of spent nuclear fuel storage would be

the design. to approve the co ntainer. to establish contracts for container fabrication . and fabricate the

needed. such as the method described in Section 3.8.

first container. During this phase. th e shipyards and prototype sites where the containers would be
stored would also construct. or modify the co ntainer storage location as appropriate for the alternative

0 .1.8 Summary

chosen. For immobile dry storage containers. this phase would take about 5 years. if 2 years are
requ ired to design and accept the container design. I year is needed for approval of the container, and

2 years are required to build the co ntainer. For containers designed for both storage and shipping.

T able D-6 su mmarizes the major advantages and disadvantages of the spent nuclear fu el
storage alternatives previously d iscussed in this attach ment.

this process would take about 5 years. based on I year to design the modifications. 1 year to approve
the container . and 3 years to build the container.

0 ·21

fI-! ~

Volume I , Appendix 0

Volume I. Appendix 0

0 ·22

Table 0-6. Comparison of naval spent nuclear fuel storage alternatives.
Table 0-6 (Cont).
Storage Mode

Advantages

Disadvantages
Storage Mode

I. Shipping Container

A. Storage on Railc,", s

I. Least amount of contai ner
handling after arrival at
storage location.

I. Railcars must be
refurbished or replaced
after prolonged storage.

2. Eli minates the need to

2. Requires the largest land

remove spent fuel modu les
from the transfer container
upon arrival at the storage
site.

B. Storage on Concrete
Pads

2. Concrete pads are less

2. Higher total cost than

1.5C

Disadvantages
I. The maxi mum fuel loading
concept requires that the
containers be filled with
water for cooling purposes
for several years after
removal fro m the reactor.
This requi res additional
mai ntenance and slightly
increases risk of low-level
contami nation spillage
dur ing accidents .

3. Shipping containers are
mo re expensive than
immobile dry storage
containers and water pools
(water pools cost more
when small fuel quantities
are stored such as at
Kesselring).
I. More container handling
required co mpared to
railcar storage option (if
containers will not need to
be removed fro m railcar) .

0 -23

Containers

Advantages

I. Lowest total costs of all the
storage options .

area of the storage options,
except for Kesselring.

I. Eliminates the need to
remove spent fuel modules
from the transfer container
upon arrival at the storage
site.

expensive than railcar
storage if rai lcars must be
replaced or refurbished .

2. Immobile Dry Storage

2. Must remove spent fuel
from transfer container and
load it into immobile
container.
3. Water Pool Storage

I. Has a lower total cost than
shippi ng containers, except
for Pearl Harbor and
Kesselring which have less

containers.
2. Provides opportunity for
conducting visual

immobile dry storage

examinations .

containers and water pools·
("when large quantit ies of
fuel are stored).
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I. Has the highest operating
costs of all the storage
options.

2. Must remove spent fuel
from transfer container and
load into water pool.

0.2 INSPECT HIGH PRIORITY FUEL AT PUGET SOUND NAVAL
SHIPYARD

0.2.1 Introduction
This section of the attachment discusses the alternative of inspecting a limitecf amount of naval
spent nuclear fuel at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard (hereafter referred to as Puget Sound) to provide
information on nuclear fuel performance for use in the development of advanced nuclear reactors.
The inspections would be performed at the shipyard's existing Water Pit Facility. The limited amount
of fuel inspected would be stored at Puget Sound following inspection, and all other spent fuel would
be stored in a facility at or near the refueling or defueling sites until the time that permanent geologic
storage becomes available.

0.2.2 Water Pit Facility Description
The Water Pit Facility is located at the west side of Dry Dock 5, within the industrial zone of
Puget Sound. This zone consists of facilities involved in ship construction and repair, dry r!llcking,
and conversions. The area is bounded by Decatur Avenue on the north, the waterfront on the south,
the Naval Supply Center on the west, and the main gate on the east. The Water Pit Facility is located
approximately 411 meters (1350 feet) from the nearest shipyard public property boundary. Figure
0-8 illustrates the layout of the Water Pit Facility.
The Water Pit Facility was originally constructed to provide the shipyard with the capability
to refuel nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, with the work for the first such refueling at Puget Sound
expected to commence in approximately 2006. To date, the facility water pool has been used for
refueling equipment demonstrations and testing.

0-25
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Figure 0-8. Puget Sound Naval Shipyard Water Pit Facility.
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BEST COpy AVAILABLE

The following key features of the Water Pit Facility are presented in terms of the fac il ity's

originaJ aircraft-carrier refueling mission. Because of these design features . the facility is also

0,2_3 Limited Inspection Operations

considered suitable for limited naval spent fuel inspectio n operations.
If future naval spent fuel examinations could not be accomplished at current capacity, th e
I.

A water pool for disassembly, assembly, and holding of fuel cells. The layout of the

capacity which was available would be used to best advantage. Only naval spe nt nuclear fuel
ident ified as havi ng the greatest scientific value would be selected for detailed exami nation.

water pool is described below .

Generally, this is spent nuclear fuel which is the first of a kind design or which has a characteristic of
2.

A work area for unpackagi ng , inspection, and preparation of new fuel clusters and

special interest.

associated equipment
Naval nuclear-powered ships would continue to be refueled and defueled at various shipyards

3.

An area for loading of shipping containers

4.

A general use work area to suppon miscellaneous refueling suppon operations .

across the country. Most of the spent fuel would be stored in a facility at or near the refueling and
defueling sites until the time that permanent geologic storage becomes available. Those few fuel cells
identified as high priority would be transponed by railcar to Puget Sound in standard shi elded
shippi ng contai ners. Following its receipt in the Water Pit Facility's rai lcar work area, a shi pping

The Water Pit Facility is divided into two distinctive structures. The high bay structure is a

container would be prepared for fuel cell removal (dust cover removed , leveled , filled with water,

radiologically controlled area cont aining th e water pool and general work areas discussed above. This

containment installed, access plug removed). The fuel cells wou ld be removed from the shipping

Structure is designed to withstand the effects of design basis natural phenomena and of postulated

container, one at a time, and transferred to the water pool in a shielded transfer contai ner. The cells

failures of adjoining or adjacent stru ctu res without damage to the water pool or co mpon.nts in the

would be discharged into the pool and placed in the holding racks to await examination work. Upon

water pool. The high bay walls are co nstructed of concrete to a height of 3.7 meters (12 feet) above

co mpl etion of examination work, the spent fuel would be stored at Puget Sound as described in

ground level. The second structure is the Personnel Su ppon Building which houses offices and other

Section 0 . 1. Storage facilities would have to be designed and cenified to accommodate module

sup pon areas. This structure is designed to meet th e requirements of established naval facilities

sections resulti ng from spent fuel examinations as well as intact modul es.

standard ized criteri a for structural design.
The following major items of water pool equipment (o r equivalent) are considered necessary
The water pool measu res 7 .3 meters (24 feet) wide x 20.4 meters (67 feet) long x 11.1 meters

to support a high-priority naval spent nucl ear fu el examination program . Also necessary are th e

(36.5 feet) deep wi th . water depth of 10.5 meters (34.5 feet). It includes four work areas on each

relatively small and ponable cameras and light sources for visual inspections. This equipment would

side of th e pool at th e eas t end to suppo n refueling operations and a fuel hold ing area at the west end

suppon those spent fu el examinations currently performed in the ECF water pools at INEL as

of the pool. Tolfee of the four work areas are a nominal 2. 1 meters (7 feet) x 2 . 1 meters (7 feet) and

described in Section B.4.1 of Attachment B and summarized below.

th e founh area is a nominal 2.6 meters (8.5 feet) x 2. 1 meters (7 feet). The transfer aisl e down the
center of th e pool is provided for all fu el and non-fuel move ments . The water pool design includes
provisions for isolatio n gates for each work area, for th e fu el holding area, and for the dry pit . This
isolation gate arrangement prov ides th e ca pability to separate th e various areas of th e water pool if
required . The dry pi t, measur ing 7.3 meters (2 4 fee t) wide x 4.9 meters (16 feet) long x 11.1 meters
(36.5 feet) deep, permits expansion of th e wate r pool as needed .
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EQUIPMENT
ITEM

PURPOSE
Remove non-fuel structurals above & below fuel region
to provide access for inspection and to rotate cells
between vertical and horizontal orientations

Bandsawl
Upender

of transferring items for examination between the water pool and the shielded cells

FLOOR SPACE
REQUIRED

would have to be implemented . Shielded cask movements via truck and cart movements

46.4 m' (500 ft')
8.2 m x 5.6 m
(27 ft x 18.5 ft)

Universal
Inspection
Station

Measure fuel cell dimensions

7.5 m' (81 ft,)
2.7 m x 2.7 m
(9 ft x 9 ft)

Vertical
Inspection Gage

Trace contour of surfaces of fuel cell assemblies and
control rods

16.7 m' (180 ft')
3.0 m x 5 .5 m
(10 ft 7. 18 ft)

Milling Machine

Section fuel cells into subassemblies, preassemblies, and
elements for other examinations

11.1 m' (120 ft')
3.7mx3.0m
(12 ft x 10 ft)

via underground tunnel are two possible means of transfer. This option is undesirable
because it involves construction of a new facility but does not provide direct
communication between the water pool and shielded cells.

Based on the above discussion, the alternative of examining a limited amount of naval spent
nuclear fuel would include a full range of water pool visual and dimensional inspections at the Puget
Sound Water Pit Facility and a full range of shielded cell examinations at another Naval Reactors site.
This alternative would therefore include all INEL-ECF capabilities as described in Sections B.4. 1 and
B.4.3 of Attachment B.

0_2.4 Advantages and Disadvantages of this Alternative
Based on floor space requirements, the Water Pit Facility water pool and dry pit could not
accommodate spent nuclear fuel examinations without removal of work area partition walls and

Advantages

without removal of the aircraft carrier refueling equipment. As a result, Puget Sound would no
longer have the capability to refuel nuclear-powered aircraft carriers. Expansion of the Water Pit

I.

Facility to accommodate simultaneous refueling and examination operations is undesirable due to the

Portions of the naval spent nuclear fuel examination program could be moved from
INEL-ECF without having to construct new facilities . A full range of water pool
inspections could be accomplished at Puget Sound. A full range of shielded c ~lI

proximity of other shipyard facilities .

examinations could be accomplished at another Naval Reactors site.
Puget Sound does not have a shielded cell examination capability. Two options were
considered fo r implement ing such a capabil ity:

I.

Disadvantages

Transfer fuel sections from Puget Sound to a shielded cell facility at another Naval

I.

The small size of the water pool complicates placement of inspection equipment. As a

Reactors site such as th e Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory near Schenectady, New York,

result, the equipment would be limited in nature and would require removal of water

or the Bettis Atomic Power Labo ratory near Pittsburgh , Pennsylvania. This would

pool work area partition walls and removal of aircraft carri er refueling equipment. As a

require addi tional shipments of spent fuel sections across the country . The spent fuel

result, Puget Sound would no longer have th e capability to refu el nucl ear-powered

would be transported in shipping casks whi ch would have to be certified for this

aircraft carriers.

purpose.
2.
2.

Transferring items for examination between th e water pool and shielded cells would

Construct shielded cells at Puget Sound . These cells would necessarily be sited some

involve additional spent fue: shi pments ac ross th e country and would require design and

distance from th e Water Pit Facility since sufficient space is not available either within

certification of a co ntainer fo r this purpose.

the facility or adjacent to it in th e industr ial zone of the shipyard . In addition, a means
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0 .2.5 Facility Support Systems

the concentration limit in IOCFR20, Attachment B, Table 2 for airborne effluents released to the
general environment . The presence of even low-level airborne contamination will eventually lead to

The systems which were intended to suppon the aircraft carrier refuelings will also suppo n
the limited naval spent fuel inspectio n effons. These include the water pool fluid systems, the heating
and ventilation systems, and the normal and emergency electrical power systems .

the ventilation system ductwork and HEPA filters becoming sources of radiation. This would occur
over a very long period of time and the radiation levels would be controlled to a very low level. As
noted above, the controls which are exercised will ensure that the occupational exposure remains as
low as reasonably achievable.

0.2.6 Radiation Sources
0 .2.7 Radiological Protection Features
The primary sources of radiation in th e Water Pit Facility would be the spent fuel and the
associated irradiated components which are handled during inspection operations . Radiation results
fro m the fission products which reside in the fuel regio n of the depleted clusters and are contained by

The facility is designed to protect workers and the general public from radiological risk.
Controls are such that workers receive much less than the allowable limits for radiation and

the fuel cladding. The cladding arou nd the fuel region would not be penetrated by any fuel cell

radioactivity. The ventilation system is designed to mitigate the co nsequences of an accidental release

cuning or sectioning operation in the Water Pit Facility. Irradiated non-fuel components are also

of radionuclides within the Water Pit Facility building and to limit the atmospheric release at the

sources of radiation, as are corrosion products which reside on all external surfaces. Handling

stack . The doubl e-walled (reinforced co ncrete, stainless steel liner) water pool is designed to prevent

operations could cause some of the corrosion products to become detached from the surfaces.

leakage under design eanhquake force loading conditions. The radioactive fluid systems will mai ntai n

Therefore. in addition to direct radiation, contamination must be co nsidered in the control of radiation

zero liquid discharge to the envi ronment du ring Water Pit Facility operations.

sources.

0.2.8 Estimated On-Site Dose Assessment
The water pool water is treated by the filtration and purification system to maintain the
waterborne radioactivity as low as reaso nably achievable, typically less than I x 10" mi crocurie

The occupational radiation exposure for workers performing limited spent fu el inspections in

Co-60/mI . This level of activity is below the concentration limit in IOCFR20, Attachment B, Table 2

the Water Pit Facility is expected to be consistent with th at of ECF workers performing si milar

for liquid effluents released to the general environment. The vessels and piping in the filter system

operations at INEL. As discussed in Section 5.2.12 . 1. radiation exposures to ECF workers at INEL

then become potential radiation sources. The water must be co nsidered a source even though its

have averaged approximately 100 mrem per year. The person-rem per year for the Water Pit Facility

radiation level will be ve ry low . The waterborne radioactive mate rial causes equ ipment in the pools

will vary with the manning level whi ch is dependent on the spent fuel inspection activity occurring in

to become radiat ion sources, the water pool fl oor to become contaminated. and a radioactive scum

the facility. However. the maximum manning level is anticipated not to exceed 60 people.

ring to form on the walls of the water pool at the water surface. Even consideri ng all of th-se
sources contributing to the ambient radiation level in the water pool area, the controls which are

0 .2.9 Seismic Design

exercised will ensure that the ove rall source is minimal and the occupational exposure remains as low
as reasonably achievable.
Structural loadings due to seismic activity were determined as follows. Building floor
response spectra for the horizontal and venical directions were obtained from a three-{(imensional
There would normally be no ai rborne radioactivity generated by th e handling of the cells in
the water pool. However, very low levels of airborne activity (approximately I x 10"" microcurie

Co-60/ml) have been detected near the su rfaces of other water pools. This level of activity is below
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damping mass sp ring model of the high bay which included soil-structure interaction. subjected to a
0.35 g ground acceleration value resulting from the seismic design analysis . The high bay
superstructure and substru cture were analyzed usi ng th e flonr respo nse spectra in separate finite
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element computer models. The superstructure model was subjected to structural loads which incl uded
a 113.5-metric ton (I 25-lOn) load lifted by the large overhead crane. The combined forces of these
loads with the seismic loads were applied
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the substructure model at the column base plate locations.
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The substructu re model was subjected to the design earthquake response spectra. This method was
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ATTACHMENT E

capabilities of the examination facility. The existing facility that can be made a part of the Savannah
River Site is the Barnwell Nuclear Fuel Plant (hereafter referred to as the Barnwell Plant) which is

DESCRIPTION OF RECEIPT,
HANDLING, AND EXAMINATION OF NAVAL SPENT
NUCLEAR FUEL AT ALTERNATE DOE FACILITIES

unused and available following acquisition from its present private corporate owners. The existing
facility on the Hanford Site is the Fuels and Materials Examination Facility (FMEF) which is unused
and available immediately. Sections E.2 and E.3 describe the modifications to existing facilities or to
current processes that would be needed to provide the complete range of ECF capabilities at the
Barnwell Plant and the FMEF. Section E.4 provides a discussion of how naval spent fuel and test
specimen examination work would proceed through the interim period as this work is being

E.1 DISCUSSION

transferred from the ECF at INEL to the ECF location at the alternate DOE facility .
This anach ment describes the optio ns for establishing new or modified facilities that
essentially duplicate the capab ilities of the existing Expended Core Facility (ECF) at the Idaho
Natio nal Engineering Laboratory (INEL). Also discussed herein are the differences from' the existing
facility . whi ch is described in detail in Attachment B.

Receipt and handling of naval spent fuel at the new ECF location at the alternate DOE facility
would be similar to recei pt and handling of spent fuel at the ECF at INEL as described in Section B.2
of Attachment B. Following all examinations at the new ECF. most of the spent fuel would be
loaded in the water pool into shipping casks for transport to the long-term fuel storage location at the
same DOE facility. The spent fuel would remain at this location until the time that ultimate

The

ca~ abilities

of the ECF at INEL include detailed examinations of spent nuclear fuel from

disposition is possible.

nav al reactors and test specimens from the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) at the INEL Test Reactor
Area . It would be possible to provide ECF capabilities at an alternate DOE facility (Savannah River
Site. Hanford Site. Oak Ridge Reservation. or Nevada Test Site) by constru cting an entirely new

The new ECF would also cuplicate the capabilities of the ECF at INEL with respect to the
assembly , disassembly, and examination of ATR irradiation test specimens.

facility . At Savannah Ri ver or Hanford. ECF capabilities could also be provided by modifying an
existing facility . The preferred locations for siting an ECF at Savannah Ri ver. Hanfo rd , Oak Ridge,
and the Nevada T est Site are desc ribed in Sectio ns 4 .3. 1, 4 .4 . 1. 4.5 . 1, and 4 .6.1 , respectively . The
main advantage of new cons truction is that the facility can provide all capabilities currently available

E.2 USE OF THE BARNWELL PLANT AT SAVANNAH RIVER
FOR ECF WORK

at the ECF at INEL without li mitatio ns . The new co nstruction water pool and shielded cell co mpl ex
would be constru cted in such a IT.anner as to duplicate, as much as possible. the capabilities of the

The Barnwell Plant is not ow ned by DOE but could be acquired and incorporated into the

ECF at INEL. The existi ng ECF is highl y capable. having bee n designed to accomp lish the tasks

Savannah River Site property. It has a water pool compl ex with abou t 433 square meters (4660

required by th e Naval Nuclear Propulsio n Program . Key disadvantages of new construction,

square feet) of surface area (see Figure E-I) that can be utili zed with minor modifications to perform

however. are high cost and the time nece5sary to initiate and complete construction.

unloading of n..al fuel transport casks in a manner virtually identical to that employed at the ECF at
INEL. An overh ead crane running the length of th e water poo! wou ld have to be added . However,

Modir :at ion of an existing facility at Savannah River or Hanfo rd which has at least some of

providing naval spent nucl ear fuel and test specimen examination capab ilities co mparabl e to th e ECF

the features that are requ ired in a functional ECF would enable reductions in cost and ti'11e to achieve

at INEL would entail an expansion of th e Barnwell Plan t water pool to at least two times its present

full capability . depend ing on how many facility mod ifications are required . A disadvantage. however,

size. The design of the Barnwell Plant facilit y provides for such an expansion in an easterly direction

i, that so me of the methods currentl y in use at the ECF at INEL may also req uire modification to

while the existing water pool remai ns fun ctional in a redu ced capacity mod e.

effectively and promptly utilize an existing facil ity. and such modifications may compromise the
E- I
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It is envisioned that the full ECF shielded cell capabilities could be provided at the Barnwell
Plant using a combination of the three remote maintenance cells and the eight sample and analytical
cells. Material would be transferred from the water pool to the remote maintenance cells via a
conveyor. The crane equipment maintenance gallery and the upper level of the remote process cell
15 TON

are connected by a shielded door; these cells are connected to the remote maintenance and scrap cell

ow<"'-

below by hatches (see Figure E-2). Additional work stations (viewing window and manipulator pons)
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would have to be added to service these cells . The remote maintenance cells are connected to the
sample and analytical cells above via a waste chute which would have to be upgraded to improve
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transfer capability between these cell areas . Methods would have to be developed for material
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movement from one shielded cell elevation to another. The combined length of the ECF shielded
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cells atlNEL is less than 57 .9 meters (190 feet). The combined length of the Barnwell Plant remote
maintenance cells and sample and analytical cells is greater than 67 . 1 meters (220 feet), so that
sufficient cell work space shou'ld be available. There are also five contact maintenance cells
available, although at present they have no workstations and are not connected to each other, to any
other cell area, or to the water pool. An alternative to the Barnwell Plant water pool expansion
would be to use the contact maintenance cells for some of the operations presently performed in the
ECF water pool at INEL. Varying amounts of existing equipment and piping in the Barnwell Plant
shielded cells would have to be removed and disposed .
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Once modified , the Barnwell Plant would provide the full range of water pool and shielded
cell examination capabilities . However, the arrangement of the cells in the fuel handling area could

PIT
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make material movement within the facility more diffi cult th an materi al movement at th e ECF at
INEL. As a result, throughput in the Barnwell Plant could be adversely affected .

TEST
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E.3 USE OF THE FUELS AND MATERIALS EXAMINATION FACILITY

'--- - - - - -

AT HANFORD FOR ECF WORK
The FMEF on the DOE Hanfo rd Site in Washington currentl y has a large shielded cell
co mplex th at is suit ab le for ECF-type shielded cell operatio ns with several modifi cati ons. Those
mod ifications primarily ent ail the logisti cs associated with install ing the equip ment in th e cells and
transpo rting items for examination to and from this equipment.
FoRur. & 1. Plan view of the Barnw ell Plant Fuel Receiving and Storage Station .
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At present, there is no water pOQI at FMEF. One means of providing this portion of ECF
capabilities would be to establish a dry cell facility . The FMEF main process cell , decontamination
cell, and upper process cell were evaluated for such a facility (see Figure E-3). Conceptually,
material would be transferred from shielded casks in the shipping and receiving crane bay into the
decontamination cell via a ceiling port. At present, there are only small penetrations between the
decontamination cell and main process cell; this would have to be upgraded to facilitate material
transfer. The combined surface area of the three cells is about 706 square meters (7600 square feet),
compared to at least 866 square meters (9320 square feet) for the conceptual expanded Barnwell Plant
water pool discussed previously. This suggests that the full ECF water pool capabilities could not be
provided in the dry cell facility. In addition, one or more of the process cells is intended for
inci~sion

in the shielded cell complex (see next paragraph). Removal of decay heat from spent fuel

and irradiation test specimens in temporary dry storage would have to be evaluated. It is concluded
that duplication of ECF spent fuel and test specimen examination capabilities at FMEF would require
construction of a new water pool at least two times the present size of thl! Barnwell Plant water pool.
The location of the pool and the means for transferring items between the pool and the shielded cell
complex would have to be evaluated.
It is envisioned that the full ECF shielded cell capabilities could be provided at FMEF using a

combination of the main process cell and the 14 process support cells. The main process cell is
connected to the process support cells below by hatches (see Figure E-3). There appear to be
sufficient workstations (viewing window and manipulator ports) servicing all cells . Methods would
have to be developed for material movement from one shielded cell elevation to the other. The
combined length of the FMEF main process cell and process support cells is greater than 76.2 meters
(250 feet), so that sufficient cell work space should be available. The decontamination cell and upper
process cell would be available in support of shielded cell operations. The FMEF shielded cells are
essentially empty.

Once modified, the FMEF would provide the full range of water pool and shielded cell
examination capabilities. However, the arrangement of the cells in the fuel hand ling area and the
separation of the water pool and shielded cells would make material movement within the facility
more difficult than material movement at the ECF at INEL. As a result, throughput in the FMEF
could be adversely affected.
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A transitional period will exist between the date th at the Record of Decision is issued and th e
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date that the alternative selected can be fully implemented (unl ess the selected alternative mai ntains
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ECF operations at INEL). This transition period would be approximately 6 years . If it is desired
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that all ECF work be completely transferred to an alternate DOE facility, then actions would have to
be taken to minimize the disruption in examination capability for naval spent nuclear fuel and ATR
test specimens. This section discusses how this will be accomplished if the alternate DOE facility
option is selected in the Record of Decision.

The Barnwell Plant would have to be acquired by th e DOE from its present private corporate
owners. It is estimated that less than $SOO million in acquisition, modifi cat ion. and co nstruction costs
would complete the Barnwell Plant for ECF usage.

The FMEF at Hanford is already owned by the DOE but it appears to requ ire a greater
amount of design effon to be a full y functional ECF since a large water pool would need to be
constructed and tied in to the shielded cell co mplex in order to initi ate fuel receipt. It is esti mated
that less than $SOO million in mod ification and co nstruction costs would complete th e FMEF for ECF
usage.

During the transitional period between the Record of Decision and full implementation of the
selected alternative, shipments of naval spent nuclear fuel to th e ECF at INEL woul d cont inue,
pending construction of storage and exami nation facilit ies at the new si te. All naval spent nuclear fuel
would then be transferred to the new site.
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F-232

F.5-5

Naval Nuclear Propulsion Prog ram sites.
Occupational injuries/illnesses for sto rage and examination fac il ity
operations at Naval Nuclear Propul sion Prog ram sites

F-228
at

at
at
at the
at the
at
.
at

F-235

F-228

F-227

at the
.
at the

F-234

F.3-1
F.3-2
F.3-3
F.3-4
F .3-5
F .3-6

Summary of chemical concentrations for fire involving diesel fuel at
Hanford (50% meteorology)
Summary of chemi cal concentrations for fire involving diesel fuel
Hanford (95% meteorology) . .. .... .. .
. .. .. . .. .
Summary of chem ical co nce ntrations for fire involving diesel fuel
. . . .. . . . . . .
Nevada Test Site (50 % meteorology) .
Summary of chemical conce ntrati ons for fire involving diesel fuel
. .. . . . . . ... .
Nevada Test Site (95 % meteorology) .
Summary of chemi cal co nce ntrati ons for fire involving diesel fuel
Oak Ridge (50 % meteorology) .
Summary of chemi cal concentrations fo r fire involving diesel fuel
Oak Ri dge (95 % meteorology) .. . ..
Summary of chemical concentrations fo r fire involving di esel fuel
Barnwell Plant (50 % meteorology)
. . .. . ... .
Summary of chemical concentratio ns for fire involving di esel fu el
Barn well Plant (95% meteorology) . . . . . . . . . . .
Summary of chemical co nce ntrations for fire in vo lving diesel fu el
Kenneth A. Kesselring Site (50 % meteorology) . . . . . . . . . . .
Summary of chemi cal co ncentrations for fire involving di esel fuel
Kenneth A. Kesselring Site (95% meteorology)
Summary of chemical co nce ntrat ions for fire invo lving d iesel fuel
Norfolk Naval Shipyard (50% meteo rology)
Summary of chemical concentrat ions fo r fi re in volving di esel fuel
Norfolk Naval Shipyard (95 % meteorology)
Summary of chemical concentratio ns fo r fi re involving diesel fuel
Pearl Harbo r Naval Shipyard (50% meteorology)

Summary of chemical concentrations for fire involving diesel fuel at
Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard (95% meteorology) . . ... . . . .
Summary of chemical concentrations for fire involving diesel fuel at
PortSmouth Naval Shipyard (50% meteorology) .. . .. . .. .
Summary of chemical concentrations for fire involving diesel fuel at
PortSmouth Naval Shipyard ·(95% meteorology) . . . . . . . .. .
Summary of chemical concentrations for fire involving diesel fuel at
Puget Sound Naval Shipyard (50% meteorology) . . . . . . . . .. . . . .
Summary of chemical concentrations for fire involving diesel fuel at
Puget Sound Naval Shipyard (95% meteorology) . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .
Summary of chemical concentrations for fire involving diesel fuel aboard
ship in Puget Sound (50% meteorology) .. .. . . .. .... .. . . . .. . .
Summary of chemical concentrations for fire involving diesel fuel aboard
ship in Puget Sound (95% meteorology) .. .
Crash parameter Pn .
Crash density constants . ..
. . ... .. . .
Crash density constants . . . . .. . .
Airport landings and takeoffs per site location per year
Airway air traffic per site location per year
Crash probabilities for various fuel storage options per site
location per year
Crash probabilities for fuel examination facilities per site
location per year . .... .

Occupational fatalities for constructi on activities at Naval Nuclear
Propulsion Program sites ...
Occupational fatalities for storage and examination fac ilit y
operations at Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program sites ...

F-232
at
F-233
at
F-233
at
F-234
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F-xvi

F-247
F-247

F-256
F-257
F-258
F-259

ATTACHMENT F

has OeV!;! T heen a nuclear reactor a~dd l!nt . critkality acddl!nt . transponation a ~dde nt. or an y release
of radioactivity having a significant

ANALYSIS OF NORMAL OPERATIONS
AND ACCIDENT CONDITIONS

efft! ~ t

on th e environment.

Summary or Na.al Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) Allernati ...
Description of SNF Activity

Altern ative

Th is attachment presents estimated environmental consequences, event probabilities. and risk

SNF retained at shipyards and Kesselring . Dry storage in con-

No Action

tainers only .

(a product of probability and consequence) for both normal operations and postul ated accident
scenarios related to the storage and examination of naval spent nuclear fuel. No rmal operations and
accide nts are evaluated to estimate the potential for releases of both radioactive material and tox ic
chemicals. The results of these analyses are presented in terms of the health effects to facility

Decentralization
No Examination

SNF retained at shipyards and Kesselring. Either dry conlainers or
water pool storage would be used .

Decentral ization
Limited Examination

SNF retained at shipyards and Kesselring. Either dry containers or
water pool storage would be used . Limited SNF sh ipments to
Pugel Sound Naval Shipya rd for examination.

workers and the public predicted due to the release of "dioactive materials and toxic chemicals into
the environment. Effects on environmentaJ facto rs are al so pres ented , based on th e amount of land

which could be impacted due to postulated accide nts .

Analysis results are presented for several different Department of Energy (DOE) and naval
shipyard locations which are being considered as alternative sites for future naval spent nucl ear fue l

All SNF shipped to INEL-ECF fo r examination. All SNF returned

Decentral ization
Full Exam ination

to origin for storage in eithl!f dry comaint!fs or water pools.

Plan ning Basis

SNF would be received. examined. and stored at INEL as in past
years. The proposed dry cell facililY would he compl eted at ECF .

Regionalization or

SNF would he received . examined. and stored at either INEL.
Hanford . Savan nah Rive r. Nevada Test Site. or Oak Ridge.

Central ization

storage alld examination. The DOE facilities evaluated include the Idaho National Engineering
Laboratory (lN EL). Savannah River Site. Hanford Site, Nevada Test Site, Oak Ridge Reservation
(hereafter referred to as Oak Ridge). and Kenneth A. Kessel ring Site. Puget Sound Naval Shipyard ,
Pearl Harbor Naval Sh ipyard. Norfolk Naval Shipyard . and Ports mouth Naval Sh ipyard have also
been eval uated fo r naval spent nuclear fuel operations.

Normal Operations
Table F- I presents the eslimated numher of fatal cancers per year to the general JX'pul ation
living with in a 50-mile radius of 1!3ch facility dut! to rad iolug h.:al rd l!ases from norm al opt!ralions.

The results in this table were calculated using Ihe methods described in Seclion F. I .3. The numher

SUMMARY

of fatal cancers is ver'i low at all locations and for all altt!rnati vt;!s .

Analyses of normal operations and des ign bas is and beyo nd design basis hypothetical accidents
were performed to estimate the potent ial consequences due to release of radioacti ve materials and

toxic chemicals . The analysis results for radiological operations have been sum marized by the
locations and alrernatives being considered in th e Environmental Impact Statement.

The ISC2 compuler code (EPA 1992h) was used

10

estimale the concentration of chem;';als

released during normal operations. The results show that for INE L. Hanford . Sava nnah River. the
Nevada Test Site. the Barnwell Pl ant. and Oak Ridge. no am hient ai r qualilY standards would he
exceeded: th erefore. no adverse

effc!~ l s

ar\!

t!xP\!~too .

Hc:aling hui lC:TS and

generators already exist at the Navy shipyard lo.:ations and thus

Historical Acci dents

would not result in a measurable!

in~rl!ast!

in c:missions .

The Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program has an outstanding nuclear safety record. In over

4500 reactor-years of operation and more than 300 refuelings and defueli ngs of Naval reactors. there
F- I

Volume I. Appendix D

Volume I. Appendix D

F-2

15 1}

sdt!~tio n

t!mt! r gt! n ~y

dic:sd

uf thc:st! aitc:rnatl!

l o~a t in n s

Hypothetical Accident Evaluations

Several hypothetical accidents were analyzed at each facility for each of the alternatives . The
results are summarized in Tables F-2 and F-3. TIl results in these tables were calculated using the
methods described in Section F. I.3. Both fatal cancers from the maximum foreseeable accident at
each location and the most severe risk from a facility accident at each location are presented. Risk is
defined as the product of the consequences of an event multiplied by the probability of that event.
The risks associated with the accidents analyzed have not been added together in order to avoid
creating the impression that all risks have been calculated. The risks presented in this appendix cover
the complete range of accidents which might make a detectable contribution to overall risk and
additional analyses would not be expected to result in increases in calculated risk. The facility
accident which results in the highest risk is a drained water pool at (NEL, Hanford , Puget Sound,
Portsmouth, and Kesselring . For Savannah River, Pearl Harbor, Norfolk, the Nevada Test Site, and
Oak Ridge, an airplane crash into a dry storage area or a dry cell facility results in the greatest risk.
As was the case for the normal operations evaluation , the accident risk is very low at all locations and
for all alternatives .
Table F-4 presents a summary of the risk of fatal cancers by alternative for normal operations
and most severe facility accident fo r each alternative. Consistent with the detailed tables , this
summaiY table shows that all alternatives and all locations assoc iated with spent fuel examination have
very low risk.
Tables F-5 through F-8 present a summary by alternative of the impacts from all naval spent
nuclear fuel facility radiological accidents which were analyzed.
A shipping accident in Puget Sound, at a location in the shipp ing lane approximately 2 mil es
from Seattle, was also anal yzed usi ng th v methods described in th is Attachment. Th is hypothetical
accident results in a fire onboard the ship which involves spent nuclear fuel shippi ng conta iners.
When compared to the fac ility accidents analyzed at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard, this shippi ng
accident has a sl ightl y lower risk of fatal cancers than the most severe facil ity accident at the
shipyard.
The EP( computer code (Homann 1988) was used to estimate the concentration of chemicals
released in the event of two postulated accident condition . One postulated accident involved a
chemical spill and fi re at ECF and the alternate DOE sites and the other postulated accident involved
a di esel fu el fire at ECF, the al ternate DOE sites, and the shipyard locations . The chemical
F-3
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Table F-l. Number of fatal cancers per year from normal operations (fatalities per year to general population located within
50-mile radius of site) .
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DRY STORAGE AT NAVAL NUCLEAR PROPULSION PROGRAM SITES, WATER POOL STORAGE AT DOE SITES
:>

"0
"0
(l>

::s

No Action

Q.
)(

o

Planning Basis!
DecentraliZAtionRegionaliZAtionl RegionaliZAtionl RegionaliZAtionl RegionaliZAtionl RegionaliZAtionl
DecentraliZAtion- Puget Sound DecentraliZAtion- CentraliZAtion- CentraliZAtion- CentraliZAtionCentniliZAtion- Cenlr1lliZAtionHanford
No Examination
Exa m
INEL Exam
INEL
Savannah River Nenda Teat Sile
Oak Ridge

INEL

0.00

0 .00

0 .00

8.50 x 10-1

8.50 x 10-1

0 .00

0.00

Ha nford

0.00

0 .00

0 .00

0.00

0.00

4.00 x 10~

0.00
5

0.00

0.00

0.00

0 .00

Savannah River

0.00

0 .00

0 .00

0.00

0.00

0.00

1.80 x 10-

0.00

0.00

Nevada Test Site

0.00

0.00

0 .00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0 .00

9.00 x 10~

0.00

Oak Ridge

0.00

0.00

0 .00

0.00

0.00

0 .00

0 .00

0 .00

5.00

Pugct Sound

1 . 20xI0~

1.20 x 1 0~

6 .62 x 10-5••

1.20 x 10~

0.00

0 .00

0.00

0.00

0 .00

9

10-

9

9

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

2.30 x 10-

1

10-

1

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

2. 10 x 10-

5

0.00

0.00

0 .00

0.00

0.00

4. 10 x 10-

,2

0.00

0 .00

0.00

0.00

0.00

9.00 x 10-1

5.00 x 10-5

0.00

0.00

0 .00

0.00

0 .00

0.00

Pearl Harbor
Portsmouth
Norfolk
Kess.:Jri ng

9 .30 x 102.30 x 10-

1

2. 10 x 10-

5

4. 10 x 10-

12

Total 2.24 x 10-

5

9.30

X

2. 10 x

10- 5

4.10 x 10-

12

2.24 x 10-

5

9.30 x 10-

9

2.30 x 10-

1

2. IOx 10-

5

4.10 x

10- 12

8.74 x

10-5

9 .30 x 102.30

X

5

2.33 x 10-

8.50 x 10-

1

4.00 x 10~

1.80 x 10-

5

X

10-5

WATER POOL STORAGE AT ALL SITES*
INEL

0.00

0.00

0.00

8.50

Hanford

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

X

10-1

8.50 x 10-1

0.00

0.00

0.00

4.00 x 10~

0 .00
10-5

Savannah River

0 .00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

1.80 x

Nevada Test Site

0 .00

0.00

0.00

0 .00

0.00

0.00

0.00

9 .00 x 10~

0 .00

Oak Ridge

0 .00

0.00

0 .00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0 .00

5.0 x 10-5

Pugct Sound

1.20 x 10-6

6.50 x 10- 5

6 .50 x 10-5

6.50 x 10-5

0 .00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

Pearl Hamor

9.30 x 10-

9

10-5

10-5

10-5

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

2.30 x 10-

1

2.30 x 10-

5

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

l . IO x 10-

5

1.40 x 10~

1.40 x 10~

1.40 x 10~

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

4. 10 x 10-

'2

5

5

5

0.00

0.00

0.00

0 .00

0.00

9.00 x 10~

5.00 x 10-5

Portsmouth
Norfolk
Kesse lring

.

TOOl I 2.24 x

10- 5

7.00 x

4. 10 x 10-

5

3.39 x 10~

7.00 x

2.30 x 10-

4. 10 x 10-

5

3.39 x 10~

7.00 x

2.30 x 10-

4. 10 x 10-

3.40 x 10~

Under No Action alternative, dry storage at Naval Nuclear PropulSion Program sites
··Includes dry 8toroge and waler pool examination under this alternative

8.50 x 10-

1

4.00 x 10~

5

1.80 x 10-

Table F-2. Number of fatal cancers from a maximum foreseeable accident (fatalities per accident over a 50-year period to general
population within a 50-mile radius of site) .

DRY STORAGE AT NAVAL NUCLEAR PROPULSION PROGRAM SITES, WATER POOL STORAGE AT DOE SITES

No Action
0 .00

INEL

."
,
VI

Planning Basisl
DecentralizalionRegiona lizationl Regionalizationl Regionalizationl Regionalizationl Regionalizationl
Decentralizalion- Pugel Sound Decentralization- Centrali7Alion- Centralization- Centralization ·
Centralization- CentralizationNo Examination
INEL Exam
Hanford
Savannah River Nevada Tell Site
Oak Ridge
INEL
Exam
0.00

1.70

0 .00

X

10-2

1.70

X

10-2

0.00

Hanford

0 .00

0.00

0 .00

0 .00

0.00

4.70

Savannah River

0 .00

0.00

0.00

0 .00

0.00

0.00

Nevada Test Site

0 .00

Oak Ridge

0.00

0 .00
0 .00
2

Pugel Sound

1.7 x 10-

Pearl Harbor

2.60 x 10 1

2.60

Pons mouth

9 .00

9.00
10 1

1.7

Norfolk

1.6

Kesselring

7.50

7.50

2.60 x 10 1

2.60

Max

X

1.6

X

X

10-

X

2

101

0.00

0 .00

0.00

0.00

5. 1 X 10- 1..
2.60

X

10 1

9.00
10 1

X

101

1.7

X

2.60

X

10 1

9 .00

1.6 ~ 10 1

1.6

7.50

7 .50

2.60

10-

2

X

10 1

X

2.60

101

10\

10-

0.00

0 .00

0.00

0.00

0 .00

0.00

4.80

0.00

0.00
10-

1

0.00

0 .00

0 .00

1.80

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

8.40

0 .00

0 .00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0 .00

0.00

0 .00

0 .00

0 .00

0.00

0.00

O .~

0 .00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0 .00

0 .00

0.00

0 .00

0 .00

4.80

1.80 x 10-\

8.40

0 .00

0 .00

0.00

0.00

0 .00

0.00
0 .00

0.00
X

X

2

1.70

0.00
X

10-2

4.70

X

10-2

X

0.00

WATER POOL STORAGE AT ALL SITES*
INEL

<

:23

c:

~

:>

"0
"0

0.00

0-

x

o

1.70

0.00

X

10- 2

1.70

X

10-2

0 .00
2

Hanford

0 .00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

4.70

Savannah Rive r

0.00

0.00

0.00

0 .00

0.00

0 .00

4.80

0 .00

Nevada Test Sile

0 .00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0 .00

0.00

1.80

Oak Ridge

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0 .00

8.40

0.00

0.00

0.00

0 .00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0 .00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0 .00

0 .00

0.00

0 .00

0.00

0 .00

0 .00

0.00

0 .00

0 .00

4.80

1.80 x 10- 1

8.40

0 .00

Pugel Sound

1.7 x 10-

Pea rl Harbor

2.60

X

2

10\

5. 1 X

0.00
10- 1

1.10

9.00

Norfolk

1.6 x 101

6 .0

7.50

2.50 x 10- 1

Kesselring
Max

2 .60 x 10\

X

1.10

5. 1 X

0.00
10- 1

1.10

3.40 x 10- 1

Ponsmouth

~

::s

0.00

10- 1

3.40
6 .0

X

2.50
1.10

5. 1 X

10- 1

1.10
X

10-\

10- 1
X

10- 1

3.40
6.0

X

10- 1

1
X 10-

2.50

X

10- 1

1.10

· Under No Achon altemahve . dry slorage .t Nav.1 Nuclear Prop uls10n Program slles
··lncludes dry storage and water pool examination under this alternative

0.00
1.70 x 10-

X

10-

0.00
2

/~

4 .70

X

10-

2

X

10-\

0 .00

-

~

Table F-3. Most severe risk from a facility accident (probability of fatalities per year per accident to general population within a
50-mile radius of site).
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DRY STORAGE AT NAVAL NUCLEAR PROPULSION PROGRAM SITES, WATER POOL STORAGE AT DOE SITES

No Action
INEL

Planning Basis!
Regional ization Regionalization/ RegioMlization/ RegioMlization/ RegioMlization/
DecentralizationDecentralization- Puget Sound Decentralization- Centralization- Centralization- Centralization- Centralization- CentralizationSavannah River NeYidi Teat Site
OIk Ridge
No Examination
INEL Exam
INEL
Hanford
Exam
0 .00

0 .00

1.70 x 10-7

0 .00

1.70 x 10-7

0.00
7

0.00

0.00

0.00

Hanford

0.00

0 .00

0.00

0.00

0.00

4.70 x 10-

0.00

0 .00

0.00

Savannah River

0.00

0 .00

0 .00

0.00

0.00

0 .00

9.(0 x 10~

0 .00

0.00

Nevada Test Site

0.00

0.00

0 .00

0.00

0 .00

0.00

0.00

7.20 x 10....

0.00

Oak Ridge

0 .00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

8.40 x 10~

0.00

0 .00

0 .00

0 .00

0 .00

2.60 x 10~

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

7

9.00 x 10-

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

1.6 x IO-~

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0 .00

0.00

0.00

0.00

9.60 x 10~

7.2 x 10....

8.40 x 10~

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0 .00

1.7 x 10-

Puget Sound

7

2.60 x 10~

Pearl Harbor
Portsmouth

9.00 x 10-

Norfolk

1.6 x IO-~
7.50 x 10-

Ke ssdring
Max

7

1.7xlO-

7

2.60

4

X

5.10 x 10~"

10

9.00 x 10-

2.60
7

1.6 x IO-~
7

2.60 x IO~

X

10

4

9.00 x 101.6 x

IO-~

7

7.50 x 10-

2.60 x IO~

4

7.50 x 10-

2.60

7

X

7

10

1.7 x 10-

7

7.50 x 102.60

X

7

4

10

0.00
1. 70

0 .00
X

10-

7

4.70 x 10-

7

WATER POOL STORAGE AT ALL SITES*
INEL

0.00

Hanford

0.00

0.00

Savannah River

0 .00

0.00

0 .00

0.00
0.00
0.00

1.70

X

10-7

0.00
0.00

1.70 x 10-7

0.00

0.00

4.70

0.00

X

10-7

0.00

0 .00

0.00

9.60 x 10~

0.00

0.00
0.00
8.40 x 10~

Nevada Tes! Site

0.00

0 .00

0.00

0 .00

0 .00

0.00

0.00

7.20 x 10-8

Oak Ridge

0.00

0.00

0.00

0 .00

0 .00

0.00

0.00

0.00

Puget Suund

1.7 x 10- 7

5.1 x 10~

5.1 x 10~

5.1 x 10~

0.00

0 .00

0 .00

0.00

0.00

Pearl Harbor

2.60 x 10~

1.10 x IO-~

1.10 x 10-~

1.10 x IO-~

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

Portsmouth

9.00 x 10- 7

3 .40 x 10~

3.40 x 10~

3.40 x 10~

0 .00

0 .00

0.00

0.00

0.00

Norfolk

1.6 x 10-~

6.0 x 10~

6.0 x 10~

6.0 x 10~

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0 .00

Kesselring

7.50

10- 7

2.50 x IO~

2.50 x 10~

2.50 x 10~

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

2.60 x 10~

\.10 x IO-~

\.10 x IO-~

\.10 x IO-~

1.70 x 10-7

4.70 x 10- 7

9.60 x 10~

7.20 x 10....

8.40 x 10~

Max

X

· Unde r No ActIon alternative, dry Itorage at Naval Nuclear PropulSIon Pro8ram IItel
··Include. d ry Ilora ge and water po<>I examiMtion under thil alternative

I ql

Table F-4. Risk of fatal cancers by alternative (probability of fatalities per year per accident to general population within a
50-mile radius of site).

DecentralizationNo Examination

DecentralizationPuget Sound
Exam

Planning Basis!
Regionalization Regionalizationl
Decentralization- Centralization- CentralizationHanford
INEL Exam
INEL

Normal
Operations Risk
Dry Storage At
2.24 x IO-~
Navy Sites,
Water Pool
Storage At DOE
Sites

2 .24 x IO-~

8.74 x 10-'

2.33 x 10-'

8.50

X

10-7

Normal
Operations Risk
Watu Pool
Storage At All
Sites

3 .39

X

10-4

3.39

X

10-4

3 .40

X

10-4

8 .50

X

2.60

X

10-4

2.60

X

10-4

2.60

X

10-4

No Action

'"rI
t
-.I

<

2c:
3(l)

>

"'0
"'0
(l)

::I

Co

><

o

2.24 x 10-'

Most Severe
Ri sk From A
Facility
Accident Dry
Storage At
2.60 x 10-4
Naval Nuclear
(I)
Propulsion
Program Sites ,
Water Pool
Storage At DOE
Sites
Most Severe
Ri sk From A
2.60 x 10-4
Facility
Accident Water
(I)
Pool Storage At
All Sites

(I)

1.10 x IO-~

(I) Accident initiator - Airplane crash

(2) Accident initiator - Drained ""ater pool

(2)

(I)

1.10 x IO-~
(2)

(I)

1.10 x IO-~
(2)

Regionalizationl
CentralizationSavannah River

Regionalizationl Regionalizationl
CentralizationCentralizationNevada Test Site
Oak Ridge

4.00 x 10~

1.80 x IO-~

9.00 x 10~

5.00 x 10-'

10-7

4.00 x 10~

1.80 x IO-~

9 .00 x IO~

5.00 x 10-'

1.70 x 10-7
(2)

4.70 x 10-7
(2)

9.60 x 10~

7.20 x 10~

11.40 x 10~

10-7

9.60 x 10~

1.70

X

10-7

(2)

4.70

X

(2)

(I)

(1)

(I)

7.2 x 10~
(I)

(I)

11.40 x IO~
(I)

Table F-S. Impacts from naval spent nuclear fuel facility radiological accidents for the
No Action alternative.

Accident
Description

Probability
(per year)

Consequences
to Public
(fatalities
per accident)

Risk to Public
(fatalities)

Dose to Worker
(rem)

Table F-6. Impacts from naval spent nuc lear fuel faci lity radiological accidents for
Decentralization alternatives.

Dose to MOl
(rem)

DRY STORAGE ACCIDENTS

Accident
Description

Probability
(per year)

Consequences
to Public
(fatalities
per accident)

Risk to Public
(fatalities)

Dose to Worker
(rem)

Dose to MOl
(rem)

10-'
10-"
10-'
10-<1
10-<1
10-<

2. 1
2. 1
2. 1
2. 1
2. 1
2. 1

1.7 x 10-'
1.4
7.9 x 10-'
. 3.0
1.6
2.9 x 10-'

x 10-'

8.0
8.0
8.0
8.0
8.0
8.0

9.2 x 10-'
1.3
6.7 X 10-'
2.7
1.4
2.3 x 10-'

WET STORAGE AND EXAMINATION
ACCIDENTS

Mechanical Damage
Puget Sound
Pearl Harbor
Norfolk
Ponsmouth
Kesselring

1.0 x
1.0 x
1.0 x
1.0 x
1.0 x

10-'
10-'
10-'
10-'
10-'

1.0 x
1.0 x
1.0 x
1.0 x

10-'
10-"
10-'
10-'

1.7
3.0
1.8
1.0
7.4

x
x
x
x
x

10-'
10-'
10-'
10-'
10-'

1.7 x
3.0 x
1.8 x
1.0 x
7.4 x

10-'
10-'
10-'
10-'
10-'

2.6
1.6
9.0
7.5

10-<
10-'
10-'
10-'

5.6
5.6
5.6
5.6
5.6

x
x
x
x
x

10-'
10-'
10-'
10-'
10-'

3.9
2.1
8.1
4.2
8.1

x
x
x
x
x

10-'
10-'
10-'
10-'
10-'

Airplane Crash
Pearl Harbor
Norfolk
Ponsmouth
Kesselring

26
16
9.0
7.5

x
x
x
x

92
92
92
92

19
72
38
7.7

"Information applicable only for full examinations at INEL .
Drained Water Pool
"INEL
Puget Sound
Pearl Harbor
Norfolk
Ponsmouth
Kesselring

1.0 x
1.0 x
1.0 x
1.0 x
1.0 x
1.0 x

10-'
10-'
10-'
10-'
10-'
10-'

1.7 x 10-'
5. 1 x 10-'
1.1
6.0 x 10-'
3.4 x 10-'
2.5 x 10-'

1.7 x
5. 1 x
1.1 x
6.0 x
3.4 x
2.5 x

10-'
10-'
10-'
10-'
10-'
10-'

6.4 X
2.8 x
6.0 x
3.5 X
1.5 x
1.1 x

6.4
2.8
6.0
3.5
1.5
1.1

Accidental Criticality
"INEL
Puget Sound
Pearl Harbor
Norfolk
Ponsmouth
Kesselring

1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0

x
x
x
x
x
x

10-'
10-'
10-'
10-'
10-'
10-'

x
x
x
x
x

10-<
10-<1
10-<1
10-<1
10-"

Mechanical Damage
"INEL
Puget Sound
Pearl Harbor
Norfolk
Ponsmouth
Kesselring

10-'
10-'
10-'
10-'
10-'

5.3 X 10- 11
7.2 X 10-'0
1.5 x 10-'
8.0 X 10-'0
5.6 X 10-'0
6.0 X 10-'0

5.2
5.2
5.2
5.2
5.2
5.2

x
x
x
x
x
x

10-<
10-<
10-'
10-'
10-'
10-'

2.6 x 10-<
1.7 x 10-<
9.3 x 10-'
3.5 x 10-<
1.9 x 10-'
3.6 x 10-'

2.0 x 10-'
4.0 x 10-'
2.0 x 10-'

4.6 x 10-'
2.4 x 10-'
1.8 x 10-'

9.2 X 10-'
9.6 x 10-'
3.6 x 10-'

1.6
1.6
1.6

X

X

10-'
10-'
10-'

2.8 x 10-'
1.1 X 10-'
1.1 x 10-'

5.0 x 10-'
5.0 x 10-'
5.0 x 10-'

5.3 x 10-'
6.4 x 10~
1.2 x 10-'

2.7 x 10-'
3.2 X 10-'
6.0 x 10-'

2.4 X 10-'
2.4 x 10-'
2.4 x 10-'

2.5 x 10-'
1.6 x 10-'
8.7 x 10-'

1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0

x 10-'
x 10-'
x 10-'
x 10-'
x 10-'
x 10-'

5.3
7.2
1.5
8.0
5.6
6.0

x 10-<1
x
x
x
x
x

Airplane Crash
Pearl Harbor
No rfolk
Kesselring

X

HEPA Filter Fire
"INEL
Puget Sound
Pearl Harbor
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Table F-6. Impacts from naval spent nuclear fuel facility radiological accidents for
Decentralization alternatives. (Cont)

Accident
Description

Probability
(per year)

Consequences
to Public
(fatalities
per accident)

6.9. 10-<
5.0. 10-<
Norfolk
WET STORAGE AND EXAMINATION
ACCIDENTS

Table F-7. Impacts from naval spent nuclear fuel facility radiological accidents for
Planning Basis, Centralizatie>n at INEL, and Regionalization at INEL alternatives .

Risk to Publ ic
(fatalities)

Dose to Worker
(rem)

Dose to MOl
(rem)

3.5 • 10-'

2.4 • 10-'

3.3 • 10-'

5.0. 10-<
5.0. 10-<

3.9. 10-<
3.3 • 10-<

2 .0 . 10-'
1.7.10-'

1.0.10- 1
1.0.10-1
1.0.10- 1
1.0.10-1
1.0 . 10- 1
1.0.10- 1

1.7. 10-'
3.5 • 10-<

I.3 • 10-'
4 .2. 10-"
4.6. 10-1•
1.8. 10-'
1.4. 10-"
8.5 • 10-"

I.3 •
4.2.
4.6.
1.8 •
1.4 •
8.5 •

10-"
10- 1•
10-"
10- 1•
10- 1•
10- 1•

N/A

N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/ A

2.5 • 10-"
3.2 • 10-1•
1.3 • 10- 1•
2.7. 10- 1•
1.3 • 10-1•
6.0 • 10-"

INEL

1.7.10-'

1.7. 10-'

2.1

1.7.10-'

6.4 • 10-'

6 .4. 10-'

8.0

9.2. 10-'

1.0.10-'

5.3. 10"

5.3. 10-"

5.2. 10-'

2.6. 10""

5.0. 10-<

5.3 • 10-'

2.7. 10-'

2.4. 10-'

2.5 • 10-'

1.3. 10-'

1.3 • 10-'

N/A

2.5 • 10-"

4.9. 10-'

4.9 • 10-'

5.6. 10-'

4.6. 10-<

1.0. 10-'

3.5 • 10-'

3.5 • 10-'

1.0.10- 1

2.2 • 10-<

1.0. 10-'

3.0. 10-"

3.0 • 10-"

7.2 • 10-'

9.3 • 10-"

1.0.10-'

1.0.10-'

Mechanical Damage
INEL

INEL

Minor Water Pool Leak

1.0.10-'
1.0.10-'
1.0 .10-'
1.0. 10-'
1.0.10-'

1.7. 10-'
3.0. 10-'
1.8. 10-'
1.0.10-'
7.4 . 10-'

1.0.10-'
1.0. 10""
1.0.10-'
1.0.10-'

26
16
9.0
7.5

1.7. 10-'
3.0. 10-'
1.8. 10-'
1.0.10-'
7.4. 10-'

5.6.
5.6 .
5.6.
5.6.
5.6.

10--'
10-'
10-'
10-'
10-'

3.9 •
2.1 •
8. 1 •
4.2.
8. 1 •

10-'
10-'
10-'
10-'
10-'

INEL

1.0.10- 1

DRY STORAGE ACCIDENTS
Mechanical Damage

Airplane Crash

INEL
2.6.
1.6.
9.0.
7.5 •

10-<
10-'
10-'
10-'

92
92
92

92

19
72
38
7 .7

1.0 . 10-'

DRY CELL ACCIDENTS
Mechanical Damage
INEL

DRY CELL ACCIDENTS

Loss of Shielding

Mechanical Damage
'INEL

INEL

HEPA Filter Fire

Mechanical Damage

Pearl Harbor
Norfolk
Ponsmouth
Kessel ring

Dose to MOl
(rem)

Accidental Criticality

DRY STORAGE ACC IDENTS

Puget Sound
Pearl Harbor
Norfolk
Ponsrnouth
Kessel ring

Dose to Worker
(rem)

Drained Water Pool
2.4 • 10-'
2.4. 10-'

Minor Water Pool Leak
'INEL
Puget Sound
Pearl Harbor
Norfolk
Pons mouth
Kessel ring

Risk to Public
(fatalities)

Probabil ity
(per year)

WET STORAGE AND EXAMINATION
ACCIDENTS

'Information applicable only for full e.aminations at INEL
Ponsmouth
Kesselring

Accident
Description

Consequences
to Public
(fatalities
per accident)

1.0. 10-<

3.5 • 10-<

3.5 • 10-'

1.0. 10- 1

2.2 • 10-<

1.0. 10-'

3.0. 10-"

3.0. 10-"

7.2. 10-'

9.3 • 10-"

INEL

Loss of Shielding
'INEL
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Table F-8. Impacts from naval spent nuclear fuel facility radiological accidents for
Regionalization or Centralization at other DOE sites alternatives .
Information applicable only to DOE site selected for Regionalization or Centralization .

Accident
Description

Probability
(per year)

Consequences
to Public
(fatal ities
per accident)

Risk to Public
(fatalities)

Dose to Worker
(rem)

Dose to MOl
(rem)

10- 1
10-2
10-3
10- 1

1.1 x 1~
4.7 X 10-1
1.9 X 10-8
1.8 X 10..{)

2.1
2.1
2. 1
2.1

1.6 x 10- 2
6.3 x 10-3
3.3 x 10-2
5.2

4 .5 X 10-1
1.6 X 10-1
7.0 x 10-9
8.8 X 10-1

8.0
8.0
8.0
8.0

9 .4 X 10-3
2.8 X 10-)
2.0 x 10-:
4.7

WET STORAGE AND EXAMINATION
ACCIDENTS
Drained Water Pool
Savannah River
Hanford
Nevada Test Site
Oak Ridge

1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0

x 10-5
x 10-5
x 10-5
x IO-~

1.1
4.7
1.9
1.8

X

X
X
X

Accidental Criticality
Savannah River
Hanford
Nevada Test Site
Oak Ridge

1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0

x
x
x
x

10-5
10-5
10-5
10-'

4.5 X 10-2
1.6 X 10-2
7.0 x lQ-4
8.8 X 10-2

x
x
x
x

10-'
10-'
10-'
10-5

2.0 X
8.6 X
5.6 X
3.4 x

Mechanical Damage
Savannah River
Hanford
Nevada Test Site
Oak Ridge

1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0

10-5
IO..{)
10-1
10-'

2.0
8.6
5 .6
3.4

X
X
X
X

10- 10
10- 11
10- 12
10- 10

5 .2 X 10-4
5 .2 x 10-*
5.2 x 1Q-4
5.2 x 10-*

2.2 X
9.8 X
4 .6x
5 .9 x

IO..{)
10-1
I~

IQ-4

Airplane Crash
6 . 1 X 10-3
1.0 X 10-2
1.7 X 10-4

1.2 X 10- 1
1.0 X 10-1
6.8 X 10- 11

1.6
1.6
1.6

X

IQ-4
IQ-4
IQ-4
10-4

1.3 x 10-4
5.3 x 10-'
5 .7 x IO..{)
2.2 X 10""

6 .5 x 10- 1
2.7 X 10- 8
2 .9 X 10-9
1.1 X 10-1

2.4
2.4
2 .4
2.4

X

1.0 x 10- 1
1.0 x 10- 1
1.0 x 10- 1

1.3 X 10- 9
1.7 X 10- 10
1.4 X 10-9

1.3
1.7

X

1.4

r. 10- 10

Savannah River
2.0 x I~
1.0 x IO..{)
Oak Ridge
Nevada Test Site 4 .0 x 10-1

X
X

10- 1
10- 1
10- 1

6.4 x 10-4
1.8 X 10- 1
1.3xlO-3

10-)
10-3
10-)
10-3

2.1 x IO-~
7.0 X 10- 6
4 .3 x 10-'
5 .7 X 10-3

HEPA Filter Fire
Savannah River
Hanford
Nevada Test Site
Oak Ridge

5.0
5.0
5.0
5.0

x
x
x
x

X
X
X

Minor Water Leak
Savannah River
Hanford
Nevada Test Site
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X

10- 10
10- 11

N/A
N/A
N/A

7.9 x 10- 10
9 .9 x 10- 12
2.5 x 10-9

Table F-8. Impacts ~rom naval spent nucl ear fuel facility radiological accidents for
ReglonahzatlOn or Centralization at other DOE sites alternatives. (Cont)
concentrations were the n compared aga inst Emergency Release Planning Guide (ERPG) levels as a

Information applicable only to DOE sites selected for Regionalization or Centralization .

Accident

Probability

Consequences
to Public
(fatalities

Description

(per year)

per accident)

Oak Ridge
1.0 x /0-'
DRY STORAGE ACCIDENTS

means of evaluating their effects. ERPG val ues are specific for each substance and provide an
estimate of the airborne concentration thresholds above which one can reasonably observe adverse
Risk to Public

Dose to Worker

(fatalities)

Dose to MOl

(rem)

(rem)

ERPG-3 level could result in a life-threatening health effect. For the postulated accident involving a

3.9

NIA

1.5 x 10-"

chemical spill and fi re. on-site personnel (worker) could be exposed to concentrations of hydrochloric

3.9 x 10-"

X

10-'0

acid. phosgene. sul furic acid . and sodi um hydroxide above ERPG-3 levels which indicates a potential

Mechanical Damage
Savannah River
Hanford
Nevada Test Site
Oak Ridge

for long-term health effects . However. no member

1.0 x
1.0 x
1.0 x
1.0 x

10-'
10-'
10-'
10-'

3.0
1.3
5.3
5. I

x
x
x
x

10-'
10-'
10-'

/0-'

3.0 x 10-'
1.3 x 10-'
5.3 x 10-'0
5. 1 x 10-'

5 .6
5.6
5 .6
5.6

x 10-'

x 10-'
x /0-'
x 10-'

4 .9
1.7
8.8
1.4

x 10-'
x 10-'
x 10-'
x /0-'

3.0 X 10-'
3.0 x /0-'

2 .8
4.7

8.4 x 10-'
1.4 x 10'"

92
92

4.7 x 10-'
120

1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0

concentrations could exceed ERPG-3 under severe meteorological conditions. However. for both
postulated accidents. the accident analyses did not include evacuation of on-site or off-site person nel

evacuation would be used to reduce the effects on the public and workers .
x
x
x
x

10-'
10-'
10'"
10-'

1.4
5.3
3.7
2.5

x
x
x
x

/0-'
10'"

/0-'
10-'

1.4 X /0-'
5 .3 x /0-'
3.7x/O-·
2 .5 x 10-'

1.0 X 10-'
1.0 X 10-'
1.0 x 10-'
1.0 x 10-'

2.4
7. I
4 .0
5 .8

x
x
x
x

10'"
10-'
10-'
10-'

Fugitive Dust Ana lysis

The FDM computer code was used to estimate the fugitive dust concentrations that could
result from the construction of a water pool faci lity at the alternate locations. It was determined that

1.0 x
1.0 x
1.0 x
1.0 x

10-'
10-'
10-'

10-'

3.0 x
4 .9 x
3.7 x
7.5 x

10-"
/0-"
/0-"
10'"

the release of fugit ive dust would not result in any adverse effects for any of the alternate locations.
3.0 X /0-21
4.9 x /0-"
3.7 x 10""
7.5 X /0-11

7.2
7 .2
7.2
7.2

x
x
x
x

10-'
10-'
10-'

/0-'

6 .7 x
3.3 x
6.3 x
1.2 x

10-"
10-"
10-"
10-'

Airplane Crash
Savannah River
Oak Ridge
Nevada Test Site

fi re. on-site personnel could be exposed to concentrations of sul fu r dioxide and oxides of nitrogen
above ERPG-3 levels. No member of the general public located off-site would be expected to be

and it is expected th at chemical exposures would be below ERPG-3 levels because actions such as

Loss of Shielding
Savannah River
Hanford
Nevada Test Site
Oak Ridge

hydroxide concentrations could exceed ERPG-3 . For the postulated accident involv ing a diesel fuel

exposed to levels above ERPG-3 except for Oak Ridge where sulfur dioxide and oxides of nitrogen

Mechanical Damage

Hanford
Nevada Test Site
Oak Ridge

the general public located off-site would be

conce ntrations could exceed ERPG-3 and one shipyard location (Norfolk) where nitric oxide

DRY CELL ACCIDENTS

Savannah River

o~

expected to be exposed to levels above ERPG-3 except lor Oak Ridge where sulfuric acid and sodium

Airplane Crash
Savannah River
Oak Ridge

effects . Exposure to an ERPG-I level could result in a very mild effect whereas exposure to an

Other Impacts

The radi ological impact of acc idents on the environs of a facility was determined by
2 .0 x 10-'
1.0 x 10'"
4.0 x /0-'

exami ning the area that could be contaminated following such an event. Calculations using average
4 .8
8.4
1.8 x /0- '

9.6 x 10-6
8.4 x 10-6
7.2 x /0-'

160
160
160

8.2 x 10-'
350
1.6

meteorological conditions were performed for each accident scenario. These calculat ions determined
the extent of the contamination which causes on ly a small increase in background radiation from
naturally occurring sou rces. For most facilities and most accidents. the contaminated area was
confined to the boundaries of th e site. For a few cases. the casualty sce narios did res ult in cont aminated land outside the site boundaries; however. the total land co ntaminated for those scenarios (inside
and outsid e the boundary) was no mor< than 207 acres. The impact o f this co ntaminati on would be
temporary while the area was isolated and remediati un efforts co mpl eted .
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F.1 RADIOLOGICAL ISSUES FROM NAVAL SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL
INSPECTIONS AND STORAGE

least 30 years beyond the active lifeti me of the reactor facility . The NRC also concluded that the
possibility of a maj or accident or sabotage at a spent fuel storage facility with radiological co nsequences for the public is extremely remote.

Naval spent nuclear fuel is currently examined and stored at the Naval Reactors Facility's
Expended Core Facility (ECF) at the DOE Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL) . The
INEL-ECF is a large laboratory facility used to receive, examine, and ship naval spent nuclear fuel

Considerable experience has been gained in the transport of spent fuel elements and in the
consequent safety-related development of suitable transportation casks. This experience has made it

and irradiated test specimen assemblies. Enclosed work areas at INEL-ECF include an array of

possible to develop a concept for dry storage of spent fuel elements within transportation casks; dry

interconnected reinforced concrete water pools which permit visual observation of naval spent nuclear

storage contai ners generally have not been th e transportation casks themselves.

fuel during handling and inspection while shi eld ing workers from radiation . Adjacent to the water
pools are shielded cells used for operations which must be performed dry . One of th e water pools

The concept of a cask which could be used for both transportation and storage has been

contains transfer canals that will link the water pools with a proposed Dry Cell Project. which would

licensed in the United States in the framework of a policy of dry storage in Independent Spent Fuel

provide a location for preparation of spent fuel in a dry , enclosed environment.

Storage Installations (CF R 1993). Acco rding to this policy, the reactor operators are entitled to store
the spent fuel elements, which have cooled in a pool for at least one year after discharge fro m the

The proposed Dry Cell Facility will consist of a shielded, radiolog ically controlled area built
of structural steel and concrete with remotely operated equipment necessary to examine fuel mod ul es.

The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) of the Nucl ear

reactor, in specially licensed containers under dry conditions for 20 years or more. A number of
storage casks have received official approval for that purpose.

F.1.1 Normal Operations

Energy Agency (NEA) reported that extensive safety analysis has sho wn that pool storage of Zircaloyclad fuel is a very safe option which can last for decades (NEA 1993). The external hazards, such as
earthquakes and aircraft crashes, are potential threats for L~ese facilities (loss of coolant) but
appropriate siting, desig n. and additional shielding can cope with these hazards. Dry storage has not
yet generally been carried out on a very large scale but it is anticipated that long-term storage in
adequate canisters is a very safe practice even against earthquakes and aircraft crashes.

Current practice for examination of naval spent nuclear fuel at ECF includes removal of upper
and lower non-fuel bearing structures, visual examination. measureme nt of key dimensions. collection
of speci mens. and loading into a shipping cask . Temporary sto rage of spent fuel at INEL-ECF is
required si nce fuel is, at times, received into the facility faster than it can be exami ned and shipped
out of the facility. In addition, a small amount of spent fuel is selected for retention as library
specimens for future reference and examination . Routine releases to the atmosphere were evaluated at

Several tech nologies are bei ng used cu rrently for the storage of spent fuel at reactor sites and
at si tes away from reactors . Both wet (POO l) storage facilities and dry storage facilities (build ings and
containers) are used on a commercial scale.

all locations based on measured releases from INEL-ECF. Each location was evaluated using releases
equivalent to those of INEL-ECF. Each location's specific population and meteorology were then
used to produce estimated co nsequences .

The safety of spent fuel storage has bee n ex tens ively evaluated . The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) reported in th e "Waste Confidence Decision" of 1984 that there is reasonable
assu rance that spent fu el can be sto red safely and without s ignificant environmental impact in reactOf
pools or in spent fuel storage installations (NUREG 1984). For both dry storage and wet storage, the

F. 1. 1. 1 Water Pool Storage. Wet sto rage is a hi ghl y developed techniqu e and it is the standard
method used worldwide for storage of spent fuel. While in wet storage pools. temperatures,
pressures, and radiation fluxes are lower than in the reactor. so there is no intrinsic driving force for
the sudden release of a major fraction of th e radi oacti ve materials co nt ained in the stored spe nt fuel .

NRC stated its belief that current sto rage technologies are ca pable o f provid ing safe storage for at
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The Zircaloy cladding of naval spent nuclear fuel is an efficient barrier against fission product
release during handling and storage of spent fuel. Given adequate control of water purity, Zircaloy

releases reponed by INEL-ECF in the past. Exposures due to downwind dispersion, water release,
and direct radiation were calculated .

resists corrosion in water during the long-term storage conditions of fuel assemblies. At the end of its
service life, the fuel is covered with a tightly adhering oxide layer formed at hi gh temperatures whi ch
is a major factor that inhibits further corrosion during storage.

F. 7. 7.2 Dry Storage. Many thousands of spent fuel assemblies of different types have been stored
for periods of time ranging from a couple of years to over 30 years in more than 20 different dry
storage facilities . In general, the spent fuel behavior during storage has been excellent and no

Direct exposure to radiation of persons working in storage facilities can occur during such

detrimental effects of dry storage on the integrity of the spent fuel have been detected (NEA 1993).

activities as handling of fuel caslcs and fuel assemblies, handling of contaminated filters , and repair
and maintenance work. Experience shows that, in common with other fuel cycle facilities, the risk of

increased occupational exposure arises when any maintenance or unusual operations are carried out.

The dry storage of spent fuel is being used to a limited extent in several countries. In the
United States, fuel was sto red in dry wells at the INEL. Dry wells were used for the storage of a

Such increased exposu res can, however, generally be minimized by good planning, adequate

small amount of fuel at the Nevada Test Site as pan of a large dry storage demonstration program.

reduodancy of critical components, paying panicular attention to the design of those items that are

Storage staned at the Climax deep dry wells (600 meters below the su rface in granite) in 1979. In

liable to become contaminated from the point of view of repair and maintenance, and by the use of

1983, one fuel assembly underwent extensive non-<lestructive and destructive characterization. No

local shielding and equipment decontamination procedures. Systems and components that are

problems requiring process changes were identified (NEA 1993).

imponant in this context include:
Designs of metal casks for use in spent fuel storage have been in existence since the late

•
•
•
•

•
•

pool water cooling and makeup systems;

19705. The caslcs are generally equipped with a double-lid system to ensure safe containment of

filter equipment for purification of pool water;

contents . These casks have been subjected to a variety of tests and demonstrations si nce the early

ventilation systems;

1980s using both intact and consolidated fuel.

equipment for temperature, water level, and leakage measurement in the fuel pools;
hoists and handling systems for fuel assembl ies; and

The DOE sponsored the demonstration of the storage of fuel in metal casks at th e Morris

equipment for handling and sto rage of other wastes.

sto rage facility in 1984 and 1985. The DOE entered into a cooperative ag reement with Virginia
Power, a United States' utility, to demonstrate the use of three types of metal casks. The Virginia

Shielding from radiat ion is normally assured by providing a minimum depth of water abnve
the fuel elements in storage to reduce the exposure rates . Fuel transfer mechanisms have limit

Power Surry Nuclear Power Station has bee n licensed by the NRC for storage of spent fuel in metal
casks.

switches and mechanical stops to prevent the inadvenent raising of fuel to the water surface. A highintegrity pool structure is needed in order to guarantee adequate containment of the pool water, but a

Results of demonstration activities have shown the following (N EA 1993):

limited loss of water resulting in a substantial reduction of the shielding layer is unlikely to involve
high risks of exposu res to personnel above operational limits since adequate countermeasures can be

•

taken in time.

•

no fuel failure has occurred during demonstration sto rage;

•

no secondary wastes have arisen from the storage operation.

radiation and thermal levels res ulting from metal cask storage have bee n acceptable;

Storage of naval spent nuclear fuel in water pools is an alternative being evaluated at all DOE
and Navy shipyard locations discussed above. Source terms fo r all locations were based on actual

Storage of naval spe nt nuclear fuel in storage or shippin g containers is an alternative being
evaluated at all locations. Since no ai rborne releases are expected from routine dry sto rage activity,
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only the biological effects of direct radiation exposure to the on-site personnel and the public were
determined .

F. 1. 1.3 Dry Cell Operations. The handling of naval spent nuclear fuel for research and devel op-

•
•

an unplanned criticality,

transportation accidents .

After the basic phenomena were identified , other references were consulted to ensure that all

ment purposes in dry cells like the proposed Dry Cell Project was evaluated at selected DOE

important accidents were considered. These included safety analysis reports, court decisions, other

locations . The health effects due to routine airborne releases and direct radiation exposure were

environmental impact statements, and summary documents such as the "Final Generic Environmental

estimated .

Impact Statement on Handling and Storage of Spent Light Water Reactor Power Reactor Fuel "
(NUREG 1979a) and "The Safety of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle" (NEA 1993).

F.1.2 Screening/Selection of Accidents for Detailed Examination
Examining the kinds of accidents which could result in release of radioactive material to the
Accidents were considered for inclusion in detailed analyses if they were expected to

environment or an increase in radiation levels shows that they can only occur if an accident produces

contribute substantially to risk (defined as the product of the probability of occurrence of the atcident

severe conditions. Some types of accidents, such as procedure violations, spills of small volumes of

times the consequence of the accident). Accidents were categorized into three types as either

water containing radioactive particles, or most other types of common human error, may occur more

Abnormal Events, Design Basis Accidents, or Beyond Design Basis Accidents. These categories are

frequently than the more severe accidents analyzed. However, they do not involve enough radioactive

characterized by their probability of occurrence as described funher in Section F.1.3. 7. Construction

material or radiation to result in a significant release to the environment or a meaningful increase in

aod industrial accidents are included in these categories .

radiation levels . Stated another way, the very low consequences associated with these events produce
smaller risks than those for the accidents analyzed , even when combined with a higher probability of

In selecting accidents to include in deta iled analyses, several considerations were utilized .
Initiating events were reviewed including natural phenomena (eanhquakes, volcanic activity,

occurrence. Consequently, they have not been included in the results presented in this Environmental
I mpact Statement.

tornadoes, hurricanes and other natural events) and human initiated events (human error, equipment
failures, fires, explosions, plane crashes , transportation accidents, and terrorism). Guiding principles

Acts of terrorism are expected to result in consequences whi ch are bounded by the results of

were established. such as : the radioactive materials involved must be available in a dispersible form;

accidents which were evaluated. Naval spent nuclear fuel is not considered to be amactive to

there must be a mechanism available for release of such materials from the facility ; and , there must

terrorists due to the bulk of the fuel and containers and due to the high radiation fields involved with

be a mechanism avai lable for off-s ite d ispersio n of the released materials. The pathways whereby

unshielded spent nuclear fuel. However, terrorist attacks on naval spent nuclear fuel during shipment

members of th e publ ic can be affected fro m the nuclear aspects of spent fuel operations are direct

were evaluated . The massive structure of the shipping containers used for naval spent nuclear fuel

exposure to radiatio n, inhalatio n of radioacti ve materials, or ingesti on of radioactive materials .

makes them an unlikely target of a terrorist attack . No such attacks have occurred in the nearly 40

Recognizi ng th ese fund amental processes and pathways . accidents involving the following basic

years of rail shipments whi ch have now travelled about 2 million kil ometers . Thus. the probability of

phenomena were identified:

a terrorist attack on a shipment is judged to be no more than the probability of a rail accident whi ch
is listed in Section A.7. 1.2. 1 of Attachment A to Appendi x D of this Environm ental Impact State-

•
•

•

loss of shi eldi ng of radioactive materi als.

ment. The consequences of a terrorist att ac k are also judged to be no more severe th an those listed

rel ease of radioactive products to th e environment du e to overheating of fuel .

for transportation accidents . Therefore. the same conclusions reached for transportation accidents

release of rad ioactive prod ucts to th e enviro nment du e to mechanical shock or damage

apply to th e risk to the ex tremely rugged shipping co nt ainers from terrori st attack during a shipment.

or inadvertent breaching of fue l cladd ing or containment,

In addition. during shipment . all naval spent nuclear fuel co ntainers are accompani ed by escorts who
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remain in contact with headquarters . In the event of an emergency, state and federal resources would

Accidents initiated at nearby facilities, by other activities unrelated to spent nuclear fuel
handling or storage. or during construction of an ECF or dry cell type of facility , would not produce

be quickly summoned to stabilize the situation.

effects more severe than the sequences of events described. This is because naval spent nuclear fuel
For an act of war, sabotage, or terrorist attack, it is likely the risk would be lower than
calculated for the airplane crash because it should be less probable that a force would exist to disperse
radioactive products into the atmosphere from a weapon as compared to the motive force of the fire

assumed in the case of an airplane crash . For example, attacks on containers using anti-tank weapons

undergoing examination or in storage under the conditions of the alternatives evaluated would not
need special conditions or uninterrupted operator attention to prevent overheating, failure of
containment, or loss of shielding. Therefore, evacuation in response to an accident at some other
facility would not co mpromise safety. This inherent safety, combined with the distance between naval
spent nuclear fuel facilities and any other activities which might suffer a catastrophic accident, means

would be less severe than the accidents analyzed because: (a) anti-tank weapons would cause a self-

that the accidents analyzed in this document produce conditions at a naval spent nuclear fuel facility

sealing penetration in the metal of a container, unlike that which is assumed from the airplane crash

which would be more severe than those for any hypothetical synergistic combination of events

(impact from a 50-inch diameter engine rotor); (b) there is no explosive material inside the container,

resulting from accidents at other, unrelated facilities. Therefore, such analyses have not been

so it will not "blow up" as a tank would if hit by such a weapon (in a tank attack, the tank shells

included in this evaluation.

inside the turret detonate); (c) there would be no fire to disperse the radioactivity that is re leased

when the container is breached, unlike an aircraft crash where the jet fuel wilt burn creating such a
fire. The rugged design of containers and the thick walls of water pools, combined with the shockabsorbing nature of water with a free surface, reduce the effects of other types of explosive charges.
It is not credible that a terrorist attack would result in a criticality or meltdown of spent nuclear fuel ;
however, in Section F.I .4.2. 1.2, the consequences of a hypoth etical criticality accident are presented.

The existence of common cause accidents at a facility has been considered. In general, only
one spent nuclear fu el facility is located at a panicular Navy site. However, it is possible for natural
phenomena, like an earthquake, to produce more than one accident at some sites causing a situation

resulting in the release of radioactive material into the atmosphere or an increase in radiation levels
due to loss of shielding. However. the probability of two or more accidents having maximum
co nsequences occur concurrently is less than the probability of the individual events . For example, if

The risks associated with an accidental criticality are less than those associated with a drained water

an earthquake affected the Naval Reactors Facil ity at INEL, a crane might fail causing damage to

pool or an airplane crash into dry storage containers.

stored spent fuel, the water pool might drain. and shielding for the Dry Cell might be damaged . The
impacts for this could conservatively be estimated by summing the consequences. A combined total

The effect of a terrori st allack or an act of sabotage is expected to be conservatively bounded
by the limiting accident discussed at each facility under each alternative . For example, the most
limiting accident involving naval spent nucl ear fuel is desc ribed in this allachment to be an airplane
crash into a shipping contai ner at the Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard. This accident would lead to 26

of 2.8 x 10" fatal cancers are estimated. Similarly, co nsequences from spent nuclear fuel facilities
within a DOE site could be co mbined to conservatively estimate site wide impacts. But again, the
probability of a common cause event resulting in this number of consequences is lower than the
probability of the indi vidual accidents because the severity of impact will vary between facilities due
to separation distances.

latent fatal cancers over the next 50 years in th e population within 50 mil es of the shipyard . Since
the probability of the event is one chance in 100,000 per year. the risk would be 0 .00026 latent fatal
cancer fatalities per year or . in other words . about one chance in 4,000 of a llngk latent fatal cancer

Several accident scenarios were developed for the handling and storage of naval spent nucl ear
fuel. All potential accidents were not evaluated. but cases which are considered to be more severe

fatality over a year. This ri sk is shared among the approxi mately 820,000 people residing within 50

than all other reasonabl e acc idents were analyzed. Each of these accident scenarios was evaluated at

miles of th e shipyard who would be expected to have over 2 ,000 cancer fatalities from all causes

several locations using identical

every year. For an act of war, sabotage. or terror ist auack, it is likely the risk would be lower than

and meteorology data specific to each site were used to esti mate site specific health effects.

so ur~ e

terms. Like the evaluations for normal operations. popul ation

calculated because it should be less probable that a fo rce would exist to disperse radioactive products
into the atmosphere from a weapo n as compared to th e motive force of th e fire assumed in the case of

F. 1.2 . 1 Water Pool Storage. Six hypoth eti cal accident scenarios were evaluated for naval spent

nu clear fu el stored in water pools . These hypotheti cal sequences of eve nts include a drainage of the
an airplane crash .

water pool caused by an earthquake. an accidental criti cal it y. mechanical damage due to operator
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error or crane failure. an airplane crash into the water pool facility , a fire in a high efficiency

it is possible to compare the incremental effect of the proposed alternative actions or the different

paniculate air (HEPA) filter, and minor water pool leakage. Radiation exposure to on-site

impacts of the postulated accidents at the different sites. These locations include four naval shipyards

individuals, an individual at the site boundary, and the general population was estimated for airborne

(portsmouth , Norfolk, Puget Sound, and Pearl Harbor), five Depanment of Energy facilities (INEL,

releases of radioactivity, water releases. and direct radiation exposure.

Savannah River, Hanford, Nevada Test Site, and Oak Ridge), and the Kesselri ng Site.

F. 1.2.2 Dry Storage. Two hypothetical accident scenarios were evaluated for naval spent nuclear

F. 1. 3.2 Exposures to be Calculated. Radiation exposure to the following different individuals

fuel stored in shipping containers . The first scenario postulates that a wind-driven missile crashes

and the general population is calculated for normal operation of the spent fuel facility and for accident

into storage casks, with mechanical damage causing a release of corrosion products into the environ-

conditions:

ment. The second hypothetical scenario is based on an airplane crash into the dry storage area. Once
again, radiation exposure to on-site individuals, an individual at the site boundary, and the general

population was estimated for airborne releases, water releases, and direct radiation exposure.

•

Worker (Worker). An individual located 100 meters (330 feet) from the radioactive
material release point. (The impact of accidents on close-in workers is not calculated
numerically but is discussed qualitatively for each accident in Section F. 1.4.3 of this

F.1.2.3 Dry Cell Operations. Three hypothetical accidents were evaluated for naval spent nuclear

attachment.)

fuel handled in dry cells at several locations . These scenarios include cuning into the fuel region or
mechanical damage during examination work, partial loss of concrete shielding due to an earthquake,
and an airplane crash into the dry cell facility. Once again, radiation exposure to on-site individuals.

•

Maximally exposed collocated worker (MCW). At DOE locations, a theoretical
individual located at whichever is the greater of 0.4 mile from the facility area

an individual at the site boundary. and the general population was estimated for airborne releases,

boundary or 75 % of the distance to the nearest independent facility area. The MCW

water releases, and direct radiation exposure.

is not evaluated if the site boundary is closer than the MCW location. Thus. at
shipyard locations and the Kesselring Site. the MCW is not specifically evaluated.

F. 1.2 .4 Shipboard Fire Involving Shipping Containers. Attachment A describes the historical
practice of shipping naval spent nuclear fu el from Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard to Puget Sound Naval
Sh,pyard by ship where the containers are then transported to ECF by rail. Since 1962 , there have

•

Maximally exposed off-site individual (MOl). A theoretical indi vid ual living at the
DOE site or shipyard boundary recei ving the maximum exposure. At the Savannah

been 17 shipments contain ing a total of 20 shipping containers. Even though there have not been any

River Site, two separate MOl locations were evaluated depending upon whether the

accidents involving th ese shipments. hypothetical accidents were eval uated near the Pearl Harbor and

spent fuel facility is co nstructed on the Savannah River Site or is located at the

Pugot Sound shipyards. The scenario involves a collision of th e spe nt nuclear fuel ship with another

existi ng Barnwell Nuclear Fuel Plant (hereafter refe rred to as the Barnwell Plant)

ship wh ich results in a fire . The radiation exposure to nearby individuals and the general population

which is adjacent to the Savannah Ri ver Site . At Hanford. two separate MOl

was estimated for airborne and water releases.

locations were also evaluated depending upon whether a new facility is co nstru cted in
the 200 Area or modifications are made to the Fuels and Materials Examination

F .1.3 Analysis Methods for Evaluation of Radiation Exposure

Facility (FMEF) which is located in th e 400 Area.
F. 1. 3. 1 General. An evaluation of normal operations and hypothetical accide nts at the existing and
proposed sites was performed to assess th e possible radiation exposure to individuals due to the
release of radioact ive materials. The an alyses are based on the same operations carried out at the
different pote ntial locations and the same accidents at any of th e s ites evaluated . With this approach.
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•

Nearest public access individual (N PA). At larger DOE sites . highways used by the
public may cross th e federal reservati on which includes th e fac ility where naval spent
nuclear fu el operations could be co ndu cted . Consequently. these analyses included
evaluation of the ex posure to a th eo retical motorist who might be stranded on such a
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highway at the time of an accident. Based on experience from emergency exercises,

•

Inter nal exposu re from ingestion of terrestrial food and animal products (ingestion)

•

Exposure from contamin ated water (water release) .

emergency response teams would be able to evacuate such an individuaJ within 2
hours. so this was the exposure time used in the calculations. At naval shipyard

locations. no public access highways exist, but military personnel. civilian employees,
o r th eir family members, including some who reside on the base, may be located
outside th e cont rolled industrial area boundary but inside th e co nfines of the military

The radiation exposure is calculated by the computer programs discussed in Section F.I .3.6 in
a manner recommended by the International Commission on Radiological Protection OCRP 1977;

base. Such perso nnel might be at their homes, in buildings, or on the roadways of

ICRP 1979). Weighting factors are used for various body organs to calculate a "commined effective

the base at the time of an accident or at any time throughout the year for the

dose equivalent" (CE DE) from radiation inside the body due to inhalation or ingestion. Comm ined

evaluation of normal operations . The base residents are used as the NPA individuals

dose equivalents (C DEs) are calculated for organs such as the lungs, stomach, small intesti ne, upper

at these shipyards for analyses of normal operations. In the event of a severe accident

large intestine, lower large intestine, bone surface red bone marrow, testes, ovaries, muscle, thyroid.

th ey would be evacuated withi n 2 hours under military control of th e base,

bladder, kidneys, liver etc. The CEDE value is the summation of the CDEs to the specific organ

S0

th is

time was used in accident calculations. No NPA value was calculated for the

weighted by the relative risk to that organ compared to an equivalent whole-body exposure.

Kesselring Site and th e Nevada Test Site because there are no public roads whi ch

cross these sites , there are no residents, and there are no other public accesses.

The programs also calculate an effective dose equivalent (EDE) for the external exposure
pathways (immersion in the radioactive material. exposure to ground contamination) and a 50-year

•

Maximally exposed ind ividual at nearby communities is evaluated for accidents.

CEDE for the internal exposure pathways . The sum of th e EDE from external pathways and the
CEDE internal pathways is called the "total effective dose eq uivalent" (TEDE) in this Environmental

•

General popul ation within a 50-mile rad ius of the facility.

Impact Statement (E IS) and is also calculated by the programs. The TEDE reponed in the results

section is the sum of the TEDE's from air, water, and direct radiation exposures.
Exposure is calculated to res ult from direct rad iatio n from the facility and exposure to
radioactive co ntam ination released to the air. Normal releases directly to the water pathway occu r

The exposure from ingestion of terrest ri al food and animal products is calcul ated on a year ly

only at shipyards whi ch are located directly on bodies of water. and co ntamination of the water at all

basis. However, it is expected that continued consumption of contamin ated food products by the

sites results from fallout of airborne contamination . The releases to the air might result in exposure

public wou ld be suspended after a Protective Action Guideline is reached. In 1991. the

through several pathways desc ribed as follows :

Env ironmental Protection Agency reco mmended protective action guidelines in the range of I to 5
rem whole-body exposure. To ensure a consistent analysis bas is, no reduction of exposure due to a

•

ExternaJ direct exposure from immersion in the airborne radioacti ve materiaJ (air
immersion)

Protective Action Guideline was accounted for in th e analysis. This would result in a conservative
approach which may slightl y overes tim ate health effects within an exposed popul ation. but allows for

consistent comparisons between alternatives.
•

External direct exposure from radioactive material deposited on the ground (ground
surface)

Table F. 1. 3.2-1 ident ifies selected nea rby co mmunities for eac h site for which hypoth eti cal
exposures for a max imall y exposed individua l were calculated. In all cases. th e MOl expos ure was

•

Internal exposure from inhalation of radioacti ve aeroso ls and suspend ed panicles
(inhalation)

greater than maximum exposure at any nearby communit y. Calcul ations were performed fo r these
localities to evaluate exposures fo r areas representat ive of the range of com mun ities within 50 mil es
of the si tes analyzed. The selection of th ese communities was not intended to indicate th at oth er
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localities were not important. Other communities of interest in the vicinity of the sites in addition to
those evaluated include a number of communities in Maine and New Hampshire near the Portsmouth
Naval Shipyard, including Portsmouth, Durham, Eliot, Greenland, Kittery, New Castle, North
Hampton, Ogunquit, Rye, and South Berwick.

Table F.1.3.2-1. Nearby communities for each site.
INEL
Savannah River
Hanford
Nevada Test Site
Oak Ridge
Puget Sound
Pearl Harbor
Norfolk
Portsmouth
Kesselring

Howe, Atomic City , Arco, Blackfoot, Idaho Falls
Snelling, Barnwell , Jackson. Aiken, Allendale, Augusta, Sylvania, Bamberg,
Wrens
Othello, Richland, Prosser, Pasco, Yakima, Umatilla
Beatty, Pahrump, Las Vegas
Oak Ridge, Harriman , Rockwood, Knoxville, Jefferson City
Seattle, Tacoma, Olympia, Port Angeles
Pearl City, Aiea, Pacific Palisades, Ewa Beach, Honolulu, Ewa, Wahiawa
Newport News, Hampton, Suffolk, Virginia Beach, Williamsburg
Dover, Exeter, Hampton Beach, Sanford, Nashua, Lowell, Concord, Portland,
Boston
Ballston Spa , Saratoga Springs , Amsterdam , Schenectady, Corinth

Table F. I.3.2-2 presents an example of the detailed exposure calculation results which were
performed. The table shows the possible exposure pathways and individuals analyzed.

F.1.3.3 Evaluation of Health Effects. Health effects are calculated from the exposure results.

The risk factors used for calculations of health effects are taken from Publication 60 of the International Commission on Radiological Protection (lCRP 1991). Table F.1.3.3-1 lists the appropriate
factors used in the analysis of both the normal operations and the hypothet.ical accident scenarios.

Cancer fatalities were used to summarize and compare the results in this Environmental
Impact Statement since this effect was viewed to be of the greatest interest to most people. As shown
in Table F .1.3.3-1 , the number of total health effects (deaths, non-fatal cancers, genetic effects, and
other impacts on human health) may be easily obtained by multiplying the latent cancer fatalities by
the factor of 1.46. which is the ratio of 7.3/5.0.

The numerical estimates of cancer deaths and other health detriments presented were obtained
by the practice of linear extrapolation from the nominal risk estimate for lifetime total cancer
mortality at 10 rad . Other methods of extrapolation to the low-dose region could yield higher or
lower numerical estimates of cancer deaths . Studies of human popul ations exposed at low doses are
F-27
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Table F.1.3.2-2. Summary of exposure cal culation results .

c

3

nl

>

'0
'0
nl

Location

::s

0.

Worker
MCW
NPA
MOl

Inhalation
CEDE
(rem)
5.4 x 10- 1
4.8 x 10""
1.4 x 10""
6.1 x 10""

Air
Immersion
EDE
(rem)
6.5 X 10""
8.6 X 10-'
3.2 X 10-'
1.2 x 10~

Ground
Surface
EDE
(rem)
7.9 X 10- 1
3.4 X 10""
5.2 x 10- 5
7.8 X 10""

lngestion
EDE
(rem)

N/A
N/A
N/A
3.1 x 10-'

Airborne
Release
EDE
(rem)

Water
Rdease
(rem)

1.3

N/A

8.2 x 10""
1.9 x 10""
1. 7 x 10-)

1.6 X 10- 17
1.6 X 10- 17
3.0 x IO-s

Direct
Radiation
(rem)
8.8 x 10-5
3.8 X 10-8
3.4 X 10-9
9.6 X 10-9

Total
EDE
(rem)
1.3
8.2 x 10-'
1.9 x 10-'
1.7 X 10-3

Likelihood
• of Fatal
Cancer
5.3 x 10-'
4.1 x 10-7
9.5 x 10-8
8.6 X 10-7

Exposure to Maximally Exposed Individual at Nearby Communities (rem)

.."
,

IV
00

Arco
(30600m)

5.2 x 10- 5

1.3

X

10-'

6.4 x 10-5

3. 1 x 10-5

1.5 x 10-'

3.0 x 10- 5

3.4

X

10-9

1. 8 x 10-'

8.8 x 10-8

Howe
(16100m)

9.8 x 10- 5

1.8

X

10-'

1.2 x 10-4

5.6 x 10- 5

2.7

Idaho Falls
(72400m)

3. 1 x 10-6

5.2

X

10- 9

3.6 x

10~

2.0 x

Blackfoot
(68100m)

4.8 x 10-6

3.3

X

10-9

5.2 x

IO~

3.4 x

Atomic City
(24200m)

2.9 x 10- 5

1.0

X

10- '

3.6 x 10- 5

X

10-4

3.0 x 10-5

3.4

X

10- 9

3.0 x 10-'

1.5 x 10-7

IO~

8.7 x

10~

3.0 x 10- 5

2.1

X

10- 10

3.9 x 100s

1.9 x 10--

IO~

1.3 x 10-5

3.0 x 10- 5

2.1

X

10- 10

4.3 x 10-5

2.2 x 10-8

1.6 x 10- 5

8. 1 x 10-5

3.0 x 10-5

3.4

X

10-9

1.1 x 10-'

5.6 x 10-8
Fatal
Cancers

Exposure to Population within 50-mile Radius (person-rem)
Population of
11 5690

1.1 x 10- 1

6.1 x 10-5

1.5

X

10- 1

4.5

X

10- 2

3.0

X

10- 1

3.8

5.3 x

IO~

4.1

2.1 x 10-)

Table F. 1.3.J-1. Ri sk estimators for health effects fro m ionizing radiation.

The STAR data were also used to calcul.te the 50% and 95 % meteorological conditions for
the accident analyses . The 50% condition represellts the average meteorological condition. This

Risk Factor (probability per rem)'
Effect

Nuclide

General
Popul ation

Work er

Fatal cancer (all organs)

All

4.0 x

10~

5 .0 x

10~

Weighted non·fatal cancer"

All

8.0 x 10"

1.0 x

10~

Weighted genetic effects"

All

8.0 x 10"

Weighted total effects"

All

5 .6 x

1.3 x

10~

I~

condition is defined as that for which more severe conditions with respect to accident consequences
occur less than 50% of the time. The 95% condit io n represents the meteorological conditions which
could produce the highest calculated exposures. This is defined as that condition which is not
exceeded more than 5% of the time or is the worst combination of weather stability class and wind
speed . Each of these conditions is evaluated for 16 wind di rections .

7.3 x 10"
For each location, the nearest available SCRAM data was used to represent the conditions at

•

For higb individual exposures ( ~20 rem), the above risk fac to rs are multipl ied by a fac to r o f two .
General population exposures were not modified because the large drop in exposure with increasing
distances results in average exposure rates well below 20 rem .
In determining a means o f assessing health effects from radiation exposure, the ICRP has developed a
wei ghting method for non-fatal cancers and genetic effects to obtain a total weighted effec t. o r "health

the site being evaluated . Table F. 1.3.5-1 shows the pertinent data for the meteorological data
application.
Table F.l .3 .5-1. Meteorological data applicability.

detriment",

inadequate to demonstrate the actual level of risk. There is scientific uncenainty about cancer risk in

Site

Data From

Data Years

th e low-<lose region below the range of epidemiologic observation, and the possibility of no risk

Portsmouth

Portland ME Airport

1985-1989

cannot be excluded (CIRRPC 1992). In this appendix, the doses have been provided in all cases to

Norfolk

Norfolk VA Airport

1985-1989

allow independent evaluation using any relation between exposure and health effects.

Puget Sound

SEATAC Airport

1985- 1989

Pearl Harbor

Honolulu Airport

1985- 1989

INEL

NRF Tower

1987- 1991

Kesselring

Albany NY Airport

1985- 1989

Savannah River

Augusta GA Airport

1984- 1987

Hanford

200 Area Tower

1983-1990

F. 1.3 . 5 Meteorology. For th e navy shipyard s, Savannah River. and Kesselring Sites. the

Nevada Test Site

Desert Rock Tower

1990

meteoro logical data used in th e analyses were obtai ned from the SCRAM bulletin board system. For

Oak Ridge

Y-12 West Tower

1990

F. 1.3 .4 Population. Population distri butions specific to each site were used for the evaluations .

The population distributio ns were obtai ned from 1990 United States Census data. The population
information was obtained in 16 compass directions and 5 equal radial di stances from the likel y
location of a naval spent nu clear fu el site to a 50-mile total di stance.

the INEL. Hanford . Nevada Test Site. and Oa k Ridge. site tower meteorological data were used . The
SC RAM bull eti n board is operated by th e Support Center for Regul atory Air Models with in the

F. 1.3 .6 Computer Programs. Five computer programs were used to evaluate th e rad iation

Environmental Protection Agency. Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards . The SCRAM
surface meteorological data fil es are compr ised of data acquired from the National Climat ic Data

exposures to the specified individuals and general population.

Cente r. The SC RAM data for 4 or 5 years were used with prog rams from the bull etin board to
develop meteorological data in the STability ARray (STAR) format wh ich is a joint frequency
distr ibution of6 wind speed interv als. 16 wind di rections. and 6 stability categories. The STAR data

F. 1. 3 . 6 . 1 GENII. The code used for th e environm ent al and transport and ex posure

assess ment cal cul ations for norm al operations was GEN II (Nap ier et al. 1988). This code was

we re reform an ed into th e form at required hy the GEN II program. desc ribed below, for evaluation of

developed at Pac ific Northwest Labo ratory by Battelle Memori al Institute to incorporate the internal

normal operations.

dosimetry models recommended by th e International Commission on Rad iological Prote<tion in
Pu blicatio n 26 (IC RP 1977) and Publication 30 (IC RP 1979) into envi ronmental pathw ay anal ys is
models in use at Pacifi c Northwest Laborato ry.
F-29
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Although GENII can be used to model both acute and chronic releases to the atmosphere,

F.7.3.6.5 WATER RELEASE. WATER RELEASE is an unpublished computer code used

only the chronic option was used in th e normal operations evaluation refl ecting long-term average

to calculate exposures to humans arising from radionuclides which have been introduced into water in

exposure to the released radioactive contaminants. For the chronic evaluations, the code also uses

the vicinity of the proposed spent nuclear fuel storage and examination facilities. The following

meteorological conditions averaged over each sector to reflect exposure to long-term average

discussion provides a brief description of the key points associated with obtaining these estimates . All

concentrations. The ingestion calcul ation used the modeling approach that exposed individuals within

radionuclides which were considered to be introduced into the water at a site were postulated to be

50 miles of the site consumed 30 % of milk products and 10 % of all products grown locally where the

promptly distributed uniformly in the water in the immediate vicinity of the site during the time

people live.

period in which the nuclides were introduced. There are two processes by which radionuclides might
enter the water at each site: via liquid discharge or via airborne discharge. For liquid discharges, a

F. 7. 3. 6.2 RSAC·5. The computer code RSAC-5 was developed by Westinghouse Idaho

fraction of the released radionuclides might enter the water accessed by humans each year by

Nuclear Co, Inc. , for the DOE-ID Operations Office and is in the public domain (Wenzel 1993). The

infiltrating the ground to the groundwater then traveling either to wells or surface water. For

code calculates the consequences of the release of radionuclides to the atmosphere. It allows the

airborne discharges, some fraction of the released radionuclides might enter the water by deposition

amount of each fission product nuclide fro m a nuclear event to be input individually or to be

from the air. For both of these processes, the fraction of radionuclides that might enter the water

calculated internally by the code. RSAC-5 calc ulates potential radiation exposures to maximally

used by humans has been postulated to enter the water immediately, except for NRF and the Nevada

exposed individuals or population groups via inhalation, ingestion, exposure to radionuclides

Test Site. For NRF and the Nevada Test Site, it has been postulated that 20 years pass before the

deposited on the ground surface, immersion in airborne radioactive material , and radiation from a

nuclides might enter the water accessed by humans. This estimate is based upon the fact that water

cloud of radioactive material . RSAC-5 meteorological capabilities include Gaussian plume dispersion

must percolate into the ground and reach groundwater resources. Further, contamination must travel

fo r Pascal-Giffo rd co nditi ons. RSAC-5 release scenario modeling allows reduction of nuclides by

with the water in the aquifer to a point where it can be used by humans, such as a well at Atomic

chemical group or element and calcul ates decay and buildup during transport through operations ,

City. An assessment of the infiltration rate of radionuclides beneath ICPP estimates that about 200

faci lities, and the enviro nment. It also models the effect of filters or other cleanup systems.

years aro needed for them to pass into the aquifer (Smith 1994). Also , the water in the aquifer flows

Population exposures are the product of the calculated indi vidual exposure and the number of people

at a rate of 5 to 20 feet per day. Therefore, 20 years was used as the time for radionuclides to reach

in the affected population.

humans at INEL. Similarly, at the Nevada Test Site surface water is not present so water must reach
aquifers which are more than 600 feet deep. Hence, 20 years was also used at this site.

F. 7. 3. 6. 3 OR/GEN. ORIGEN (Croff 1980) is a computer code system for calcul at ing the
buildup and decay of radioactive materials (fi ssio n products, act inides, and activation products). The

Once the radionuclides have bee n introduced into the water at a site, they were calculated to

code input was modeled to describe tt , naval nucl ear fuel system and incorporates cross-section data

be transported to locations where th ey might affect man ei ther directly as via immersion (swimming)

that are distinct to naval fuels .

or indirectly as via ingestion of food . During this transport period , th ese radionuclides are subjected
to various mechanisms which may redu ce their concentration in the water such as radioactive decay,

F.7.3.6.4 SPAN. SPAN (Wall ace 1972) is the co mputer code which was used to calcul ate

dilution in larger vo lu mes of water, removal by sedimentation, etc. The pathways co ns idered in this

the direct radiation levels. Atte nuation from ai r was included in th e calcul ated radi ation levels. To

anal ysis by which radionuclides in th e water at a site might reach man are immersion, exposure to

determine the unit pe rson exposu re per secto r, SPAN was used to integrate th e radiation level over

surface deposits, boating and equipment ex posure, and co nsumption of drinking water, fish,

the sector . The radiation levels calcul ated at various distances were used as the source to represent

crustacea, molluscs, game animals, vegetables and fru its, root crops, milk and eggs, and domesticated

the proper distance falloff in the secto r. and a total radiation level fo r each sector was calculated .

animals. During the period when th e rad ionu clides have left the water environment and are being

This total integrated radiation level for each sector was th en divided by the sector volume, resulting in

transported through the pathways to man, th ey may be subj ected to both co ncentration and removal

an -average" radiation exposure for any point within the sector.

mechan isms which wi ll further mod ify their effect upon man. These mechanisms include
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concentration in the surface deposit, animal . and crop pathways; decay during periods between

required for the consequences . For accidents included in this range, results are presented for both the

harvesting a crop and its ingestion by man ; and removal of activity due to harvesting, handling , and

50% meteorological condition (average meteorology) and the 95% meteorological condition.

cleaning of a foodstuff.
F. 1.3.7.2 Design Basis Accident Range. Accidents which have a probability of

For each of the sites at which storage or examination of spent nuclear fuel is being
considered, estimates were made for the exposures which the total population affected by rel eases
from the site may receive and for th e exposures which a maximally exposed individual may receive
from these same releases . The exposures to the population affected at a given site were obtained by
calculating the exposures received by an average individual in the vicinity of that s ite and mUltiplying

occurrence in the range of 10" to 10" per year are included in the range called the Design Basis
Accident Range. The terminology "design basis accident," which normally refers to facilities to be
co nstructed, also includes the "evaluation" basis accident which applies to existing facilities. For
accidents included in this range, results are presented for both the 50% meteorological condition
(average meteorology) and the 95% meteorological condition. Risk calculations for accidents in this
range utilize the consequences associated with 95% meteorological conditions.

that exposure by the number of people that are affected. The exposure to a maximally exposed
individual used the maximum exposures and co nsumption rates which any individual at that site may

F. 1.3. 7. 3 Beyond Design Basis Accidents. This range includes accidents which are less

experience regardl ess of the probabilities associated with just one individual actually following all the

likely to occur than the design basis accidents but whi ch may have very large or catastrophic

maximum pathways. The specific pathways which are applicable at a given site are dependent upon

consequences . Accidents included in this range typically have a total probability of occurrence in the

the site, since th e exposure of an average or a maximum individual to each of the pathways is
different for each of the sites . For example, exposures associated with the drinking water pathway
are not considered for the shipyard si tes since all radionuclides basically end up in salt water prior to
their becoming available to man at th ese sites. On the other hand , the radionuclides introduced at the

range of 10" to 10" per year. Accidents which are less likely than 10" per year typically are not
discussed since it is expected they do not contribute in any substantial way to the risk. For these
beyond design basis accidents, consequences are presented for 50% and 95% meteorological conditions. Risk calculations for accidents in this range utilize the consequences associated with 95%
meteorological conditions .

DOE and prototype sites can enter the drinking water pathway after a delay period. An initial delay
occurs while the radionuclides seep through the ground soil before entering the aquifer. The delay

F.1.3.B Evaluation of Impacted Area

continues while the radionuclides travel through the drinking water pathway and ultimately yield
exposures to man. The total exposure to the population or to a maximally exposed indi vidual at a

The impacted area surrounding a facility following an accident was determined for each

given site is the resultant sum of the exposure co mmitments from the individual pathways applicable

scenario evaluated. The impacted area was defined as that area in which the plume deposited

at that site.

radioactive material to such a degree that an individual standing on the boundary of the fallout area
would receive approximately 0 .01 mremihr of exposure. If this individual spends 24 hours a day at
this location, that person would receive about 88 mrem per year from the ground surface shine. This

F. 1.3. 7 Categorization of Accidents.

is within th e 100 mremlyear limit of IOCFR20 .
F. 1. 3 . 7. 1 Abnormal Events. Abnormal Events are unpl anned or improper events which

result in little or no consequence. Abnormal events include industrial accidents and accidents during
normal operations such as ski n co ntamination with radioactive materials, spills of radioactive liquids,

To best characterize the affected areas for each casualty , a typ ical 50% meteorology was
chosen (pasquill-Gifford Class D, wind speed 10 mph) and applied to each accident scenario. The

or exposure to direct radiation due to improper placement of shielding . The occu rrence of these

RSAC-5 resul ts fo r grou nd su rface dose were interpolated to determine th e distance downwind where

unplanned events has been anticipated and mit igat ive procedures are in place whi ch promptly detect

the centerline dose had dropped to approximately 88 mrem per year based on 24 hours per day

and eliminate the events and limit the effects of these events on ind ividuals . As a result. there is little

exposure. For the wind class chosen. th e plume remai ns within a si nge 22.5-degree sector. The area

hazard to the general population from these eve nts . Such events are considered to occur in the

affected by the plume is determined as the entire sector contami nated to th e calculated dow nwind

probability range of I to 10" per year. The probability referred to here is the total probability of

distance. Table F.1.3 .8-1 lists each facility accide nt analyzed and the contaminated footp rint

occurrenCl .nd includes the probability the event occu rs (e.g., plane crash) times other probabilities
F-33
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F.1.3.S-1. Footprint estimates for facility accidents.

Sites with Footprint
Beyond Facility
Boundary

Footprint Length
(miles)

Footprint Area*
(acres)

Drained Water Pool

0.29

II

Norfolk, Oak Ridge,
Portsmouth

Critical ity

0.25

8

Norfolk, Oak Ridge,
Portsmouth

Accident Scenario

Wet Storage
Mechanical Damage

<0.06

<0.5

none

Wet Storage
Airplane Crash

<0.06

<0.5

none

Dry Storage
Mechanical Damage

<0.06

<0.5

none

Dry Storage
Airplane Crash

106

0.91

Pearl Harbor,
Norfolk, Oak Ridge,
Portsmouth

Dry Cell
Mechanical Damage

<0.06

<0.5

none

HEPA Filter Fire

<0.06

<0.5

none

Dry Cell
1.27
Airplane Crash
*Based on contamination of a single sector.

207

Oak Ridge

Although the plume would be contained within a single sector, the direction of the wind is
unknown. Therefore, each site was examined for impacts in all directions around the facility site out
to a distance equal to the footprint length . Since the accidents do occur over a short duration of time,
the acreage of the sector quoted is still an accurate indication of the total contaminated area .
Identification of the potential impacts for each site is contained in Tables F .1.3 .8-2 through -II.
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Table F.1.3.8-2. Secondary impacts of facility accidents at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard .
Site

>

"C
"C

Significant
Accidents in
Decreasing
Severity

Biotic
Resources

Water
Resources

Economic
Impacts

The water
used for
drinking and
industrial
purposes is
monitored
and use may
be temporariIy suspended
during
cleanup
operations .
Some
recreational
activities may
also be
temporarily
suspended .
No enduring
impacts are
expected.

A small
number of
individuals
may
experience
temporary job
loss due to
temporary
restrictions on
farming.
fishing and
other support
activities near
the facility
during
cleanup
operations .
Some costs
would also be
incurred for
the actual
cleanup
operation.

National
Defense

Environmental
Contamination

Endangered
Species

Land
Use

The facility
accident
would not
result in the
extermination of any
species.
Nor would
it effect the
long term
potential for
survival of
any species .
A listing of
endangered
species can
be found in
Section
4 . 1.1 of this
Appendix.

Access to
some areas
may be
temporarily
restricted
until
cleanup is
completed.
The total
area
restricted
would be no
greater than
the areas
identified
under "Environmental
Contamination".

Treaty
Rights

(l>

::J

I . Dry
Storage
Plane Crash

0)C

"

Puget Sound
Naval
Shipyard

2. Drained
Water Pool

3. Criticality
and all other
radiological
accidents

Plants and
animals on
the site and
around the
site will
experience
no long
term
impacts .

Naval vessels at
the shipyard
could be
temporarily
contaminated
during the
accident.
Cleanup
operations
wo uld restore
these ships to
full readiness .

I . A total of
approximately
106 acres might
r~uire cleanup.
Contamination
could extend
about 0 .6 miles
beyond the
closest site
boundary .
2. Contamination
might occur up to
the nearest shipyard boundary
but would be
limited to approximately
\ 0 acres total.
3 .Contamination
would be within
the shipyard
boundaries.
Table F.\.3.8-\
lists the area that
could be
contaminated .

No enduring
impacts

Tahle F.1.3.8-3. Secondary impacts of facility accidents at Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard ,
Site

Significant
Acc idents in
Decreasing
Severity

Biotic
Resources

2 . All other
radiological
accidents

<

2-

c

3('l>

:>

"0
"0
('l>

::I

Q.
)C

10

Economic
Impacts

National
Defense

Environmental
Contamination

Endangered
Species

Land
Use

The facility
accident
would not
result in the
extennination
of any
species. Nor
would it
effect the
long tenn
potential for
survival of
any species.
A listing of
endangered
species can be
found in
Section 4 .1.4
of this
Appendix.

Access to
some areas
may be
temporarily
restricted
until
cleanup is
completed.
The total
area
restricted
would be no
greater than
the areas
identified
under "Environmental
Contamination" .

Treaty
Rights

"

1. Dry
Storagc
Plane Crash

Pearl Harbo r
Naval
Shipyard

Water
Resources

Plants and
animals on
the site and
around the
site will
cxperience
no long
tenn
impacts .

The water
used for
drinking and
industrial
purposes is
monitored
and use may
be temporariIy suspended
during
cleanup
operations .
Some
recreational
activities may
also be
temporarily
suspended .
No enduring
impacts arc
expected .

A small
number of
individuals
may
experience
temporary job
loss r1ue to
temporary
restrictions on
fanning,
fishing and
other support
activities near
the facility
during
cleanup
operations .
Some costs
would also be
incurred fo r
the actua l
cleanup
operation .

Naval vessels at
the shipyard
could be
temporarily
contaminated
during the
accident.
Cleanup
operations
would restore
these ships to
full readiness .

1. A total of
approximately
106 acres might
require cleanup.
Contamination
could extend
about 0 .4 miles
beyond the closest site boundary.
2 . Contamination
would be within
the shipyard
boundaries.
Table F. I.3 .8-1
lists the areas that
could be contaminated .

No enduring
impacts

<
2-

Table F.1.3.8-4. Secondary impacts of facility accidents at Norfolk Naval Shipyard.

c:
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Cl>

Site

Significant
Accidents in

Biotic
Resources

Water
Resources

Economic
Impacts

The water
used for
drinking and
industrial
purposes is
monitored
and use may
be temporariIy suspended
during
cleanup
operations .
Some
recreational
activities may
also be
temporarily
suspended .
No enduring
impacts are
expected .

A small
number of
individuals
may
experience
temporary job
loss due to
temporary
restrictions on
farming.
fishing and
other support
activities near
the facility
during
cleanup
operations .
Some costs
would also be
incurred for
the actual
cleanup
operation .

National
Defense

Environmental
Contamination

Endangered
Species

Land
Use

The facility
accident
would not
result
in the
extermination
of any
species. Nor
would it
effect the
long term
potential for
survival of
any species.
A listing of
endangered
species can he
found in
Section 4. 1.2
of this
Appendix.

Access to
some areas
may be
temporarily
restricted
until
cleanup is
completed .
The total
area
restricted
would be no
greater than
the areas
identified
under "Environmental
Contamination. "

Treaty
Rights

Decrea~ ing

>

'0
'0

Severity

::l

I . Dry
Storage
Plane Crash

Cl>

C.

><

o

."
I
~

00

Norfolk
Naval
Shipyard

2. Drained
Water Pool
and Criticality

1 . All other
radiological
accidents

Plants and
animals on
the site and
around the
site will
experience
no long
term
impacts .

Naval vessels at
the shipyard
could be
temporarily
contaminated
during the
accident.
Cleanup
operations
would restore
these ships to
full readiness.

I . A total of
approximately
106 acres might
require cleanup.
Contamination
could extend
about 0.8 miles
beyond the cIosest site boundary.
2. This accident
might contaminate about 10
acres which could
extend beyond the
nearest site
boundary by
about 0.1 miles
3. Contamination
would be within
the shipyard
boundaries.
Table F. 1.3 .8-1
lists the areas that
could be
contaminated .

No enduring
impacts

Table F.1.3.8-S. Secondary impacts of facility accidents at Portsmouth Naval Shipyard.
Site

Significant
Accidents in
Decreasing
Severity

Biotic
Resources

Water
Resources

Economic
Impacts

The water
used for
drinking and
industrial
purposes is
monitored
and use may
be temporariIy suspended
during
cleanup
operations .
Some
recreational
activities may
also be
temporarily
suspended .
No enduring
impacts are
expcctd.

A small
number of
individuals
may
experience
temporary job
loss due to
temporary
restrictions on
farming.
fishing and
other support
activities near
the facility
during
cleanup
operations .
Some costs
would also be
incurred for
the actual
cleanup
operation .

1. Dry
Storag
Plane Cr4sh

Portsmouth
Naval
Shipyard

2. Drained
Water Pool

3. Criticality
and all other
radiological
accidents

Plants and
animals on
the site and
around the
site will
experience
no long
term
impacts .

National
Defense

Naval vessels at
the shipyard
could be
temporarily
contaminated
during the
accident.
Cleanup
operations
would restore
these ships to
full readiness.

Environmental
Contamination

I . A total of
appro,umately
106 acres
might require
cleanup.
Contamination
could extend
about 0.6
miles beyond
the closest site
boundary.
2. Contamination might
occur up to the
nearest
shipyard
boundary but
would be
limited to
approximately
10 acres total.
3.Contamination would be
within the
shipyard
boundaries .
Table
F. 1.3.8-1 lists
the areas that
could be
contaminated .

Endangered
Species

Land
Use

Treaty
Rights

The facility
accident
would not
result
in the
extermination of any

Access to
some areas
may be
temporarily
restricted
until cleanup is completed. The
total area
restricted
would be no
greater than
the areas
identified
under "Environmental
Consequenccs" .

No enduring
impacts

~pecies .

Nor would
it effect the
long term
potential for
survival of
any species.
A listing of
endangered
species can
be found
Section
4. t .J of this
Appendix .

Table F.1.3.S-6. Secondary impacts of facility accidents at Oak Ridge Reservation.

<

9c
3
C1>

Site

:>

"0
"0

Significant
Accidents in
Decreasing
Severity

Biotic
Resources

Water
Resources

Economic
Impacts

National
Defense

Environmental
Contamination

Endangered
Species

Land
Use

The facility
accident
would not
result
in the
extennination
of any
species. Nor
would it
effect the
long tenn
potential for
survival of
any species .
A listing of
endangered
species can be
found in
Section 4.5 of
this
Appendix.

Access to
some areas
may be
temporarily
restricted
until
cleanup is
completed .
The total
area rest ricted would
be no
greater than
the areas
identified
under "Environmen!al
Consequenees" .

Treaty
Rights

C1>

::J

Q.

><

."
I
~

o

I . A total of
approximately
207 acres might
require cleanup.
Contamination
could extend
about 1. 1 miles
beyond the closest site boundary .

I . Dry Cell
Air Plane
Crash

o

Oak Ridge
Rese rvat ion

2. Dry
Storage Plane
Crash

3 . Drained
Water Pool
and Criticality

4. All other
radiological
accidents

Plants and
animals on
the site and
around the
site will
experience
no long
tenn
impacts .

The water
used for
drinking and
industrial
purposes is
monitored
and use may
be temporariIy suspended
during
cleanup
operations .
Some
recreational
activities may
also be
temporarily
suspended .
No enduring
impacts are
expected .

A small
number of
individuals
may
experience
temporary job
loss due to
temporary
restrictions on
fanning.
fishing and
other support
activ ities near
the facility
during
cleanup
operations.
Some costs
would also be
incurred for
the actual
cleanup
operation .

No
impacts

2. This accident
could conta minate
about 106 acres
and would extend
beyond the
nearest site
boundary by
about 0 .7 miles .
3 . About 10 acres
might become
cont.aminated
extending about
0 . 1 miles offsite.
4. Contamination
would remain
within the site
boundaries .
Table F. 1.3 .8-1
Lists the areas that
could be co ntaminated .

Some
temporary
restrictions
on access
may be
required until
cleanup is
completed .
No enduring
impacts are
expected.

Table F.1.3.8-7. Secondary impacts of facility accidents at Savannah. River Site.
Site

Savannah
River Site

>

'0
'0
C1I

:::l

0-

>C.

o

Significant
Acc idents in
Decreasing
Severity

All
Radiological
Accidents

Biotic
Resources

Water
Resources

Economic
Impacts

Plants and
animals on
the site and
around the
site will
experience
no long
tenn
impacts .

The water
used for
drinking and
industrial
purposes is
monitored
and use may
be temporariIy suspended
during
cleanup
operations .
Some
recreational
activities may
also be
temporarily
suspended .
No enduring
impacts are
expected .

A small
number of
individuals
may
experience
temporary job
loss due to
temporary
restrictions on
fanning.
fishing and
other support
activities near
the facility
during
cleanup
operations .
Some costs
would also be
incurred for
the actual
cleanup
operation .

National
Defense

No
impacts

Environmental
Contamination

Contamination
would remain
within the site
boundaries.
Table F . \.3 .8-1
lists the a reas that
could be contaminated .

Endangered
Species

The facility
accident
would not
result
in the
extennination
of any
species . Nor
would it
effect the
long tenn
potential for
survival of
any species.
A listing of
endangered
species ean be
found in
Section 4.3 of
this
Appendix.

Land
Use

Access to
some areas
may be
temporarily
restricted
unt il
cleanup is
completed .

Treaty
Rights

Some
temporary
restrictions
on access
may be
required until
cleanup is
completed .
No enduring
impacts are
expected.

Table F.1.3.8-8. Secondary impacts of facility accidents at Nevada Test Site.
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Site

Nevada Test
Site

Significant
Accidents in
Decreasing
Severity

All
Radiological
Accidents

Biotic
Resources

Plants and
animals on
the site and
around the
site will
experience
no long
term
impacts .

Water
Resourees

Economic
Impacts

The water
used for
drinking and
industrial
purposes is
monitored
and use may
be temporariIy suspended
during
cleanup
operations .
No enduring
impacts are
expected .

A small
number of
individuals
may
experience
temporary job
loss due to
temporary
restrictions on
support
activities near
the facility
during
cleanup
operations.
Some costs
would also be
incurred for
the actual
cleanup
operation .

National
Defense

No
impacts

Environmental
Contamination

Contamination
would remain
within the site
boundaries.
Table F . 1.3.8-1
lists the areas that
could be contaminated.

Endangered
Species

The facility
accident
would not
result
in the
extermination
of any
species. Nor
would it
effect the
long term
potential for
survival of
any species.
A listing of
endangered
species can be
found Section
4.6 of this
Appendix.

Land
Use

Access to
some areas
may be
temporarily
restricted
until
cleanup is
completed.

Treaty
Rights

Some
temporary
restrictions
on access
may be
required until
cleanup is
completed.
No enduring
impacts are
expected.

Table F.1.3.8-9. Secondary impacts of facility accidents at Idaho National Engineering Laboratory.
Site

Idaho
National
Engineering
Laboratory

Significant
Accidents in
Decreasing
Severity

All
Radiological
Accidents

Biotic
Resources

Water
Reso urces

Plants and
animals on
the site and
around the
site wiU
experience
no long
term
impacts .

The water
used for
drink.ing and
industrial
purposes is
monitored
and use may
be temporariIy suspended
during
cleanup
operations.
No enduring
impacts are
expected .

Economic
Impacts

A smaU
number of
individuals
may
experience
temporary job
loss due to
temporary
restrictions on
support
activities near
the facility
during
cleanup
operations .
Some costs
would also be
incurred for
the actual
cleanup
operation.

National
Defense

No
impacts

Environmental
Contamination

Contamination
would remain
within the site
boundaries.
Table F.1.3 .8-1
lists the areas that
could be contaminated .

Endangered
Species

The facility
accident
would not
result
in the
extermination
of any
species. Nor
would it
effect the
long term
potential for
survival of
any species .
A listing of
endangered
species can be
found Section
4.2 of this
Appendix.

Land
Use

Access to
some areas
may be
temporarily
restricted
until
cleanup is
completed .

Treaty
Rights

Some
temporary
restrictions
on access
may be
required until
cleanup is
completed.
No enduring
impacts are
expected.

Table F.1.3.S-10. Secondary impacts of facility accidents at Hanford Site.
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(1)

Site

>

"0
"0

Significant
Accidents in
Decreasing
Severity

Biotic
Resources

Water
Resources

Economic
Impacts

The water
used for
drinking and
industrial
purposes is
monitored
and use may
be temporariIy suspended
during
cleanup
operations .
Some recrcatioroal acti"ities may also
be temporariIy suspended .
No enduring
impacts alT
expected .

A small
number of
individuals
may
experience
temporary job
loss due to
temporary
restrict ions on
support
activities near
the facility
during
cleanup
operations.
Some costs
would also be
incurred for
the actual
cleanup
operation .

National
Defense

Environmental
Contamination

Endangered
Species

Land
Use

The facility
accident
would not
result
in the
extermination
of any
species . Nor
would it
effect the
hng term
potential for
survival of
any species.
A lis:ing of
endangered
species can be
found Section
4.4 of this
Appendix.

Access to
some areas
may be
temporarily
restricted
until
cleanup is
completed.

Treaty
Rights

(1)

::I
Co
)(

o

Hanford Site

All
Radiological
Accidents

Plants and
animals on
the site and
around the
site will
experience
no long
term
impacts .

No
impacts

Contamination
would remain
within the site
boundaries .
Table F. \.3.8-1
lists the areas that
could be contaminated.

Some
temporary
restrictions
on access
may be
required until
cleanup is
completed .
No enduring
impacts are
expected .

Table F.1.3.8-11. Secondary impacts of facility accidents at Kenneth A. Kesselring Site.
Site

Signilicant
Accidents in
Decreasing
Severity

Biotic
Resources

I. Dry
Storage
Plane Crash

Kenneth A.
Kesselring
Site
."
I

+:0-

VI

<

2c:

3

~

:>

"0
"0
~

::J
0X

2. Drained
Water Pool
and
all other
radiological
accidents

Plants and
animals on
the site and
around the
site wIll
experience
no long
term
impacts .

Water
Resources

Economic
Impacts

The water
used for
drinking and
industrial
purposes is
monitored
and use may
be temporariIy suspended
during
cleanup
operations .
So me recreational activities may also
be temporarily suspended .
No enduring
impacts are
expected .

A small
number of
individuals
may
experience
temporary job
loss due to
temporary
restrictions on
support
activities near
the facility
during
cleanup
operations .
Some costs
would also be
incurred for
the actual
cleanup
operation.

National
Defense

Environmental
Contamination

I . Contamination
is expected right
up to the nearest
site boundary but
limited to
approllimately
106 acres total.

No
impacts

2. Contamination
would remain
within the
shipyard
boundaries .
Table F . 1.3.8-1
lists the areas that
could be contaminated .

Endangered
Species

The facility
accident
would not
result
in the
extermination
of any
species . Nor
would it
effect the
long term
potential for
survival of
any species.
A listing of
endangered
species can be
fo und Section
4 .1.5 of this
Appendix.

Land
Use

Access to
some areas
may be
tempoarily
restricted
until
cleanup is
completed.

Treaty
Rights

Some
temporary
restrictions
on access
may be
required
until
cleanup is
completed .
No enduring impacts
are
expected .

F.1. 3.9 Emergency Preparedness and Mitigative Measures.

public from exceeding a Protective Action Guideline, if needed. No reduction of exposure due to
these actions are accounted for in this analysis . The public is assumed to spend approximately 30%

F. 1.3. g. 1 Emergency Preparedness Emergency plans are in effect at shipyards and

prototype sites to ensure that workers and the public would be properly protected in the event of an

of the day within their homes or other buildings and the exposure to ground surface radiation is
therefore reduced appropriately on a yearly basis.

accident . In addition, emergency plans are in effect for accidents involving the transportation of
radioactive materials. These response plans include the activation of emergency response teams

Individuals that reside or work on site, or those that may be traversing the site in a vehicle

provided by the site and a site emergency control center, as well as activation of a command and

would be evacuated from the affected area within 2 hours. This is based on the availability of

control network with Naval Reactors Headquarters and supporting laboratories. The long standing

security personnel at all locations to oversee the removal of residents, collocated workers, and

emergency planning program that exists within the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program includes the

travelers in a safe and efficient manner. Periodic training and evaluation of the security personnel is

ability to utilize the comprehensive and extensive emergency response resources of each naval site and

conducted to ensure that correct actions are taken during an actual casualty. Therefore, residents,

provides for coordination with appropriate civil authorities . In addition to the Naval Nuclear

collocated workers, and travelers would be exposed to the entire contaminated plume as it travels

Propulsion Program resources, extensive federal emergency response resources are available as

downwind for a period not to exceed 2 hours. Similarly, the radiation shine from the deposited
radioactive materials would be limited to a 2·hour period . No ingestion of contamination is calculated

needed to support State or local response .

for these individuals.
Emergency response measures include provisions for immediate response to any emergency at

the shipyard or prototype site, identification of the accident conditions, and communications with civil

Facility workers all undergo training to take quick, decisive action during a casualty . These

authorities providing radiological data and recommendations for any appropriate protective actions.

individuals quickly evaruate the area and move to previously defined "relocation" areas on the facility

In the event of an accident involving radioactive or toxic materials, workers in the vicinity of the

site. Workers could be exposed to a full 5 minutes of the radioactive plume as they move to the

accident would promptly evacuate the immediate area. Th is e"acuation can typically be acco mplished

"relocation" centers. Once the immed iate threat of the plume has moved off-site and downwind, the

within minutes of the acc ident and would reduce the hazard to workers .

workers would be instructed to walk to vehicles waiting to evacuate them from the site. An
additional 15 minutes would be required to evacuate the workers from the contaminated area and

Regu larly scheduled exercises are conducted periodically at each site in order to test each
site's ability to respond to accidents. These exercises include realistic tests of people, equipment , and

therefore the workers receive a total of 20 minutes of ground shine. No ingestion of contamination is
calculated for these individuals.

communications involved in al l aspects of the pl ans, and the plans are regularly reviewed and
modified to incorporate experience gained fro m the exercises. These exercises also periodically
include steps to verify the adequacy of interactions with local hospitals and emergency personnel and

The following summary provides the individual exposure times utilized in the accident
analyses presented in Section F. 1.4.2.

state officials .
F. 1.3 .9 .2 Mitigative Factors. For members of the general public resid ing at the site

boundary or beyond, no cred it is taken fo r an y preventi ve or mitigative actions that would limit their
exposure. These individuals are calcul ated as being exposed to the entire contaminated plume as it
travels downwind from the accident site. Similarly no action is taken to prevent these people from
continuing thei r normal day·to-day routine and ingestion of terrestrial food and animal products
continue on a yearly basis. As discussed in Section F.I .3. action would be taken to prevent the
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fstimated Time an Individual Might be Exposed

Worker (100 m)
To Plume
To Fallout on Ground
Surface
To Food

standard technique based on the amount of radiation exposure that might occur from all conceivable
Collocated Worker
(MCW) and Nearest
Public Access (NPA)

Individual at
Nearest Site
Boundary (MOl)

100% of release
time up to
120 min .

100% of release
lime

5 min.
20 min.
N/A

120 min.

0.7 yr

N/A

I yr

pathways and the number of people who might be affected (refer to Section F. I.3.3).
A couple of examples should serve to illustrate the calculation of risk. In the first , the
lifetime risk of dying in a mo:or vehicle accident can be computed from the likelihood of an
individual being in an automobile accident and the consequences or number of fatalities per accident.
There were 10,000,000 motor vehicle accidents during 1992 in the United States resulting in about
40,000 deaths (NSC 1993). Thus, the probability of a person being in an automobile accident is
10,000,000 accidents divided by approximately 250,000,000 persons in the United States, or 0.04 per
year. The number of fatalities per accident, 0.004 (40,000 deaths divided by 10,000,000 accidents),
is less than I since many accidents do not cause fatalities. Multiplying the probability of the accident

F. 1.3. 10 Perspective on Calculations of Cancer Fatalities and Risk

(0.04 per year) by the consequences of the accident (0.004 deaths per accident) by the number of
years the person is exposed to the risk (72 years is considered to be an average lifetime) gives the risk

The topics of human health effects caused by radiation and the risks associated with normal
operations or postulated accidents associated with spent nuclear fuel management are discussed many

for any individual being killed in an automobile accident. From this calculation, the overall risk of
someone dying in a motor vehicle accident is about I chance in 87 over their lifetime.

times throughout this Environmental Impact Statement. It is imponant to understand these concepts
and how they are used in order to understand the information presented in this document. It is also

valuable to have some frame of reference or comparison for understanding how the risks compare to

A second example illustrates the calculation of risk for another event which occurs daily .
Fossil fuels , such as natural gas or coal, contain naturally occurring radioactive material that is
released into the air during combustion. This radioactivity in the air finds its way into our bodies

the risks of daily life.

through our food and the air we breathe. This radioactivity has been estimated to produce about 0.5
The method used to calculate the risk of any impact is fundamental to all of the evaluations

millirem of rad iation dose to the average American each year (NCRP 1987). The probability of this

presented and follows standard accepted practices. The first step is to determine the probability that a

happening is essentially 1.0 since these fuels are burned every day all over the country. The number

specific event will occur. For example. the probability that a routine task. such as operating a crane.

of fatal cancers from exposure to 0.5 millirem per year is calculated by taking 0.5 millirem per year

will be performed sometime during a year of normal operations at a facility would be I. That means

times the 72 years considered to be an average lifetime times the 0.0005 fatal cancers estimated to be

that the action would cenainl y occur. The probability that an accident might occu r is less than 1.0.

caused by each rem (0.5 millirem per year x 72 years x 0.0005 fatal cancers per rem = 0.000018

This is true because accidents occur only occasionally and some of the more severe accidents. such as

fatal cancers per individual lifetime). The risk is the probability (1.0) times the consequences

a catastrophic earthquake. might occur at any location only once in hundreds. thousands. or millions

(0.000018 cancer fatalities) which equals about I chance in 55 ,000 of death from this cause over a

of years.

lifetime.

Once the probability of an event has been determined. the next step is to predict what the
consequences of the event being considered might be. One imponant meas ure of consequences

These risks and others from everyday life can be used to gain a perspective on the risks
associated with the alternatives in this EIS. As illustrated . the risk of death from cancer from the

chosen for this EIS is the number of human fatalities from cancer induced by radiation. This was

radioactivity released daily from combustion of fossil fu els is about I chance in 55,000 for the

chosen because this document deals with radioactive materials. The number of cancer fatalities that

average American. As a funher comparison. the naturally occurring radioactive materials in

might be caused by any routi ne operation or any postul ated accident can be calculated usi ng a

agricultural fenilizer contribute abo ut I to 2 millirem per year to an average American's exposure to
radiation (NCRP 1987). A calculation similar to the one in the preceding paragraph shows that the
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use of fenilizer to produce food crops in the United States results in a risk of death from cancer
between I chance in 12 ,500 and I chance in 25,000. Finally, the average American's risk of dying

F_1.4 _1. 1 Water Pool Examination and Storage Source Terms. The evaluation of
nor mal water pool operations was performed us ing two different source terms. In one analysis, a

from cancer from all causes is I chance in 5 over his or her lifetime. These risks can be compared,

source term was ut ilized which included both the incremental release of radioactive materials due to

for example, to the average individual risk of less than I chance in I billion for a resident in the

the alternative spent nuclear fuel storage actions and the rel ease from other ongoing Naval Reactors

vicinity of the INEL developing a fatal cancer due to normal operations at the Expended Core Facility

activities. Identical source terms were used for the evaluation of radiation exposure due to the release

(see the data in Section F. 1.4. 1).

of radioactive materials during normal operations of wet storage and spent fuel examinations . The
1991 annual airborne release from the INEL-ECF was used to evaluate these operations. Since the

A frame of reference for the risks from accidents assoc iated with spent nuclear fuel management alternatives can be developed in the same way. For an average resident in the vicinity of the

INEL-ECF releases are extremely low, this upper limit approach is not unduly conservative for the
wet storage option which is expected to have a lower release. Table F. 1.4. 1.1-1 shows the 1991

INEL, the individual risk of death from cancer caused by the water leaking from the Expended Core

INEL-ECF release rate, the current release rate at Kesselr;ng and NRF (including both INEL-ECF

Facility after a large eanhquake would be approximately I chance in 9 billion . This individual risk

and prototypes), and the release rate representing Naval Reactors operations at naval shipyards . The

was determined by dividing the risk value to the population within 50 miles (1.7 x 10" fatalities per

release rate representing naval shipyards is based on upper bound data from Navy operations

year per accident from Table F-3) by the total population of 115,690 and mult iplying by an average

contai ned in Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program (NNPP) Repon 1'<1-94-1 (NNPP 1994). With no

life span of 72 years . This risk can be compared to the risks of death from other accidental causes to

current Naval Reactors facilities at Savannah River, Hanford , Oak Ridge. or the Nevada Test Site. the

gain a perspective. For example, the risk of death in a motor vehicle accident was calculated earlier

current release for each of these sites is zero for this analysis.

to be about I chance in 87. Similarly, the risk of death for the average American from fires is
approximately I chance in 500, and for death from accidental poisoning the risk is about I chance in

Table F.L4_LI-L Airborne releases from current Naval Reactors operations.

1000 (Crouch 1982).
Location

F .1.4 Analysis Results

H-3
C-14
Sr-90

9 .35 x 10"
7.0 x 10"
5.5 x 10"

Y-90
1-131
Kr-85

5.5 x 10"
4.82 x 10"
3.0 x 10"

NRF

H-3
C-14
Ar-41
Co-60
Kr-85

9 .35 x 10"
8.0 x 10"
2.7 x 10"
1.6 x 10"
3.0 x 10"

Sr-90
Y-90
1-131
Cs- 137

2.45 x 10"
2.45 x 10"
6.3 x 10"
6.3 x 10"

Kesselring

H-3
C-14
Ar-41
Co-60

1.0 x 10"
4.0 x 10"
1.4
1.0 x 10"

Kr-85
1-131
Cs- 137

1.0 x 10"
5.0 x 10~
5.0 x IO~

Savannah Ri ver_ Hanford.
Nevada Test Site. Oak Rid ge

none

Ponsmouth, Norfolk
Puget Sound ,
Pearl Harbor

H-3
C-14
Ar-41
Co-60
Kr-83m
Kr-85m
Kr-85

1.0 x
1.0 x
4. 1 x
1.0 x
2.0 x
2.4 x
1.0 x

Kr-87
Kr-8S
Xe l31m
Xel33m
Xe-133
Xe-135

5.0
2.0
5.0
1.0
2.1
2.5

F. 1.4 . 1 Normal Operations. The purpose of this analysis is to determine the hypothetical health
effects on workers and the public due to routine handling of naval spent nuclear fuel. Radioactive
releases from facilities involved in routine handling of naval spent nuclear fuel are small and less than
those of comparable DOE and commercial nuclear facilities. Records of routine releases due to
operations at ECF were used as source terms for all locatio ns to estimate what effects these types of
releases have on workers and the public. Site-specific meteorological and population data were used
at each of the locations analyzed. For normal operations at the Naval Reactors Facility (NRF and
Oak Ridge), exposure to the nearest public access (NPA) indi vidual is not estimated due to the ~hon
period of time that such an individual would spend on-site while driving on the public access road .
At Hanford _ the NPA is located at the Washington Public Power Supply System Plant . and at
Savannah River at the U.S. Forestry Service Office. The NPA at shipyard locations is defined in
Section F.I.3 .2.
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Annual Releases (Ci t year)

INEL-ECF

F-5 1

o;eiJJ,

10"
10"
10"
10"
10"
10"
10"

x
x
x
x
x
x

10"
10"
10"
10"
10"
10"

Volume I. Appendix D

The evalualion of conlinuing Naval ReaClOrs aClivilies combined wilb Ibe proposed allernalives for naval spenl nuclear fuel is based on Ibe combined ai rborne release source lerms shown in

Table F.L4_LI-2. Airborne releases used in Ibe analysis of waler pool aClivilies plus ongoing
Naval Reaclors operalions.

Table F. 1.4.1.1-2. This lable presenlS a summalion of Ibe INEL-ECF source lerm and Ibe currenl
Naval Reaclors operalions source lerms from Table F.1.4.1. 1-1 for each localion. Beginning in
1995. wilb Ibe Shuldown of Ibe S5G prolOlype. Ibe NRF releases will only resull from Ibe
INEL-ECF. and Ibis condilion is shown in me lable.
The olber analysis ulilized Ibe same source lerm al all localions. The INEL-ECF source lerm

Annual Releases (Ci/year)

Localion
NRF. Savannah River.
Hanford . Nevada Tesl Sile.
Oak Ridge

H-3
C-14
Sr-90

9.35 x 10"
7.0 x 10"
5.5 x 10"'

Y-9O
1-131
Kr-85

5.5 x 10"
4.82 x 10"
3.0 x 10"

Kesselring

H-3
C-14
Ar41
Kr-85
Co-60

1.935 x 10"

Sr-9O
Y-9O
1-131
Cs-137

5.5 x 10"
5.5 x 10"'
5.0 x 10~
5.0x

I~

Kr-88
Sr-90
Y-90
1-131
Xe l31m
Xel33m
Xe-133
Xe-135

2.<r x
5.5 x
5.5 x
4.8 x
5.0 x
1.0 x
2. 1 x
2.5 x

l<r'
10"
10"

of Table F.1.4.1.1-1 was used 10 compare Ibe incremenlal heaJlb effeelS due 10 providing waler pool
slOrage or examinalion facil ities al each localion.

1.1

1.4
3.0 x 10"
1.0 x 10"

801b analyses also considered Ibe impacl on heallb effeclS of direcl radialion levels from a
waler pool facilily and Ibe deposilion of radionucl ides onlo Ibe ground and inlO waler supplies as
discussed in Seelions F.1.3 .6.4 and F.1.3 .6.5.

POrlSmoulb. Norfolk
Pugel Sound.
Pearl Harbor

H-3
C- 14
Ar41
Co-60
Kr-83m
Kr-85m
Kr-85
Kr-87

9.45 x 10"
8.0 x 10"
4.1 x 10"
1.0 x 10"
2.0 x 10"
2.4 x 10"
3.0 x 10"
5.0 x 10"

10"

H)"'
10"
10"
10"

F. 1.4 . 1.2 Dry Storage Source Terms. Anolber operalion analyzed was Ibe slOrage of

naval spenl nuclear fu el in shipping comainers or slOrage casks in a safe arrayal NRF. Ibe naval
shipyards . and Kesselring localions. II is poslulaled Ihal shielding and physical boundaries are
eslablished in accordance wilb exisling regulalions 10 prOlecl facilily workers . There are expecled 10
be no rouline airborne or waler releases from Ibe dry slorage aClivily . The source will consisl of an
array of filled slorage conlainers. Suppl emenlary shielding would be provided as needed 10 ensure
Ibal Ibere would be no measurable increase in radialion levels al Ihe peri meIer of Ibe induslrial area
and Ibal radialion levels wilbin Ibe industrial area bUI oUlside Ibe slorage area would nOI require
occupalional radialion exposure moniloring fo r workers . Each local ion analyzed would have a
differenl number of slorage casks. As conlai ners are received over lime. shielding will be provided
10

limil radial ion exposure rales as discussed above. Dislance falloff for radial ion levels was

delermined using SPAN compuler calculalio ns as discussed in Seclion F.I .3.6. 4.
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F. 7.4. 7.3 Dry Cell Facility Source Terms. The normal airborne rel ease source terms

Norfolk

utilized for the dry cell facility analyses are identical to the INEL-ECF rel eases in Tab le F .1.4.1-1. It

Portsmouth

Kesselring

Nevada
Test Site

Oak Ridge

is expected that these val ues bound the actual releases from the proposed facility. A source term

Worker EDE (rem)

6.9 x 10-'

7.7 x 10-'

8.5 x 10-'

4.6 x 10-'

1.2 x 10-'

different from the water pool analysis was utilized for the direct radiation calculations. This source

MOl EDE (rem)

1.1 x 10-'

4.4 x 10-'

6.8 x 10-'

3.4 x 10-'

1.0 x 10-'

NPA EDE (rem)

6.8 x 10-'

3.3 x 10-'

Total EDE
(person-rem)

2.8 x 10-'

4.5 x 10-'

8.2 x 10-'

1.8 x 10-'

1.0 x 10-'

1.4 x 10-'

2.3 x 10-'

4.1 x 10-'

9.0 x 10-'

5.0 x 10-'

term is based on the proposed facility design, expected fuel examination capacity, and shielding
calculations. Like the airborne releases, source terms for water deposition were identical to those
util ized in the water pool analysis .
F. 7.4. 7.4 Water Pool Storage. This section presents tabulated radiation exposure results

Number of Fatal
Cancers

N/A

N/A

N/A

for the wet storage option. The following summary provides an indication of the incremental change
at each location due to the addition of an ECF·type facility .
Evaluations of environmental impacts at DOE sites are presented in Volume I , Appendices A,
B, C, and F. The radiological impacts at these sites are quite low in that fatal cancer projections to

Summary or Exposure Calculation Results
For Normal Operations - Water Pool Examination or Storage only
At All Sites

the population with in SO miles from normal operat io ns are well below 1.0. Further, impacts at naval
shipyards and prototype sites are addressed in Appendix D and also are well below 1.0. Hence, the
addition of the above small values to those which already exist at a site result in total values which
are also quite small .

INELlNRF

Savannah
River

Hanford

Puget
Sound

Pearl
Harbor
1.1 x 10-'

Worker EDE (rem)

7.1 x 10-'

9. 1 x 10-'

8.9 x 10-'

9.4 x 10-'

MOl EDE (rem)

2.5 x 10-'

4.8 x 10-'
3.8 x 10"'"

2.4 x 10-'
4.4 x 10-' "

8.7 x 10-'

2.0 x 10-'

2. 1 x 10-'

1.3 x 10-'

6.2 x 10-'

5.2 x 10-'

1.7 x 10-'

3.6 x 10-'

8.0 x 10-'

1.3 x 10-'

1.4 x 10-'

8.5 x 10-'

1.8 x 10-'

4.0 x 10""

6.5 x 10-'

7.0 x 10-'

NPA EDE (rem)
Total EDE
(person-rem)
Number of Fatal
Cancers

N/A

The following summary provides the ex posure calculation resul ts for water pool storage or
examination plus all ongoing Naval Reactors operations at each site.

, MOl (Barnwell Plant)
•• MOl (FMEF)
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Summary or Exposure Calculation Results
For Normal Operations - Water Pool Examination or Storage
plus all ongoing Naval Reactors operations
At all sites

INELlNRF

Savannah
River

Worker EDE (rem)

7.1 x 10-5

9.1

MOl EDE (rem)

2.5 x 10-7

4.8 X 10-7
3.8 x lQ-6*
2. 1 x 10-8

NPA EDE (rem)
Total EDE
(person-rem)
Number of Fatal
Cancers

N/A

X

10-5

Hanford
10-5

Puget
Sound

Pearl
Harbor

1.2 x 1~

1.4 x 1~

2.4 X 10-7
4.4 x 10-7. -

1.0 x 1~

2.3

1.3 x 10-8

7.2 x
1.5

8.9

X

1.7 x 10-3

3.6

X

10-2

8.0

8.5 x 10-7

1.8

X

10- 5

4.0 x IQ-6

X

10-3

X

10-5

I~

5.8 x

1~

10- 1

1.7

X

10- 1

7 .6 x 10-5

8.5

X

10-5

X

* MOl (Barnwell Plant)

** MOl (FMEF)

Norfolk

Portsmouth

Kesselring

Nevada
Test Site

Oak Ridge

8.4 x 10-5

9 .7

X

10-5

1.4 x 1~

4.6

X

10- 5

1.2

X

10-4

(rem)

1. 2 x 1~

5 .0

X

10- 5

1.2

10- 5

3.4

X

10-7

1.0

X

10-4

NPA EDE (rem)

7.4 x 10-5

3 .5 x I ~

Total EDE
(person-rem)

3.4 x 10- 1

5 .5

X

10- 2

1.4

X

10- 1

1.8 x I~

1.0

X

10- 1

1.7 x 10-4

2.7

X

10-5

7.2

X

10-5

9 .0 x 10-8

5 .0

X

10-5

Worker EDE (rem)
MOl

~DE

Number of Fatal
Cancers

X

N/A

N/A

N/A

Tables F. 1.4. 1. 4- 1 th rough - 10 present the detailed results of using the source terms of Table
F . 1.4.1-2 to determine the radiation exposu res . These tables thus depict the result if an ECF-type
exami nation operation is added to existing, current , continuing Naval Reactors operations at DOE
sites and Navy shipyards.
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Table F.1.4.1.4-1. Summary of Exposure Calcul ation Resul ts .
For Normal Operations - Water Pool Examination plus all ongoing Naval Reactors operations
Atl NEL

Total EDE
(rem)

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

Worker

7. 1 x 10"'

2.8 x 10"'

MCW

4.2 x 10"'

1.7 x IO" IJ

MOl

2.5 x 10"'

1.3 x 10"10

Location

Table F.1.4.1.4-3. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results.
For Normal Operations - Water Pool Examination plus all ongo ing Naval Reactors operations
At Hanford

Location
Worker
MCW
MOl (New ECF)"

-----------------------Exposure to Population with in
50-mile Radius (person-rem)
Population of
115,690

1.7 x 10"'

MOl (FMEF)""

Number of
Fatal Cancers

NPA

Table F. 1.4. 1.4-2. Summary of Exposure Calcul ation Res ults .
For Normal Operations - Water Pool Examination plus all o ngoing Naval Reactors operations
At Savannah River

Location
Worker

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

9. 1 x 10"'

3.6 x 10"'

MCW

1.4 x 10-'

5.6 x 10"1.

MOl (New ECF)"

4.8 x 10"'

2.4 x 10"10

MOl (Barnwell Plant)""

3.8 x 10-'

1.9 x 10-*

NPA

2.1 x 10-'

1.1

Population of
375,860

3.6 x 10"'

1.6 x 10-'

6.4 x 10"10

2.4 x 10"'
----------4.4 x 10"'

---------------

1.3 x 10"'

6.5 x 10""

Exposu re to Population with in
50-mile Radius (person-rem)
Population of
579,541

3.6 x 10"'

8.0 x 10"'

4.0 x 10-'

Table F .1.4.1.4-4. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results .
For Normal Operations - Water Pool Storage plus all ongoing Naval Reactors operations
At Puget Sound

Location

Number of
Fatal Cancers
1.8 x 10"'

Total EDE
(rem)

Volume I, Append ix D

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

Worker

1.2 x

1 0~

4.8 x 10-'

MOl

1.0 x

1 0~

5. 1 x 10-'

NPA

7.2 x

10~

3.6 x 10"'

Exposure to Population withi n
50-mile Radius (person-rem)

" MOl (New ECF) appl ies if spent fuel fac il ity is constructed on the Savan nah Rive r Site.
"'MOl (Barnwell Plan!) applies if spent fu el faci lity is constructed at Barn well Nuclear Fuel Plant.
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2.2 x 10"1.

" MOl (New ECF) applies if spent fuel fac il ity is constructed at the 200 area on the Hanford Site.
"'MOl (FMEF) applies if spent fuel facil ity is constructed at the Fuels and Materials Examination
Facility .

IO- IJ

6??./ ~

1.2 x 10"1.

Number of
Fatal Cancers

--------------- --------- ------ ----- ---------- ----X

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

8.9 x 10"'

Exposure to Population within
50-mile Radius (person-rem)

8.5 x 10"'

Total EDE
(rem)

Total EDE
(rem)

Populat ion of
2,975,810

Volume I , Appendi x D

1.5 x 10- 1

Number of
Fatal Cancers
7.6x 10-'
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Table F.1.4. 1.4-S. Summary of Exposure Calcul at ion Resul ts.
For Normal Operations · Water Pool Storage plus al l ongoing Naval Reactors operations
At Pearl Harbo r

Total EDE
(rem)

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

Worker

1.4 x 10-'

5 .6 x 10-'

MOl

2 .3 x 10-'

1.1 x 10-'

Location

NPA

5 .8 x 10-'

Exposure to Population within
50-mile Rad ius (person·rem)
Population of
817.385

1.7 x 10-'

Table F .1.4.1.4-7. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results.
For Normal Operations - Water Pool Storage plus all ongoing Naval Reactors operations
At PortSmouth

Total EDE
(rem)

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

Worker

9 .7 x 10-'

3.9 x 10-'

MOl

5 .0 x 10-'

2 .5 x 10-'

NPA

3.5 x 10-'

1.7 x 10-'

Location

2 .9 x 10-'
Number of
Fatal Cancers

Population of
2,432,627

8.5 x 10-'

Table F. 1.4.1.4-6. Summary of Exposure Calcul ation Results .
For Normal Operations - Water Pool Storage plus all ongoing Naval Reactors operations
At Norfolk

5 .5 x 10-'

Total EDE
(rem)

Li kelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

1 0~

5 .6 x 10-'

1.2 x 10-'

5 .8 x 10-'

Li kelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

Worker

8.4 x 10-'

3.4 x 10-'

Worker

1.4 x

MOl

1.2 x 10-'

6 . 1 x 10-'

MOl

NPA

7.4 x 10-'

3.7 x . 0-'

Ex posure to Populat ion withi n
SO-mile Rad ius (pe rson-rem)
Populat ion of
1.539.002

3.4 x 10-'

Location

Ex posure to Popul ation with in
50-mile Radius (perso n-re m)

Number of
Fatal Cancers

2.7 x 10-'

Table F.1.4.1.4-H. Summary of Exposure Calcul ation Results .
Fo r No rmal Operations - Water Pool Storage plus all ongoing Naval Reactors operations
At Kesselring

Total ED E
(rem)

Locat ion

Number of
Fatal Cancers

Exposure to Population within
50-mile Radius (person-rem)

Population of
1, 148,587

1. 4 x 10-'

Number of
Fatal Cancers
7.2 x 10-'

1. 7 x 10-'
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Table F.1.4.1.4-9. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results.
For Normal Operations - Water Pool Examination plus all ongoing Naval Reactors operations
At Nevada Test Site

F. 7.4 . 7.5 Dry Stolage. This section presents tabulated radiation exposure results for the

dry storage option at INEL. Navy shipyard sites, and the Kesselring Site. Dry storage at Hanford,
Savannah River, the Nevada Test Site, and Oak Ridge is not included in this section as it is discussed
in EIS Volume I, Appendices A, C. and F, respectively. The following summary provides an

Total EDE
(rem)

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

health effect due

4.6 x 10-'

1.8 x 10-'

all DOE locations.

Mf~W

3.7 x 10-"

1.5 x 10-"

MOl

3.4 x 10-'

1.7 x 10-10

Location
Worker

Exposure to Population within
50-mile Radius (person-rem)
Population of
13,792

indication of the incremental change at each location due to the addition of dry storage areas . The

9.0

X

Location

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

Worker

1.2 x

I~

4.8 x 10-'

MCW

1.3

X

10-'

5.1 x 10-"

MOl

1.0 x

I~

5.1 x 10-'

Exposure to Popul ation within

k 5O-mile Radius (person-rem)
Population of
871 ,531

INEL

Puget Sound

Pearl
Harbor

Norfolk

Ponsmouth

Kesselring

Worker EDE
(rem)

1.1 x 10·'

5.4 x 10-'

2. 1 x 10-'

5.8 x 10·'

2.7 x 10-'

6. 1 x

MOl EDE
(rem)

6.5 x 10-"

8.9 x 10-'

1.5 x 10'"

2.9 x 10·'

5.6 x 10-'

5.2 x 10-"

NPA EDE
(rem)

N/A

7.4x 10-'

2.3 x 10·'

2.9 x 10-'

2.2 x 10· '

N/A

Total EDE
(person-rem)

1.7 x 10- 11

2.4 x 10-'

1.9 x 10-'

4.3 x 10·'

4.6

X

10 4

8.2 x 10-'

Number of
Fatal
Cancers

8.6 x 10-"

1.2 x 10'"

9.3 x 10-'

2.1 x 10-'

2.3

X

10-'

4. 1 x 10-"

10-'

Table F. 1.4.I.4-tO. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results.
For Normal Operations - Water Pool Examination plus all ongoing Naval Reactors operations
At Oak Ridge

Total EDE
(rem)

dry storage of spent fuel is largest at the Navy shipyards and is extremely small at

Summary of Exposure Calculation Results
For Normal Operations· Dry Storage only
AI all siles

Number of
Fatal Cancers

1.8 x 104

10

Number of
Fatal Cancers

Tab les F. 1.4. 1.5-1 through -6 present the results if a dry storage area is added to existi ng.
current , continuing Naval Reactors operations at all locations.

1.0 x 10-'

5.0 x 10-'
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Table F.1.4.1.5-1 . Summary of Exposure Calculation Results.
For Normal Operations - Dry Storage plus all ongoing Naval Reactors operations
AtlNEL

Total EDE
(rem)

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

Worker

1.1 x 10-'

4.4 x 10-"

MOl

1.1 x 10- 10

5.5

NPA

6.5 x 10- 1•

Location

Exposure to Population within
50-mile Radius (person-rem)
Population of
115,690

1.7 x 10- 1'

3.3

X

10- 1•

X

1
'

10-

X

Worker

Likeli hood
of Fatal
Cancer

5 .4 x 10-'

2.2 x 10'"

MOl

1.1 x 10-'

5.3 x 10-'

NPA

7.5 x 10-'

3.8 x 10-"

Exposure to Populatio n within
50-mile Rad ius (person-rem)
Population of
2,975,810

3 .6 x 10-'

2. 1 x 10-'

8 .5 x 10-'

MOl

5 .3 x 10-"

2 .7 x 10-'

NPA

2.3 x 10-'

1.2 x 10-'
Number of
Fatal Cancers

3.3 x 10-'

Total EDE
(rem)

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

Worker

5.8 x 10-'

2.3 x 10'"

MOl

2.9

10-'

1.5 x 10'"

NPA

2.9 x 10-'

1.5 x 10'"

X

Exposure to Population withi n
50-mile Radius (person-rem)

1.8 x 10-'

Popul ation of
1,539 ,002

Volume I , Appendix D

1.7 x 10-'

.
T able F. 1.4.l.S-4. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results .
For Normal Operations - Dry Storage plus all ongoing Naval Reactors operatIOns
At Norfolk

Location

Number of
Fatal Cancers

F-63

Worker

Population of
817 ,385

10- 1•

Total EDE
(rem)

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

Exposure to Population within
50-mile Radius (person-rerr.)

Table F.1.4.1.5-2. Summary of Exposure Calcul ation Results .
For Normal Operations - Dry Storage plus all ongoing Naval Reactors operations
At Puget Sound

Location

Total EDE
(rem)

Location

Number of
Fatal Cancers
8.6

Table F.1.4.1.5-3. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results.
.
For Normal Operations - Dry Storage plus all ongoing Naval Reactors operations
At Pearl Harbor

Volume I , Ap pendix D

9 .7 x 10-'

Number of
Fatal Cancers
4.9 x 10-'

F-64

Table F.1.4.1.S-S. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results.
For Normal Operations - Dry Storage plus all ongoing Naval Reactors operations
At Portsmouth

F. 1.4 . 1.6 Dry Cell Operstions. This section presents tabulated radiation exposure results

for the dry cell operations option. Since a facility like the proposed dry cell would only be
constructed for the alternatives which include examination of all naval spent fuel, this analysis was
only performed for the INEL, Savannah River, Hanford, the Nevada Test Site, and Oak Ridge

Location

Total EDE
(rem)

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

locations . The following summary provides an indication of the incremental change at each location
due to the addition of a dry cell facility . The calculated health effect to the general population is

Worker

2.7 x 10-3

1.I x 10-<'

roughly proportional to the surrounding population with Oak Ridge being the worst and Nevada Test

MOl

6.3 x 10-'

3. 1 x 10-'

Site being the best.

NPA

2.2 x 10-'

1.I x 10-'

Exposure to Population within
50-mile Radius (person-rem)
Popul ation of
2.432,627

9.2 x 10- 3

Summary or Exposure Calculation Results
For Normal Operations - Dry Cell Operations
At all sites

Number of
Fatal Cancers
4.6 x 10-<'

Table F.1.4.1.S-6. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results.
For Normal Operations - Dry Storage plus all ongoing Naval Reactors operations
At Kesselring

Total EDE
(rem)

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

Worker

6.6 x 10-'

2.7 x 10-'

MOl

5. 1 x 10'"

2.6 x 10-'

Location

Exposure to Population within
50-mile Radius (person-rem)
Population of
1.148,587

5.7 x 10-'

Savannah
River

Hanford

Worker EDE (rem)

6.3 x 10-'

8.3 x 10-'

8. 1 x 10-'

MOl EDE (rem)

2.5 x 10-'

4.8 X 10-'
3.8 x 10... •

2.4
4.4

X

2. 1 x 10- '

1.3

X

1.7 x 10-'

3.6 x 10-'

8.0

X

8.5 x 10-'

1.8 x 10-'

4.0 x 10'"

NPA EDE (rem)
Total EDE
(person-rem)
Number of Fatal
Cancers

N/A

X

10-'
10-' "
10-'
10-3

• MOl (Barnwell Plant)
• • MOl (FMEF)

Number of
Fatal Cancers
2.9 x 10-'
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INELlNRF

Tables F.I .4.1 .6-1 through -5 present the detailed analysis results.
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Nevada
Test Site

Oak Ridge

3.5 x 10-'

1.1 x 10-'

10-'

8.9 x 10-'

3.4

X

N/A

1.8 x 10-'

9 .0

X

10-1

N/A

1.0

X

10-'

5.0 x 10-'

.-

Table F.1.4.1.6-1. Summary of Exposure Calculation Resulrs .
For Nonnal Operations - Dry Cell Operations
AtlNEL

Location
Worker

Total EDE
(rem)
6.3 x 10-'

Table F. .4. 1.6-3. Summary of Exposure Calculation Resulrs.
For Normal Operations - Dry Cell Operations
At Hanford

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

Location

Total EDE
(rem)

2.5 x 10-'

Worker

8. 1 x 10-'

3.2 x 10-'

1.5 x 10-"

6. 1 x 10-'·

MCW

4.2 x 10-'

1.7 xlO-il

MCW

MOl

2.5 x 10-'

1.3 x 10-'·

2.4 x 10-'
-~g~-~I'!~~-!:~~]:------- -----------

Exposure to Population within
Radius (person-rem)

5~mile

Population of
115,690

1.7 x 10-'

Number of
Fatal Cancers

Location

8.3 x 10-'

3.3 x

1.3 x 10-"

5.3 x 10-'·

-~-~~-~~~-!:~~]:-------

-----------

MOl (Barnwell Plant)""

3.8 x 10'"

1.9 x 10-"

NPA

2. 1 x 10-'

1.1

4.8 x 10- '

Exposure to Population within
Radius (person-rem)

~m i le

Population of
579,541

3.6 x 10-'

2.4

X

1.2 x 10-'·
---------.- --- -2.2 x 10-'·

NPA

1.3 x 10-'

6.5 x 10-"

Total EDE
(rem)

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

Worker

3.5 x 10-'

1.5 x 10-'

MCW

3.7 x 10-'

l.5 xlo-"

MOl

3.4 x 10-'

1.7 x 10-'·

10-'·

Location

10-"

Number of
Fatal Cancers

Exposure to Population within
Radius (person-rem)

1.8 x 10-'

5~ mil e

" MOl (New ECF) applies if spent fuel facility is constructed on the Savannah River Site.
"'MOl (Barnwell Plant) applies if spent fuel facility is constru cted at Barnwell Nuclear Fuel Plant.

F-{i7

4.0 x 10-"

Table F.1.4.1.6-4. Summary of Exposure Calcul ation Resulrs.
For Normal Operations - Dry Cell Operations
At Nevada Test Site

--------------1.

8.0 x 10-'

Number of
Fatal Cancers

" MOl (New ECF) applies if spent fuel facility is constructed at the 200 area on the Hanford Site.
"'MOl (FMEF) applies if spent fuel facility is constructed at the Fuels and Materials Examinat ion
Facility.

H,'

Worker

4.4 x 10-'

Population of
375,800

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

MCW

MOl (FMEF)""

Exposure to Population within
50-mile Radius (person-rem)

8.5 x 10-'

Table F.l.4. 1.6-2. Summary of Exposure Calculation Resulrs .
For Normal Operations - Dry Cell Operat io ns
At Savannah River

Total EDE
(rem)

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

Volume I, Appendix D

Population of
13.792

Volume I. Appendix D

1.8 x 10-'

Number of
Fatal Cancers
9.0 x 10-'

F-{i8

Table F.1.4.1.6-S. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results.
For Normal Operations · Dry Cell Operations
At Oak Ridge

F. 1.4.2 Accident Evaluation. The analysis of airborne «leases from hypothetical a«idents is
evaluated with RSAC·S. Unless stated otherwise. the following conditions were used when perform·
ing calculations with RSAC·S . In most cases. these conditions are taken directly as defaults from the
code.

Total EDE
(rem)

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

Worker

l.l x 10-·

4.4 x 10-'

MCW

l.l

10-'

4.6 x 10-"

8.9 x 10-'

4.S x 10....

Location

MOl

X

Exposure to Population withi n
SO-mile Radius (person· rem)
Population of
871 ,S31

1.0 x 10-'

Meteorological Data

•

Wind speed. direction. and Pasquill stability are taken from SO% and 9S%
meteorology . See Section F.I .3 .S for a discussion of meteorological conditions.

Number of
Fatal Cancers

•

S.O x 10-'

•

The release is calculated as occurring at ground level (0 m) .

Mixing layer height is 400 meters (1320 feet). Airborne materials freely diffuse in
the atmosphere near ground level in what is known as the mixing depth . A stable
layer ex ists above the mixing depth which restricts vertical diffusion.

•

Wet deposition is zero (no rain occurs to accelerate deposition and reduce the area
affected).

•

Dry deposition of the cloud is mod eled. During moveme nt of the radioactive plume.
a fraction of the plume is deposited on the ground due to gravitational forces and
becomes available for exposure by grou nd surface radiation and ingestion.

•

The quantity of deposited radioactive material is proportional to the materi al size and
speed. The foll owing dry deposition velocities (m/s) were used :
solids

= 0 .001

hal ogens

= 0 .01

nohle gases

= 0 .0

cesiu m = 0 .001 ruthenium = 0 .001.

•

If radioacti ve releases occ ur through a stack. th <n additio nal pl "",.- Jispersion can he
accounted fo r by calculating a iet plume ri se . In this anal )

IS.

iet plume ri se is

ignored.

•

When rel pased gases have a heat content . the plu me ca n disperse more qu i<kly. In
this calculation. buoyant pluloe effects are ignored .
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Inha lation Data
F. 1.4.2. 1 Water Pool Storage. In the analysis of a spent fuel storage pool, a number of

•

Breathing rate is 3.33 x 10"' cubic meters per second (cu m/s) for worker, MCW, and
NPA; 2 .66 x 10" cu mls for people at site boundary and beyond .

possible disrurbances and minor accidents have been posrulated. A prerequisite for a large release of
radioactive material to the environment under more severe accident conditions is the damage of the
cladding of a fairly large amount of stored fuel , with an accompany ing release of gaseous and

•

airborne particles of radioactive material from the fuel. Several conceivable mechan isms which might

Particle size is 1.0 micron.

lead to this siruation are the possibility that the fuel overheats so that the fuel cladding loses its

•

The internal exposure period is 50 years for individual organs and tissues which have
radionuclides co mmitted .

integrity or there is a mass ive mechanical impact on the stored fuel.

Exposure to the entire plume for th e general public. The worker, MeW, and NPA

the stored fuel ceases and the fuel temperarure increases to fis5ion product release temperarures due to

are exposed as discussed in Section F. 1.3.9.

decay heat . The pool water could be lost by leakage at a rate in excess of U,e makeup system

The only way for the fuel to overheat would be to lose enough pool water such that cooling of

•

capability. Unless a catastrophic event like an earthquake causes severe damage to the strucrure of

•

Inh alation exposure factors based on ICRP 30.

the water pool, loss of water from the pool strucrure would be a slow phenomenon with only
gradually inc reasing severity for which corrective measures can be taken in due time. Additionally, a

Ground Surratt Exposure

thermal analysis was conducted to demonstrate that fuel overheating is not possible in the event of a

•

Exposed to contaminated soil for I year for the general public. See Section F. 1.3.9
for additional details.

drained water pool.

The circumstances in whi ch an event could lead to severe mechanical loading of th e fuel have

•

Build ing shielding factor is 0 .7 which exposes the individ ual to co ntaminated soil for

been identified as:

16 hours a day .
•

accidents during handling of heavy items, such as a lifti ng device failu re

Ingestion Data

•

•
Ingestion numbers will be redu ced by a factor of 10 to account for only 10% of the

external events (earthquake, tornado, flood, ai rcraft crash, etc.) which could cause
strucru ral failure .

food consumed being grown locally (such as in a person's garden).

•

Prevention of inadvertent, uncontrolled nuclear chain reactions is generally assured by the
The following changes from RSAC·5 defaults were used :

design of the racks for the fuel, primarily by diminishing the chances for a chain reaction by spaci ng
the fuel element bundles far enough apart to eliminate th e poss ibility. Special attention is given to the

Annual Dietar) Consumpti on Rates:

risk of accidental criticality whi ch might be experienced in fuel transpo rt and handling operations.
Uncontrolled nuclear reaction is prevented duri ng fuel handling by applying the principle of

177 Kg/y r Stored Vegetabl es (produce)

18.3 Kg /y r Fresh Vegetables (leafy)

transferring one fuel element, module , or co ntainer at a time. In addition, fuel handling rules are

94 Kg /yr Meat

developed to ensure that criti cal ity cannot occur. The double accident criterion is applied to ensure
that criticality would not occur foll owing two severe, concurre nt, unrelated accidents. Thus , three

112 Llyr Milk .

fuel handling accidents are required to reach an uncontrolled nuclear chain reaction.
F·71
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F. 1.4.2. 1. 1 Drained Water Pool.

~

Co-{i()

3.6

F. 1.4.2. 1. 1. 1 Description of Conditions. In this hypothetical accident scenario, a

Fe-55

6 .6

catastrophic event, like an earthquake, causes severe damage to the structure of th e water pool,

Co-58

1.3

Mn-54

2.2 x 10"

Fe-59

1.9 x 10"

resulting in a co mplete loss of pool water. A thermal analysis of spent fuel in a water pool was
conducted to demonstrate th at clad failure or fuel melting is not possible in the event of an
accidentally drained water pool. Air circulation through the fuel racks and fuel units was shown to be
sufficient to prevent clad failure in the unlikely event of complete loss of pool water. However, the
loss of water could result in increased direct radiation and a release of corrosion products.

F. 1.4 .2 . 1. 1. 3 Results. The following tab le summarizes the public health risk to the

general population that might result from the hypothetical drained water pool accident at each
location . The number of fatal cancers would be expected to occur over a 50-year period. "Ri sk" is
defined as the number of fatal cancers times the probability of occurrence. The results are presented

F. 1.4.2. 1. 1.2 Source Term. Conditions used in developing the source term are as

follows:

for the design basis accident with 50'% and 95% meteorology. For INEL. the evaluation basis
eanhquake results in a 0'.24 g peak ground acceleration at the ECF (Rizzo 1994). Tnis is based on
the event being initiated at the Howe eanhquake epicenter and involving a surface rupture length of

•

300 naval fuel units would be in the water pool.

34 kilometers. Using the medium response spectra, which is appropriate for a risk oriented analysis.
the analyses of the structures at the INEL-ECF indicate that damage sufficient to cause the pool to

•

The thermal anal ysis demonstrates that no fission product release would occur during

drain would not occur if the pool is filled , but that, if several sections of the water pool were empty,

the accident.

a crack could develop in the area between the wall and floor of some of the older sections of the
water pool. However, the INEL-ECF water pools are nearly always filled . Sections of the pool are

•

The amount of corrosion products on the fuel units is based on best estimate values.

•

The release to the environment would occur at a constant rate over a 15-minute

of the initiating seismic event (I x 10-< per year to 4 x IO'~ per year) and the probability the

period .

•

only drained if maintenance work is necessary within the pools . Taking into accou nt the probability
eanhquake will occur with a se~tion of the pool drained. the total probability of occurrence of an
event leading to draining of the pool is estimated to be in the range of 10" to 10'-6 per year. A value
of 10" was used to devel op the risk results in the table.

One percent of the origi nal corrosion products from the fuel units might be relea<ed to

A beyond design basis seismic event was also considered . Fo r IN EL, this beyond design

the atmosphere due to th ermal air currents. Additionally. 10'% of the corrosion

basis eanhquake is based on a scenario that results in a peak ground acceleration at the IN EL-ECF of

products could be released to the environment with the pool water.

0'.40 g (Rizzo 1994). Analysis of this event has shown that so me cracks could develop. The

The following amounts of corrosio n product nucl ides might be released to the

based on the probability of the initiating seismic event (2 x 10" to 6 x 10-'). and the probability of

atmosphere. As noted above. the release to the water environment is 10' times these

failure of th e mitigative actions that would be taken to preve nt th e pool from draining. A val ue of

probability of this beyond design basis event is estimated to be in the range of 10-6 to 10" per year

•

values . This listing includes nuclides that result in at least 99% of the exposure.

10-6 was selected to calculate ri sk for this beyond design basis eve nt. Any cracks developed as a
result of either a design ba,is or a beyond design basis seismic eve nt are expected to be small and

•

No filtrat ion by High Efficiency Paniculate Air (HE PA) filters is assumed .
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mitigative actions coul d be taken to stop the pool from draining. Analysis has show n that air cooling
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is suffi cient to maintain fuel integrity if the pool was drained . No overheating of fuel would occur;
hence, no fission products would be released even if the pool were completely drained . The
consequences calculated stem from th e release of radioactive co rrosion products within the pool water

Table F . I.4.2. I.I-I. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results.
For Wet Storage - Drained Water Pool
At INEL

and would be the same for the desig n basis and beyond design basis seis mic events. Since th e
consequences are the same, the following table uses the acc ident probability for the design basis
50% METEOROLOGY

seismic event si nce that results in the larger risk.

Total EDE
(rem)

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

Worker

7.5 x 10-'

3 .0 x 10-'

MCW

6 .9 x 10-'

2.7 x 10-'

NPA

3.9 x 10-'

2.0 x 10-'

MOl

2.8 x 10-'

For locations other than INEL, water pools might need to be constructed . For these
locations, it was expected that the design approaches would be similar to or better than were used in
the construction of the INEL-ECF. Therefore, a probability value of 10" per year was also used at
these locations for the total probability that a design basis seismic event would lead to draining of a

Location

water pool. Consequences were based on site specific population data and meteorology.

Drained Water Pool Summary
Maximally exposed
off-site
individual (MOl)
(rem)

Site

1.7 x 10"

INEL

No. of fatal cancers
if accident occurs

Risk per year

1.7 x 10"

1.7 x 10"

Savannah River

1.6 x 10"

1.1

10"

1.1 x 10-6

Hanford

6 .3 x 10"'

4 .7 x 10"

4.7 x 10"

Puget Souod

1.4

5.1 x 10"

5 . 1 x 10-6

Pearl Harbor

7.9 x 10"'

1.1

1.1 x 10"

X

Norfolk

3.0

6.0 x 10"

6 .0 x 10-6

Portsmouth

1.6

3.4 x 10"

3.4 x 10-6

Kesselring

2.9 x 10"

2.5

2.5 x 10-6

Nevada Test Site

3.3 x 10"

1.9 x 10"

1.9

Oak Ridge

5 .2

1.8 x 10"

1.8 x 10-6

X

10"

X

10"

The risk for th is hypoth etical accident is ge nerally more severe at Navy shipyards than at the
DOE sites. At all sites, this accident results in the highest ri sk of th e wet sto rage accidents eval uated.

For the hypothetical drained water pool scenario, the radioactive plume might result in
contamination of the ground to a downwind distance of 0.29 mile. This would yield a total area
impacted by the accident of approximately II acres. The calculated downwind distance would be

1.4 x 10'"
Number of
Fatal Cancers

Exposure to Population within
50-mile Radius (person-rem)
Population of
115690

6.7

3.3 x 10-'

95 % METEOROLOGY

Location

Total EDE
(rem)

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer
8.3 x

10~

Worker

2. 1

MCW

7.6x 10-'

NPA

2.3 x 10-'

1.2 x 10'"

MOl

1.7 x 10-'

8.5 x 10'"

Exposure to Populat ion within
50-mile Radius (person-rem)
Population of
115690

3.5 x 10'

3.0 x 10'"

Number of
Fatal Cancers
1.7 x 10-'

contained within the boundaries of all sites und er evaluation with the exception of Oak Ridge and
Norfolk .
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Table F. 1.4.2.l.t-3. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results.
For Wet Storage - Drai ned Water Pool
At Hanford

Table F.1.4.2.I.I-2. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results.
For Wet Storage - Drai ned Water Pool
At Savannah River

50% METEOROLOGY

50% METEOROLOGY

Total EOE
(rem)

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

Worker

3.4 x 10"'

1.3 x 10-'

7.9 x 10""

MCW

2.6 x 10"'

1.0 x 10"'

2.5 x 10-'

1.3 x 10-'

NPA

3.0 x 10"

1.5

X

10"'

MOl (New ECF)

3.5 x 10-'

1.8 x 10""

MOl (New ECF)

8.3 x 10"

4.2

X

10"'

MOl (Barnwell)

1.3 x 10"'

6.3 x 10""

MOl (FMEF)

1.7 x 10"'

8.6 x 10-'

Total EOE
(rem)

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

Worker

3.4 x 10-'

1.3 x 10-'

MCW

2.0 x 10"'

NPA

Location

Exposure to Population within
50-mile Radius (person-rem)
Population of
579541

Location

Number of
Fatal Cancers

2.4 x 10'

1.2

X

Number of
Fatal Cancers

Exposure to Population within
50-mile Radius (person-rem)
Population of
375860

10"'

2.4 x 10"'

4.8

95% METEOROLOGY

95% METEOROLOGY

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

Total EOE
(rem)

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

Worker

2. 1

8.3 x 10-'

MCW

2.5 x 10-'

1.0 x 10-'

MCW

NPA

4.3 x 10"'

2.1

NPA

4.8 x to-'

2 .4

MOl (New ECF)

1.6 x 10"'

8.0 x 10""

MOl (New ECF)

6.3 x to-'

3.2 x to-6

MOl (Barnwell)

1.4 x 10"'

7.2 x 10"'

MOl (FMEF)

2.2 x to-'

Location

Exposure to Population within
SO-mile Rad ius (person- rem)
Population of
579541

2.2 x 10'

X

Location

2. 1

Worker

10-6

Number of
Fatal Cancers

1.6

X

to-I

Exposure to Population within
50-mile Radius (person-rem)
Population of
375860

1.1 x 10"'
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Total EOE
(rem)
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9.4 x 10'

8.3 x 10"
6.6 x to-'
X

to-6

1.1 x to-'
Number of
Fatal Cancers
4 .7 x 10-'
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Table F.1.4.2.1.1-4. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results .
For Wet Storage - Drained Water Pool
At Puget Sound

Table F.1.4.2.I.I-S. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results.
For Wet Storage - Drained Water Pool
At Pearl Harbor

50% METEOROLOGY

Location

50% METEOROLOGY

Total EOE
(rem)

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

1.8 x 10-'

7.3 x 10-'

N/A

N/A

Worker
MCW
NPA

2.2 x 10-'

I I x

MOl

1.2 x 10-'

6.0 x 10-'

Exposure to Population within
50-mile Radius (person-rem)
Population of
2975810

Location
Worker

7.5 x 10-'

MCW

IO~

Number of
Fatal Cancers
1.7 x 10'

Locat ion
Worker

2. 1

3.0x

I~

N/A

NPA

1.9 x 10-'

9.7 x 10-'

MOl

2.0 x 10-'

Exposure to Population within
50-mile Radius (person-rem)
Population of
817385

8.2 x 10-'

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

N/A

95% METEOROLOGY

Total EOE
(rem)

Total EOE
(rem)

9.8 x 10-'
Number of
Fatal Cancers

8.0 x 10'

4.0 x 10-'

95% METEOROLOGY
Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer
8.3 x

Location

I~

Total EOE
(rem)

Worker

2. 1

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer
8.3 x

10~

MCW

N/A

N/A

MCW

N/A

N/A

NPA

2.6

1.3 x 10-'

NPA

6 .3

3. 1 x 10-'

MOl

1.4

MOl

7.9 x 10-'

Exposure to Popu lati on within
50-mile R2dius (person-rem)
Populat ion of
297581 0

7.2 x

I~

Number of
Fatal Cancers
1.0 x 10'

Exposure to Population within
50-mile Radius (person-rem)
Population of
817385

5. 1 x 10-'

F-79

Volume I , Appendix 0

Volume I , Appendi x 0

2.2 x 10'

3.9 x

10~

Number of
Fatal Cancers
1.1
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Table F.1.4.2.1.1-6. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results.
For Wet Storage - Drained Water Pool
At Norfolk

Table F.1.4.2.1.1-7. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results.
For Wet Storage - Drained Water Pool
At Portsmouth

50% METEOROLOGY

50% METEOROLOGY

Location

Total EDE
(rem)

Worker

1.8 x 10-'

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

Location
Worker

7.4 x 10-'

Total EDE
(rem)

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

1.8 x 10-'

7.3 x 10-'

N/A

MCW

NPA

4.6 x 10-'

2.3 x 10-'

NPA

4.4 x 10-'

MOl

2.8 x 10-'

1.4 x 10-"

MOl

1.3 x 10-'

MCW

N/A

Exposure to Population within
SO-mile Radius (person-rem)
Population of
1539002

Population of
2432627

7.7 x 10-'

Location
Worker

2.1

6.4 x 10-'
Number of
Fatal Cancers

6.5 x 10'

3.2 x 10-'

95% METEOROLOGY

95 % METEOROLOGY

Total EDE
(rem)

N/A

2.2 x 10-'

Exposure to Population within
SO-mile Radius (person-rem)

Number of
Fatal Cancers

1.5 x 10'

N/A

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

Location

Total EDE
(rem)

Worker

8.3 x 10-"

2. 1

Likelihood
of Fatal

Cancer
8.3 x 10-"

MCW

N/A

N/A

MCW

N/A

N/A

NPA

5.3 x 10-'

2.7 x 10-"

NPA

9.8 x 10-'

4.9 x 10-"

MOl

3.0

1.5 x 10-]

MOl

1.6

Exposure to Populatio n with in
SO-mile Radi us (perso n-rem)
Population of
1539002

1.2 x 10'

Exposure to Population within
SO-mile Radius (perso n-rem)

Number of
Fatal Cancers

Population of
2432627

6.0 x 10-'
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6.7 x 10'

7.9 x 10-"
Number of
Fatal Cancers

3.4 x 10- '
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Table F . t.4.2. t.I-8. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results.
For Wet Storage - Drained Water Pool
At Kesselring

Table F. t.4.2.t.1 -9. Summary of Exposure Calcul at ion Results .
For Wet Storage - Drained Water Pool
At Nevada Test Site

50% METEOROLOGY

50% METEOROLOGY

Location

Total EDE
(rem)

Worker

1.8xlO-'

MCW

N/A

NPA

N/A

MOl

2.0 x 10-'

Exposure to Population within
50-mile Rad ius (person·rem)
Population of
1148587

Total EDE
(rem)

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

Worker

1.2 x 10-'

4.8 x 10-'

N/A

MCW

9.3 x 10-'

3.7 x 10-'

N/A

NPA

N/A

N/A

1.0 x 10-'

MOl

1.5 x 10-'

7.5 x 10-'

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

Location

7 .4 x 10-'

Exposure to Populat ion within
50-mile Radius (person-rem)

Number of
Fatal Cancers

7. 1 x 10'

Population of
13792

3.6 x 10-'

Number of
Fatal Cancers

3.2 x 10-'

1.6 x 10-'

95% METEOROLOGY

95% METEOROLOGY

Total EDE
(rem)

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

2. 1

8.3 x 10-'

5 .4 x 10-'

2.2 x 10'"

Total EDE
(rem)

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

2. 1

8.3 x 10-'

MCW

N/A

N/A

MCW

NPA

N/A

N/A

NPA

N/A

N/A

MOl

2.9 x 10-'

1.5 x 10-'

MOl

3.3 x 10-:

1.7 x 10-'

Location
Worker

Exposure to Populatio n within
50-mile Radius (person-rem)
Population of
1148587

5.0 x 10'

Location
Worker

Exposure to Population within
50-mile Radius (perso n-rem)

Number of
Fatal Cance rs

Population of
13792

2.5 x 10-'
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Number of
Fatal Cancers
3.7

1.9 x 10-'
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Table F.1.4.2. 1.1-10. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results .
For Wet Storage - Drained Water Pool
At Oak Ridge

F. 1.4 .2 . 1.2 Accidental Criticality.

F. 1.4.2 . 1.2. 1 Description of Conditions. In this hypothetical accident scenario, an

accidental uncontrolled chain reaction producing I x 10" fissions is postulated . The criticality occurs
50% METEOROLOGY

Location

Total EDE
(rem)

in the water pool which is not emptied by the event and does not subsequently empty . Release of
Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

Worker

7.5 x 10"'

3.0 x 10-"

MCW

2.0 x 10"'

7.9 x 10'"

NPA

2.6 x 10-'

1.3 x 10-"

MOl

8.2 x 10"'

4. 1 x 10-"

Exposure to Populatio n within
SO-mile Rad ius (person-rem)
Population of
871531

fission products includes those specified in Regulatory Guide 3.34 (NUREG 1979b) from the
criti cal ity, plus fission products remaining in the fuel as a result of the original use. Removal of
fission products by the pool water is included.

F. 1.4.2. 1.2.2 Source Term. Conditions used in developing the source term are as

follows:

Number of
Fatal Cancers

7.1 x 10'

•

The fraction of the fission products released to the building is 100% of the noble
gases, 25% of the halogens, 0. 1% of the ruthenium (Elder et al . 1986), and 0.05% of
the cesium and remaining solids.

3.6 x 10"'
•

The original inventory of fission products from two naval fuel units are available for
release in addition to those created by the criticality event.

95% METEOROLOGY
•

Total EDE
(rem)

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

Worker

2. 1

8.3 x 10-"

MCW

1.2 x 10-'

4.8 x 10"'

NPA

1.6

8.2 x 10-"

MOl

5.2

2.6 x 10"'

Location

Exposure to Population within
SO-mile Rad ius (person· rem)
Population of
871531

3.5 x 10'

A High Efficiency Particul ate Air (HEPA) filter removes 99.9% of the solid fission
products from the plume .

•

The release to the environment occurs at a constant rate over a IS-minute period .
This is conservative as compared to the 8· hour release allowed in Regulatory Guide
3.34.

Number of
Fatal Cancers
1.8 x 10"'
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•

The following amounts of radionuclides are released to the environment. This listing
includes nuclides that result in at least 99% of the possible exposure.

F. 1.4 .2. 1.2.3 Results. The following table su mmar izes the public health risk to the
general population that wo uld result from the hypothetical criticality accident at each location. The
number of fatal cancers woul d be expected to occur over a 50-year period . "Risk" is defined as the

Nuclide

Curies

Te-133

3.4 x 10'

1-134

3 .5 x 10'

1-135

1.2 x 10'

Y-91m

4.3 x 10"

Cs-138

1.6 x 10"'

Rb-88

1.7 x 10"

Rb-89

6 .05 x 10"'

Y-91

1.1 x 10"'

Curies

number of fatal cancers times the probability of occurrence. An accidental criticality during spent

1- 132

1.7 x 10"

nuclear fuel handling operati ons is extremely unlikely. There are no known events of this type which

Sr-9O

1.94 x 10"

Nuclide

Pu-238

3 .7 x 10"'

Cs-139

7.3 x 10-'

Br-84

2.3 x 10'

Ba-142

4.8 x 10"'

1-133

2.4 x 10"

Y-93

1.3 x 10"

Sr-91

5 .4 x 10"

Ba-137m

1.9 x 10"

2.4 x 10"'

Ru-I06

7.6 x 10"

Ba-139

6 .9 x 10-6

Zr-95

1.4 x 10"

Ba-141

8.8 x 10"'

Sr-89

7.01 x 10"

1-129

5 . 1 x 10"'

Eu-154

1.3 x 10"

1-131

3 .2 x 10"'

H-3

1.42 x 10'
1.5 x 10"

Ba-14O

2.5 x 10"'

1-136

1.1 x 10'

Cs-137

2.0 x 10"'

C.-I44

4.5 x 10"'

Nb-95

2.7 x 10"'

Rb-9O

2.2 x 10"'

a dry state. Fuel handling procedures in water in conj unction with required physical barriers ensure
that a double accident criterion is met. This criterion specifies that the fuel will not anain a critical
condition even if any two unlikely and unrelated accidents occur at the same time. The DOE
criticality control requirement is a double contingency criterion which specifies that a second unlikely
and unrelated accident would be required for a critical condition to result. To satisfy the NNPP

5r-92

Cs- 134

have occurred during handling of fuel modules either in or out of water. Due to the need for a
neutron moderator. extremely large quantities of naval fuels would be required to achieve criticality in

double accident criterion. naval fuel handling operations are conducted in the fo llowing manner:

•

No more than one module is to be h"ndled in one area at a time.

•

If two mod ules are capable of achieving a critical condition. separation must be
maintained by a positive barrier between them which is locked in place.

•

If three modules are required to achieve criticality. a physical barrier which does not
need to be locked is required to be placed between them.

•

If four or more modul es are neooed to achieve criticality. no harriers are required. but
modules are to remai n separated .

Based on the above requ irements. at least three dist inct errors are needed to achieve accidental

criticality. Fo r example. bringing two or more modules in close proximity is always prohibited .

Failure to maintain separation constitutes an error. Secondly. failure to recognize and use physical
barriers when required also constitutes an error. A hum an error rate of 10" per operation (Swain and
Gunman 1983) is taken as the probability of error for trai ned personnel. Further. because all fuel
handling operations must be chec ked by an independent verifier. an additional facto r of 10"' may be
taken for a probability of

10~

fo r eac h independent error . Fo r naval fuel handli ng. an error in which

two modules are brought together is a violation of a fundam ental req uirement. Compliance with this
requirement alone ensures that a subc rit ic.1 state is mai nt ained. Therefore. th e bringing of two or
F-87
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c915.

more modul es togeth er error is considered separate and independent of all oth er errors. Because a
second error must occur to cause accidental criticality, an additional reduction in the probability is

Ta hle F.1.4,2 ,1.2- 1. Summ ary of Ex posure Calcul at ion Results .
Fo r Wet Storage - Accidental Criti cality
At INE L

warranted . For example, failure to recognize the need to install a barrier when required is such an
error. Because this mistake is independ ent of the first error and has been checked , a second value of
IQ4 is appropriate for a total value of 10" per year. This probability is taken as the likelihood of a

50% METEOROLOGY

criticality for movement of a single module. Based on an estimated 1,000 fu el handling operations a
year, a value of 10" per year has been used in the risk assessment of accidental criticality.
Total EDE
(rem)

Location
Accidental Criticality Summary
No. of fatal cancers
if accident occurs

INEL

9 .2 x 10"

6.4 x 10"

6 .4 x 10"

Savannah River

9.4 x 10"

4.5 x 10"

4 .5

Hanford

2.8 x 10"

1.6 x 10"'

1.6 x 10"'

Puget Sound

1.3

2.8 x 10"'

2.8 x 10""

Pearl Harbo r

6 .7 x 10"

6 .0

10"'

6 .0 x 10""

No rfolk

2 .7

3.5 x 10"

3 .5 x 10""

Portsmo uth

1.4

1.5 x 10"'

1.5 x 10""

Kessel ring

2.3 x 10"'

1.1 x 10"'

1.1 x

2 .0 x 10-'

7.0x 10-'

7.0 x 10-'

4 .7

8.8 x 10-'

8.8 x 10-'

Site

Nevada Test Site
Oak Ridge

X

Risk per year

X

10"

Cancer

3.0

1.2 x 10-'

MCW

1.3 x 10-'

5. 1 x 10-'

NPA

5.9 x

IO~

2 .9

X

10-'

MOl

2 .0 x 10-'

1.0

X

10-"

Worker

Maximally exposed
off-site
individual (MOl)
(rem)

Likdihood
of Fatal

Nu mher of
Fatal Cancers

Exposu re to Population within
50-mil e Radius (person-rem)
Popul at ion of
115690

5.5

2. 8 x 10-'

95% MET EO ROLCG Y

10~

Location

Total EDE
(rem)
8.0

Worker

Likelihood
of Fatal
Ca nce r
3.2 x 10-'

MCW

1.3 x 10-'

5.0

sites. At all sites, this accident results in the seco nd highest risk of th e wet storage accidents

NPA

2 .8 x 10-'

1.4 x 10-'

evaluated.

MOl

9 .2 x 10- '

The risk for this hypothetical accident is more severe at Navy shipyards th an at th e DOE

For the hypothetical criticality acc ident sce nario, th e radioact ive plume might cause co ntamination of the ground to a downwind distance of 0 .25 mile. This woul d yield a total area impacted by

4 .6 x 10"

1.3 x 10'

6.4 x 10-'

the accident of approximately 8 acres. The calculated dow nwind distance would be contai ned within
the boundaries of all sites under evaluation with the exception o f Oa k Ri dge and Norfolk .
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10-"

Numhcr of
Fat31 CanL:ers

Exposure to Population within
50-mi le Radius (person-rem)
Population of
115690

X
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Table F.1.4.2.1.2-2. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results .
For Wet Storage - Accidental Criticality
At Savannah River
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Table F. 1.4.2_1.2-3. Summary of Expos"re Calculation Results.
For Wet Storage - Accidental Criticality
At Hanford

METEOROLOGY

50% METEOROLOGY

Total EOE
(rem)

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

1.3

5.3 x 10-'"

MCW

6 .8 x 10'"

2.7 x 10'"

NPA

7.4 x 10"'"

3.7 x 10'"

MOl (New (ECF)

3.3 x 10'"

1.6 x 10-"

MOl (Barnwell)

1.2 x 10'"

5.9 x 10-"

MOl (FMEF)

Location
Worker

Exposure to Population within
5O-mile Radius (person-rem)
Population of
579541

95~

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

Worker

1.3

5.3 x 10"'"

MCW

8.9 x 10'"

3 .5 x 10'"

NPA

6.6 x 10....

3 .3 x 10'"

MOl (New (ECF)

4.7 x 10"'"

2.4 x 10'"

1.3 x 10-'

6.7 x 10'"

Location

Number of
Fatal Cancers

2.2 x 10'

Total EOE
(rem)

Number of
Fatal Cancers

Exposure to Population within
50-mile Radius (person-rem)
Population of
375860

1.1 x 10'"

METEOROLOGY

1.1 x 10-'

2.2

95 % METEOROLOGY

Total EOE
(rem)

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

8.0

3.2 x 10-'

Total EOE
(rem)

Likel ihood
of Fatal
Cancer

8.0

3.2 x 10'"

Worker

MCW

7.9 x 10'"

3. 1 x 10"'"

MCW

4.9

10'"

2.0 x 10....

NPA

6.4 x 10'"

3.2 x 10-"

NPA

6 .9 x 10-'

3 .5 x 10'"

MOl (New ECF)

9 .4 x 10'"

4.7 x 10-<

MOl (New ECF)

2.8 x 10'"

1.4 x 10-<

MOl (Barnwell)

I I x 10'"

5.3 x 10'"

MOl (FMEF)

1.2 x 10-'

6 . 1 x 10'"

Location
Worker

Exposure to Po . 1",:1011 1,1,
50-mile Radius (person-rem)
Population of
579541

Location

Number of
Fatal Cancers
8.9 x 10'

Number of
Fatal Cancers

Exposure to Population within
50-mile Radius (perso n-rem)
Population of
375860

4.5 x 10-'

F-91

X
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3. 1 x 10'

1.6 x 10-'
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Table F.1.4.2 . 1.2-4. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results.
For Wet Storage - Accidental Criticality
At Puget Sound

Table F. 1.4.2.1.2-S. Summary of Exposure Czlculation Results.
For Wet Storage - Accidental Criticality
At Pearl Harbor

50% METEOROLOGY
50% METEOROLOGY

Location

Total EDE
(rem)

Worker

7.2 x 10-'

2.9 x 10-'

NIA

N/A

MCW
NPA

7.7 x 10-'

MOl

1.1 x 10-'

Exposure to Population within
50-mile Radius (person-rem)
Population of
2975810

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

Location

3.8 x 10-'
5 .6 x 10-'

1.1

X

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

3.0

1.2 x 10-'

Worker

Number of
Fatal Cancers

2.3 x 10'

Total EDE
(rem)

MCW

N/A

N/A

NPA

7.0x 10-'

3.5 x 10'"

MOl

1.8 x 10-'

8.9 x 10-'

Exposure to Population within
50-mile Radius (person-rem)
Population of
817385

10-'

Number of
Fatal Cancers

5.6 x 10'

2.8 x 10-'

95% METEOROLOGY
95% METEOROLOGY

Location

Total EDE
(rem)

Worker

8.0

MCW

N/A

NPA

8.8

MOl

1.3

Exposure to Population with in
50-mile Radius (person-rem)
Population of
2975810

5 .6 x 10'

Likelihood
of Fatal

Cancer

Location

3.2 x 10-'

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

8.0

3.2 x 10-'

Worker

N/A
4 .4 x 10-'

6 .3 x 10-'
Nu mber of
Fatal Cancers

MCW

N/A

N/A

NPA

2.2 x 10'

2.2 x 10-'

MOl

6 .7 x 10-'

Exposure to Population with in
50-mile Radius (perso n-rem)
Population of
817385

2.8 x 10-'

F-93

Total EDE
(rem)
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Volume I, Appendix D

3.4 x 10'"
Number of
Fatal Cancers

1.2 x 10'

6.0 x 10-'
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'fah le F.1.4.2. 1.2-6. Summary of Exposure Calcu lalion Results .
For W<l Slorage - Acc idental Crilicalily
Al Norfolk

Table F. 1.4.2.1.2-7. Summary of Exposure Calculalion Results.
For Wet Storage - Accidental Criticality
At Portsmouth

50 % METEOROLOGY

50% METEOROLOGY

TOlal EDE
(rem )

Likelihood
of Falal
Cancer

7.4 x 10-'

2.9 x 10-'

MCW

N/A

N/ A

NPA

1.6 x 10- '

8.2 x 10-'

MOl

2.7 x 10- '

Localion
Worker

Exposure 10 Popu lalion wilhin
50-mile Radius (perso n-rem)
Populalion o f
1539002

1.3 x

Location
Wocker

10~

Number of
Falal Cancers
1.6 x 10'

8.0

3.2 x 10-'

N/ A

N/ A

NPA

1.8

8.8 x 10-'

MOl

2.7

Exposure 10 Populalion within
50-mile Radi us (perso n-rem)
Populalion of
1539002

7.0 x 10'

2 .9 x 10-'

N/A

N/A

NPA

1.5 x 10-'

7.7 x 10-'

MOl

1.2 x 10-'

Population of
2432627

5.9 x 10-'
Number of
Fatal Cancers

7 .9 x 10'

4 .0 x 10-'

95% METEOROLOGY
Li kelihood
of Falal
Cancer

MCW

7 .2 x 10-'

Exposure to Population within
50-mile Radius (person-rem)

8. 1 x 10-'

Total EDE
(rem)

Worker

Likel ihood
of Fatal
Cancer

MCW

95 % METEOROLOG Y

Location

Total EDE
(rem)

1.4 x 10-'

X

1'·95

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

Worker

8.0

3.2 x 10-'

MCW

N/ A

N/A

NPA

3.3

1.6 x 10-'

MOl

1.4

Location

Numh<r o f
Falal Cancers
3.5

TOlal EDE
(rem)

Exposure to Population within
50·mile Radius (person· rem)
Population of
2432627

10-'

Volume I. Appendi< D

Volume I, Appendix D

2 .9 x 10'

7.0x 104
Number of
Fatal Cancers
1.5 x 10-'
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Table F. 1.4.2. I.2.,<1. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results.
For Wet Storage - Accidental Criticality
At Kesselring

Table F.1.4.2. 1.2-9. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results.
For Wet Storage - Accidental Criticality
At Nevada Test Site

50% METEOROLOGY

50% METEOROLOGY

Total EDE
(rem)

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

Worker

7.4 x 10-'

2 .9 x 10-'

MCW

N/A

N/A

NPA

N/A

N/A

MOl

1.9 x 10-'

9.7 x 10-'

Location

Exposure to Population within
5O-mile Rad ius (person-rem)
Population of
1148587

Location

1.9 x 10-'

MCW

2.1 x 10-'

8.0 x 10-'

NPA

N/A

N/A

1.5 x 10-'

7.3 x 10-'

MOl

Population of
13792

95% METEOROLOGY
Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

8.0

3.2 x 10-'

MCW

N/A

N/A

NPA

N/A

N/A

MOl

2.3 x 10-'

1.2 x 10-'

Worker

Exposure to Population within
50-mile Radius (perso n-rem)
Population of
1148587

2.2 x 10'

4 .3 x 10-'

2 .2 x 10-'

95 % METEOROLOGY

Total EDE
(rem)

Location

Number of
Fatal Cancers

Exposure to Popul ation within
50-mile Radius (person-rem)

2.8 x 10-'

Likel ihood
of Fatal
Cancer

4 .8 x 10-'

Worker

Number of
Fatal Cancers

5.6 x 10'

Total EDE
(rem)

Location

Number of
Fatal Cancers

F-97

Cdncer

8.0

3.2 x 10-'

MCW

8. 1 x 10-'

3.3 x 10....

NPA

N/A

N/A

MOl

2.0 x 10-'

9 .9 x 10....

Population of
13792

Volume I. Appe nd ix D

Likelihood
of Fatal

Worker

Number of
Fatal Cancers

Exposure to Population within
50-mile Radi us (person-rem)

1.1 x 10-'

c96 Q

Total EDE
(re m)

Volume I . Appendix D

1.4

7.0 x

10~
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Table F. 1.4.2.1.2-10. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results.
For Wet Storage - Accidental Criticality
At Oak Ridge

F. 1.4 .2. 1.3 Mechanical Damage from Operator Error, Crane Failure, or Similar
Accidents

F. 1.4. 2 . 1.3 . 1 Description of Conditions. Accidental mechanical damage to spent fuel

was eval uated . The hypothetical accident included damage to one fuel unit. allowing fission products

50% METEOROLOGY

within the elements to escape th rough the clad failures . All gas and some volatile and solid nuclides

Total EDE
(rem)

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

3.0

1.2 x 10-'

MCW

6 .6 x 10-'

2.6 x 10-'

NPA

9 .1 x 10-'

4.6x

MOl

7.6x 10-'

3.8 x I~

Location

were cllculated to be released to the pool. The release fractions are consistent with severe accident
analyses and Regul atory Guide 1.4. Due to the presence of pool water. no solids would be released
into the air inside the facility .

Worker

Exposure to Population within
50-mile Radius (person-rem)

F. 1.4.2. 1.3.2 Source Term. Conditions used in developing the source term are as

I~

follows:

Number of
Fatal Cancers

•

One fuel unit is damaged because only o ne fJel unit would be handled at a time and
the storage facility design prevents damage to stored un its from such events .

Population of
871531

7.4 x 10'

3.7 x 10-'
•

One percent of the fuel is damaged and those fission products are available for
release.

•

95 % METEOROLOGY

Location

Total EDE
(rem)

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

8.0

3.2 x 10-'

Worker

3.6 x 10-'

NPA

5.6

2.8 x 10-'

MOl

4.7

2.4 x 10-'

Population of
871531

1.8 x 10'

Approximately 25 % of the hal oge ns are released to th e pool and 90% of these fission
products are absorbed in the water as they rise through the pool water. Therefore.
2.5% of th e halogens are rel eased to the ai r inside the facility .

I~

MCW

Exposure to Populatio n withi n
50-mile Radius (person-rem)

1.4 x

•

All (100 %) of the noble gases are released to the environment.

•

Due to th e gaseous nature of the released fi ssion products. installed HEPA filters
would not remove th em once they are released to th e air in th e building .

Number of
Fatal Cancers

•

Th e release to the environment occurs at a constant rate over a IS·minute period .

8.8 x 10-'

•

There is no particulate fission product release to th e atmos phe re due to th e presence of
pool water.
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•

The following amounts of radionudides could be released to the enviro nment. This
Wet Storage Mechanical Damage Summary

listing indudes nu clides th at result in at least 99% of the possible exposure.
~

~

H-3

1.42

Maximally exposed
off-site
individ ual (MOl)
(rem)

Site

No. of fatal cancers
if accident occurs

Risk per year

1-129

2.52 x 10"

INEL

2.6 x 10"

5.3 x 10"

5 .3 x 10'''

1-131

5 .37 x 10"

Savannah River

2.2 x 10"

2.0 x 10"

2.0 x 10" ·

Hanford

9 .8 x 10"

8 .6 x 10"

8.6 x 10'"

Puget Sound

1.7 x 10<

7.2 x 10"

7 .2 x 10"·

Pearl Harbor

9.3 x 10"

Norfolk

3.5 x

F. 1.4.2. 1.3.3 Results. The following table summarizes the public health ri sk to th e

general population that would result fro m th e hypoth etical mechanical damage accident at ead,
location. The number of fatal cancers would be ex pected to occur over a 50-year period . "Risk" is
defi ned as the number of fatal cancers times the probability of occurrence. The probabili\y of th e

10~

stored fuel and so heavy casks are never moved over the sto rage rack area. The heavy containers are
brought only into an empty receiving area to discharge a si ngle fuel unit. The spent fuel is removed

1.5 x 10"
8.0 x 10"·
5.6 x 10"·

Ports mouth

1.9 x 10<

5 .6 x 10"

Kesselring

3.6 x 10"

6 .0 x 10"

Nevada Test Site

4.6 x 10"

5.6

10"

5.6 x 10'"

Oak Ridge

5.9 x 10"

3.4 x 10"

3 .4 x 10"·

Occurrence of fuel damage is small based on the co nservative fu el hand ling rul es. At the INEL-ECF,
it is recognized that the drop of a heavy container into a storage rack could crush the rack and th e

1.5 x 10<
8.0 x 10"

X

6 .0 x 10"·

from the receiving area before the next fuel unit is brought into the receiving area. Therefore, two
errors must occur before damaged fu el is possible. The first is th at fuel is improperly left in the

The risk for this hypothetical accident is generally more severe at Navy shipyards than at th e

discharge station while the heavy cask is moved over the discharge stati on. The second is that the

DOE sites. At all sites , this acc ident results in th e lowest or next to the lowest risk of the wet storage

cask must accidentally fall fro m the overhead crane or the crane must fail. The probability of failure

accidents evaluated .

associated with crane failu re has been taken as 10" per year. Further, the crane failu re must also
occur in the right location and the drop must be high enough that suffici ent energy is availab le to

For the hypothetical wet storage mechani cal damage accident scenario. the radioacti ve plu me

damage both the discharge station structurals and the fuel inside. An additional factor of 10" has

might cause co ntam ination of the ground to a dow nwind distance of less th an 0.06 mile. This would

been taken for this event. giving th e total probab ility of 10~ for th e drop of the cask in th e right

yield a total area impacted by the accident of less th an 0 .5 acre . The calcul ated downwind distance

location. Allowing a fuel unit to remain in the stand req uires an operator error because fuel handling

would be contained within th e bound aries of all sites under evaluation.

procedures cal l fo r the fuel unit to be removed from the stand and taken to an underwater storage
location away from the receiving area. In additio n, because independent ove rchecking is req uired for
all fuel movement. an error by a verifier is also required . Therefore. based on operator error rates
(Swain and Guttman 1983), th e likelihood of this erro r is take n as 10" per year. Hence, th e
combined probability of cask drop on a fu el unit is take n as 10" per year per fuel movement. Then ,
taking an estimated rate of 1.000 fuel movemenl> per year, the overall probability is taken as 10"
events per year.
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Table F.1.4.2 .1.3-1. Summary of Exposure Calculalion Results .
For WeI Slorage - Mechanical Damage

Table F_1.4.2.1.3-2. Summary of Exposure Calculalion Results.
For WeI Storage - Mechanical Damage
At Savannah River

~IINEL

50% METEOROLOGY
50% METEOROLOGY

Localion

Total EDE
(rem)

Likelihood
of Falal
Cancer

1.9 x 10-<

7.6 x 10-<

Worker
MCW

2.5 x 10-'

NPA

1.5 x 10-'

MOl

5 .7 x 10-'

Exposure 10 Populalion within
5<J..mile Radius (person-rem)
Populalion of
115690

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

Worker

8.4 x 10-'

3.4 x 10-'

MCW

5 .2 x 10-<'

2.1 x 10-'

NPA

9.1 x 10-'

4.5 x 10-"

MOl (New ECF)

3.9 x 10-'

1.9 x 10-'·

MOl (Barnwell)

1.5 x 10....

7.4 x 10-'·

Location

9 .6 x 10-"
7 .4 x 10-"
2 .9 x 10-'·
Number of
Falal Cancers

5.0 x 10-'

Total EDE
(rem)

Exposure to Population within
5<J..mile Radius (person-rem)

2.5 x 10-<'

Population of
579541

7 . 1 x 10-'

Number of
F alai Cancers
3.5 x 10-<'

95% METEOROLOGY

Localion

TOlal EDE
(rem)

Likelihood
of Falal
Cancer

10~

2 . 1 x 10-'

Worker

5 .2 x

MCW

2.4 x 10-<'

NPA
MOl

8.3 x 10- '
2 .6 x 10....

Exposure 10 Populalion within
50-mile Radius (person-rem)
POpulalion of
115690

1.1 x 10-'

95% METEOROLOGY

Location

Total EDE
(rem)

9.6 x 10-'·
4 .2 x 10-'·

1.3 x 10-'
Nu mber of
Falal Cancers
5 .3 x 10-<'

Worker

5.2 x 10-<

2 . 1 x 10-'

MCW

6 .7 x 10-'

2.6 x 10-'

NPA

1.4 x 10....

7.2 x 10-'·

MOl (New ECF)

2 .2 x 10....

1.1 x 10-'

MOl (Barnwell)

1.8 x 10-'

9 .0 x 10-'

Exposure 10 POpulalio n within
5<J..mile Radius (person-rem)
Populalion of
579541

F- IO)

c:988

Likelihood
of Falal
Cancer

4 . 1 x 10-'

Number of
Fatal Cancers
2.0 x 10-'
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Table F.1.4.2.1.3-4. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results.
For Wet Storage - Mechanical Damage
At Puget Sound

Table F.1.4.2.1.3-3. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results.
For Wet Storage - Mechanical Damage
At Hanford

50% METEOROLOGY

50% METEOROLOGY

Total EDE
(rem)

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

Worker

4.6 x 10-'

1.8 x 10-'

2.9 x 10-'

MCW

N/A

N/A

1.0 x 10-'

5. 1 x 10-"

NPA

5.5 x 10-'

2.7 x 10-'

MOl (New (ECF)

1.3 x 10-'

6.5 x 10-"

MOl

1.3 x 10-'

6.7 x 10-'

MOl (FMEF)

2.4 x 10-'

1.2 x 10-'·

Exposure to Population within
50-mile Radius (person-rem)

Total EDE
(rem)

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

Worker

8.4 x 10-'

3.4 x 10-'

MCW

7.1 x 10-'

NPA

Location

Exposure to Population within
50-mile Rad ius (person-rem)
Population of
375860

9.4 x 10-'

Location

Number of
Fatal Cancers

Population of
2975810

Number of
Fatal Cancers

6.0 x 10-'

3.0 x 10-'

4.7 x 10-'

95 % METEOROLOGY
95% METEOROLOGY
Total EDE
(re m)

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

Worker

5.2 x 10-'

2. 1 x 10-'

2. 1 x 10-'

MCW

N/A

N/ A

1.8

NPA

6.5 x 10-'

3.2 x 10-'

1.7 x 10-'

Total EDE
(rem)

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

Worker

5.2 x 10-'

MCW

4.4 x 10-'

Location

X

Location

10-'

NPA

1.6 x 10-"

7.9 x 10-'·

MOl

MOl (New ECF)

9.8 x 10-'

4.9 x 10-'·

MOl (FMEF)

3.1 x 10-"

Exposure to Population within
50-mile Radius (person-rem)

Exposure to Population within
50-mile Radius (person-rem)
PopuIat ion of
375860

1.7 x 10-'

1.5 x 10-'

Population of
2975810

Number of
Fatal Cancers

1.5 x 10-'

8.4 x 10-'
Number of
Fatal Cancers
7.2 x 10-'

8.6 x 10-'

Volume I, Appendix D

Volume I . Appendix D
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Table F.1.4.2.I.J-S. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results.
For Wet Storage - Mechanical Damage
At Pearl Harbor

Table F.1.4.2.1.J..6. Summary of Exposure Calcul ation Results .
For Wet Storage - Mechanical Damage
At Norfo lk

50 % METEOROLOGY

Location

50 % METEOROLOGY

Total EDE
(rem)

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

Worker

1.9 x 10--"

7.6 x 10-'

MCW

N/A

N/A

NPA

4.9 x 10-'

2.4 x 10-'

MOl

2.3 x 10-'

Exposure to Population withi n
50-mile Rad ius (person-rem)
Population of
817385

Location
Worker

1.2 x 10-'
Number of
Fatal Cancers

I I x 10-'

Location
Worker

N/A

NPA

1. 2xlO-'

6 .0 x 10-'

MOl

3.2 x 10-'

1.6 x 10-'

Population of
1539002

Cancer

N/A

N/A

NPA

1.6 x 10-'

7.9 x 10-'

9 .3 x 10-'

4.6 x 10-'

3. 1 x 10-'

Number of
Fatal Cancers

1.4 x 10-'

Likelihood
of Fatal

MOl

Population of
817385

1.9 x 10-'

N/A

7 .0 x 10-"

95% METEOROLOGY

2.1 x 10-'

Exposure to Population within
50-mile Radius (perso n-rem)

4.6 x 10-'

Exposure to Population within
50-mile Rad ius (person-rem)

5.6 x 10-'

5 .2 x 10--"

MCW

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

MCW

95% METEOROLOGY

Total EDE
(rem)

Total EDE
(rem)

Location
Worker

Total EDE
(rem)
5.2 x 10'"

MCW

Number of
Fatal Cancers

X

10-'

N/A

NPA

1.4 x 10'"

7.0 x 10-'

MOl

3.5 x 10'"

Population of
1539002

Volume I , Appendix D

Cancer
2.1

N/A

Exposu re to Population withi n
50-mile Radius (person· rem)

1.5 x 10--"

Likelihood
of Fatal

Volume I , Appendix D

1.6 x 10-'

1.7

X

10-'

Number of
Fatal Cancers
8.0 x 10-'
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Table F.1.4.2.1.3-7. Summary of Exposure Calculation Res ults.
For Wet Storage - Mechanical Damage
At Portsmouth

Table F.1.4.2.1.3-8. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results.
For Wet Storage - Mechanical Damage
At Kesselring

50% METEOROLOGY

50% METEOROLOGY

Total EDE
(rem)

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

4.6 x 10-'

1.8 x 10-'

MCW

N/A

N/A

NPA

1.1 x 10-'

5.6 x 10-'

MOl

1.5 x 10-'

7.4 x 10-'

Location
Worker

Exposure to Population within
50-mile Radius (person-rem)
Population of
2432627

Location

3.8 x 10-'

1.9 x

4 .6 x 10-'

1.9 x 10-'

N/A

N/A

NPA

N/A

3.2 x

MOl

Population of
1148587

I~

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

5.2 x 10-'

2.1 x 10-'

MCW

N/A

N/A

NPA

2.5 x 10-'

1.3 x 10-'

MOl

1.9 x 10-'

9.3 x 10-'

Exposu re to Population within
50-mile Radius (pe rson-rem)
Population of
2432627

1.1 x 10-'

N/A

1.6 x 10-'
Number of
Fatal Cancers

4.7 x 10-'

2.3 x 10-'

95% METEOROLOGY

Total EDE
(rem)

Worker

I~

Exposure to Population within
50-mile Radius (person-rem)

95% METEOROLOGY

Location

Likelihood
of F.tal
Cancer

MCW

Worker

Number of
Fatal Cancers

Total EDE
(rem)

Worker

5.2 x 10-'

2. 1 x 10-'

MCW

N/A

N/A

NPA

N/A

N/A

MOl

3.6 x 10-'

1.8 x 10-'

Exposure to Populatio n within
50-mile Radius (person-rem)
Population of
1148587

5.6 x 10-'

F- I09

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

Location

Number of
Fatal Cancers

c)qq

Total EDE
(rem)

Volume I, Appendix D

Velume I. Appendix D

1.2 x 10- '

Number of
Fatal Cancers
6.0 x 10-'

F- IIO

!).,ClD

Table F .1.4.2.1.3-9. Summary of Exposure Calcul ation Results.
For Wet Storage - Mechan ical Damage
At Nevada Test Site

Table F.1.4.2.1.3-10. Summary of Exposure Calcul ation Results.
For Wet Sto rage - Mechanical Damage
At Oak Ridge

50 % METEOROLOGY

Location

Total EDE
(rem)

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

3.0 x 10-'

1.2 x 10-'

3.0 x 10-'

1.5 x 10-"

N/A

N/A

3.8 x 10-'

1.9 x 10- 1•

Worker
MCW
NPA
MOl

Exposure to Population with in
SO-mile Rad ius (person-rem)
Population of
13792

50% METEOROLOGY
Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

Worker

1.9 ~ 10-'

7.6 x 10-'

MCW

5.4 x 10-'

2.2 x 10-"

NPA

6.6 x 10-'

3.3 x 10-'

MOl

9.3 x 10-'

4.7 x 10-'

Location

Number of
Fatal Cancers

4.5 x 10-'

Total EDE
(rem)

Exposure to Population within
SO-mile Radius (person-rem)
Population of
871531

2.3 x 10-'

95 % METEOROLOGY

Location
Worker
MC W

Total EDE
(rem)
5.2 x 10-'

2. 1 x 10-'

1. 8 x 10-'

7. 1 x 10- 1•

N/A

N/A

MOl

4.6 x 10-'

2.3 x 10-"

Ex posu re to Population with in
SO- mile Radius (person-rem)
Population of
13792

I I x 10-]

1.0 x 10-'

95 % METEOROLOGY
Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

NPA

2.0 x 10-'

Number of
Fatal Cancers

Worker

5.2 x 10....

2. 1 x 10-'

MCW

3.3 x 10-'

1.3 x lO-'

NPA

4.2 x 10....

2.l x lO-'

MOl

5.9 x 10....

Exposure to Population within
SO-mile Radius (person-rem)
Popul ation of
87 1531

5.6 x 10-'

F- III

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

Location

Nu mber of
Fatal Cancers

c:;KJ(p

Total EDE
(rem)

Volu me I . Appendix D

Volume I, Appendix D

6.7 x 10-'

3.0 x 10- '
Number of
Fatal Cancers
3.4 x 10-'

F- 11 2
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F. 7.4 .2 . 7.4 Airplane Crash.

•

The following amounlS of radionuclides could be released 10 lIle environment . This
lisling includes nuclides lIlal resull in al least 99% of lIle possible exposure.

F. 7.4.2 . 7.4 . 7 Description o( Conditions. Impac l inlo waler pools by airc raft willl

resulling damage 10 lIle naval fuel uni lS slored inside lIle pool was evaluated. Based on lIle
probabilily of occurrence, as discussed in Seclion F .3, specific analyses were only perfo rmed for
Savannah River. lIle Nevada Tesl Sile, Oak Ridge, Pearl Harbor, Norfolk, and Kesselring localions.
AI olller localions, lIle likelihood of occurrence is less lIlan 10" per year. The hypolllelical accidenl
included damage 10 all fuel unilS slored alllle waler pool. Fission produclS and corrosion produclS
are released from lIle fuel unilS inlo lIle waler pool; however, lIle pool waler is nOI rel=ed 10 lIle
environmenl. An airplane crash into a waler pool would nOl produce enough force 10 cause lIle pool
10 leak because lIle walls of lIle waler pool are conslrucled of lIl ick, reinforced concrele willl earlh

~

~

1-129

7.59 x

1-13 1

1.61 x 10"

H-3

4.28 x 10'

IO~

F. 7.4.2. 7.4 . 3 Results. The following table summarizes the public heallll risk 10 lIle

general populalion lIlal would resull from lIle hypolllelical airplane crash accidenl al each localion.
The number of falal cancers would be expected to occur over a 50-year period . "Risk" is defined as
lIle number of fatal cancers limes lIle probabilily of occurrence.

su rrounding lIlem, making lIlem very slro ng. In addilio n, il was judged unl ikely lIlal an airplane
would impacl lIle waler pool al an angle Sleep enough 10 expose lIle fl oor of lIle pool or lIle walls of
Waler Pool Airplane Crash Summary

lIle pool below lIle waler level to lIle direcl impact. The presence of pool waler resul lS in only a
release of gaseous fi ssion produclS 10 lIle almosphere.

•

One percent of lIle fission produclS fro m each of lIle fuel un ilS slOred inside lIle pool
is available for release.

•

Of lIle avai lab le fission prod ucls, 100% of lIle noble gases and 25% of lIle halogens

No. of falal

cancers

Sile
Savannah River

2x

10~

6 . 1 x 10"

1.2 x 10"

Pearl Harbor

2 x 10"

2.8 x 10"

4 .6 x 10"

9.2

Norfolk

4 x 10"

1.1

10"

2.4 x 10"

9 .6 x 10"

Kesselring

2 x 10"

1.1 x 10"

1.8 x 10"

3.6 x 10"

Nevada Tesl Sile

4 x 10"

1.3 x 10"

1.7 x

10~

6 .8

X

10·1\

Oak Ridge

I x

1.0 x 10"

1.0

X

10"

F. 7.4.2. 7.4 .2 Source Term. Cond ilions used in developing lIle source lerm are as

follows:

Maximally exposed
off·sile
individual (MOl)
(rem)

Probabilily of
accident per year
10 ~

IO~

6.4 x

1.8

X

X

10"

if accidenl occurs

Ri sk per year

X

10"

are released 10 Ihe pool waler. Due 10 lIle presence of pool waler, a reduclion of lIle
halogen release by a faclOr of 10 prio r 10 release 10 lIle almosphere occurs.
The risk for lIlis hypolllelical accidenl is mosl severe al Pearl Harbor. For lIle siles willl

•
•

No solid fission products or corrosion products are released to the environment due to

crash probabilities less lIlan 10" per year, consequences were nOl calculaled since il is expected lIlal

lIle conlinued presence of pool waler.

lIley would nol subslanlially contri bule 10 lIle risk.

The release 10 lIle env iro nm enl occurs al a conslanl rale over a 15-minule period .

Fo r lIle hypolllelical airplane crash inlo a weI slOrage facilily accident scenario. lIle radioaclive plume might resull in conlamination of lIle ground 10 a downwind dislance of less lIlan 0.06 mile.

•

This would yield a 10lal area impacled by lIle accide nl of less lIlan 0.5 acr.. The calculaled

300 naval fuel unils would be in lIle waler pool.

downwind dislance would be contained wilhin lIle boundaries of all siles lIlal are al risk for lIlis

•

accidenl.

No fillration by HEPA fillers is assu med .
F-113

cif7f
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Table F. 1.4.2. 1.4-1. Summary of Exposure Calcul ation Resul ts.
For Wet Storage · Airplane Crash
At Savannah River

Table F.1.4.2.1.4-2. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results .
For Wet Storage - Airplane Crash
At Pearl Harbor

50 % METEOROLOGY

50% METEOROLOGY

Total EDE
(rem)

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

Worker

2.5 x 10-'

1.0 x 10-'

MCW

1.6 x 10-'

6.3 x 10-'

NPA

2.8 x 10-'

1.4 x 10-'

MOl

1.1 x 10-'

Location

Exposure to Population within
50-mile Radius (person-rem)
Population of
579541

5.5 x

Location
Worker

:0-'

Number of
Fatal Cancers
2.2

Total EDE
(rem)

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

5.7 x 10-'

2.3 x 10-'

MCW

N/A

N/A

NPA

1.5xlO-'

7.3 x 10-"

MOl

6.9 x 10-'

Exposure to Population within
50-mile Radius (person-rem)
Population of
817385

1.1 x 10-'

3.5 x 10-Number of
Fatal Cancers

3.3 x 10'

1.7 x 10-'

95 % METEOROLOGY
95 % METEOROLOGY

Location

Total EDE
(rem)

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

Total EDE
(rem)

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

1.6 x 10-'

6.3 x 10-'

Worker

1.6 x 10-'

6.3 x 10-'

MCW

2.0 x 10-'

8.0 x 10-"

Worker

NPA

4.3 x 10-'

2.2 x 10-'

MCW

N/A

MOl

6.4 x 10-'

3.2 x 10-'

NPA

4.7 x 10-'

Number of
Fatal Cancers

MOl

2.8 x

Exposure to Population withi n
5O-mile Radius (person-rem)
Population of
579541

1.2 x 10'

Location

Exposure to Popul ation within
50-mile Radius (person-rem)

6. 1 X 10-'

F- 115

a:o

1(,'

Population of
817385

Volume I. Appendix D

Volu me I . Appendix D

9.2 x 10'

N/A

2.4 x

10~

1.4 x 10-'
Number of
Fatal Cancers
4.6 x 10-'

F- 116

,,3
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Table F .1.4.2.1.4-3. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results .
For Wet Storage - Airplane Crash
AI Norfolk

Table F. 1.4.2.1.4-4. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results .
For Wet Storage - Airplane Crash
At Kesselring

50% METEOROLOGY

- Location

Total EDE
(rem)
1.4 x 10-'

5.6 x 10-"

N/A

N/A

3.6 x 10-'

1.8 x 10-"

9.6 x 10-'

4.8 x 10-"

Worker
MeW
NPA
MOl

50% METEOROLOGY
Likel ihood
of Fatal
Cancer

Exposure to Populat ion within
50-mile Radius (person-rem)
Population of
1539002

Location

4.2

1.4 x 10-'

5.6 x 10-"

N/A

N/A

NPA

N/A

MOl

9.5 x 10'"

Population of
1148587

2. 1 x 10-'

Worker

NPA
MOl

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

1.6 x 10-'

6 .3 x 10-'

N/A

N/A

4.2 x 10-'

2. 1 x 10-'

1.1 x 10-'

5.3 x 10-'

Exposure to Population within
50-mile Radius (person-rem)
Populat ion of
1539002

4.8 x 10'

X

10-'

1.4 x 10'

7 . 1 x 10-'

95% METEOROLOGY

Total EDE
(rem)

MCW

N/A

4.8

Number of
Fatal Cancers

Exposure to Population within
50-mile Radius (perso n-rem)

95% METEOROLOGY

Location

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

MCW

Worker

Number of
Fatal Cance rs

Total EDE
(rem)

X

F-1I7

Worker

1.6 x 10-'

6.3 x 10-'

t,ICW

N/A

N/A

NPA

N/A

N/A

MOl

I I x 10-'

5.4 x 10-"

Exposure to Population within
SO-mile Radius (person-rem)
Population of
1148587

10-'

3[)Q

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

Location

Number of
Fatal Cancers
2.4

Total EDE
(rem)

Vol ume I , Appendi x D

Volume I. Appendix D

3.6 x 10'

Number of
Fatal Cancers
1.8 x 10-'

F-1 18
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Table F.1.4.2. I.4-S. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results.
For Wet Storage - Airplane Crash
At Nevada T est Site

Table F . 1.4.2.1.4-6. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results.
For Wet Storage - Airplane Crash
At Oak Ridge

50% METEOROLOGY
50% METEOROLOGY

Location

Total EDE
(rem)

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

9.0 x 10-'

3.6 x 10-"

9 _1 x 10-"

3_7 x 10-'

Worker
MCW
NPA

N/A

N /A

MOl

5.5 x 10-'

2_8 x 10-'

Exposure to Population within
50-mile Radius (person-rem)
Population of
13792

Location

Number of
Fatal Cancers

1_3 x 10-'

Total EDE
(rem)

Worker

5.7 x 10-'

2_3 x 10-'

MCW

1.6 x 10-'

6.5 x 10-'

NPA

2.0 x 10-'

9 .9 x 10--"

MOl

2.8 x 10-'

Exposure to Population within
50-mile Radius (perso n-rem)
Population of
871531

6.5 x 10-'

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

1.4 x 10-'
Number of
Fatal Cancers

6 _0

3_0 x 10-'

95% METEOROLOGY
95% METEOROLOGY

Location
Worker
MCW

Total EDE
(rem)

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

1.6 x 10-'

6.4 x 10-'

5.3 x 10--'

2.2 x 10-'

N /A

N/A

NPA
MOl

L3 x 10-'

Exposure to Population within
50-mile Rad ius (person-rem)
Populatio n of
13792

3_3 x 10-'

6.5 x 10-'

Worker

1.6 x 10-'

6 _3 x 10-'

MCW

9_9 x 10-'

3_9 x 10"

NPA

1.3 x 10-'

6 _3 x 10-'

MOl

1_8 x 10-'

Exposure to Population within
50-mile Rad ius (person-rem)
Population of
87153 1

L7 x 10--'

30'-1

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

Location

Number of
Fatal Cancers

F-119

Total EDE
(re m)

Volume I. Appendix D

Volume I , Appendix D

2 _0 x 10'

8_9 x 10-'
Number of
Fatal Cancers
1.0 x 10-'

F-120

3Q!5

F.I .4.2 . 1. 5 HEPA Filter Fire.
Nuclide

Curies

Nuelide

Curies

Cs-137

1.46 x 10"

Co.{i()

2 .09 x 10"

Cs-134

2 .04 x

Ba-137M

unrelated fire that spreads to this system. Although the risks associated with this accident are
relatively minor, it was analyzed to bound the higher probability, lower consequence type accident

F. I .4.2. 1. 5. 1 Description of Conditions. In this hypothetical accident scenario, a fire in
the ECF High Efficiency Paniculate Air (HEPA) filter banks is postulated. This accident could be
initiated by the ignition of a flammable mixture released upstream of the system or by an external,

10~

5r-90

8.90 x 10"

6.26 x 10-<>

Y-9O

8.90 x 10"

Fe-55

2 .32 x 10"

Eu- 154

9 .80 x 10"

Ni-{i3

2 .98 x 10"

category. The airborne release fractions associated with this accident were conservatively chosen so
F. 1.4 .2 . 1.5 .3 Results. The following table summarizes the public health risk to the

that a HEPA filter failure by crushing or impact was also bounded.

general population that would result from the hypothetical HEPA filter fire accident at each location.
F. I .4.2. 1. 5.2 Source Term. Conditions used in developing the source term are as

The number of fatal cancers would be expected to occur over a 50-year period . "Risk " is defined as
the number of fatal cancers times the probability of occurrence. The probability of a fire in a HEPA

follows:

filter is estimated based on the probability of other fires spreading to the HEPA filter system. As

•

The original inventory of fission products in the filters is based on the total estimated

discussed in section F.2.4 .2, a probability of 5 x 10" is assigned to chemical fires . The probability

unabated ECF releases over a 5-year period.

of HEPA fires is considered less than a chemical fire since chemicals would not be stored in the

One percent of the radionuelide inventory present on the filters becomes airborne

or explosive. It is estimated that the probability for an existing chemical fire to spread to the HEPA

immediate vicinity of the HEPA filter system. Additionally, HEPA filters are not inherently volatile

•

during the fire . Release fractions for HEPA filters are small because the filters are

filters is less than 0 .1. This results in a probability of less th an 5 x 10· for a HEPA filter fire. A

constructed of material containing glass fibers which would melt during a fire and trap

value of 5 x IO~ was used to develop the risk results in the table.

panieles in the medium . Measurements from experiments show that one one-hundredth of I % of the material in HEPA filters could be released during a fire, but 1%
has been used in th ese analyses to allow for uncertainties in the final results of an
individual fire .

•

The release to the environment occurs at a constant rate over a IS-minute period .

•

There is no increase in direct radiation due to this accident .

•

The following amounts of radionuelides could be released to the environment. This
listing ineludes nuelides that result in at least 99% of the possi ble exposure.

•

No fi ltratio n by HEPA filters is assumed .

F· 121

.sOle

Volume I, Appendix D

Volume I. Appendi x D

F·1 22
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Table F.1.4.2. 1.5-1. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results.
For Wet Storage - HEPA Filter Fire
At INEL

HEPA Filter Fire Summary
Maximally exposed
off-site
individual (MOl)
(rem)

Site

No. of fatal cancers
if accident occurs

Risk per year

INEL

2.5 x 10-'

5.3 x 10-'

2.7 x 10"

Savannah River

2.1 x 10-'

1.3 x 10-<

6.5 x 10"

Hanford

7.0 x 10--

5.3 x 10"

2.7 x 10"

Puget Sound

1.6 x 10-'

6.4 x

10~

3.2 x 10"

Pearl Harbor

8.7 x 10-<

1.2 x 10-'

6.0 x 10-'

Norfolk

3.3 x 10-'

6.9 x 10-<

3.5 x 10"

Ponsmouth

1.7 x 10"

3.9 x

10~

2.0 x 10-'

Kesselring

3.5 x

10~

3.3 x

10~

1.7 x 10-'

Nevada Test Site

4.3 x 10"

5.7 x 10--

2.9 x 10"

Oak Ridge

5.7 x 10-'

2.2 x 10-<

1.1 x 10-'

The risk for this hypothetical accident is generally more severe at the Navy shipyards than at

50% METEOROLOGY

Total EDE
(rem)

Location

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

Worker

8.7 x 10-'

3.5 x 10-'

MCW

7.9 x 10-'

3.2

NPA

4.5 x 10-'

2.2 x 10- 1•

MOl

9.9 x 10-"

10- 10

5.0 x 10-'
Number of
Fatal Cancers

Exposure to Population within
50-mile Radius (person-rem)
Population of
115690

X

7.6 x 10-'

3.8 x 10-'

the DOE sites .

For the hypothetical HEPA filter fire accident scenario, the radioact ive plume might cause
95% METEOROLOGY

contamination of the ground to a downwind distance of less than 0.06 mile. This would yield a total
area impacted by the accident of less than 0.5 acre. The calculated downwind distance would be

Total EDE
(rem)

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

Worker

2.4 x 10-'

9.6 x 10-'

MCW

8.8 x 10-'

3.5 x 10-'

NPA

2.7 x 10'"

1.4 x 10-'

MOl

2.5 x 10-'

conta ined within the boundaries of all sites under evaluation.
Location

Exposure to Population within
50-mile Radius (person-rem)
Population of
115690

F-123

30?

Volume I , Appendix 0

Volume I, Appendix 0

1.1 x 10-1

1.3 x 10-'
Number of
Fatal Cancers
5.3 x 10-'

F-124

3 ciT

Table F.1.4.2.1.5-2. Summary of Ex posure Calc ulatio n Res ults.
For Wet Storage - HEPA Filter Fire
At Savannah Ri ver

Table F.1.4.2.1.S-3. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results.
For Wet Storage - HEPA Filter Fir<
At Hanford

50% MET OROLOGY
50% METEOROLOGY
Total EDE
(rem)

Locaiion

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

Worker

3.9 x 10-<

1.5 x 10-'

MCW

2.3 x 10-'

8.8 x 10-"

NPA

2.9 x 10-'

1.4 x 10-"

MOl (New ECF)

7.2 x 10-"

3.6 x 10-"

MOl (Barnwell)

1.7 x 10-'

8.6 x 10-"

Exposure to Population within
5O-mile Radius (person-rem)
Population of
579541

Number of
Fatal Cancers

4.1 x 10-'

Total EDE
(rem)

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

Worker

3.9 x 10-"

1.5 x 10-'

MCW

3.0 x 10-'

1.2 x 10-"

NPA

3.5 x 10-'

1.8 x 10-'·

MOl (New ECF)

9.6 x 10-'

4.8 x 10-'·

MOl (FMEF)

1.9 x 10-"

9.7 x 10-'·

Lucation

Exposure to Population within
50-mile Radius (person-rem)

2.0 x 10-'

Population of
375860

6.7 x 10-'

Number of
Fatal Cancers
3.4 x 10-'

95 % METEOROLOGY
95% METEOROLOGY

Locatio n

Total EDE
(rem)

Worker
MCW
NPA
MOl (New ECF)
MOl (Barnwell)

2.4 x 10-'
2.9 x 10-<
4.9 x 10-"
2.1 x 10-'
1.6 x 10-<

Exposure to Population within
5O-mile Radius (person. rem)
Population o f
579541

2.5 x 10-'

Likelihood
of Fatal
Total EDE
(rem)

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

Worker

2.4 x 10-'

9 .6 x 10-'

MCW

1.9 x 10-4

7.5 x 10-'

NPA

5.5 x 10'"

2.7 x 10-'

MOl (New ECF)

7 .0x 10-'

3.5 x 10-'

MOl (FMEF)

2.4 x 10-'

Cancer
Location

9.6 x 10-'
I.J x 10-'

2.5 x 10-'
1.0 x 10-'
8. 1 x 10-'
Number of
Fatal Cancers

Exposure to Popul ation within
5(}.mile Rad ius (person-rem)

1.3 x 10-<

F- 125

.310

Population of
375860
Volume I. Appendix 0

Volume I . Appendix 0

1.1 x 10-'

1.2 x 10-'
Number of
Fatal Cancers
5.3 x 10-'

F- 126
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Table F.1.4.2.I.5-S. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results.
For Wet Storage - HEPA Filter Fire
At Pearl Harbor

Table F. I .4.2.1 .5-4. Summary of Exposu re Calculat ion Results.
For We!. Storage - HEPA Filter Fire
At Puge!. Sound

50% METEOROLOGY

50% METEOROLOGY

Total EDE
(rem)

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

Worker

8.7 x 10-<

3.5 x 10-'

N/A

MCW

N/A

2.5 x 10-<

1.2 x 10-'

NPA

2.2 x

1.4 x 1(,'

6.8 x 10-'

MOl

2.2 x 10-<

Total EDE
(rem)

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

2. 1 x 10-<

8.4 x 10-'

MCW

N/A

NPA
MOl

Location
Worker

Exposure to Population withi n
5{}.mile Radius (person-rem)
Population of
2975810

Location

Number of
Fatal Cancers

3.4 x II, '

Population of
817385

1.7 x 10-<

Location

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

2.4 x 10-'

9.6 x 10-'

N/A

NPA

2.9 x 10-'

MOl

1.6 x 10-'

Exposure to Populatio n within
50-mile Rad ius (person-rem)
Population of
2975810

9.0 x 10-'

10-'

4.5 x 10-<

N/A

1.5 x

I~

8.0 x 10-'

F-127

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

Worker

2.4 x 10-'

9.6 x 10-'

MCW

N/A

NPA

7.2 x 10-'

3.6

MOl

8.7 x 10-<

4.3 x 10-'

Populatio n of
817385

Volume I . Appendix 0

Volume I, Appendix 0

N/A
X

10-"

Number of
Fatal Cancers

Expo~ure to Population within
50-mile Radi us (person-rem)

6.4 x 10-<

E};:J..

Total EDE
(rem)

Location

Number of
Fatal Cancers

1.3

X

1.1 x 10-'

95 % METEOROLOGY

Total EDE
(rem)

MCW

N/A

1.1

Number of
Fatal Cancers

Exposure to Population within
50-mile Radius (person-rem)

95% METEOROLOGY

Worker

1 0~

2.4

1.2 x 10-'

F-128

..3/3

Table F.1.4.2.1.5-6. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results .
For Wet Storage· HEPA Filter Fire
At Norfolk

Table F.1.4.2.1.5-7. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results.
For Wet Storage· HEPA Filter Fire
At Portsmouth

50% METEOROLOGY

50% METEOROLOGY

Total EDE
(rem)

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

2.1 x 10-"

8.5 x 10-'

MCW

N/A

N/A

NPA

5 .3 x 10-'

2.7 x 10-'

MOl

3.2 x 10-"

Location
Worker

Exposure to Population within
5().mile Radius (person· rem)
Population of
1539002

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

Worker

2.1 x 10-"

8.4 x 10-'

MCW

N/A

N/A

NPA

5.0 x 10-'

2.5 x 10-'

MOl

1.4 x 10....

Location

1.6 x 10-'
Number of
Fatal Cancers

2.3 x 10-'

Total EDE
(rem)

Exposure to Population within
50·mile Radius (person-rem)
Population of
2432627

1.2 x 10-"

95% METEOROLOGY
Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

2.4 • 10-'

9.6 x 10-'

MCW

N/A

N/A

NPA

6.2 x 10-"

3.1 x 10-'

MOl

3.3 x 10-'

1. 7 x 10-"

Worker

Exposure to Population withi n
5().mile Radius (person·rem)
Population of
1539002

Location

Number of
Fatal Cancers
1.4

1.2 x 10-'

6.0 x 10-'

95% METEOROLOGY

T0ta1 EDE
(rem)

Location

7.2 x 10-'
Number of
Fatal Cancers

F·129

Worker

2.4 x 10-'

MCW

N/A

9.6

X

10-'

N/A

NPA

1.1 x 10-'

5.6

X

10-'

1.7 x 10-'

8.7

X

10-'

Population of
2432627

Volume I . Appendix D

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

MOl

Exposure to Pop ulation within
SO-mile Radius (person-rem)

6 .9 x 10-"

,3i~

Total EDE
(rem)

Volume I, Appendix D

7.9 x 10-'

Number of
Fatal Cancers
3.9 x 10....

F-I30

36

Table F. 1.4.2.1.5-8. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results.
Fo r Wet Storage - HEPA Filter Fire
At Kessel ring

50~

Location
Worker

METEOROLOGY

50~

Total EDE
(rem)

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

2. 1 x 10-'

8.5 x 10-'

N/A

N /A

MCW
NPA

N /A

N/A

MOl

5.5 x 10-'

2.7 x 10-'

Exposure to Population within
5Q.mile Rad ius (person-rem)
Population of
1148587

Location
Worker

5 .5 x 10-'

1.1 x 10-'

4 .2 x 10-"

NPA

N/A

N/A

MOl

8.5 x 10-'

4.2 x 10-'

Population of
13792

9.6 x 10-'

N/A

N/A

NPA

N/A

N /A

MOl

3.5 x 10-'

1.8 x 10-'

Exposure to Population within
50-mile Radius (ptrson-rem)
6 .7 x 10- '

Location

Number of
Fatal Cancers

Total EDE
(re m)

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer
10-'

Worker

2.4 x 10-'

9 .6

MCW

6 .2 x 10'"

2.5 x 10-'

X

NPA

N/A

N/A

MOl

4.3 x 10-'

2.2 x 10-'

Population of
13792

Volume I. Appendix D

3 .8 x 10'"

METEOROLOGY

Exposure to Populat ion within
50-mile Radius (person-rem)

3.3 x 10-'

F- 131

Number of
Fatal Cancers

7.6 x 10-'

9S~

2.4 x 10-'

MCW

Population of
11 48587

l.4x 10-'

MCW

METEOROLOGY
Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

Worker

Exposure to Population with in
50-mile Radius (person-rem)

9.8 x 10-'

Total EDE
(rem)

METEOROLOGY

Total EDE
(rem)

Location

Number of
Fatal Cancers

2.0 x 10-'

95~

Table F. 1.4.2.1.5-9. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results.
For Wet Storage - HEPA Filter Fire
At Nevada Test Site

Volume 1. Appendix D

1.1 x 10-'

Number of
Fatal Cancers

5.7 x 10'"

F- 132

-Bfl)

Table F.1.4.2.1.5-IO. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results .
For Wet Storage - HEPA Filter Fire
At Oalc Ridge

F. 7.4.2. 7. 6 Minor Water Pool Leakage.

F. 7.4.2. 7. 6. 7 Description of Conditions. In this hypothetical accident scenario, a minor

leak develops in the water pool resulting in a grad ual discharge to the environment. There is no
danger of uncovering any spent nuclear fuel in the water pool. since the leak is so small that it is

50% METEOROLOGY

undetected and water level is mai ntained in the water pool. Since a strict accounting of water added

Location
Worker

Total EDE
(rem)

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

8.7 x 10-'

3.5 x 10-'

MCW

2.3 x 10-'

8.8 x 10-'

NPA

3.0 x 10-'

1.5 x 10-'

MOl

9.0 x 10-'

Exposure to Population within
SO-mile Radius (person-rem)
Population of
871531

1.2 x 10-'

to and removed from the water pool is maintained, the magnitude of this leak would be less than
4,400 gallons per year . The 4,400 gallons per year value is the maximum amount of water which
might leak out of the water pool before periodic review of the water balance would detect a leak.

F. 7.4 .2 . 7. 6.2 Source Term. There is no airborne release above normal levels in this

hypothetical accident scenario. The radionuclide inventory in the leaking water is based on radioac-

4.5 x 10-'

tivity analysis of ECF water pool water. The isotopes that were analyzed for but not detected could

Number of
Fatal Cancers

exist at the minimum detection limit.

95% METEOROLOGY

Total EDE
(rem)

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

Worker

2.4 x 10-'

9.6 x 10-'

MCW

1.4 x 10-'

5.6 x 10-'

NPA

1.9 x 10-'

9.4 x 10-'

MOl

5.7 x 10-'

Location

Exposure to Population within
SO-mile Radius (person-rem)

IOCFR20
Effluent limit
(pCi/ml)

6.0 x 10-'
Nuclide

Sample Results
(pCi/ml)

H-3
Mn-54
Fe-55
Co-58

2.0 x
2.5 x
1.0 x
7.0 x
1.6 x
2.3 x
4.0 x
4.0 x
4.0 x
4.2 x

Co~

Ni-{i3
Sr-9O
Y-9O
1-129
Cs-137

10~

1.0 x
3.0 x
1.0 x
2.0 x
3.0 x
1.0 x
5.0 x
7.0 x
2.0 x
1.0 x

10-'
10" •
10"
10"
10-'
10-'
10"
10" •
10"

10"
10-'
10~

10-'
10"
IO~

10-'
10"

10-'
10"

Annual Releases
(Ci/year)
3.3 x
4.1 X
1.6 x
1.1 x
2.6 x
3.8 x
6.5 x
6 .5 X
6.5 x
6.9 x

10"
10"
10-' •
10"

10"
10"

10-'
10-'
10" •
10-'

• These radionuclides were not detected in the ECF water. The numbers quoted reflect the
detection limit of the analysis.

2.9 x 10-<
Number of
Fatal Cancers

It should be noted that the sample results for the water pool indicate that the nuclide levels are

all below the Code of Federal Regulations limits for liquid effluent in IOCFR20 with the exception of
Population of
87153 1

4.3 x 10-'

Co~ . The level of 1- 129 used in the calcul ations was based on the minimum detection limit of the

2.2 x 10-'

sample. This level exceeds the effluent limit: however. 1-129 was not actually detected in the water
sample. Since Sr-9O has comparable water solubility to 1- 129 and exists in spent nuclear fuel at about

F-133

-.3r?

Volume I. Appendix 0

Volume I . Appendix 0

F-134

3r0.

a factor of 1.0 x 10' higher than 1-129, it is inferred from the detected level of Sr-90 that the actual
level of 1-129 is well below the IOCFR20 effluent limit.

Table F.1.4.2.1.6-1. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results.
For Wet Storage - Minor Water Pool Leakage
At INEL

F.1.4.2. 1. 6.3 Results. The following table summarizes the public health risk to the

general population that might result fro m the hypothetical minor water pool leak at each location .
The number of fatal cancers would be expected to occur over a 50-year period . "Risk " is defined as
the number of fatal cancers times the probability of occurrence. The probabil ity of a leak developing
is 10·' per year.

Minor Water Pool Leakage Summary
Maximally exposed
off-site
individual (MOl)
(rem)

Site

No. of fatal cancers
if accident occurs

Risk per year

INEL

2.5 x 10·'

1.3 x 10·'

1.3 x 10·'

Savannah River

7.9 x 10·'·

1.3 x 10-'

1.3 x 10·'·

Hanford

9.9 x 10·"

1.7

Puget Sound

3.2 x 10·'·

4.2 x 10·'

Pearl Harbor

1.3 x 10·"

4.6

X

X

10·'·

10·'·

1.7

X

10·"

4.2

X

10·"

4.6

X

I(}"

Norfolk

2.7 x 10-'·

1.8 x I(}'

1.8 x 10·'·

Ponsmouth

1.3 x 10-'·

1.4 x 10·'

1.4

X

10·'·

Kesselring

6.0 x 10-'

8.5 x 10"

8.5

X

10-'·

Nevada Test Site

1.4 x 10·'

2.5 x 10·'

1.4

X

Location

Total EDE
(rem)

Worker

NIA

N/A

MCW

1.6 x 10-"

6.4 x 10-"

NPA

1.6 x 10-"

8.0 x 10-"

MOl

2.5 x 10-'

1.3 x 10-"
Number of
Fatal Cancers

Exposure to Population within
5(}.mile Rad ius (person-rem)
Population of
115690

2.6 x 10-'

1.5 x 10"

3.9 x 10-'

Location

Total EDE
(rem)

I(}'·

N/A

N/A

4.8 x 10-"

1.9 x 10-"

NPA

4.8 x 10-"

2.4 x 10-"

MOl

7.9 x 10-'·

4.0 x 10-"

At al l sites except the Nevada Test Site, this accident results in the lowest or next to lowest

Exposure to Populat ion within
50-mile Radius (person-rem)
Population of
579541

F-135

3!:tD

Volume I , Append ix 0

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

MCW

3.9 x I(}'·

risk of the wet storage accidents evaluated.

1.3 x 10-'

Table F. 1.4.2. 1.6-2. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results.
For Wet Storage - Minor Water Pool Leakage
At Savannah River

Worker
Oak Ridge

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

Volume I , Appendix 0

2.5 x 10-"

Number of
Fatal Cancers
1.3xlO-'

F-136

3:21

Table F.1.4.2.1.6-S. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results.
For Wet Storage - Minor Water Pool Leakage
At Pearl Harbor

Table F.1.4.2.1.6-3. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results .
For Wei. Storage· Minor Water Pool Leakage
At Hanford

Total EDE
(rem)

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

Worker

N/A

N/A

3.3 xlO-il

MCW

N/A

N/A

8.3 x 10-"

4.2 XlO-il

NPA

4.8 x 10-"

2.4 x 10-"

9 .9 x 10-"

5 .0 x 10-"

MOl

1.3 x 10-'·

6.5 x 10-"

Total EDE
(rem)

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

N/A

N/A

MCW

8.3 x 10-"

NPA
MOl

Location
Worker

Number of
Fatal Cancers

Exposure to Population within
SO-mile Rad ius (person-rem)
Population of
375860

Location

3.3 x 10-'

Population of
817385

1.7 x 10-'·

Table F.1.4.2. 1.6-4. Summary of Exposure Calculation Resul ts .
For Wei. Storage - Minor Water Pool Leakage
At Pugel. Sound

4.6 x 10-'·

Table F.1.4.2.1 .6-6. Summary of Exposure Calcul ation Results.
For Wet Storage - Minor Water Pool Leakage
At Norfolk

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

Worker

N/A

N/A

N/A

MCW

N/A

N/A

1.2 x 10- 11

6.0 x 10-"

NPA

9.9 x 10-"

5.0 x 10-"

3.2 x 10-'·

1.6 x 10-"

MOl

2.7 x 10- 10

1.4 x 10-"

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

Worker

N/A

N/A

MCW

N/A

NPA
MOl

Exposure to Population within
SO-mile Rad ius (person-rem)
Population of
29758 10

9.2 x 10-'

Total EDE
(rem)

Total EDE
(rem)

Location

Number of
Fatal Cancers

Exposure to Popul ation within
50-mile Radius (person-rem)

8.4 x 10-"

Location

Number of
Fatal Cancers

Exposure to Population within
50-mile Radius (person-rem)
Population of
1539002

4.2 x 10-'

F-137

3;):;).,

Volume 1. Appendix D

Volume 1. Appendix D

3 .6 x 10-"

Number of
Fatal Cancers
1.8 x 10-'

F-138

36)3

Table F.1.4.2. 1.6-9. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results.
For Wet Storage - Minor Water Pool LeaJcage
At Nevada Test Site

Table F.1.4.2 .1.6-7. Summary of Exposure Calculalion Results.
For We!. Slorage - Minor Water Pool LeaJcage
At Portsmouth

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

Total EDE
(rem)

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

Worker

N/A

N/A

Worker

N/A

N/A

MCW

N/A

N/A

MCW

1.6 x 10-"

6.4 x 10-"

NPA

4.8 x 10-"

2.4 x 10-"

NPA

1.6 x 10-"

8.0 x 10-"

MOl

1.3 x 10-'·

MOl

2.5 x 10-'

1.3 x 10-"

Location

Exposure 10 Population within
5(}.mile Radius (person-rem)
Population of
2432627

Locati0n

6.5 x 10-"
Number of
Fatal Cancers

2.7 x 10-'

Population of
13792

1.4 x 10-'

2.7 x 10-'

1.4 x 10-'

Table F.l .4.2.1.6-10. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results.
For Wet Storage - Minor Water Pool Leakage
AI Oak Ridge

Total EDE
(rem)

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

Worker

N/A

N/A

N/A

MCW

9.4 x 10-"

3.8 x 10- 16

N/A

N/A

NPA

9.4 x 10-"

4.7 x 10- 16

6.0 x 10-'

3.0 x 10-"

MOl

1.5 x 10-'

7.5 x 10-"

Total EDE
(rem)

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

Worker

N/A

N/A

MCW

N/A

NPA
MOl

Exposure to Population within
5(}.mile Radius (person-rem)
Population of
1148587

Number of
Fatal Cancers

Exposure to Populalion within
50-mile Radius (person-rem)

Table F.1.4.2.1.6-8. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results.
For We!. Storage - Minor Water Pool LeaJcage
At Kesselring

Location

Total EDE
(rem)

1.7 x 10-'

Location

Number of
Fatal Cancers

Exposure to Population within
50-mile Radius (person-rem)
Population of
871 531

8.5 x 10-'

F- 139

&;4

Volume I . Appendix 0

Volume I. Appendix 0

7.7 x 10"

Number of
Fatal Cancers
3.9 x 10-'

F-I40

~,95

measurements of the fraction of co rrosion products loosened from naval spent nuclear

F. 1.4 .2.2 Dry Storage.

fuel by shock and vibration and the fact that a wind-driven missile would not penetrate
the container or damage the fuel inside. Only loose corrosion products would be

F. 1.4 .2.2. 1 Wind·driven Missile Impact into Storage Casks with Mechanical

available for r"lease from the container, and any release from the container would

Damage.

have to occur via a convoluted path through the damaged seal.
F. 1.4.2 .2. 1. 1 Descrip tion o( Conditions. In this hypoth etical accident, no fu el damage
would result from any impact because of the strength of the containers used . Dry storage containers

•

The release to the environment occurs at a constant rate over a 15-minute period.

•

There is no increase in direct radiation due to this accident.

•

The following amounts of radionuclides could be released to the environment. This

could experience a major wi nd storm or tornado which could propel a large object into a storage
container causing the container seal to be breached . However, container analysis for this si tuation
shows that the container is strong enough to prevent crushing of the spent nuclear fuel and release of
fission products.

listing includes nuclides th at result in at least 99 % of the possible exposure.
Winds produced by tornados are higher than hurricane winds and thus the impacting missile
would be travelling with higher velocity and would have higher kinetic energy. Even at this higher
velocity, analysis has shown that the missile would not penetrate the container. The probability of
penetration at the lower velocity of a hurricane (212 miles per hour) would be even smaller than the
probability of penetration for a missile propelled by the winds of a tornado (travelling at 360 mph).

While hurricanes can have high winds, hurricane winds normally cannot generate the very large, very

~

~

Co-{)()
Fe-55
Co-58
Mn-54
Fe-59

9 .58
1.76
3.54
5.98
5 . 11

x
x
x
x
x

10"
10"
10"
10')
10~

fast missiles analyzed for tornados. While hurri canes may occur more frequently than tornados, the
overall risk from a hurricane is lower because the co ntainer would not be penetrated .
F. 1.4.2. 2. 1. 3 Results. The following table summarizes the public heal th risk to the
The analys is of wind damage usi ng missiles propelled by the winds of torn ados is the same as

general population that would result from the hypoth eti cal wind-driven missile accident at each

is done for design of nuclear power plants . Hurricanes very infrequentl y have winds th at could

location. The number of fatal cancers would be expected to occur over a 50-year period. "Risk " is

generate such missiles, so th e analyses provided for tornados provide an upper limit for the effects of

defined as the number of fatal cancers times the probab ility of occurrence. The probability of

hurricanes. Exami nation of damage caused by recent severe hurri canes shows that rob ust structures

contai ner damage is small due to th e very strong container design. The dry storage containers are

can withstand hu rr icanes .

expected to be designed as well as sh ipping conta iners so th at they would not be pe netrated by
environmentally caused missi les and the fuel wou ld not be affected . Howeve r. an analysis was

F. 1.4 .2 .2.1.2 Source Term. Conditions used in developing the source term are as
follows :

performed for a case in which th e impact of a torn ado missile might topple a container on a railcar
and cause unseating of th e co ntai ner seal and thus release radioactive material in th e fo rm of
corrosion products.

•

The source term is based on best estimate spent nuclear fuel co rrosion products .

•

One percent of the original corrosio n products associated wi th the fu el could be

The probability of the occurrence of a tornado was obtained using the data in doc um ent
WASH- 1300 (AEC 1974). The max imum likelihnod of a tornado occ urrence at all sto rage locations

released from the cask to th e at mosphere . This is based on experimental
F- 141

3(;20

Volume I . Appendi x D

Volume I, Appendix D

F- 142

3:7J

being evaluated in the continental United States is 10" per year, The probability of a missile
generated by the tornado striking a co ntainer and causing the damage analyzed has been estimated to

Table F.1.4.2.2.1-1. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results.
For Dry Storage - Mechanical Damage
At INEL

be less than 10-'. Thus. the total probability of a wind-driven missile damaging a co ntai ner is less
than 10-'. and a probability of 10-' per year was used in the risk assessment.
50% METEOROLOGY
Dry Storage Mechanical Damage Summary
Maximally exposed
off-site
individual (MOl)
(rem)

Site

No. of fatal cancers
if accident occurs

2.0 x 10-'

8.0x I~

MCW

1.8 x 10-'

9 .2 x 10-'

NPA

1.0 x 10-'

5 .2 x 10-'

1.7 x 10"

MOl

8.0 x 10-'

3.0 x 10"

Exposure to Population with in
SO-mile Radius (person-rem)

4.6 x 10-<

Savannah River

4.9 x

10~

3.0 x 10"

J.U , 10"

Hanford

1. 7 x 10-<

1.3 x 10"

1.3

3.9 x 10"

1.7 x 10"

Location

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

Worker

INEL

Puget Sound

4.9 x 10-<

Risk per year

Total EDE
(rem)

4.9 x 10-'

X

10"

Pearl Harbor

2. 1 x 10"

3.0 x 10"

Norfolk

8.1 x 10"

1.8 x 10"

1.8 x 10"

Ponsmouth

4.2 x 10"

1.0 x 10"

1.0 x 10"

Kesselring

8. 1 x 10-'

7.4 x 10"

7.4

X

Population of
115690

4.0 x 10-'
Number of
Fatal Cancers

2.3 x 10-'

1.2 x 10-'

10-'

Nevada Test Site

8.8 x

10~

5 .3 x 10-'

5.3 x 10"·

Oak Ridge

1.4 x 10-'

5 . 1 x 10"

5 . 1 X 10"
95% METEOROLOGY

The risk for this hypothetical accident is generall y more severe at Navy shipyard s than at the
Total EDE
(rem)

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

Worker

5.6 x 10-'

2.2 x 10-'

MCW

2 .0 x 10-'

1.0 x 10-'

area impacted by the accident of less than 0.5 acre. The calculated downwind distance would be

NPA

6 .3 x 10-'

3. 1 X 10-'

co ntained within the boundaries of all sites under evaluatio n.

MOl

4.6 x

DOE sites. This accident results in the lowest ri sk of " two dry storage accidents evaluated.
Location
For the hypothetical wind-driven missile accide nt scenario. the rad ioactive plume might cause
contamination of the ground to a downwind distance of less tha n 0.06 mile. This would yi eld a total

1 0~

Exposure to Popul ation withi n
50-mile Radius (person-rem)
Popul ation of
115690

F-143

3QfJ

Vol ume I. Appendix D

Volu me I. Appendix D

9.8 x 10-'

2.3 x 10-'
Number of
Fatal Cancers
4.9 x 10-'

F- I44

Table F . 1.4.2.2. 1-2. Summary of Exposu re Calcu lat ion Results.
For Dry Storage - Mechanical Damage
At Savannah River

Table F .1.4.2.2. 1-3. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results.
For Dry Storage - Mechanical Damage
At Hanford

50\11, METEOROLOG Y

50\11, METEOROLOGY

Total EDE
(rem)

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

Worker

8.9 x 10-'

3.6 x 10-'

MCW

5.3 x 10-"

NPA

6.7 x 10-'

Location

Total EDE
(rem)

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

Worker

8.9 x 10-'

3.6 x 10-'

2. 1 x 10-'

MCW

7.0x

3.4 x 10-"

NPA

8. 1 x 10-6

Location

10~

2. 8

X

10-'

4. 1 x 10-'

MOl (New ECF)

1.6 x 10-"

8. 1 x 10-'

MOl (New ECF)

2.3 x 10-'

1.1 x 10-'

MOl (Barnwell)

4.0 x 10-"

2.0 x 10- '

MOl (FMEF)

4.6 x 10-'

2.3 x Woo,

Exposure to Popul ation within
50-mile Rad ius (person-rem)
Populatio n of
579541

Number of
Fatal Cancers

9.4 x 10-'

Exposure to Population within
50-mile Rad ius (person-rem)
Population of
375860

4.7 x 10-"

95\11, METEOROLOGY
Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

Worker

5.6 x 10-'

2.2 x 10-'

MCW

6.7 x 10-'

NPA

1.1 x

10~

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

Worker

5.6 x 10-'

2.2 x 10-'

2.6 x 10-'

MCW

4.4 x 10-'

1.8 x 10-6

5.7 x 10-'

NPA

1.3 x

IO~

6.3 x Woo,

1.7 x

1 0~

Location

MOl (New ECF)

4.9 x 10-"

2.5 x 10-'

MOl (New ECF)

3.9 x 10-'

2.0 x 10-'

MOl (FMEF)

Popul. tion of
579541

Nu mber of
Fatal Cancers
6. 1

7.0 x 10-'

Total EDE
(rem)

MOl (Barnwell)

Exposure to Population within
5O-mile Rad ius (person-rem)

l.4x Woo,

95 % METEOROLOG Y

Total EDE
(rem)

Location

Number of
Fatal Cancers

Exposure to Pop ulation within
50-mile Radius (person-rem)
Population of
375860

3.0 x 10-'

F-145

o.3(D

5.9 x 10-"

Volume I, Appendix D

Volume I , Appendix D

8.4 x 10-'
2.9 x Woo,
Number of
Fatal Cancers

25

1.3 x 10-'

F-146

-53 /

Table F . 1.4.2.2. 14. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results .
For Dry Storage - Mechanical Damage
At Puget Sound

Table F. 1.4.2_2_I-S _ Summary of Exposure Calculation Results.
For Dry Storage - Mechanical Damage
At Pearl Harbor

50% METEOROLOGY

Location
Worker

Total EDE
(rem)

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

4.9 x 10-'

1.9 x 10-<'

N/A

N/A

MCW
NPA

5.7 x 10-'

MOl

50% METEOROLOGY

3.5 x 10-'

Exposure to Population within
50-mile R>di us (person-rem)
Population of
2975810

Location
Worker

2.9 x 10-"
1.7 x 10-<'
Number of
Fatal Cancers

1.2 x 10'

Total EDE
(rem)

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

2.0 x 10-'

8.0 x 10-<'

MCW

N/A

N/A

NPA

5.2 x 10-'

2.6 x 10-<'

MOl

5.3 x 10-'

Exposure to Population within
50-mile Radius (person-rem)
Population of
817385

5.8 x 10-'

2.7 x 10-<'
Number of
Fatal Cancers

2.2 x 10'

1.1 x 10-'

95% METEOROLOGY
95% METEOROLOGY

Location
Worker

Total EDE
(rem)

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

5.6 x 10-'

2.2 x 10-'

N/A

N/A

MCW
NPA
MOl

6.8 x 10-'
3.9 x 10-'

Exposure to Population within
50-mile Radius (person-rem)
Population of
2975810

3.4 x 10'

Location
Worker
MCW

.

1.9 x 10-'

F-147

5.6 x 10-'

2.2 x 10-'
N/A

NPA

1.7 x 10-'

8.4 x 10-'

MOl

2. 1 x 10-'

1.1 x 10-'

Exposure to Population within
50-mile Radius (person-rem)
Popul atio n of
817385

1.7 x 10-'

33~

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

N/A

3.4 x 10-'

Number of
Fatal Cancers

Total EDE
(rem)

Vo lume I, Appendix 0

Volume I, Appendix D

5.9 x 10'

Number of
Fatal Cancers
3.0 x 10-'

F-148

333

Table F. 1.4.2.2.I-6. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results.
For Dry Storage - Mechanical Damage
At Norfolk

Table F.1.4.2.2.1-7. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results.
For Dry Storage - Mechanical Damage
At Portsmouth

SO% METEOROLOGY
SO% METEOROLOGY

Location

Total EDE
(rem)

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

4.9 x 10-'

2.0 x 10-"

Total EDE
(rem)

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

Worker

4.9 x 10-'

1.9 x 10-"

MCW

N/A

N/A

NPA

1.2 x 10-'

S.8 x 10-'

MOl

3.S x 10-'

Location

Worker
MCW

N/A

NPA

1.2 x 10-'

MOl

7.8 x 10-'

Exposure to Population within
5O-mile Radius (perso n-rem)
Population of
IS39002

N/A

6 .2 x 10-'
3.9 x 10-"
Number of
Fatal Cancers

7.4

Exposure to Population within
SO-mile Radius (person-rem)
Population of
2432627

3.7 x 10-'

1.8 x 10-'
Number of
Fatal Cancers

4.2

2. 1 x 10-'

9S% METEOROL()GY
9S % METEOROLOGY

Location
Worker

Total EDE
(rem)

MOl

S.6 x 10-'

2.2 x 10-'

N/A

N/A

1.4 x 10-'
8. 1 x 10-'

Ex posure to Population within
SO-mile Radius (person· rem)
Population of
IS39OO2

Total EDE
(rem)

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

Worker

S .6 x 10-'

2.2 x 10-'

MCW

N/A

N/A

NPA

2.6 x 10-'

1.3 x 10-'

MOl

4.2 x 10-'

2. 1 x 10-'

Location

MCW
NPA

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

3.S x 10'

7.1 x 10-"
4.0 x 10-'
Nu mber of
Fatal Cancers

Exposure to Population within
SO-mile Radius (pe rson-rem)
Populat ion of
2432627

1.8 x 10-'

F-149

..33t.;.

Volume I. Appendix D

Volume I , Appendix D

2.0 x 10'

Number of
Fatal Cancers
1.0 x 10-'

F· ISO

33..5

Table F.1.4.2.2. 1-8. Summary of Exposure Calculation Res ults .
For Dry Storage - Mechanical Damage
At Kesselring

Table F.1.4.2.2.1-9. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results.
For Dry Storage - Mechanical Damage
At Nevada Test Site

50% METEOROLOGY

Location

50% METEOROLOGY

Total EDE
(rem)

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

4.9 x 10-'

2.0 x 10-"

N/A

N/A

Worker
MCW
NPA

N/A

N/A

MOl

8.8 x 10-'

4.4 x 10-'

Exposure to Population within
5O-mile Radius (person· rem)
Population of
1148587

Location

Number of
Fatal Cancers
3.3

3.2 x 10-'

1.3 x 10-"

MCW

2.5 x 10-"

9.6 x 10-'·

NPA

N/A

N/A

MOl

4.5 x 10-'

2.2 x 10-'

Exposure to Population within
50-mile Radius (person-rem)
Population of
13792

1.7 x 10-'

Worker

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

5.6 x 10-'

2.2 x 10-'

N/A

N/A

NPA

N/A

N/A

MOl

8. 1 x 10-'

4.0 x 10-"

Exposure to Population wilJ1in
5O-mile Radius (person-rem)
Population of
1148587

1.5 x 10-'

Location

Number of
Fatal Cancers
1.5 x 10'

Number of
Fatal Cancers
7.3 x 10-"

95% METEOROLOGY

Total EDE
(rem)

MCW

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

Worker

95% METEOROLOGY

Location

Total EDE
(rem)

F-151

5.6 x 10-'

2.2 x 10-'

MCW

1.4 x 10-'

5.8 x 10-'

NPA

N/A

N/A

MOl

8.8 x 10-'

4.4 x 10-'

Population of
13792

Volume I , Appendix 0

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

Worker

Exposure to Pop ulation within
50-mile Radius (person-rem)

7.4 x 10-'

33((,

Total EDE
(rem)

Volume I, Appendix 0

1.1 x 10-'

Number of
Fatal Cancers
5.3 x 10-'

F-152

33'7

Table F.l.4.2.2.1-10. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results.
For Dry Storage - Mechanical Damage
At Oak Ridge

50% METEOROLOGY

Total EDE
(rem)

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

Worker

2.0 x 10-2

8.0 x l~

MCW

5.3 x 1(14

2.1xlO-'

3

Location

NPA

6 .9 x 10-

3.4 x 1~

MOl

2.2 x 10-2

1.1

Exposure to Population within
50-mile Radius (person-rem)

X

10-5

Number of
Fatal Cancers

Population of
871531

2.8

1.4 x 10-3

95% METEOROLOGY

Location

Total EDE
(rem)

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer
10-5

Worker

5 .6 x 10-2

MCW

3.2

NPA

4.4 x 10- 2

2.2

X

10-5

MOl

1.4 x 10- 1

6 .9

X

10-5

X

10-3

X

1.3 x 1~

Number of
Fatal Cancers

Exposure to Population within
50-mile Radius (person-rem)
Population of
871531

2.2

1.0 x 10 1

5 . 1 X 10-3

F- 153

33&>

Volume I, Appendix D

•

F.1 .4.2.2.2 Airplane Crash.

The followi ng amount of radionuclides could be released to the environment. This
listing includes nuclides that result in at least 99% of the possible exposure.

F. 1.4.2.2.2. 1 Description of Conditions. A hypothetical aircraft accident scenario was

developed for the dry storage option. Based on the probability of occurrence, as discussed in Section

N!!£lilk

~

F.3, specific analyses were only performed for Savannah River, Oak Ridge, Pearl Harbor, Norfolk,

Cs-134

2.57 x 10'

Ponsmouth, and Kesselring locations. At other locations, the likelihood of occurrence is less than

Cs-137

3.56 x 10'

10" per year. The accident is postulated to cause damage to a single storage cask. This is based on

Pu-238

5.90 x 10"

the fact that containers used to store naval spent nuclear fuel would be very rugged so that only the

Ba-137M

3.07

rotor shaft from one of an airliner's jet engines would be strong enough and possess enough energy to

Sr-90

3. 12

have a chance of penetrating a container. From analyses of existing container designs, the rotor of a

Ce-l44

7.17

large jet engine, including those from the largest aircraft such as a Boeing 777, Russian Antonov

Nb-95

4.37

An-225, or a Lockheed C-5, would not penetrate a container during an airliner crash , but, for the

Y-90

3. 12

purposes of evaluation, calculations were performed for one container damaged to the extent that

Ru-l06

6 . 11 x 10"

fiss ion products and corrosion products might be released . Due to the severity of the shock, the cask
seal might be breached resulting in damage to the fuel. The severe mechanical shock results in the

F.1.4.2.2.2.3 Results. The following table summarizes the public health risk to the

release of corrosion products to the environment. The release of fi ssion products also occurs due to

general population that would result from the hypothetical airplane crash accident at each location.

the impact and resultant fire . The fission product release factors are based on overheating testing

The number of fatal cancers would be expected to occur over a 50-year period . "Risk" is defined as

performed on the naval fuel systems .

the number of fatal cancers times the probability of occurrence.

F.1.4.2.2.2 .2 Source Term. Conditions used in developing the source term are as

Dry Storage Airplane Crash Summary

follows:

•

One percent of all of the fuel units stored inside the cask are damaged either by the
impact or the resullant fi,e and those fission products are available for release.

•

Of the available fission products, 100% of the noble gases, 3% of the halogens , 1.1 %
of th e cesi um, and 0. 1% of th e remaining solids are released to the environment.

•

Th e rr \ease Co the environment occurs at a constant rate over a 15-minute period .

•

Ten percent of the ori ginal corros ion products from the fu el units are releas ed from
th e cask to th e atmosphere.

Volume I . Appe ndix D

Site

Probability of
accident per year

Maximally exposed
off-site
individual (MOl)
(rem)

Savannah River

3 x 10"

4.7

Pearl Harbor

I x 10"

19

Norfolk

Ix

IO~

72

16

1.6 x 10"

Portsmouth

I x 10"

38

9 .0

9 .0 x 10"

Kesselring

I x 10"

7.7

7.5

7.5 x 10"

Oak Ridge

3 x 10"

120

4.7

1.4 x

X

10"

No. of fatal

cancers
if accident occurs

Risk per year

2.8

8.4 x 10"

26

2.6 x 10"

10~

The risk for this hypothetical acc ident is most severe at Pearl Harbor and Norfolk . It is also
th e highest risk for any hypothetical acc ident evaluated at Pearl Harbor and Norfolk. For the sites

F-154

33Q

F- 155

340

Volume I. Append ix D

with crash probabilities less than 10" per year, consequences were not calculated since it is expected
that they would not substantially contribute to the risk.

Table F_L4_2.2_2-L Summary of Exposure Calculation Results.
Dry Storage - Airplane Crash
At Savannah River

For the hypothetical airplane crash into a dry storage cask accident scenario, the radioactive
plume might cause contamination of the ground to a downwind distance of approximately 0.9 mile.
50% METEOROLOGY

This would yield a total area impacted by the accident of about 106 acres. The calculated downwind
distance would be contained within the boundaries of the Savannah River and Kesselring sites. The

Total EDE
(rem)

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

Worker

1.5 x 101

5.9 x 10-'

MCW

8.7 x 10-1

3.5 x 10-'

NPA

1.1 x 10-'

5.5x

MOl

1.8 x 10-1

8.8 x 10-'

contaminated plume would extend beyond the boundaries of Oak Ridge and the shipyards that are at
Location

risk for this accident.

Exposure to Population within
50-mile Radius (person-rem)
Population of
579541

I~

Number of
Fatal Cancers

9.6 x 10'

4.8 x 10- 1

95% MET!:OROLOGY

Total EDE
(rem)

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

Worker

9 .2 x 10 1

7.4 x 10-'

MCW

1.1 x 10 1

4.4 x 10-'

NPA

1.9 x 10- 1

9.5 x 10-'

MOl

4.7 x 10- 1

Location

Exposure to Popul ation within
50-mile Radius (person-rem)
Popul ation of
579541

Volume I, Appendix 0

5.5 x 10'

2.3 x 10-'
Number of
Fatal Cancers
2.8

F-156

F-157

3'-11"

3~

Volume I, Appendix 0

Table F.1.4.2.2 .2-2. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results.
Dry Storage - Airplane Crash
At Pearl Harbor

Table F.1.4.2.2.2-3. Summary of Exposu re Calculation Results.
Dry Storage - Airplane Crash
At Norfolk

50% METEOROLOGY

50% METEOROLOGY

Total EOE
(rem)

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

Worker

3.3 x 10'

2.7 x 10-'

MCW

N/A

N/A

MCW

N/A

N/A

NPA

8.6

4.3 x 10-'

NPA

2.0

1.0 x 10-'

MOl

4 .7

MOl

6.9

Location

Exposure to Population within
50-mile Radius (person-rem)
Population of
817385

2.3 x 10-'
Number of
Fatal Cancers

2.0 x 10'

Location

8.2

3.3 x 10-'

Exposure to Population within
50-mile Radius (person-rem)

95% METEOROLOGY

Location

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

Worker

Population of
1539002

9.8

Total EOE
(rem)

3.4 x 10-'
Number of
Fatal Cancers

6.5 x 10'

3.2

95% METEOROLOGY

Total EOE
(rem)

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

Location

Total EOE
(rem)

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

9 .2 x 10'

7.4 x 10-'

MCW

N/A

N/A

MCW

N/A

N/A

NPA

2.8 x 10'

2.8 x 10- '

NPA

2.4 x 10'

2.4 x 10-'

MOl

1.9 x 10'

MOl

7.2 x 10'

Worker

Exposure to Population within
50-mile Radius (pe rson-rem)
Population of
817385

Volume I. Appendix 0

9.3

X

10-'

Number of
Fatal Cancers
5.2 x 10'

2.6 x 10'

F-158

31.:3

Worker

9.2 x 10'

Exposure to Population within
50-mile Radi us (person-rem)
Population of
1539002

3. 1 x 10'

7.4

7.2

X

X

10- 2

10-'

Number of
Fatal Cancers
1.6

X

F- 159

10'

311-

Volume I. Appendix 0

Table F.1.4.2.2.2-4. Summary of Exposure Calculation Resul ts.
Dry Storage - Airplane Crash
At Ponsmouth

Table F .1.4.2_2_2-S. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results.
Dry Storage - Airplane Crash
At Kesselring

50% METEOROLOGY

50% METEOROLOGY

Total EDE
(rem)

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

Worker

8. 1

3.2 x 10-'

MCW

N/A

N/ A

MCW

N/A

N/A

NPA

1.9

9 .6 x 10-'

NPA

N/A

N/A

MOl

3. 1

1.6 x 10-'

MOl

1.3

Location

Number of
Fatal Cancers

Exposure to Population within
50-mile Radius (perso n-rem)
Population of
2432627

3.7 x 10'

1.9

Location

Total EDE
(rem)

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

8.2

3.3 x 10-'

Worker

Exposure to Population within
50-mile Radius (person-rem)
Popul ation of
1148587

95% METEOROLOGY

6 .6 x 10-'
Number of
Fatal Cancers

4 .8 x 10'

2.4

95% METEOROLOGY

Total EDE
(rem)

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

Worker

9 .2 x 10'

7 .4 x 10-'

MCW

N/A

N/A

MCW

N/A

N/A

NPA

4 .3 x 10'

4 .3 x 10-'

NPA

N/A

N/A

MOl

3.8 x 10'

3.8 x 10-'

MOl

7 .7

Location

Number of
Fatal Cancers

Exposure to ? opulation within
50-mile Rad ius (person-rem)
Population of
2432627

Volume I. Appendix D

1.8 x 10'

9 .0

F- I60

3'-I!f .

Location
Worker

Total EDE
(re m)

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

9.2 x 10'

7.4 x 10-'

Exposure to Population within
50-mile Rad ius (person-rem)
Population of
1148587

3.8 x 10-'
Number of
Fatal Cancers

1.5 x 10'

7.5

F-16 1

Volume I. Appendix D

Table F.1.4.2.2.2-6. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results.
Dry Storage - Airplane Crash
At OaJc Ridge

F.1.4.2.3 Dry Cell Operations.

F. 1.4.2.3. 1 Inadvertent Cutting into Fuel Region or Mechanical Damage.

F.1.4.2.3. 1. 1 Description of Conditions. Mechanical damage due to handling during

50% METEOROLOGY

examination. such as accidentally cutting into the fuel region of an element. was assessed. This
Total EOE
(rem)

Location
Worker

3.3 x 10'

MCW

8.7

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer
2.7

X

10-'

the facility building and escape to the environment. The majority of the volatile and

10-'

3.5 x 10-"

1.1 x 10'

5.7 x 10-'

MOl

1.9 x 10'

lid nuclides

environment was evaluated. The possible exposure to the workers. individuals living on the site
boundary. and the general population was evaluated .

9.7 x 10-'
Number of
Fatal Cancers

Exposure to Population within
50-mile Radius (person· rem)

5

are likely to be retained in the fuel or the facility exhaust filters . The resulting airborne release to the

NPA

X

hypothetical accident results from inadvenent cutting across the fuel region when cropping off the
Zircaloy ends of a fuel unit. All noble gas isotopes within the vicinity of the cut might be released to

F. 1.4 .2.3. 1.2 Source Term. Conditions used in developing the source term are as

follows:

Population of
871531

2.9 x 10'

1.4
•

One percent of the fission products in the fuel element being handled are close enough
to the cut site to be available for release.

95% METEOROLOGY

Location
Worker

Twenty-five percent of the halogens available for release are released .

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

•

9.2 x 10'

7.4 x 10-'

•

5.3

2.2 x 10-'

NPA

7.2 x 10'

7.2 x 10-'

MOl

1.2 x 10'

1.2 x 10-'

Exposure to Population within
50-mile Radius (person· rem)

Volume I. Appendix 0

All (100%) of the noble gases available for release are released to the atmosphere.

Total EOE
(re m)

MCW

Population of
871531

•

9.5 x 10'

One percent of the paniculate fission products could be released and 99.9% of these
are removed by normally installed HEPA filters .

•

Cs and Ru would behave like paniculate fissi<,o products .

Nu mber of
Fatal Cancers

•

The release to the environment occurs at a constant rate over a 15· minute period.

4.7

•

There is no increase in direct rad iation due to this accident.

F· 162

311

F· 163

Volume I. Appendix 0

•

The following amounts of radionuclides could be rel eased to the environment. This
listing includes nuclides that result in at least 99 % of the possible exposure.

F. 1.4.2.3. 1.3 Results. The following table summarizes the public health risk to the

general population that would result from the hypothetical mechanical damage accident at each
location . The number of fatal cancers would be expected to occur over a 50-year period . "Risk " is

~

~

Pu-238

7.2 x I(t'

Cs-134

2.9 x 10-'

Cs-137

4 x 10"

defined as the number of fatal cancers times the probability of occurrence. The probability of damage
to fuel during handling is small. The work on fuel at the INEL-ECF includes removal of the
non-fueled portions at each end of the fuel unit. This is done in a sawing operation. To cut into the
fuel , there must be operator error in positioning the spent fuel in the cutting appar"tus and error in

1-129

2.5 x 10"

Sr-9O

3.9

Ce-l44

9.0 x 10"

1983). Using a conservative number of 10' saw cut operations per year results in a fuel cutting

Nb-95

5.4 x 10"

probability of less than

1-131

5.4 x

x 10"

selecting the saw cut positioning gage. The combined operator and independent checker ermr
probability for cutting of the fuel has been evaluated to be less than 10-' per cut (Swain and Guttman

1O~

per year which has been used in the risk evaluation.

10~

H-3

1.42

Y-90

3.9 x 10"

Ory Cell Mechanical Damage Summary

Ba-137m

3.8 x 10"

Ru- I06

7.6 x

Zr-95

2.9 x 10"

Maximally exposed
off-site
individual (MOl)
(rem)

Y-91

2. 3 x 10"

Eu- 154

2.7 x

10~

10~

Site

No. of fatal cancers
if accident occurs

Risk per year

INEL

2.2 x

10~

3.5 x

Savannah River

2.4 x

10 ~

1.4 x 10"

1.4

Hanford

7. 1 x 10"

5.3 x

5.3 x 10"

Nevada Test Site

4 .0 x

10~

3.7 x 10"

3.7 x 10"

Oak Ridge

5.8 x 10"

2. 5 x 10"

2.5 x 10"

I~

3.5 x 10-'

10~

X

10"

The risk for this hypotheti cal accident is roughly proportional to the surrounding populatio n
with Oak Ridge being the worst and the Nevada Test Site being the best.

For the hypotheti cal dry cell mechani cal damage accident scenario . the radioacti ve plume
might result in contamination of the ground to • dow nwind distance of less th an 0.06 mile. This
would yield a total area impacted by the accident of less th an 0.5 acre. The calcul ated downwind
d istance would be contai ned wi th in the boundari es of all OOE sites under evaluation.
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F-I64

F-165

..35'0
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Table F.1.4.Z.3 . I-1. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results .
For Dry Cell Operations - Mechanical Damage
At INEL

Table F.1.4.2.3.I-Z. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results .
For Dry Cell Operations - Mechanical Dam.ge
At Savannah River

50% METEOROLOGY

50% METEOROLOGY

Total EDE
(rem)

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

Worker

3.7 x 10-'

1.5 x 10"'

MCW

3.4 x 10"'

NPA

1.9 x 10"'

MOl

6.2 x 10"'

Location

Exposure to Population within
50-mile Radius (person-rem)

Total EDE
(rem)

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

Worker

1.6 x 10"'

6 .6 x 10-"

1.4 x 10"'

MCW

9.6 x 10-'

3.8 x 10"'

9.5 x 10"'

NPA

1.2 x iO"'

6 . 1 x 10"'

3. 1 x 10"'

MOl (New ECF)

1.0 x 10-'

5.1 x 10-'

Number of
Fatal Cancers

MOl (Barnwell)

2.0 x 10....

Location

Exposure to Population within
50-mile Radius (person-rem)

Population of
115690

3.9 x 10"'

1.0

X

10"'

Number of
Fatal Cancers

1.9 x 10-'
Population of
579541

6 .2 x 10"'

3. 1 x 10-'

95 % METEOROLOGY
95% METEOROLOGY
Total EDE
(rem)

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

Werker

1.0 x 10"'

4. 1 x 10"'

MCW

3.7 x 10-'

1.5 x 10"'

Worker

1.0 x 10"'

4. 1 x 10"'

NPA

1.1 x 10-'

5 .7 x 10"'

MCW

1.2 x 10"'

4.9 x 10-"

MOl

2.2 x 10-'

1.0 x 10"'

Location

Exposure to Population within
5O-mile Radius (perso n-rem)
Populatio n of
115690

7.0 x 10"'

1.1 x 10"'
Nu mber of
Fatal Cancers
3.5 x 10-'

Location

F- I66

361

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

NPA

2.1 x 10-'

MOl (New ECF)

2.4 x 10-'

1.2 x 10"'

MOl (Barnwell)

1.7 x 10"'

8.4 x 10"'

Exposure to Popul at ion within
50-mile Radius (person-rem)
Populat ion of
579541
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Total EDE
(rem)

Number of
Fatal Cancers
2.8

1.4 x 10- '

F- 167

,ff:<
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Table F. 1.4.2.3.1-3. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results .
For Dry Cell Operations - Mechanical Damage
At Hanford

Table F. 1.4.2.3. 1-4. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results.
For Dry Cell Operations - Mechanical Damage
At Nevada Test Site

50% METEOROLOGY

50% METEOROLOGY

Total EDE
(rem)

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

Worker

1.6 x 10--'

6.6 x 10-"

MCW

1.3 x 10--'

5. 1 x 10--'

NPA

1.5 x 10--'

7.4x 10-'

MOl (New ECF)

9.8 x 10-"

4.9 x 10--'

MOl (FMEF)

2.0 x 10--'

Location

Population of
375860

9.9 x 10--'
Number of
Fatal Cancers

Exposure to Population with in
50-mile Radius (person-rem)
6 .2 x 10--'

Total EDE
(rem)

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

Worker

5.8 x 10--'

2.3 x 10-"

MCW

4 .5 x 10-"

1. 8 x 10--'

NPA

N/A

N/A

MOl

4 .7 x 10--'

2.3 x 10--'

Location

Exposure to Population within
SO-mile Radius (person-rem)
Popul ation of
13792

Number of
Fatal Cancers

3.6 x 10--'

1.8 x 10-'

3. 1 x 10--'

95% METEOROLOGY
95% METEOROLOGY

Total EDE
(rem)

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

Worker

1.0 x 10--'

4. 1 x 10--'

MCW

8.0 x 10--'

3.2 x 10-"

NPA

2.3 x 10-'

1.2 x 10--'

MOl (New ECF)

7. 1 x 10--'

3.6 x 10--'

MOl (FMEF)

2.5 x

Location

10~

Volume I. Appendix D

X

10--'

Number of
Fatal Cancers

Exposure to Population within
50-mile Radius (person-rem)
Population of
375860

1.2

1.07

Total EDE
(rem)

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

Worker

1.0 x 10-'

4. 1 x 10-'

MC W

2.6 x

Location

N/A

NPA
MOl

10~

4.0 x

10~

Exposure to Popul ation withi n
SO-mil e Radius (person-rem)
Population of
13792

7.4 x 10-'

1.0

X

10-'

N/A

2 .0

X

10--'

Number of
Fatal Cancers
3.7 x 10-'

5.3 x 10-'

F- 168

353

F- 169

354
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Table F. 1.4.2.3. I-S. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results .
For Dry Cell Operations - Mechan ioal Damage
At Oak Ridge

F. 7.4 .2.3.2 Partial Loss of Shielding Due to Earthquake.

F. 7.4.2.3.2. 7 Description of Conditions. A hypothetical earthquake causes the proposed
Dry Cell Facility to lose some portion of its concrete shielding . Direct radiation exposure to the onsite work force and the general public has been calculated.

50% METEOROLOGY

Total EDE
(rem)

Location

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

Worker

3.7 x 10-'

1.5 x 10-'

MCW

9.6 x 10-"

3.8 x 10-'

NPA

1.3 x 10-'

6.3 x 10-"

MOl

9.3 x 10-'

4.6 x 10-"

F. 7.4 .2.3.2.2 Source Term. The conditions used to calculJte the dry cell direct radiation
levels are as follows :

•

earthquake would result in cracks or small openings in the shielding. This bounds
anticipated damage to the facility .

Number of
Fatal Cancers

Exposure to Population within
50-mile Radius (person-rem)

•

Population of
871531

For calculational purposes, a total of 50% of the high-density concrete dry cell
shielding might be removed due to the earthquake. More realistic damage from an

1.9

9.5 x 10-"

Building containment and ventilation systems remain in operation. Therefore, there is
no airborne release to the environment. Calculations have already been performed in
Sectio n F. I.4 .2. 1. 1 for a drained water pool hypothetical accident which bound any
anticipated airborne releases from the dry cell facility should the building containment
and ventilation systems fail.

95 % METEOROLOGY

F. 7.4 .2 .3.2.3 Results. The following table summarizes the public health risk to the
Total EDE
(rem)

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

The number of fatal cancers would be expected to occur over a 50-year period . "Risk" is defined as

Worker

1.0 x 10-'

4. 1 x 10-'

the number of fatal cancers times the probability of occurrence. As d iscussed in Section

MCW

5.9 x 10-'

2.4 x 10-"

F.1.4.2.1.1.3 , the probability of this hypothetical acc ident is estimated to be 10" per year.

Location

NPA

8.0 x 10-'

4.0 x 10-'

MOl

5.8 x 10-'

2.9 x 10-'
Number of
Fatal Cancers

Exposure to Population within
50-mile Radius (person-rem)
Populat io n of
87153 1
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general population that would result from the hypothetical loss of shielding accident at each location.

5. 1

2.5 x 10-'

F-170

3 5'5

F-17 1

35((,
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Dry Cell Panial Loss of Shi~ lding Summary
Maximally exposed
off-site
individual (MOl)
(rem)

Site

No. of fatal cancers
if accident occurs

Table F.1.4.2.3.2-1. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results.
For Dry Cell Operations - Panial Loss of Shielding
At INEL
Risk per year

INEL

9.3 x 10'"

3.0

10-"

3.0 x 10'"

Savannah River

6 .7 x 10-"

3.0 x 10-"

3.0 x 10-"

Hanford

3.3 x 10-"

Nevada Test Site

6.3 x 10-"

Oak Ridge

X

4.9 x 10''''
3.7 x 10-"
7.5 x

1.2 x 10-'

I~

4 .9

X

Receptor
Location

10'"

Total EDE
(rem)

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

3.7 x

10~2

Worker

7.2 x 10-'

2.9 x 10-'

7.5

10'"

MCW

7.5 x 10-"

3.0 x 10-"

MOl

9 .3 x 10-"

4.7 x 10-"

X

At all sites, the risks associated with this accident are the lowest of any accident evaluated .

Exposure to Population within
50-mile Radius (person-rem)
Population of
115,690

5.9 x 10-"

Number of
Fatal Cancers
3.0

X

10-"

Table F. 1.4.2.3.2-2. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results.
For Dry Cell Operations - Partial Loss of Shielding
At Savannah River

Total EDE
(rem)

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

Worker

7.2 x 10-'

2.9 x 10-'

MCW

2.7 x 10'"

1.1 x 10-'

MOl (New ECF)

6.7 x 10-"

3.4

Receptor
Location

MOl (Barnwell Plant)

2.4 x 10'"

1.2 x 10-'

7.9 x 10-"

4.0 x 10-'"

Population of
579,541

F- I72

35'7

10- 11

NPA

Exposure to Population within
50-mile Radius (person-rem)
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X

5.9 x 10-"

Number of
Fatal Cancers
3.0 x 10-"

F-173

358
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Table F.1.4.2.3.2-3. Summary of Exposure Calcul ation Results.
For Dry Cell Operations· Panial Loss of Shielding
At Hanford

Table F.1.4.2.3.2-S. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results.
For Dry Cell Operations - Panial Loss of Shielding
At Oak Ridge

Total EDE
(rem)

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

Worker

7. 2 x 10-'

2.9 x 10-'

Worker

7.2 x 10-'

2.9 x 10-'

MCW

2.7 x 10-"

1.1 x 10-"

MCW

5.5 x 10-'

2.2 x 10-"

MOl (New ECF)

3.3 x 10-"

1.7 x 10-'"

MOl

1.2 x 10-'

6 .0 x 10-"

MOl (FMEF)

6.7 x 10-"

3.4 x 10.11

NPA

1.4 x 10"'

7.0 x 10-'

NPA

3.9 x 10-"

2.0 x 10-"

Receptor
Location

Exposure to Population within
50-mile Radius (person-rem)
Population of
375.860

9.7 x 10-"

Number of
Fatal Cancers

Receptor
Location

Total EDE
(rem)

Exposure to Popul ation within
50-mile Radius (person-rem)
Population of
87 1,53 1

1.5 x 10-'

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

Number of
Fatal Cancers
7.5 x 10"

4.9 x 10-"

Table F.I.4.2.3.2-4. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results .
For Dry Cell Operations - Partial Loss of Shieldi ng
At Nevada Test Site

Total EDE
(rem)

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

7.2 x 10-'

2.9 x 10-'

MCW

7. 1 x 10-"

2.8 xlO-il

MOl

6.3 x 10-"

3.2 x 10-1'

Receptor
l,<>cation
Worker

Ex posure to Populatio n with in
50-mile Radius (person-rem)
Populatio n of
12. 159

Volume I. Appendix D

8.7 x 10-"

Number of
Fatal Cancers
4.4 x 10-'"

F-174

3~C)

F-175

.;3((;0
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•

F. 1.4.2.3.3 Airplana Crash Into Dry Cell Facility.

The following amount of rad ionuclides could be released to the environment. This
listing includes nuclides that result in at least 99% of the possible exposure.

F. 1.4.2.3.3. 1 Description of Conditions. A hypothetical aircraft accident scenario was
devel oped for dry cell operations. Based on the probability of occurrence, as discussed in Section

~

F.3, specific analysis was only performed for Savannah River, the Nevada Test Site, and Oak Ridge.

Cs-134

4.5 x 10'

The accident was postulated to cause major damage to the building, resulting in the loss of contain·

Cs-137

6 .23 x 10'

ment and filtered exhaust systems. The fuel units inside the dry cell could also be damaged due to
mechanical impacts and potential fire. The fission products which might be released are based on
factors derived from overheating testing performed on the naval fuel systems. The mechanical impact
also could result in the release of corrosion products to the environment.

F.1.4.2.3.3.2 Source Term. The development of the radioactive source term for this

~

Pu-238

1.03 x 10"

BA-137M

5 .37

Sr-90

5 .46

Ce-l44

1.25 x 10'

Nb-95

7.65

Y-90

5.46

Ru- l06

1.07

scenario is based on the following :

F. 1.4.2.3.3.3 Results. The following table summarizes the public health risk to the

•

One percent of the fuel units stored inside of the dry cell might be damaged by either

general population that would result from the hypothetical airplane crash into the dry cell at the

the impact or resultant fire and those fission products would be available for release.

Savannah River Site. The number of fatal cancers would be expected to occur over a 50-year period.
"Risk " is defined as the number of fatal cancers times the probability of occurrence.

•

Of the fission products available for release, 100 % of the noble gases, 3% of the
halogens, 1. 1% of the cesium, and 0. 1% of the remaining solids could be released to
the environment.

Probability of
accident per year

Site
•

The release to the environment would occur at a constant rate over a 15-minute
period .

•

10% of the available corrosion products could be rel eased to the environment.

•

A portion of the concrete shieldi ng is destroyed; however, the resultant rubble
provides a minimum of 6 inches of concrete shielding.

Maximally exposed
off-site
individual (MOl)
(rem)

10~

No. of fatal
cancers
if accident occurs

Risk per year

Savannah River

2 x

4.8

9.6 x 10~

Nevada Test Site

4 x 10"

1.6

1.8 x 10"

7 .2 x 10"

Oak Ridge

I x

10~

350

8.4

8.4 x 10~

8.2

X

10"

This accident results in the highest ri sk for any hypothetical accident evaluated at Savannah
River, the Nevada Test Site, and Oak Ridge.

For the hypoth etical airplane crash into a dry cell acc ident scenario , th e radioactive plume
might cause contamination of the ground to a downwind distance of approximately 1.3 miles. This
would yield a total area impacted by the accident of about 207 ac res. The calcul ated downwind
distance would be contained within th e boundaries of Savannah River and the Nevada T est Site, but
not Oak Ridge.
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Table F. 1.4.2.3.3-1. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results .
For Dry Cen Operations - Airplane Crash
At Savannah River

Table F.1.4.2.3.3-2. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results .
For Dry Cen Operations - Airplane Crash
At Nevada Test Site

50% METEOROLOGY

50% METEOROLOGY

Total EDE
(rem)

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

Worker

2.6 x 10'

2. 1 X 10-'

Worker

MCW

1.6

6.2 x 10-"

MCW

NPA

1.9 x 10-'

9 .6x I~

NPA

N/A

N/A

MOl

3. 1 x 10-'

1.5 x 10-"

MOl

2.5 x 10-'

1.3 x 10-"

Location

Number of
Fatal Cancers

Exposure to Population within
50-mile Radius (person-rem)
Population of
579541

1.6 x 10'

8. 1 x 10-'

Location

Population of
13792

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

Worker

1.6 x 10'

1.3 x 10-'

MCW

1.9

10'

NPA
MOl

3.7 x 10-'
2.9x I~

Number of
Fatal Cancers

2. 1 x 10'

1.1 x 10-'

Total EDE
(rem)

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

Worker

1.6 x 10'

1.3 x 10-'

7.8 x 10-'

MCW

4.2 x 10-'

1.7 x 10'"

3.3 x 10-'

1.7 x 10-"

NPA

N/A

N/A

8.2 x 10-'

4.l x lo-"

MOl

1.6

8.0 x 10-"

X

Exposure to Population within
50-mile Radius (person-rem)

Vol ume I. Appendix D

9.2

95% METEOROLOGY

Total EDE
(rem)

Populatio n of
579541

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

7. 1 x 10-'

Exposure to Population within
50-mile Radius (person-rem)

95 % METEOROLOGY

Location

Total EDE
(rem)

9.6 x 10'

Number of
Fatal Cancers
4 .8

F-178

3W

Location

Exposure to Population within
50-mile Rad ius (person-rem)
Population of
13792

3.5 x 10'

Number of
Fatal Cancers
1.8

X

F- 179

3/.cH

10-'
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Table F.1.4.2.3.3-3. Summary of Exposure Calculation Results.
For Dry Cell Operations - Airplane Crash
At Oak Ridge

F. 1.4.3 Impact of Accidents on Close-in Workers. An evaluation has been made of the impact

to close-in workers involved in naval spent nuclear fuel management that might occur due to the
various radiological accidents postulated in spent fuel handling. This evaluation focused on the
radiological consequences of the accident. Clearly, a limited number of fatalities may occur which
are related to spent fuel handling only in a secondary manner; i.e., the worker who happened to be in

50% METEOROLOGY

the facility may be killed due to a plane crash, seismic event, crane failure, etc. These secondary
Total EDE
(rem)

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

5.8 x 10'

4.7 x 10-'

MCW

1.5

6.2 x 10-'

NPA

2.2 x 10'

2.2 x 10-'

MOl

1.7 x 10'

Location
Worker

Population of
871531

1.7 x 10-'
Number of
Fatal Cancers

Exposure to Population within
50-mile Radius (person-rem)
5.2 x 10'

2.6

effects are not discussed in the following . Rather, only radiological consequences are considered.

F. 1.4.3. 1 Wet Storage.
F. 1.4.3. 1. 1 Drained Water Pool Due to Seismic Event. No fatalities to workers close

to the scene of the accident would be expected due to radiological consequences. This is because
drainage of the large amount of water in a water pool is expected to take several days which provides
ample time for workers to leave the facility.

F. 1.4.3 . 1.2 AccidentBl Criticality in. Water Pool Due to Human Error. It is likely no

fatalities would occur. At most, two or three workers may receive some appreciable radiation
exposure. This is because the criticality would occur under approximately 20 feet of water.
Shielding by the water would be sufficient to prevent exposure of nearby workers . Expulsion of a
cone of water above the critical ity might lead to significant exposure to any workers who were

95% METEOROLOGY

directly above the location of the criticality.

Location

Total EDE
(rem)

Likelihood
of Fatal
Cancer

Worker

1.6 x 10'

1.3 x 10-'

MCW

9 .3

4.7 x 10- 3

NPA
MOl

1.3 x 10'
3.5 x 10'

3.5 x 10-'
Number of
Fatal Cancers

Exposure to Popul atio n within
5O-mile Rad ius (person-rem)
Population of
871531

1.3 x 10-'

F.1.4.3.1.3 Mechanical Damage to Fuel in a Water Pool Due to Operator Error or
Crane Failure. No fatalities to workers would be expected from radiological consequences. This is

because the release of the source term is underwater. Attenuation by the water would occur for most
products, but release of noble gases would cause

3

direct radiatio n exposure to workers in the area.

Upon releases fro m the surface of the water pool. radiation alarms would sound requiring evacuation
of nearby workers . Timely evacuation would prevent suhstantial radiatio n exposure.

F. 1.4. 3. 1.4 Airplane Crash into Water Pool Storage. No fatalities to workers would be

1.7 x 10'

8.4

expected from rad iological consequences . This is because any release of radioactive products would
be underwater and radiation alarms would sound requiring evacuation of nearby wo rkers . Timely
evacuation would prevent substantial radiation exposure.
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F. 7.4 .3 .2 Dry Storage.

F. 7.4.3.4 Other Accidents.

F. 7.4.3 .2. 7 Wind·driven Missile Impact on Storage Casks. It is likely there would be

no fatal ities to workers from radiological consequ ences . This is because there usually would be no
nearby workers except fo r brief periods when a container is being placed in the dry storage array .
Since a wind.<Jriven miss ile is not expected to penetrate a dry storage container, direct radiation

F. 7.4.3.4. 7 HEPA Filter Fire. No fatalities would be expected among nearby workers

from the radiological consequences of a fire in a HEPA filter. This is because HEPA filters are not
located in an area where workers are likely to be working. In addition, the release of radioactivity
invol ved in a HEPA filter fire is not large.

exposures even to nearby workers would not be expected . The conta iner seal could be breached and
some airborne products released . At most, two or three nearby workers may receive some radiation
exposure from inbalation of airborne radioactivity .

F.7.4 .3.4.2 Small Leaks from Water Pools. No fataliti es are expected among nearby

workers from the radiological consequences of a small leak from a water pool. The leak would be
expected to be into the ground through the water pathway. Drinking water supplies would not be

F.7.4.3.2.2 Airplane Crash into Dry Storage. It is not likely that any fataliti es would

immediately impacted . In addition, the typical concentration of radioactivity in the water is low.

occur to nearb y workers due to the radiological consequ ences of this accident. As in Section
F. I .4.3.2. 1 above. workers are usually not in the dry storage array except when a container is being

F. 7.4.4 Evaluation of Shipboard Fire Involving Shipping Containers.

placed into the array. At most, two or three nearby workers might receive significant radiation
exposure from inbalation of airborne radioactivity s ince the container seal may be breached. The low
probab ility of the airplane crash itself. coupled with the probability that workers would be close

F. 7.4.4 . 7 Description of Conditions. In this hypothetical accident scenario, a fire

onboard a ship that is transporting naval spent nuclear fuel in shipping containers from Pearl Harbor

enough to be affected, coupled with the probability th at the wind would be blowing in the direction of

to Puget Sound is postul ated . This accident could be initiated by a collision with another ship. The

the workers. makes it very unlikely th at any worker would receive substantial radiation exposure.

collision and subsequent fire are postul ated to occur in Puget Sound in the center of the shipping lane
at a distance of approximately 2 miles from Seattle. The consequences of a similar accident at Pearl

F. 7.4 .3. 3 Dry Cell Operations.

Harbor would be less because of the smaller population and the fact that Pearl Harbor is a restricted
area and is very close to the sea on the south side, limiting the number of people who might be

F. 7.4 .3 . 3 . 7 Inadvertent Cutting into Fuel or Mechanical Damage. No fatal ities to

workers would be expected from the radiological consequences of this accident. This is because the

ex posed . Th is section addresses the rad iological consequ ences of this postulated accident scenario.
The tox ic chemical consequences related to th e burning fu el oil aTe presented in Section F .2.4.2.2.

ventilation systems' exhaust from a dry cell is di rected to the outside of the building in which a dry
cell is constru cted and away from nearby workers.

During shipment, the cont ainers are well protected fro m direct mechani cal damage should a
ship coll ision occur. The ru gged nature of the shippi ng cont ainer and the naval reactor 's fuel system

F. 7.4. 3. 3.2 Partial Loss of Shielding of a Dry Cell. It is li kely th at no fatalities would

is de monstrated by the analys is of airp lane crashes which showed th at a jet engi ne rotor wou ld not

occur among nearby workers from he radiologicai consequences of this accident. This is because

penetrate the conta iner or rupture the fuel. A severe fi re is necessary to potent iall y cause fai lure of

there is still substantial shielding of radiation fro m material inside th e cell eve n wi th the assumed

the container seals and overheat the spe nt fuel suffiCientl y to release fiss io n products. Co ll is ions of

5(}.percent loss of the high.<Jensity concrete. How.ver. one or twu nearby workers may receive some

this severity are extremely unlikely. During the hypotheti cal accident, the fire would need to burn

exposu re from radiatio n streaming through a crac k in the dry cell if th is is the mode of fai lure.

intensely in the hold for several hours to cause release of fission products or corrosion products to the

Workers are trai ned to evacuate quickly when rad iation alarms sound .

en vironment .
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F. 1.4.4 .2 Source Term. Conditions used in developing the source term are as follows:

F. 1.4 .4.3 Results. The following table summarizes the public health risk to the general
population that would result from the hypothetical shipboard fire accident . The number of fatal

•
•

Ten percent of all fuel unit cladding inside of two shipping containers is ruptured and

cancers would be expected to occur over a 50· year period . "Risk" is defined as the number of fatal

the contained fission products are available to be released from the fuel units.

cancers times the probability of occurrence.

Of the available fission products. 100 % of the noble gases. 3 % of the halogens. 1. 1%

The probability of occurrence of this hypothetical shipping accident is 6.7 x 10" per year or

of the cesium. and O. I % of the remaining solid fission products are assumed to be

less. and was obtained as follows. The probability of a single pon entry accident is 1.6 x let<

released to the container.

(DOE 1994). The probability of a fire. given the occurrence of an accident. is 8 x 10" (DOE. 1994).
Combining these two probabilities with the pon entry frequency of 21 naval spent nuclear fuel

•

Ten percent of all fission products released to the container are released to the
environment and the remainder are adherent on the fu el and cask surfaces .

shipments spread over 40 years results in a probability of 6.7 x 10" per year. Due to the rugged
nature of the naval fuel and likely effectiveness of fire fighting over a several hour period. the
probability of fission product release to the environment would be even less .

•

Ten percent of the original corrosion products from the fuel units are released from
DOE guidance (DOE 1993b) provides that the consequence of an accident which has a

the cask to the environment.

probability of occurrence of less than I x 10" per year need not be calculated . However. in view of

•

The following amount of radionucl ides could be released to the environment . This
listing includes nuclides from one container that result in at least 99% of the possible

interest in th is accident expressed in several public comments. the foll owing table is provided listing
both the consequence and the risk.

exposu re .
Sh ipboard Fire Involving Shipping Containers

~

~

Cs·134

2.57 x 10'

Cs·137

3.56 x 10'

Pu·238

5.90 x 10"

Ba· 137M

3.07

Sr'9O

3.12

In Puget
Sound Shipping
Lane

50% Meteorology

95 % Meteo rology
Likelihood of
Fatal Cancer

Total EDE
(Rem)
9.3 x 10"

4.7 x 10"

1.8

9 .2 x let<

General
Population
with in 50-mile
Radius

Exposure
(perso n· Rem)

Numher of
Fatal Cancers

Exposure
(person-Rem)

Number of
Fatal Cancers

2.27 x 10'

11.4

1.03 x 10'

51.5

Risk per year

Likelihood of
Fatal Cancer

Total EDE
(Rem)

Maximall y
Exposed Off·
site Individual
(MOl)

7.6 x 10"

3.5 x 10"

Ce- l44

7. 17

Nb·95

4.37

The risk fo r this hypothetical accide nt is slightly lower th an that fo r the most severe facility accident

Y·9O

3. 12

anal yzed at Puget Sound .

Ru·l 06

6. 11 x 10"
For the hypothetiCal shipboard ti re accident. the radioacd ve plu me might cause contamination to a
downwind distance of less th an I mile . However. s ince this area is entirely over water. the
contamination woul d be quickly diluted by tidal fl ow anJ turbulence.
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F.1.S Analysis of Uncertainties

F. 7.5. 7 Probabilities of Events. The probabil ity that an accident might occur has been determined
for a number of events which might reasonably be postulated. These probabilities are used in this

The analyses of the impacts of normal operations and hypothetical accidents associated with
management of naval spent nuclear fuel presented in this Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) are

appendix to calculate the risk. defined as the product of the probability times the consequences, for
each postulated accident.

based on conservative calculations. This is necessary because virtually all of the events analyzed have
never occurred and most of the impacts of routine operations are so small that they cannot be

The best methods available have been used to estimate the probabilities for the events selected

measured. The use of calculations introduces the possibility that the actual impacts may differ from

for analysis. For example, a methodology developed by Sandia Laboratories (Sandia 1983) was used

those calculated due to various kinds of uncertainties, such as differences between actual behavior and

to compute the probability that an aircraft might crash into naval spent nuclear fuel facilities. This

the theoretical models or equations and the variability of the values of factors used in the calculations.

method uses actual aircraft crash statistics obtained from the Federal Aviation Administration and was

In order to ponray the effects of such variability and uncenainty, the analyses performed for this

developed by Sandia to reproduce the observed frequencies as closely as possible. Probabilities for

appendix have been divided into four components: the probability that an event. such as an accident,

seismic events were derived from published studies of the frequencies of seismic activity and

could occur; the amount of rad ioactive material or radiation that might be released by the event; the

represent the best available estimates, but these probabilities are subject to some uncenainty due to the

calculation of the potential fo r exposure to human beings from the release; and the conversion of the

relatively few events which have occurred at the sites eval uated under the alternatives in this EIS .

radiation exposure to detrimental health effects . Each of these components is discussed separately in
the following sections for both routine operatior.s and accidents.

The probabilities of a range of accidents which might be caused by human error have also
been included . Such events include accidental criticality caused by handling errors, dropping of fuel

Each of these components has been analyzed for both routine operations and accidents . The
discussion in the following sections focuses on accident analyses, but it should be understood that the

modules, improper operation of cranes, and incorrectly performing machining procedures. For
human error, a probability of one error in one thousand operations (a frequency of 10"' events per

analysis of uncertainties for routine operations is the same, with a few exceptions . First, routine

year) is used for operations performed by a single trained operator following a written procedure. If

operations are cenain to occur, so the "probability" of such events is effectively 1.0. Second . the

the procedure requires verification of the action by a second trained operator, this frequency is

source terms used for the analyses of routine operations are based on monitoring of current operations

lowered to I<t'. These probabilities are derived from the methodology used by the Nuclear Regulato-

at Naval Nuclear Propu lsion Program facilities such as the Expended Core Facility at INEL.

ry Commission for assessment of human reliability (Swain 1983).

Consequently. the estimates of the amount of rad iation or radioactivity involved are ex pected to be
close to those which might actuall y occur und er the alternatives evaluated in this EIS . It is possible

In many instances, the probabilities assigned to the events reflect the likelihood that a

that there would be some variatio ns among faci lities and that future effons to keep exposures to

panicular event. such as an earthqu ake or an aircraft crash . might occur. However. for the purpose

workers as low as reasonably achievable mi ght reduce the source terms further . but the values used in

of the analyses, the resulting accident was assumed to have quite severe consequences. The

the analyses in this EIS are expected to be little different from those actually encountered . The

probability of such severe consequ ences is smaller th an the probability th at the initiating event might

effects of routine operations and accidents have been calculated using similar analytical methods and

occur, with consequences as severe as used in the analyses possibly occurring only one time in 10 or

models for determination of radi onuclide movement in th e envi ronment, pathways to humans. and

100 occurrences of the initiating eve nt. The probabilities for most of the analyses in this appendix

conversion of exposu re to health effects. Therefore. the discussion of uncenainties in Sections

used only the probability of the initi ating event and did not include the further reduction in the

F. I .S.3 and F. I .S.4 app lies to the resu lts of analyses of rou tine operations, as well as to postulated

probability of the postulated severe consequences resulting f:om the severity used . This was done, in

accidents.

pan, because the severe consequences ass um ed . and in some cases the initiati ng events themselves.
occur very infreq uentl y, or have neve r occu rred . so little data on their frequency is ava il ab le.
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For example. one accident analyzed is the impact on a spent fuel container of a missile
produced by a tornado or other high winds. The sequence of events analyzed included breaching the

evaluation of all of the alternatives considered and all of the risks are small, so the approach used is
adequate for the purposes of this EIS .

container seal in order to release radioactive material . In reality. the missile would have to be large
enough and traveling at high enough speed to cause the postulated damage. Similarly, it would have

F.7.5.2 Release of Radioactive Material or Radiation (Source Term). Since the source terms

to contact the container at the correct location and at the correct angle in order to damage the seal.

used in the accident analyses are typically for accidents which have never occurred, there is greater

The probability assigned to this accident is 10" per year, the probability that a wind-driven missile

room for uncertainty . All of the accidents analyzed in this EIS are intended to be accidents which

might strike a container. and does not include any factor to account for other elements in the sequence

produce consequences which are unlikely to be exceeded by any reasonably foreseeable accident. As

required to actually damage the seal . Therefore. the probability of the consequences calculated for

a result, the accidents themselves and the sequences of events during the accidents have been chosen

this accident would be much smaller than the probability of 10" per year used in the analysis .

to maximize the source term. For example, systems such as high effiCiency particulate filters have
been considered to be inoperative in all cases where the accident might have an opportunity to disable

A second example is provided by the analysis of aircraft impact on shipping containers used

them .

for storage of naval spent nuclear fuel. In this accident analysis, the impact was assumed to cause a
shipping container to be penetrated if the contai ner were contacted by the aircraft . However, naval

The source terms for the hypothetical accident analyses are dependent upon a number of

spent nuclear fuel shipping containers are of very rugged design. and structural analysis of the

factors . For there to be an accidental release of radioactivity to the environment, there must be

container showed that a naval shipping container is very unlikely to be penetrated by an aircraft crash,

damage to the storage facility or containment structure. Furthermore, naval spent nuclear fuel must

even by the hardest parts of the airplane . Consequently . the probability that the naval spent nuclear

be damaged as well in order for there to be any release of fission products since all fission products

fuel could be damaged and that fission products might be released is much. much less than the crash

are fully contained within naval nuclear fuel. The amount of damage to the external containment or

probability alone, which is the probability assigned to these consequences in this appendix .

the fuel is dependent upon the severity and the nature of the accident. In the accidents analyzed,
there are assumptions concerning the containment or the extent of damage to the fuel units which

A third example is seen in the ship fire accident. In this analysis, it is assumed that if a ship
carrying naval spent nuclear fuel shipping containers were involved in a very severe collision and a

were made to provide a conservative, bounding evaluation whose results would not be exceeded by
reasonably postulated accidents of a similar type.

fire occurred . the fire would include the cargo hold where the naval spent nuclear fuel containers are
carried. the fire would not be extinguished hy the redundant systems provided . and it would burn long
enough at sufficient intensity to damage the shipping container and the spent nuclear fuel inside and

One example of this is the evaluation of the dry storage container impacted by a wind-driven
missile . Damage to the container by the missile is not expected to occur, but for the analysis in this

cause release of radioactive materials from the containment provided . Given that a severe collision

EIS, the seal is assumed to be damaged by the missile impact and corrosion products within the

occurred . the probability that all of the necessary conditions would occur and a fire of the required

contai ner are assumed to be released through the damaged seal. The uncertai nty on the resultant

intensity and duration would occur in the cargo hold is clearly far less than the probability of the

release is one-sided since the probability of a release larger than in the calculation (resulti ng in a

collision.

higher calculated dose) is essentially zero while the possibility of a release of less radioactive material
is large (for example, no release if the container seal is not broken) . The range of variation. or the

As can be see from these examples. the actual prohability of the cunsequences result ing from

uncertainty interval , in the source term for this accident is between +0% and · 100 %.

the analyses are smaller than the values presented in this appendix , at least in part because these
probabilities do not incl ude an additional factor to refl ect the accident severity used in the anal yses.

Another example is the plane crash into a dry processing facility for naval spent nucl ear fuel.

As a result, the risks stated in this appe ndi x for most acc idents are believed to be at least 10 to 100

The dry processing facility includes a thick concrete shielded cell in whic h a few naval spent nuclear

times larger than what would actually occur. However. the same probabilities have been used in the

fuel units are processed at a time. The mass ive concrete shield is provided to protect operating
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personnel from radiation but it has the secondary benefit of protecting the fuel units being processed
from missiles caused by natural or man-made phenomena. In the unlikely event that an airplane
crashed into the facility, it is expected that no damage to the spent fuel would result . Even so, for
evaluation of this accident in this EIS , it is assumed that I % of the fuel in the dry cell could be
damaged and that sufficient jet fuel could enter the dry cell to cause a fire which could cause the
release of fission products from the damaged fuel and destroy the filtration system . Again, the

conditions and for the worst case are provided in detailed tables in this attachment and show that the
worst case meteorological conditions produce exposure estimates which are 2 to 10 times higher than
those for the most likely conditions (depending upon local meteorological conditions). Overall , the
net effect is that the Gaussian plume model might introduce an uncenainty of a factor of 5 or less in
either direction, but the use of the worst case meteorological conditions would essentially offset any
underestimation of effects.

uncenainty range is one-sided since no damage to fuel is expected, causing the variability or
uncenainty to range from +0% to -100% .

The direct radiation from the cloud is calculated using a conservative representation of the
plume as a finite cloud, and , as a result, little uncenainty is introduced in this pan of the analysis .

All of the source terms used for the evaluation of the accidents were developed in a similar
fashion . Thus, the expected outcome for all of the accidents is that a lower rel ease to the environment is expected than is used in the analysis, representing a range of variation of +0% to -100%.

Direct radiation from contamination which results from panicles from the plume deposited on the
ground surface depends upon the deposition parameters which are input as best-estimate values.
Faster deposition would result in more material on the ground and increased exposure to those closer
to the accident location but less material on the ground and decreased exposure for those farther from

F. 1.S. 3 Exposure to Humans. Exposure to the individuals and the general population is evaluated

by integrated computer programs. The methods used model the movement of airborne, ground , and

the accident site. Any effects of uncertainty in this parameter would depend upon the population
distribution around the postulated accident scene.

water contamination resulting from the postulated release using five types of pathways to the
population. These pathways include exposure directly to the radiation from the material in the plume,
direct exposure to radiation from contaminated sailor water, inhalation of air containing gases or
panicles, and ingestion of contaminated water or food. The analyses in this appendix used parameter
values which were the best available estimates or, when best estimate values were not available, are

conservative.

The possible exposure to direct radiation from material in surface water and associated
sediments as a result of accidental release directly to the water or fallout from an airborne release was
estimated for people involved in activities such as professional fishing, maritime operations,
swimmio&, and boating. The calculations took no credit for dilution by river currents or tidal
movement and the concentrations in the air were not reduced by the amount of material deposited in
the water. Due to the conservative concentrations used in the calculations and an assumption that

The Gaussian plume model used in these analyses to represent airborne movement of
rad ioactive material is the standard used in virtually all eval uations of environmental effects.

every member of the popul ation in the area would be exposed to direct radiation from surface waters,
exposure from this pathway is very likely overestimated.

Comparison of distributions calculated using the Gaussian plume model with test data has shown that
the results may differ by as much as a factor of 5 in some circumstances. In o rder to ensure that
exposures would be as high as could occur under any set of conditions, in most of the analyses a
ground level release was used and no reduction in the airborne concentrations was included for either
turbulence caused by buildi ngs or the effect of wi nd meand er which occurs naturally at the low wind
speeds accompanying the worst case meteorological conditio ns.

One intentio nal choice of parameters to ensu re that the results would be conservative is the
use of the worst case meteorological conditio ns in the tabulations of the ris ks and consequences for all
alternatives provided in Chapters 3 and 5. The results for both the most likely meteorological
Volume I, Appendix D
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The inhalation pathway evaluation is based on average breathing rates and uptake consistent
with the recommendations by the ICRP (ICRP 1977 and ICRP 1979). Obviousl y, higher values for
these parameters would increase the estimated exposures and lower values would decrease the
estimates. There appears to be little controversy concerning these parameters and the same parameters are used for evaluat ion of all of the altern ati ves in this appendix .

The ingestion pathway includes meat, seafood, dairy and crop products, and drinking water.
Best-estimate parameters are used to evaluate the contamination levels in food and water when ready
for consumpt ion . Consumption rates for individuals are based on observed eating habits. The
F-191

Volume I , Appendix D

analysis also includes the assumption that a conservative 10% of the entire di et of the affected

calculations to the evaluation of the dose to the population. The population data used were obtained

population consists of contaminated products . The uncertainties associated with these pathways can

from the 1990 U. S. census, so population growth or decreases in a region could introduce small

obviously affect the estimated impacts, but the range of variation is not large and the same values for

changes, but the same population distributions were used for a specific site for evaluation of all

a given site were used for eval uation of all alternatives.

alternatives.

The drinking water contribution to the ingestion pathway was calculated by assuming that a
portion of the radioactive material would become dissolved in the drinking water suppl y. At sites

Considering all of the factors wh ich might have an appreciable effect on the results of the
analyses , any tendency of the Gaussian plume model to underestimate concentrations would be offset

where fresh surface water provides drinking water, any contamination of the water was assumed to

by the use of other parameters which are known to be conservative. Examples of such conservative

occur promptly and no decreases due to radioactive decay were used . At sites where aquifers are a

factors include the general use of the meteorological conditions which would produce the most severe

source of drinking water, consumption of water from the aquifer was delayed for the time required

effects and the use of the entire population of a 22.5-<1egree sector. Consequently, this portion of the

for the contamination to reach the aqui fer and then to reach the nearest drinking water source. As an

analyses would appear to contribute linle in the way of uncertainty which could cause the results to be

example, for a postul ated leak from the Expended Core Facility, it was assumed that 20 years would

greater than presented in this appendix .

pass before water carrying the radioacti ve material would reach a well drawing from the aquifer and
that I percent of material released would enter the aquifer each year. Maximum exposed individuals

F.7 .5.4 Conversion of Exposure to Health Effects. The conversion of amounts of radiation or

were conservatively assumed to drink only water from the contaminated source and to drink 2 liters

radioactive material trans mined to an individual or to population groups requires the calculation of the

of water per day. For the population in general, a conservative fraction of the population was

exposure or dose received by humans caused by inhaling or ingesting rad ioactive material or by being

assumed to drink I li ter of water per day from affected sources. The concentrations in these

in a radiation field. Such calcul ations are based on a number of factors , including the nature and rate

calculations are considered to be higher th an expected because no reduction of the concentration by

of human metabolic processes, such as resp iration o r excretion, the type of radiation involved, the

dilution was included and the fraction of the population exposed to the affected drinking water is

sensitivity of various organs, and the age of the individuals involved . The rates of human metabolic

conservatively high .

processes are well characterized at this time and the energies, half-l ives, and similar properties of
radioactive material or radiation have been measured extensively and are not subject to great debate.

At sites where irrigation is used, contamination of food crops, livestock, and local game was

Consequently, these factors introduce linle uncertainty into the calculations in this EIS .

analyzed . The same concentration of rad ioactive material as in drinking water was used in the
irrigation water. Affected crop;, livestock, and game were assu med to receive all water from the
contaminated water source and applicable biological accum ul ation factors were used . Human

However , the number of detri mental health effects which might result fro m exposure of a
large group of people to low levels of radiation has been the subject of debate for many years. The

consumption rates for the crops, livestock, and game were used to calculate the exposu re from this

National Acade my of Sciences has condu cted several investigations of this maner and its full

source. The uncertainty from this source is assoc iated with the concentration of contaminants in the

commentary on page 181 of its latest study of the health effects of exposure to low levels of radiation,

irrigation water, the amount of such foods consumed , and the fractio n of the popul ation which ingests

frequently identified as BEIR V (NAS 1990), states:

the affected food .
Finall y, it must be recognized that derivation of risk estimates for low doses and dose rates
The population used to determine the effects of postulated accidents in this appendix is the

through the use of any type of risk model involves assu mptions that remain to be validated .

entire population within the 22 .5-<1egree sector at each distance within 50 miles downwind of the

"'t low doses, a model depe ndent interpolati on is involved between the spontaneous incidence

accident. The spread of the plume for the worst case meteorology does not cover the entire sector.

and the incidence at the lowest doses for which data are available. Si nce the comminee' s

The result is that there is a conservatism of more than a factor of 2 in the application of the

preferred risk models are a linear function of dose. linle uncertainty should be introduced on
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this account. but depanure from linearity cannot be excluded at low doses below the range of

F.1.S.S Summary of Uncertainties. As discussed in the preceding ponions of this section. the

observation. Such depanures could be in the direction of either an increased or decreased

calculations in this EIS have generally been performed in such a way that the estimates of risk

risk. Moreover. epidemiologic data cannot rigorously exclude the existence of a threshold in

provided are unlikely to be exceeded during either normal operations or in the event of an accident.

the millisieven dose range. Thus. the possibility that there may be no risks from exposures

For routine operations. the results of monitoring of actual operations provide clearly realistic source

comparable to ex .. rnal natural background radiation cannot be ruled out. At such low dose

terms. which. when combined with conservative estimates of the effects of radiation. produce

rates. it must be acknowledged that th e lower limit of the range of uncenainty in the risk

estimates of risk which are very unlikely to be exceeded. The effects for all alternatives have been

estimates extends to zero.

calculated using the same source terms and other factors . so this EIS provides an appropriate means
of comparing potential impacts on human health and the environment.

The National Academy of Sciences considers that the uncenainty in the lifetime total excess cancer
monality risk estimates calculated using the linear extrapolation. no threshold models it has designated

The analysp.s of hypothetical accidents provide more opponunities for uncenainty. primarily

as preferred. which is consistent with the model used in this EIS . is approximately a factor of 2 in

because the calculations must be based on sequences of events and models of effects which have not

either direction (an interval of 0.5 to 2 times the calculated estimates).

occurred . In this appendix. the goal in selecting the hypothetical accidents analyzed has been to
evaluate events which would produce effects which would be as severe or more severe than any other

The calculations of health effects performed in this Environmental Impact Statement use the

accidents which might reasonably be postulated. The models have attempted to provide estimates of

relation recommended by the International Council on Radiation Protection because it is well-

the probabilitip.<; . source terms. pathways for dispersion and exposure. and the effects on human health

documented and kept up to date by the Council. It is also consistent with the preferred model

and the environment which are as realistic as possible. However. in many cases, the very low

identified by the National Academy of Sciences in the BEIR V repon and is widely accepted by the

probability of the accidents postulated has required the use of models or values for input which

scientific community as representing a method which produces e.<timates of health effects which will

produce estimates of consequences and risks which are higher than would actually occur because of

not be exceeded. However. there are some who bel ieve that exposure to low levels of radiation can

the desire to provide results which will not be exceeded . In summary. it is judged that the risks

produce more health effects than would be estimated using the International Council on Radiation

presented in this appendix are believed to be at least \0 to 100 times larger than what would actually

Protection relat ion. On the oth er hand . a growing number of researchers believe that the International

occur .

Council on Radiat io n Protectio n relation overestimates the number of detrimental health effects
produced by low levels of rad iation and . in fac t. the possibility of no effect cannot be excluded
(CIRRPC 1992).

The use of conservative analyses is not an imponant problem or disad vantage in this EIS since
all of the alternatives have been evaluated using the same methods and data. allowing a fair co mparison of all of th e alternatives on the same basis. Funbermore. even using th ese conservative analytical

Clearly. using a relation developed by one or the other of th ese groups would produce a
larger or smaller estimate of th e number of heal th effects th an th e values presented in this EIS . but a

meth ods. th e risks for all of th e altern atives are small , which greatl y reduces the Significance of any
uncenai nty analysis parameters .

factor of 2 change in th e smal l risks cal cul ated for all of the alternatives would still leave them as
small risks . All of the resul ts of analyses of normal operatio ns and hypoth eti cal accidents in
Appendix 0 include the calculated exposure in add ition to th e number of health effects in order to
permit independent calculations usi ng any relation betwee n rad iatio n ex posure and health effects
judged appropriate.
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F.2 TOXIC CHEMICAL ISSUES AT NAVAL SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL

Table F.2-1. INEL-ECF chemical inventory.

EXAMINATION AND STORAGE SITES
CAS No.

Chemical Name

The INEL· ECF is a large laboratory facility used to receive, exam ine, and ship naval nuclear
fuel and irradiated test specimen assemblies. In order to accompl ish these tas ks, some chemicals

Chemicals Used for Water Pool Operatio ns

classified as toxic are involved in a variety of operations and thus a potential ex ists for releases of

60-00-4

toxic chem icals due to human error and failure or malfunctioning of equ ipment.

75-71 -8

Ethylenediaminetetraacetic Acid (EDTA)
(reagent for water analyses)
Dichlorodifluoromethane (CFC-12)
(refrigerant in coolers for pool water)

Weight
Total
(oounds)

Weight
Unit'
(oounds)

46.3

1.1

30.0

30.0

5.7
100.6
65.5
198.0
3.7
2.8
643

5.7
6.6
3.3
99.0
1.8
0.28
125

This section provides the resul ts of an evaluation of both normal operations and accidents that
could result in toxic chemical rel eases. This section describes how fac ilities and operations were
selected for anal ysis, discusses the computer codes used in the analys is. presents the weather

Chemicals Used for Examination Coerati ons
60-29-7
67~3-{}

cond itions and atmospheric dispersion. defi nes the hypotheti cal accidents which would prod uce the
most severe consequences, and estimates the potent ial health effects . Each altern ate location's specific
population and meteorology were used to produce estimated consequences for each operati on and
accident .

123-31 -9
144-55-8
302-{}1-2
7664-41 -7
7727-37-9

Eth yl Ether
Isopropyl Alcohol
Hydroqu inone (photographic film developer)
Sodium Bicarbonate
Hydrazine

Ammonia'2
Diatomic Nitrogen

Chemicals Used for Fac ility Suppon

F.2.1 Toxic Chemical Inventory
Some chemicals classified as toxic are routinely used in a variety of operatio ns at the

107-21- 1
115-{}7-1
13 10-73-2
7664-93-9

INEL-EC F. Table F.2-1 prov ides the INEL-ECF Chemical Inventory. Th is inventory wa.<
developed from the Naval Reactors Fac il ity Superfu nd Amendments and Reauth orization Act (SARA)
Section 312 chemical inventory (INEL 1993). Those chemicals specificall y stored and used at
INEL-ECF as well as those used for fac il ity suppo n (e.g .. fuel o il , di esel fuel. sulfuric ac id , and

68476-33-5
68476-34~

72623-83-7

Ethylene Gl ycol (anti-freeze and paint additive)
Propylene (Propene)
Sodi um Hydroxide (bo iler water pH control)
Sulfuric Acid
(boiler and cooling tower water pH control)
Fuel Oil #5
Diesel Fuel #2
H ydrotreated Lu bricating Oil

516. 1

om

43260
96427
7762 10
14316
882.6

514.0
0.005
43260
96427
204270
10735
4 13

Chemical Used for Nuclear Po ison

sodium hydrox ide) were included . Chemicals at INE L-ECF th at were (a) in excess of 500 pounds, or
(b) in excess of reponable quantit ies (usually I pound) on the EPA T itl e '" List of Li m (EPA 1992a)

I 332-77-{}

Potassium Tetraborate

17000

10

were eval uated . The chemicals in the EPA Title '" List of Lists are the hazardous chemicals defined
in:
I

•

SARA Sect io n 302 Extremely Hazardous Substances (CFR 1992a)

•

CERCLA Hazardous Substances (CFR 1992b)

•

SARA Section 313 Toxic Che micals (CFR 1Y92c)

•

RCRA Hazardous Wastes (CFR 1992d)

•

EPA list of 100 extremely hazardous chemicals (F R 1993).
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The quantities in this column represent the amount of chemi cal stored in the largest single contai ner as
identified in the INEL-ECF chemi cal invt:ntory.
The ammonia is present as ammonium hydroxide.
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In order to evaluate the alternate locations, the same inventory of chemicals at the INEL-ECF
was used at the DOE sites; namely, the Savannah River Site. the Hanford Site. the Nevada Test Site.
and the Oak Ridge Reservation. In addition , th e Barnwell Nuclear Fuel Plant (hereafter referred to as
the Barnwell Plant). which is adjacent to the Savannah River Site. was evaluated along with the DOE
sites . Since the shipyards would not be involved with examination operations (except for Puget
Sound). of the chemicals listed, only diesel fuel would be available in a substantial quantity, in the
form of fuel stored at the shipyards. Although several of the chemicals listed in Table F .2-1 are
water treatment chemicals associated with water pool operations and small water pools may be needed
at the shipyards for fuel storage and inspection, the shipyard would already have on-hand similar

water treatment chemicals for other operations at the shipyard. Therefore, an increase in the
quantities or types of chemicals at the shipyards was considered to be very small and thus did not
require evaluation. In addition. eve n though the Kenneth A. Kesselring Site is not a shipyard , this
f.cility would also not be involved with exami nation operations. Therefore, this facility was
evaluated in the same manner as the shipyards.

F.2.2 Computer Modeling to Estimate Toxic Chemical Exposures
Factors such as locations of affected persons. terrain. meteorological conditions, release
condit io ns, and characteristics of the chemical inventory are requi red as input parameters for
calculations to determine human exposure from airborne rel eases of tox ic chemicals. This section
descri bes the computer models used to perform exposure estimates . Specific input parameters used in
the analyses are summarized in the appropriate su bsection for normal operations and accident
conditions. The EPlcode was used to eval uate toxic chemical releases resulting from accidents. and
the ISC2 code was used to evaluate releases fro m normal operations.

F.2 .2. 1

EPlcode~.

The Emergency Predicti on Informat io n Computer Code

(EP l code~)

is the

computer code chosen for estimating airborne concentrations result ing from most releases of toxic
chemicals (Homann 1988). Like RSAC . EPlcode uses the well-established Gauss ian Plume Model to
calculate the airborne toxic chemical co ncentrations usuall y at th e same downwind locations as RSA C.

Enter sun conditions

and wind speed EPlcode delermines

stability class

The EPlcode lib rary contai ns info rmation on over 600 toxic substances listed by the American
Conference o f Governmental Indust rial Hygie nists in the EPlcode Manual. EPlcode also allows use r
description of substances not incl ud ed in the library. A step-by-step flow chan of th e main EPlcode
features (u p to the output options) is shown in Figure F.2- 1.
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Figure F .2-1. Flow sheet for EPlcode (Homann 1988) .

F-199

Volume I , Appendix D

As shown in Figure F.2-1 , thl! I.:ontinuous release modds require specification of the source

As described in its user manual (Homann 1988), EPlcode also includes the following steps:

term as an ambient concentration and a release rate. For releases over a specific time interval (i.e ..
term releases). the user specifies the release duration and the total quantity of material released .

•

Treating a release as instantaneous vs. continuous depending upon the plume length at
the specific downwind location being considered

Area continuous and area term releases are useful in calculating the effects of a release from
pools of spilled volatile liquids. Th. us.r must enter the radius of the circle encompassing the spill

•

Correcting the concentration for sampling time

•

Adjusting the wind sp.ed for release height

•

Depleting the plume as a function of downwind distanc.

area. Also entered is the temperature of the pool and ambient temperature to establish release rate
from a liquid spill. An upwind virtual point source. which results in an initial lateral diffusion equal
to the effective radius of the area source. is used to model an area release.

By specifying a release quantity . release duration. and release area. the user effectively
proposes a release rate per unit spill ar.a. The release quantity is defined as a source term (Q) or
fraction of the material at risk. The concepts and defined terms are the sam. as for radiological

•

Adjusting the standard deviations of the crosswind and vertical concentrations for brief
releases.

calculations. EPlcode confirms that the volatility of the spilled substance can support such a release
rate . If the proposed release rate exceeds the saturation conditions at the rel ease temperature,
EPlcode calculates a low.r release rate and a corresponding longer r.lease time .

As oUlput, EPlcode can generate data plots of mean toxic chemical concentration (during a
specified averaging time) as a function of downwi nd distance. From these graphs and numerical
oUlput, the concentrations for the worker at 100 meters (330 feet) (the shortest distance for which

In calculating effecti ve release height, the actual plume height may not be the physical r.l.ase
height. e.g., the stack height. Plume rise can occur because of the velocity of a stack emission and

EPlcode calc ulates), for the nearest public access (NPA). for the maximum off-site individual (MOl),
and for nearby communities are determined and evaluated for health effects.

the temperature differential between the stack efflu.nt and the surrounding air. EPlcode calculates
both the momentum plume rise and the buoyant plume rise and chooses th e greater of the two results.
Since this .ffective incr.as. in r.lease height I.ads to lower co ncentrations at the ground lev.1. the
physical r.leas. heights were used to calculate the concentrations that the general public may b.
exposed to during accidental releases of toxic substances . This approach will always yield conserva-

EPlcode was selected as the computer code for release analysis of chemicals amenable to
Gaussian modeling after comparison with a number of codes. primarily CHARM and ARCHIE . It
was judged more applicable for this application than eith er the CHARM cod. or the comparable
ARCHIE code.

tive estimates .
F.2.2.2 ISC2 Code. The Industrial Source Complex (ISC2) model is a widely used. publicly
In th is application. the standard terrain cal culation of EPlcode is always used . Downwind
co ncentrat io ns were cal culated using both 95% and 50 % meteoro logical conditions (Section F. I .3.S) .
The elevat io n of the aff.cted p.rson is always ground I. vel (0 meters) and. as in RSAC-S. th e mixing
layer height is always 400 mete' s (1 320 feet). The deposition v. loc ities used (Sectio n F.2.4 .2. 1.3)
are somew hat d ifferent th an those of RSAC -S. but th ey are still co nservatively low.

ava ilable, and accepted EPA regulatory model which employs straight lin. (i .... uniform wind field)
Gaussian diffusion to estimate pollutant dispersio n (EPA 1992b). ICS2 is an app rop ri ate model fo r
industrial complexes in rural or urban areas with transport distances less than SO kilometers
(30 miles). This model employs a standard meteorologi cal data set requiring single point hourly wind
speed . wind direction, ambient air temperature. atmospheri c stability, and vertical mixing height
values . Also. the ISC2 model is abl e 10 account for variations in pollutant concentrations due to the
influence of nearby structures .
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In addition to the ISC2 model. the MESOPUFF II model was also eval uated . MESOPUFF II

•

Exposure to concentrations greater than ERPG-2 values results in an unacceptable

is a regional (mesoscale) scale model th at takes into account a varying wind fi eld . Past trajectory

likelihood that one would experience or develop irreversible or other serious health

analyses at the INEL have demo nstrated th at plumes may undergo many changes in direction due to

effects, or symptoms that could impair one's ability to take protective action.

the varying winds common to the INEL vici nity. The number of changes is partially dependent on
rel«lSe time and transport duration . The plume transport and estimation of pollutant concentration

•

Exposure to concentrations greater than ERPG-3 values results in an unacceptable
likelihood that one would experience or develop life-threatening health effects.

beyond 12 miles (20 kilometers) is best modeled using spatially varying wind data. Although not
used as a basis for determining or enforcing compliance with regulations, it is used on a case-by-case
basis . The model is also read ily availahle to the puhlic.

Where ERPG values have not been derived for a toxic substance, other chemical toxicity
values are substituted, as follows :

Upon review of the ISC2 and MESOPUFF II models, the decision was made to utilize ISC2
for the dispersion analysis of pollutants emitted from stationary sources. ISC2 is able to reasonably

•

For ERPG-I, Threshold Limit Value, Time-Weighted Average (TLV-TWA) values

and accurately predict downwind pollutant concentrations within 30 miles (50 kilometers) by taking

(ACGIH 1993) are substituted: The TWA is the time-weighted average concentration for

into account multiple point and area emission sources, eval uating hourly meteorological data, and

a normal 8-hour workday and a 40-hour workweek, to which nearly all workers may be

determining the effects of nearby stru ctures.

repeatedly exposed, day after day, without adverse effect.

•

F.2.3 Health Effects

For ERPG-2 , Level of Concern values (equal to 0.1 of Immediately Dangerous to Life
or Health) are substituted : Level of Concern is defined as the concentration of a
hazardous substance in air, above which there may be serious irreversible health effects

Tox ic constituents dispersed during an acc ident could induce adverse health effects among

or death as a result of a single exposure for a relatively short period of time (EPA

exposed individuals. This possible impact is assessed by comparing the airborne concentrations of

1987).

each substance at specified downwind locations to standard accident exposure guidelines for chemical
toxicity .

•

For ERPG-3 , Immediately Dangerous to Life or Heal th (IDLH) values are substituted:
IDLH is defined as the maximum concentration from which a person could escape within

Where available. Emergency Respo nse Planning Guideline (ERPG ) values are used for this
comparison. ERPG values are estimates of airborne concentration thresholds above which one can

30 minutes without a respi rator and without experiencing any effects which would impair
the ability to escape or irreversible side effects (NIOSH 1990).

reasonably anticipate observing adverse effects (Rusch 1993). ERPG values are specific for each
substance. and are derived for each of three ge neral severity levels:

Possible health effects associated with exceeding an ERPG-2 or -3 value are specific fo r each
substance of concern , and must be characterized in that context. When concentrations are found to

•

Exposure to concentrations greater than ERPG- I values results in an unacceptable
likelihood that one would experi ence mild transient adverse health effects, or perception

exceed an ERPG or substitute value. the specific toxicological effects for the chemicals of concern are
considered in describing possible health effects associated with exceed ing a threshold value.

of a clearly defined objectionable odor.
ERPG values are based upon a I-hour exposure of a member of the general pop ul ation. In
this EIS. expos ures res ulting from the release of toxic chemicals during an accident condition were
postulated to occur over a period of I hour or less to allow for a direct comparison to the ERPG
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values. This approach provides an additional element of conservatism in the evaluation of accidents
F.2 .4.7 Normal Operations.

with releases that last much less than I hour.

F.2.4. 7. 7 Source of Emissions. Emissions resulting from normal operations involving

In addition to comparing the airborne concentrations of each substance to standard accident
exposure guidelines, each substance was evaluated to determine if it has the potential for future

tox ic chemicals listed in Table F.2-1 were evaluated. It was determined that the burning of Number 5

carcinogenic health impacts. If a particular substance has this potential, the Integrated Risk Informa-

fuel oil in the facility's boilers and the burning of Number 2 diesel fuel in the facility's emergency

tion System (IRIS) (TOXnet 1993) was reviewed and if sufficient toxicological information was

diesel generators represented the largest sources of emissions under normal operations and thus

available, a future potential likelihood of developing cancer was determined . If sufficient information

provide the conditions producing the most severe consequences for evaluation. These normal

from IRIS was not available, alternative evaluation methods, including comparison to ambient air

operations result in the release of oxides of nitrogen (90% nitric oxide and \0% nitrogen dioxide),

quality criteria, were substituted.

sulfur dioxide, particulates (PM-IO), lead, and volatile organic compounds (VOCs). The airborne
release of these chemicals was evaluated for effects on the on-site workers, MCW, NPA, and MOl.

The impact of normal operations was also evaluated . This impact was assessed by comparing
the airborne concentrations of each substance at specified downwind locations to the National Ambient
Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) assigned for each substance . NAAQS consist of national primary

The emissions that occur due to normal operations at the INEL-ECF were evaluated using the
ISC2 code. These releases were also used at the alternate locations (Hanford, Savannah River,

and secondary ambient air quality standards (CFR 1991 ). National primary ambient air quality

Nevada Test Site, Barnwell Plant, and Oak Ridge) for evaluation purposes . Heating boilers and

standards define levels of air quality which the EPA judges are necessary, with an adequate margin of

emergency diesel generato rs already exist at the alternate shipyard locations and thus selection of

safety, to protect the public health . National secondary ambient air quality standards define levels of

these alternate locations would not result in a measurable increase in emissions. Therefore, routine
releases from shipyard locations were not considered.

air quality which the EPA judges are necessary to protect the public welfare from any known or
anticipated adverse effects of a pollutant. As a result, the immediate as well as cumulative impact of
normal operations was evaluated by comparing the ai rborne concentrations of each substance to the

F.2.4 . 7.2 Conditions end Key Parameters.

NAAQS .
•

Number 5 fuel oil was burned in facility boilers for space heating .

•

Number 2 diesel fuel was burned in facility emergency diesel generators.

•

Source term was based on the INEL repon on routine yearl y releases (NRF 1993) which
included :

F.2.4 Analysis Description and Results
The analysis resul ts for both normal operations and accident conditions are reponed for each
location anal yzed . Detailed estimated concentrations and ERPG levels, expressed in milligrams per
cubic meter (mg/m'). are reponed in tabular form for a worker, maximally exposed collocated worker
(MCW), maxi mally exposed off-site ind ividual (MOl), and maximally exposed individual at the
nearest public access (NPA). A complete description of these individuals is provided in Section

•

1.02 tons per year of carhon monoxide released

•

9.04 tons per year of oxides of nitrogen released

•

33.7 tons per year of sulfur diox ide

•

1.54 tons per year of panicul ates

F. 1.3. 2.
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•

5 .86 x

10~

tons per year of lead

Carbon monoxide. The national primary ambient air quality standards for carbon mo noxide
are 10 mglm' for an 8-hour average co ncentration not to be exceeded more than once per year, and

•

•

0. 18 tons per year of volatile organic compounds.

Fony percent of the total boiler and emergency diesel generator use for the Naval

40 mglm' for a I -hour average concentration not to be exceeded more than once per year.

Sulrur oxides. The nat ional primary ambient air quality standards for sulfur oxides that are

Reactors Facility was attributed to the INEL-ECF.

measured as sulfur dioxide are 0.08 mglm' as an annual arithmetic mean and 0.365 mglm' as a

Three point sources (one representing boilers and two representing emergency diesel

ambient air quality standards are 1.3 mglm' as a maximum 3-hour concentration not to be exceeded

generators) were used .

more than once per year.

maximum 24-hour concentration not to be exceeded more than once per year. The national secondary
•

•

Stack diameters of 1.07 meters (3.5 fee!) for boilers and 0.305 meter (I foot) for
emergency diesel generators were used.

•

Stack gas exit velocities of 21.8 meters per second (72 feet per seco nd) for boilers and
44.2 meters per second (145 feet per second) for emergency diesel generators were used.

Nitrogen dioxide. The national primary and secondary ambient air quality standard for
nitrogen dioxide is O. I mglm' as an annual arithmetic mean.

Lead. The national primary and secondary ambient air quality standard for lead and its
compounds that are measured as elemental lead is 1.5 x 10" mglm' as a maximum arithmetic mean
averaged over a calendar quaner.

•

Stack gas exit temperatures of 505 °K for boilers and 794°K for emergency diesel
generators were used .

Particulate matter. The national primary and secondary ambient air quality standard for
paniculate matter is 0.05 mglm' as an annual arithmetic mean and 0 . 15 mglm' as a !'laximum

•

Worker concentrations were based on 16 sector polar grids. Other affected locations

24-hour concentrat ion.

were defined as discrete points.
A comparison of the downwind concentrations provided in Tables F.2.4. I-1 through -6 with
•

DOE site meteorological data were used for eval uat ions at the Naval Reactors Facility,

the NAAQS identified above indicates that no NAAQS is exceeded for normal operations.

Hanfo rd , Nevada Test Site, and Oak Ridge. Meteorological data from the closest
National Weather Service Station were used for evaluations at Savannah River and the
'1arnwell Plant.

F.2 .4 . 1. 3 Results. The airbo rne co ncentrations, averaged over the duration of each

exposure, were calculated by ISC2 for the wo rker, MCW, NPA, and MOl using no rmal meteorology .
Tables F .2.4. 1-1 through -6 list the dow nw ind co ncentrations at various locations . The airborne
concentrations were compared to respective NAAQS values where available. The NAAQS are as
follows:
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Table F.2.4.1-1. Summary of chemical concentrations for normal operations at the INEL Expended Core Facility.

<

2c:
3

CHEMICAL CONCENTRATIONS mg/m3

~

Worker
MCW
MOl
NPA

Carbon
Monoxide
4.6 x 10-'
3.7 x 1(J6
7.7 x 10. 1
7.7 x 10-

Sulfur
Dioxide
5.5 X 10-4
9.5 x Io-~
2.3 X 10-'
2.3 X 10-'

Nitric
Oxide
1.9 X 10-4
2.6 x IO-~
5.8 x 10-<>
5.8 X 10-<>

Nitrogen
Dioxide
2.1 X 10-'
2.9 x IO~
6.4 X 10- '
6.4 X 10- 1

Lead
9.0 X 10-11
2.0 X 10-9
< 1.0 X 10-9
< 1.0 xlO-il

VOC
1.9 X
8.5 X
1.6 X
1.6 x

10-'
10-7
10-1
10-

PM-IO
2.7 x 10-'
4.6 x 1(J6
I.l X 10-<>
I.l X 10-<>

Table F.2.4.1-2. Summary of chemical concentrations for normal operations at Hanford.

."
I
IV

o00

Worker
MCW
MOl (New ECF)*
MOl (FMEF)**
NPA

Carbon
Monoxide
2.9 x IO-~
1.6 X 10-'
1.0 x 10-<>
1.4 x 10-<>
1.3 x 10-<>

Sulfur
Dioxide
1.5 X 10-4
2.1 X 10-4
3.2 X 10-)
4.0 x IO-~
4.1 X 10-'

CHEMICAL
Nitric
Oxide
1.3 X 10-4
9.6 X 10-'
8.0 x 10-<>
1.1 x IO-~
1.0xlO-'

CONCENTRATIONS mg/m3
Nitrogen
Dioxide
Lead
1.0 x IO-~
3.0 X 10-11
1.1 X 10-'
5.0 X 10-11
8.9 x 101.0 X 10""
1.2 X 10-<>
1.0 X 10-11
I. I x 10-<>
1.0xlO-1I

VOC
I.l x

IO-~

4.7 X 10-6
2.0 x 10
3.0 X 10-7
2.6 X 10-'

PM-IO
1.4 x IO-~
1.5 X 10-'
1.5 x 10-<>
1.9 X 10-<>
1.9 x 10-<>

*MOI (New ECF) applies if spent fuel facility is constructed at the 200 Area on the Hanford Site.
**MOI (FMEF) applies if spent fuel facility is constructed at the Fuels and Materials Examination Facility.

Table F.2.4.1-3. Summary of chemical concentrations for normal operations at Savannah River.

Worker
MCW
MOl
NPA

Carbon
Monoxide
1.5 x IO-~
9.4 x 1(J6
1.8 x 1(J6
8.6 x 10-7

Sulfur
Dioxide
6.4 x IO-~
1.6 x 10-4
4.8 x IO-~
2.4 X 10-'

CHEMICAL CONCENTRATIONS mg/m3
Nitric
Nitrogen
Oxide
Dioxide
Lead
6.4 x IO-~
7. 1 x 1(J6
1.0 x 10-9
5.7 X 10-'
6.3 x 1(J6
3.0 x 10-9
1.3 x IO-~
1.0 x 10-9
1.4 x 1(J6
7
6.3 x 10-<>
7.0 X 10< 1.0 X 10-9

VOC
6.2 x
2.8 x
3.8 X
1.9 X

1(J6
1(J6
10-7
10-7

PM-IO
5.9 x 1Q-6
8.7 x 1Q-6
2.3 X 10-<>
1.1 X 10-<>

Table F.2.4.1-4. Summary of chemical concentrations for normal operations at the Nevada Test Site.

- Car
, bon
Worker
MCW
MOl

Monoxide
9.0 x lO-~
2.5 x lO-7
7.9 x lO-

Sulfur
Dioxide
3.6 x IQ-4
7.3 X lO-(I
2.3 x lO-'

CHEMICAL CONCENTRATIONS mg/mJ
Nitric
Nitrogen
Oxide
Dioxide
Lead
4.0 x lO-4
4.5 X lO-'
7.0 x 1(J9
1.9 X lO-(I
2.1xlO< 1.0 x 10-9
7
5.9 x lO-<>
6.6 X 10< 1.0 X 10-9

VOC
3.8 x lO-'
5.2 X 10-1
1.6 X 10-7

PM-lO
4.lxlO-'
3.5 X 10-'
1.1 x 1()-6

Table F.2.4.1-S. Summary of chemical concentrations for normal operations at Oak Ridge.

I Carbon
"TI
I

IV

~

Worker
MCW
MOl
NPA

Monoxide
6.4 x lO-'
1.6 x 10-<>
1.4 x 10-'
1.9 x 10-'

Sulfur
Dioxide
3.0 X lO-4
2.6 x 10-'
2.5 X 10-4
3.1 X 10-4

CHEMICAL CONCENTRATIONS mg/mJ
Nitric
Nitrogen
Oxide
Dioxide
Lead
2.8 X 10-4
5.0 X 10- 9
3.1 x 10-'
9.6 X 10-(1
1.1 x 10-<>
< 1.0 xlO-il
9.8 X 10-(1
4.0 X 10-9
8.8 x lO-'
l.l X 10-4
1.2 x 10-'
5.0 X lO-9

VOC
2.6 X lO-'
5.0 x 104.3 x 1Q-<I
5.6 x 10-<>

PM-IO
2.7 X 10-'
1.5 x lO-<>
1.4 X lO-'
1.7 x 10-'

Table F.2.4.1-6. Summary of chemical concentrations for normal operations at the Barnwell Plant.

<
2c::

3

~

Worker
MCW
MOl
NPA

Carbon
Monoxide
1.5 x 10-'
1.9 x 10-(1
5.9 x 10-6
5.9 x 10-6

Sulfur
Dioxide
6.5 X 10-'
4.7 x IO-~
1.4 X 10-4
1.4 X 10-4

CHEMICAL CONCENTRATIONS mg/mJ
Nitric
Nitrogen
Dioxide
Oxide
Lead
6.4 x lO-)
7.1 X 10-(1
1.0 x 1(J9
1.3 X 10-'
1.5 x 1()-6
1.0 X 10-9
2.0 x 10-'1
4.0 x 10-'
4.5 x 1()-6
s
4.5 X IO-<i
4.0 x IO2.0 X 10-9

VOC
6.2 x 10-<>
4.5 X 10-7
1.5 x 1Q-<I
1.5 x 1()-6

PM-lO
5.9 x 1()-6
2.3 X lO-6
7.0 X lO-(I
7.0 x 1()-6

F.2 .4 .2 Accidents. Spill age of chemicals with a subsequent fire was evaluated for the bounding

F. 2 .4. 2. 1 Chemica' Spil/and Fire.

accident involving toxic chemicals . The toxic chemical s that could be invo lved in th e postulated
accident are described in Section F.2 . 1. As was noted in that sectio n, th e extens ive listing of
chemicals provided in Table F .2- 1 would be appli cable o nly at sites involved with fuel examinatio n.

F.2 .4.2 . 1. 1 Accident Description. An accident might occur which caused toxic
chemicals to spill , dispersed powdered toxic chemicals, and accelerated the vaporization of the toxic

The bounding accident evaluated fo r spent nuclear fuel storage in water pools at shipyard locations

chemicals with a subsequent fire . The airborne release resulting from the involvement of the entire

was a diesel fuel spill and fire. A diesel fuel fire involving spent nuclear fuel shipping containers

available amount of the toxic chemicals was evaluated with respect to the on-site workers , MCW,

aboard a ship at sea in Puget Sound was al so evaluated .

NPA, and MOl.

Evaluation of the chemical spill with fire accident (excluding diesel fuel) at the alternate sites

F.2.4.2. 1.2 Source Term. The toxic chemicals involved in this hypothetical accident are

(INEL-ECF, Hanford, Savannah River , Nevada Test Site, Oak Ridge, and the Barnwell Plant) where

provided in Table F.2-1. The entire amount of the toxic chemical might be involved due to the

naval spent nuclear fue l examinatio ns may be conducted is presented in Section F.2 .4.2 . 1. Evaluation

catastrophic nature of this accident.

of J iesel fuel fires at shipyards and aboard ship in Puget Sound, as well as at INEL-ECF, Hanford ,
Savannah River, Nevada Test Site, Barnwell Plant, and Oak Ridge, is described in Section F .2.4 .2 .2 .

These accidents incorporate spillage of the entire amount of a given chemical accompanied by

F.2.4.2. 1.3 Conditions and Key Parameters.

(I)

Gases

•
•
•
•

a fire . The in itiating event might be, fo r example, an airplane crash or ship co llision . Such an
accident bounds si mpler chemical spills, such as handling accidents involving limited or unit (see
Table F .2-1 ) amounts of a chemical , wh ich were al so co nsidered . Consequently, only results for the
fire accident are provided. The analyses utilize meteo ro logical (see Section F. 1.3 .S) and demographic

100% of the gas was released to the atmosphere.
Release period was 10 minutes.
Release was a point source.
Deposition velocity was 0 . 1 centimeter per second .

parameters specific to the eval uated location.
(2)

Liquids

Th e toxic chemicals evalu ated in the accident analyses would be used and stored in a number

•

of different areas withi n the faci lity. Fuel o ils, sulfuri c acid , and sodium hydroxide would be

•

expected to be located outside facility buildings in storage tanks . Other chemicals used fo r facility

•
•

support and operation would likely be sto red in a variety of locations within facility buildings such as
tool rooms , laboratories, craft shops, equi pment roo ms, chemical mix ing areas, hot cells, and

100% o f the liquid was released to the atmosphere.
The liqu id was released inlo a poo l o f O. I-inch depth.
The liquid was at its bo iling point.
The release period was the lo nger of the calculated evaporatio n time o r 10

flammable cabinets . The probability of releasing all o r most of th ese chemi cals in a single accident

minutes .

•
•

such as an airplane crash would be quite low, less th an 10" per year, as supported in Sectio n F.3.S.
However, the probability of releasing an individual or limit ed number of chemi cal s is expected to be

Release area was equ al to the pool area.
Depos ition veloc ity was 0 . 1 centimeter per seco nd .

greater than this level and include a cons ideratio n o f sto rage locatio ns, types, s izes, and numbers of
containers, and types and frequencies of initiating eve nts . For acc id ents th at could result in a to xi c

(3)

Solids

chemical release, a probability of 5 x 10" per year (Ganti and Kras ner 1984) was co ns id ered to be a
reasonable upper level. This level was based o n th e probabil ity th at a stru cturall y damaging industrial
fire could occur.
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•
•

I % of th e solid was dis persed into th e atmosphere as PM- IO.
Release period was 10 mi nutes.
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•
•

•

Release was a point source.
Deposition velocity was 1.0 centiml!ter per seC(lnd .

To determine health impacts, the estimated concentrations were compared
against the Emergency Response Planning Guidelines (ERPG) levels I, 2, and 3
concentration limits or alternates.

(4)

•

Specific Chemicals

To determine the likelihood of developing cancer from exposure to hydrazine, a
slope factor of 1.7 x 10' per mg/kg-<Jay obtained from IRIS (TOXnet 1993) was

•
•

•

CFC-12 could break down at elevated temperatures into hydrochloric acid

used . In addition, the exposure time was based on the duration of the release.

(10%) and phosgene (I %) with the remaining (89%) released as CFC-12 .

and individual breathing rates and sizes were the same as those used in Section

The hypothetical sulfuric acid spill would be contained by a berm r""ulting in a

F.I for radiological accident evaluations using the Radiological Safety Analysis

pool release area of 443.2 square feet .

Computer Program (RSAC-5) (Wenzel 1993).

The hypothetical spill of sodium hydroxide was in the form of an aqueous
solution and was contained by a berm resulting in a pool release area of 374
square feet . A IO-minute perie<! was used for this release. and the sodium
hydroxide was dispersed as a particulate.

F.2.4 .2. 1.4 Results. The airborne concentrations, averaged over the duration of each
exposure, were calculated using EPlcode for the alternate locations for the worker, MCW, NPA , and
MOl for both 50% and 95% meteorology. The airborne concentrations were compared to respective
ERPG values where available. However, ERPG values have not been derived for some of the

(5)

Meteorology

chemicals. The effects of these substances were assessed by comparison with other appropriate values
for toxic effects as discussed in Section F.2.3 .3.

•

Wind speeds and atmospheric stability classifications used for the calculations
were based on both 50% and 95 % meteorology (Section F. 1.3 .5) to estimate
downwind concentrations . The 95% meteorology included atmospheric stability
classes A through F and wind sp'eeds from 1.1 to 30 miles per hour.

Tables F.2.4.2-1 through -12 list the downwind concentrations at various locations and
corresponding ERPG values (or equivalent if TL V-TWA and IDLH concentrations are available).
Hydrochloric acid and phosgene. from decomposition of CFC-12, sulfuric acid. and sodium
hydroxide dominate the toxic chemical effects for on-site personnel. Concentrations of these

(6)

General

chemi cals above ERPG-3 levels might result in life-threatening effects. However, in no case is an

•

Standard rural terrain was used since this most closely resembles the sites being

acid concentrations could exceed ERPG-3 level> under both 50% and 95% meteorological conditions

evaluated .

and sodium hydroxide concentrations could exceed ERPG-3 levels under 95 % meteorol ogical

ERPG-3 level exceeded for any member of the general public except for Oak Ridge where sulfuric

•

•

Release was cal cul ated to occur at ground level.

cond itions . For the on-site workers. collocated workers , and any member of the general publ ic that

No evacuatio n of down wi nd populatio ns was included. in order to obtain maxi-

could be exposed to toxic chemi cals at levels above ERPG -3, it is expected that actual toxic chemi cal

mu m esti mates of effects; the refo re. exposures were not reduced to account for

ex posures would be mu ch less due to th e mit igative measures that would be impl emented (Section

this actIon.

F.2. 4.3).

•

No credit was taken for buildir,g comainment or filtration.

•

Biological effects of exposure to each chemical were treated separately. This
was done to account fo r a lac k of a current methodology to evaluate the effects

Addi tional info rmation on the tox ic prope rt ies for the chemi cals that dominate the tox ic effects
is provided below.

resulting fro m simultaneous mult iple chemi cal exposures.
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F-2 12

..3Q' )

F-2 13

Volume I , Appendi x D

Hydrochloric acid is a irritant to the respiratory tract, skin, eyes, and mucous membranes.
More severe exposures result in pulmonary edema, and often laryngeal spasm. A concentration of
53 mg/m3 causes irritation of the throat after short exposure. Concentrations of 75-150 mg/m3 are

tolerable for 1 hour; concentrations of 1,500-3,000 mg/m3 are dangerous, even for brief exposures
(fOXnet 1993).
Phosgene, also known as carbonyl chloride, is a highly toxic, corrosive liquid with a low
boiling point. It is toxic from intakes by inhalation, ingestion, and dermal absorption. Effects from
exposure may include contact burns to the skin and eyes, shortness of breath, chest pain, severe
pulmonary edema, and death. At low vapor concentrations, it smells like musty hay. At higher
concentrations, it has a sharp and pungent odor. It is a severe irritant to the eyes and respiratory tract
and can be fatal if inhaled, even for short durations and at low concentrations. Exposure to 12
mg/cm3 can result in immediate irritation of the respiratory tract. 80 mg/m3 may cause lung injuries
within 2 minutes; 100 mg/m3 for as little as 30 minutes is very dangerous; and 360 mg/m3 is rapidly

fatal for exposures of 30 minutes or less (fOX net 1993).
Sulruric acid mist can be strongly irritating to the skin, eyes, mucous membranes, and
respiratory tract. Odor may be detected at concentrations of 1 mg/m3; irritating effects may occur at
concentrations of 1.1 mg/m3. Inhalation of concentrations near 3 mg/m3 may cause constriction of the
air passage and choking sensations. At higher concentrations and durations of exposure, inhalation
can cause pulmonary edema, emphysema, and permanent changes in pulmonary function
(fOXnet 1993).
Sodium hydroxide dust can be irritating to the upper respiratory system. Irritating effects
may occur at concentrations of 2 mg/m3 . At higher concentrations and durations of exposure,
inhalation can cause extreme irritation of the respiratory tract nd permanent changes in pulmonary
function (fOXnet 1993).
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Table F.2.4.2-1. Summary of chemical concentrations for chemical spill and fire at the INEL Expended Core Facility.

CHEMICAL CONCENTRATIONS mg/m) - 50% METEOROLOOY
EIIIy .....

ERPG-I 127
ERfG.2 •
ERPG-) •

H)dJu'"
ERPG-I 0.1l
ERfG.2 10
ERPG·) 100

Ioopropyl
Ak<>boI
ERPG-I 98)
ERPG-2 29jO
ERPG-) 29jCX)

Worker

3300

49

MCW

2 .3

MOl

GIy<>oI

NPA

7'

-

/i)drodIIoric
Acid

SWfurie
Acid

~

SocIi....
It)druUdo

ERfG.1 • .$
ERPG-2 lO
ERfG.J I~

1'Il00...,.
ERfG.1 0 .•
ERPG-2 0 .8
EJlPG·) • .0

ERfG.1 2
ERPG-2 10
ERPG-) lO

ERPG-I 2
ERfG.2 •
ERfG.) •

ERfG.1 2
ERfG.2 II
ERfG.) ~

ERPG-I I.
ERPG-2 1«1
ERPG-) 100

CFC· 12
ERfG.1
ERfG.2
ERfG.)

890

38

400

45

4.5

2300

6.4

2300

1.6 x 10-2

0 .45

1.2 x 10-2

0 .12

1.3 x 10-2

1.3 x 10-1

1.4

9.3 x I~

0.60

I.S

1.0 x 10-2

0.29

7.9 x 10-1

7.7 x 10-2

8.5

X

10-3

8.5 x I~

0.86

5.9x I~

0 .39

1.6

10-2

8.3 x 10-'

X 10-2

9.0

X

10-'

9 .0 x 10~

0.91

5.9x I~

0.39

1.1 x

0.30

8.1

49jC)
~7~
~7~

Table F.2.4.2-2. Summary of chemical concentrations for chemical spill and fire at the INEL Expended Core Facility.

N
VI

CHEMICAL CONCENTRATIONS mg/mJ
GIy<>oI

H)d,.. ...

Alcohol

ERPG-I 127
ERPG·2 •
ERPG·) •

ERPG· I 0.1)
ERPG·2 10
ERPG·) 100

EJlPG· 1 98)
ERPG·2 29jO
ERPG·) 29jCX)

-

ERPG-I I'
ERfG.2 1«1
ERPG-) 100

CFC· 12
ERPG-I
ERPG·2
ERPG-)

Worker

4400

58

2200

150

MCW

7.6

4.8 x 10-2

2.6

MOl

3.6

2.3 x 10-2

1.1

3.2

3 .6

10-2

EIIIy .....

<
£.
c:

3

~

>
g

"0
"0

NPA

IocpnJpyI

2.3 x

1.1

95% METEOROLOOY
SWfurie

H)dtoc!>Jori<

Acid

~

SocIi....
It)druUdo

ERPG-I U
ERPG-2 lO
ERfG.J I~

1'Il00...,.
ERPG-I 0 .•
ERPG-2 0 .8
ERPG-) U

ERfG.1 2
ERPG-2 10
ERfG.) lO

ERPG-I 2
ERfG.2 •
ERfG.) •

ERfG.1 2
ERfG.2 II
ERfG.) ~

1600

180

18

2800

7.7

2700

8.3 x 10-2

0.80

8.9 x 10-2

8.9

X

10-3

3.9

2.2 x 10-1

1.5

10-2

0.30

3.4 x 10-2

3.4

X

10-'

1.9

8.8 x 10~

0 .58

0.30

10-2

3.4

X

10-3

1.9

8.8x I~

0 .58

X

3.2 x Io-J

Acid
49~

~7~
~7~

3.4 x

*IDLH concentrations are not available; therefore. corresponding ERPG-2 and -3 levels could not be determined.

Q.

>C .

o

-

~oo

Table F.2.4.2-3. Summary of chemical concentrations for chemical spill and fire at Savannah River.

CHEMICAL CONCENTRATIONS mg/m) - 50% METEOROLOOY
ru.,. .....

7'

~

Il)dtocbIori<

Anmco!ia
ERJ'G.I 18
EJlPG.2 140
ERJ'G.) 700

eFe· 12
EJlPG.I 49j()
ERJ'G.2 247jO
EJlPG.) 247jOO

A<C

Pboo .....

A<C

ERPG·I 0. 13
ERPG·2 10
ERPG·) 100

Itopropyl
AIccboI
ERJ'G.I 983
ERJ'G.2 29jI)
ERJ'G.) ~

ERJ'G.I 4.'
ERJ'G.2 jO
ERJ'G.) ljO

EJlPG.I 0 .4
EJlPG.2 0.8
ERJ'G.) 4.0

1500

19

370

14

150

16

MCW

J2

0.25

6.6

0 . 19

1.9

0.21

MOl

1.3

8.7

10-3

0.24

6 .7 x 10-3

6.4

X

10-2

7.2

X

NPA

1.3

8.7 x 10-)

0.24

6.7

10-3

6 .4

x

10-2

7.2

X

Glycol
EJlPG.I 127
EJlPG.2 •
ERPG· ) •

Ifrdruino

Worker

X

x

Sodhm
II)odroUIo

EJlPG.I 2
EJlPG.2 10
EJlPG.3 30

~
EJlPG.I 2
EJlPG.2 •
EJlPG.3 •

1.6

1000

2.9

1200

2.1 x 10-2

20

3.6

10-3

7.2 x I~

0.88

7.2 x I~

0 .47

10-3

7.2x I~

0.88

7.2x I~

0.47

X 10"-2

EJlPG.I 2
EJlPG.2 2j
EJlPG.3 2jO

22

Table F.2.4.2-4. Summary of chemical concentrations for chemical spill and fire at Savannah River.

N

0\

CHEMICAL CONCENTRATIONS mg/mJ - 95% METEOROLOOY
Ethy .....

~

Il)dtocbIori<

AImo1ia
ERJ'G.I 18
ERJ'G.2 140
ERJ'G.) 700

ere·12
ERJ'G.I 49jO
EJlPG. 2 247jO
ERJ'G.) 247jOO

A<C

Pboo .....

A<C

ERPG· I 0. 13
ERPG-2 10
ERPG· 3 100

Itopropyl
AIccboI
ERJ'G.I 983
ERJ'G.2 29jI)
ERPG· ) ~

ERJ'G.I 4.S
ERJ'G.2 30
ERPG· ) IjO

ERPG-I 0.4
ERPG·2 0.8
ERPG·) 4.0

ERJ'G.I 2
EJlPG.2 10
EJlPG.) 30

4400

58

2200

150

1600

180

18

220

1.6

85

4.0

39

4.3

Glycol
EJlPG- 1 127
ERJ'G. 2 •
ERJ'G.) •

Ifrdruino

Worker
MCW

10-2

0.44

4.9 x

0.44

4.9 x 10-2

MOl

4.9

3.0 x 10-2

1.6

4.7 x

NPA

4.9

3.0 x 10-2

1.6

4.7 x 10-2

10-2

II)odroUIo

EJlPG.l •

EJlPG.I 2
EJlPG.2 2j
EJlPG.) 2jO

2800

7.7

2700

0.43

120

0. 12

n

4.9 x 10-3

2.5

1.3 x 10-3

0.85

4.9

2.5

1.3 x 10-3

0 .85

X

10-3

*IDLH concentrations are not available; therefore. corresponding ERPG-2 and -3 levels could not be determined.

,Lj0/

Sodhm
~
EJlPG.I 2
EJlPG.2 •

Table F.2.4.2-S. Summary of chemical concentrations for chemical spill and fire at Hanford.

CHEMICAL CONCENTRATIONS mg/mJ
GIya>I

Il)odruibo

EIlPG· 1 117

Eabylco<

EltPG-J •

EIlPG-1 0. 13
EIIPG·2 10
EltPG-) 100

Ioq>ropyl
AIooboI
EltPG-1 983
EltPG-2 29SO
EltPG-) 29SOO

Ammoni.o
EltPG-1 18
EltPG·2 140
EltPG· ) m

CFC· 12
EltPG-1
EJlPG..
EIlPG-)

Wo rk~r

1500

19

370

14

MCW

46

0.36

9.6

0 .28

MOl (New ECF)··

0.73

5. 1 x 10-)

8.1 X 10-'

3.9

MOl (FMEF)···

0.97

7. 1 x 10-)

0 .19

NPA

1.5

9 .9 x 10-)

0 .29

ERPG-~

'Tl

N

•

-

50% METEOROLOGY
Sulfuric

-

If)dtodlJoric:
Acid

Phoo_

Acid

EJlPG-1 • ..s
EIlPG-2 lO
EIlPG-) ISO

EltPG-1 0.'
EIlPG-2 0.1
EltPG-) ' .0

EJlPG-1 2
EJlPG-2 10
EIlPG-) lO

~
EJlPG-1 2
EltPG-2 •
EJtPG· ) •

150

16

1.6

1000

2.9

1200

2.7

0.30

3.0 x 10-'

28

4. 1 x 10-'

26

~

2 2.',.,
2A7~

If)dtoljde
EJlPG-1 2
EJlPG-2 2j
EIlf'G.J 2$0

10-'

4.2

X

10-)

4.2

X

10-4

0.44

2.3 x 10-'

0.16

5.4 x 10-3

5.2 x 10-'

5.8

X

10-)

5.8

X

10-4

0.96

7.8 x 10-'

0.51

7.9 x 10-3

7.6

8.5

X

10-3

8.5

X

10-4

0.86

7.3 x 10-'

0.49

X

10-1

3.8

X

X

10-'

Table F.2.4.2-6. Summary of chemical co ncentrations for chemical spill and fire at Hanford.

-.J

CHEMICAL CONCENTRATIONS mg/m) - 95% METEOROLOGY

-<

2c::
3
~

Ioq>ropyl

-

Add
EIIPG· I 4 .S
EltPG-2 lO
EltPG-) ISO

PhooIC"D

Sulfuric
Acid

~

983
EIIPG-2 ::9SO
EltPG-) 29~

CFC· 12
EIIPG· I 49SO
ERPG· 2 2A7SO
EltPG· ) 2A7~

ERPG-I 0.'
EltPG-2 0 .1
EltPG·) ' .0

EltPG-1 2
EltPG-2 10
EJlPG-) lO

EJlPG-1 2
EltPG-2 •
EJlPG-) •

58

2200

150

1600

180

18

2800

7.7

2700

150

l.l

55

2.5

24

2.7

0.27

78

7.6 x 10-'

45

2.1

\.3 x 10-'

0.47

1.3 x 10-2

0 .13

1.4 x 10-2

1.4 x 10-3

1.1

4. 1 x 10-'

0.28

3

2.8

1.5 x 10-1

0.99

10-3

2.7

1.4 x 10-3

C1.94

H)'CIruinc

AkohoI

EltPG-1 IZ7
EIIPG·2 •
EltPG·) •

ERPG·I 0. 1)
ERPG·2 10
EIIPG·) 100

Eltpr~1

Worker

4400

MCW
MOl (New ECF)··

If)dto<bIoric

I

Ammonio
EIIPG-I 18
ERPG·2 14()
EltPG·) m

Ethylene
Glyrol

MOl (FMEF)···

5.5

3.5 x 10-'

1.8

5.4 x 10-'

0 .51

5.7 x 10-'

5.7 x 10-

NPA

5.3

3.3 x 10-2

1.7

5. 1 x 10-'

0 .48

5.4 x 10-'

5.4

X

• IDLH conc.!ntrations are not available; therefore, corresponding ERPG-2 and -3 levels could not be determined.
··MOI (New ECF) appJies if spent fuel facility is constructed at the 200 Area on the Hanford Site.
···MOI (FMEF) applies if spent fuel facility is constructed at the Fuels and Mat.erials Examination Facility.

If)dtoljde
EltPG-1 2
EJlPG-2 2j
EIlf'G.) 2$0

Table F.2.4.2-7. Summary of chemical concentrations for chemical spill and fire at the Nevada Test Site.

<

£.
c
3
(I>

CHEMICAL CONCENTRATIONS mg/m) - 50% METEOROLOOY

>

EII". .....

"0
"0

EIlPG-1 18
EJlJIG.2 1«1
EIIPG·) 100

H)d.-Joric
Acid
EJlJIG.I 4..1
EIlPG-2 )0
EIIPG-) I.!O

Pboo_
EIlPG-1 0 .4
EIlPG-2 0 .8
EIlPG· ) 4.0

s..Ifuric
Acid
EJlJIG.I 2
EJlJIG.2 10
EIIPG-) )0

~
EJlJIG.I 2
EJlJIG.2 •
EIIPG-) •

EJlJIG.I 2
EIlPG· 2 2.!
EIlPG·) 2.!0

130

5. 1

53

5.9

0.59

820

1.2

490

I.S x 10-'

4. 1 x 10--'

1.1 x 10-'

1.1 x 10--'

1.2 x 10-'

1.2 x 10-'

0 . 12

2.1 x 10-'

0.14

5.4 x 10-'

0. 14

4.0 x 10-'

3.8 x 10"

4.4

4.4 x

0 .97

7.0 x 10-'

0 .46

EIlPG· 1 127
EIlPG· 2 •
EIlPG-) •

Worker

530

6 .8

MCW

0 .22

MOl

0.74

;<.

Sodi.."

CfC· 12
EJlJIG.I 49j()
EIlPG-2 2A7.!O
EIIPG-) 2A7.!OO

AIoohoI
EJlJIG.I 98)
EJlJIG. 2 29.!0
r UG-) 29.!00

Co

o

~I

H,dtuino
EJlJIG.I 0 .1l
EIlPG-2 10
EIIPG· ) 100

Glycol

(I>
~

............

X

10-'

10~

H~

Table F.2.4.2-S. Summary of chemical concentrations for chemical spill and fire at the Nevada Test Site .

,

."
N
00

CHEMICAL CONCENTRATIONS mg/m) - 95% METEOROLOOY
Ell".1c ....

"""""""'

EIIPG-I 18
EIIPG-2 1«1
EIIPG· ) 100

Cf<:·12
ERPG·I 49.!O
EIIPG·2 ZA7.!O
EIIPG·) 2A7.!OO

1I)d.-Joric
Arid
EIlPG· I 4..!
EJlPG·2 )0
EIlPG· ) I.!O

2200

150

1600

3.7 x 10-2

1.9

5.8 x 10"

4.6 x 10--'

2.5

7.8 x 10"

Ek PG· I 127
EIl PG· 2 •
EIIPG·) •

AIoohoI
EIlPG· I 98)
EIlPG· 2 29.!O
EIIPG· ) 29.!OO

Worker

4400

58

MCW

5.9

MO l

7.3

!

EIlPG· I 0.4
EIlPG·2 0.1
ERPG· ) 4.0

s..Ifuric
Acid
EJlJIG.I 2
EJlJIG.2 10
EJlJIG.) )0

EIIPG· ! 2
EJlJIG.2 •
EJlJIG.) •

Sodi.."
Il)draUclo
ERPG-I 2
EJlJIG.2 2.!
ERPG-) 2.!0

180

18

2800

7.7

2700

0.55

6 .2 x 10"'

6.2 x 10-'

3.0

1.6 x 10-'

1.1

0.76

8.4 x 10"'

8.4 x 10-'

3.8

2.2 x 10-'

1.4

bopnJpy l

1I)d .....;".
EIIPG-I 0 .1)
EJlPG- 2 10
ERPG- ) 100

Glycol

Phoo""",

·IDLH concentrations are not available; therefore. corresponding ERPG-2 and -3 levels could not be detennined.

~

Table F.2.4.2-9. Summary of chemical concentrations for chemical spill and fire at Oak Ridge.

CHEMICAL CONCENTRATIONS mg/ml - 50% METEOROLOOY
Iocptopyl

EdIy .....

7'

Sulfuric

ERPG· I 913
EJlPG.l :mel
ERJIG.)

AImIaaio
EJlPG.1 II
EJlPG.2 14)
EJlPG.) "XXI

CfC· 12
EJlPG.1 ~
ERPG· 2 lA750
ERJIG.) lA 7500

Arid
EJlPG.1 4..S
ERPG·l 30
ERJIG.) 150

"""'-

EJlPG.1 0 .4
EJlPG.2 0 .1
ERJIG.) • .0

Arid
EJlPG.1 1
EJlPG.l 10
ERJIG.) 30

~
ERJIG.I 1
ERJIG.1 •
ERJIG.) •

SaIiI.m
II)odraUIo
ERJIG.I 1
ERJIG.1 1$
ERJIG.) 250

49

890

38

400

45

4.5

2300

6.4

2300

34

0.27

7.1

0.21

2.0

0.22

2.2

21

3.0

MOl

310

2.8

68

2. 1

21

2.4

0.24

190

0.38

210

NPA

440

4.3

100

3 .2

32

3.7

0.37

280

0.60

310

Glycol

1I)od,

AIooboI

ERPG· I 121
ERJlG.l •
ERPG· ) •

EJlPG.1 0.1)
EJlPG.l 10
EJlPG.) 100

Worker

3300

MCW

II)'dtocbIori<

:moo

lC

10-'

l(

10-'

19

Table F.2.4.2-10. Summary of chemical concentrations for chemical spill and fire at Oak Ridge.

N
~

CHEMICAL CONCENTRATIONS mg/m) - 95% METEOROLOOY
Iocptopyl

Ethy .....

<

2c:
3
n>

H)<ItoehIoric

Glycol

II)odrulno

AIocboI

Ammonia

CFC· I~

ER JlG. I 121
ERJlG.2 •
ER PG· ] •

ERJlG.I 0. 1)
ERJlG.2 10
ERPG·) 100

ERJlG.I 913
ERJlG.2 :mel
ERPG· )

ERJIG. . I.
ERJlG.2 14)
ERPG·) "XXI

Worker

4400

58

2200

MCW

110

0 .75

MO l

930

NPA

1300

"""'.....

II)odraUIo
ERPG· I 2
ERJIG.2 1$
EJlPG.) 250

18

2800

7.7

2700

0.20

58

S.4 x 10-'

32

2.4

S40

0.82

410

3 .8

790

1.3

630

ERJlG.I 0 .•
ERJlG.2 0.1
ERJIG.' • 0

150

1600

180

41

1.9

18

2.0

11 .4

400

22

220

24

13

S90

33

340

38

,

Sodhan

ERJlG.I 1
ERJlG.2 10
EIIJ1G.) 30

ERPG· I ~
ERJlG.l lA750
ERJIG.) lA7500

:moo

Sulfuric
Ad:!

~
ERJIG.I 2
EJlPG.2 •
ERJIG.) •

Arid
ERJlG.I ..,
ERJlG.2 30
ERPG·) 150

·IDLH concentration are not available; therefore, corresponding ERPG-2 and -3 levels could not be determined.

Table F.2.4.2-11. Summary of chemical concentrations for chemical spill and fire at the Barnwell Plant.

<:
o

C
3
(I>

CHEMICAL CONCENTRATIONS

>

EdI)' .....
GIywI
EItJ'G. I IV
E1tPG-2 •
EItJ'G.) •

"0
"0
(I>

::I

Q.

)C .

o

AIoohoI

...........

E1tPG-1 0.13
E1tPG-2 10
E1tPG-) 100

EItJ'G. I 913
EltPG-2 ~
EltJ'G.3 29lOO

50% METEOROLOGY

EltJ'G.I 0.4
EltJ'G.2 0.8
EItJ'G.) 4.0

SuIf\Iric
Arid
EltJ'G.I 2
EltJ'G.2 10
EItJ'G.) 1O

~
EltJ'G.I 2
EltlG-2 •

EItIG-) •

Sodnm
If)dnaido
EltJ'G.I 2
EltPG-2 25
EltPG-) 230

1200

If)droo:hloric

Arid
EItJ'G.! 4.5
EltJ'G.2 1O
E1tPG-3 130

Pboo.....

E1tPG-1 II
E1tPG-2 1«1
E1tPG-) 1Q)

eFe· 12
EltJ'G.I ~
EltJ'G.2 24730
E1tPG-) 247D

Worker

1500

19

370

14

150

16

1.6

1000

2.9

MCW

0 .89

6.4 x 10-'

0. 17

4.9 x 10-3

4.6 x 10-2

5.2 x 10-'

5.2 x 10-'

0.83

9.0

x

10-'

0.59

1./01

6. 1

4.3 x 10-2

1.2

3.4

X

0.32

3.6

10-2

3.6

x

10-1

4.9

4.9

x

10-'

3.2

6. 1

x 10-2

3.4

x 10- 2

1

3.6

x

10-1

4.9

4.9

x

10-1

3.2

NPA

71

Ioapropyl
If)dtuino

3
mg/m -

4.3

1.2

10-1

0.32

3.6

x
x

10-

Table F.2.4.2-12. Summary of chemical concentrations for ch4!mical spill and fire at the Barnwell Plant.

IV
IV

o

CHEMICAL CONCENTRATIONS
Ioapropyl

EdI)' .....
GIywI
EltPG· 1 IV
E1tPG·l •
E1tPG·) •

Il)'CInuino
E1tPG-1 0. 1)
EIIPG-2 10
EIIPG·) 100

Worker

4400

58

MCW

11

6.4

MOl

28

0. 18

NPA

28

X

0. 18

10-2

mg/m) -

r RPG-1 98)
ERPG·l 2930
ERPG·) 29D

AmmonIa
E1tPG-1 II
EIIPG·l 1«1
E1tPG·) 1Q)

ere· 12
E1tPG· 1 4930
E1tPG·2 24730
UlPG· ) 247D

H)'CItoehIotk
Arid
EltPG-1 4.5
E1tPG·2 1O
E1tPG-) 130

2200

150

1600

3.5

0 . 13

10

0.41

Aklohol

10

0 .41

95% METEOROLOGY
SUlf1aok

•.,. ,+=nco

EltJ'G.2 0.1
E1tPG-) 4.0

Arid
ERPG· I 2
EIIPG· 2 10
ERPG· ) 1O

EltlG-I 2
EltJ'G.2 •
EItJ'G.) •

Sodnm
If)dnaido
EltJ'G.I 2
EltJ'G.2 25
ERPG-) 230

180

18

2800

7.1

2700

1.3

0 . 14

1.4 x 10-2

5.4

3.2

x

10-1

2 .0

3.9

0 .44

4.4 x 10-1

15

1.1

x

10-2

6.9

0.44

x 10-1

10-2

6.9

3.9

"""'
Ii<""
EltJ'G.I 0.4

4.4

15

·IDLH concentrations are not available; therefore. corresponding ERPG-2 and -3 levels could not be detennined .

l..J05

1.1 x

In addition to comparing the airborne concentrations to their respective ERPG or other

F.2.4.2.2 Fire Involving Diesel Fuel.

appropriate values, each substance was evaluated to determine if it has the potential for future
carcinogenic health impacts. It was determined that exposure to hydrazine could result in an

F.2.4.2.2.7 Accident Description. A catastrophic failure of the diesel fuel storage tank

increased likelihood for developing cancer. Tables F.2 .4.2-13 and F.2 .4.2-14 provide the future

facility was postulated to occur. This could result in the spilling of the entire quantity of diesel fuel

potential likelihood for developing cancer from exposure to hydrazine for the worker, MCW, and

and a subsequent fire. The airborne release of toxic chemicals resulting from the fire was evaluated

MOl at the alternate locations under 50% and 95% meteorological conditions, respectively.

with respect to the on-site workers, MCW , NPA, and MOl as applicable for the accident site.

Table F .2.4.2-13. Future potential likelihood for developing cancer from hydrazine 50% meteorology .

Worker

INEL
Expended
Core Facility

Savannah
River

9.3 x 10"

3.6 x 10"

F.2.4.2.2.2 Source Term. The material involved in this accident was diesel fuel with the
fire generating the following toxic chemicals due to combustion:

Hanford"

Nevada
Test
Site

Oak
Ridge

Barnwell
Plant

3.6 x 10"

1.3 x 10"

9.3 x 10"

3.6 x 10"

MCW

3.0 x 10"

4.8 x 10"

6 .8 x 10"

2.8 x 10"

5. 1 x 10"

1.2 x 10"

MOl

1.5 x 10"

1.3 x 10"

7.6 x 10"

8. 1 x 10"

4.2 x 10"

6 .4 x 10"

•

Carbon monoxide

•

Oxides of nitrogen (90% nitric oxide and 10% nitrogen dioxide)

•

Lead

•

Sulfur dioxide.

F.2.4.2.2.3 Conditions and Key Parameters.
Table F.2.4.2-14. Future potential likelihood for developing cancer from hydrazine 95 % meteorology.
INEL
Expended
Core Facility

Savannah
River

Worker

3.8 x 10"

3.8 x

MCW

2.0

10"

6.7 x 10"

MOl

7 .8 x 10"

1.0 x 10"

X

10~

Oak
Ridge

3.8 x 10"

3.8 x

4.6 x 10"

1.6

10"

4.4 x 10"

1.6 x 10"

3.8 x

10~

X

For alternate DOE sites and the Barnwell Pl ant, th e di esel fuel was stored in bulk
storage tanks .

Nevada
Test
Site

Hanford"

•

Barnwell
Plant
10~

3.8 x

10~

3.2 x 10"

2.7

10"

2.9 x 10"

6 . 1 X 10"

X

• MOl shown applies to new ECF if spent fuel facility is constructed at the 200 Area on the Hanford
Site. A future potential carcinogenic risk of 1.1 x 10" (50% meteorology) and 1.2 x 10" (95%
meteorology) applies to a spent fuel facility co nstru cted at the Fuels and Materials Exami nation
Facility.

•

For shipyards, the diesel fuel was stored in a portable diesel power unit.

•

For the ship accident, the diesel fuel was stored in large tanks adjacent to the hold .

•

For alternate DOE sites and the Barnwell Plant , 1950 gallons of diesel fuel could be
spilled.

•

For shipyards, 3 15 gallons of diesel fuel could be spilled.

•

For the ship accident, 121,000 gallons of diesel fuel could be spilled .

•

For all facilities, the entire quantity of di esel fuel was spilled and ignited in open air .

•

For alternate DOE sites and the Barnwell Plant, the spill area was 26 1 square feet.

•

For shipyards, the spill area was 66 square feet.

•

For th e ship accident, the sp ill area used was 4812 square feet.

•

For alternate DOE sites and the Barnwell Plant, the entire amou nt of diesel fu el was
consumed by th e fire over a 2-hour period.

•

For shipyards, the entire amount of di esel fuel was co nsumed by the fire ove r a I-hour
period.
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•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

For the ship accident, the entire amount of diesel fuel was consumed by the fire over a

Tables F .2 .4.2- 15 through -38 list the downwind concentrations at various locations and

6-hour period .

corresponding ERPG (or equivalent) values. Results for the diesel fuel fire at fuel examination sites

For all facilities, the releases per gallon of fuel burned were as follows :

indicate that the toxic chemical concentrations for sulfur dioxide and oxides of nitrogen may exceed

Carbon monoxide = 0.34 pound

ERPG-3 levels for the worker. At Savannah River and Hanford , the MCW also may be exposed to a

Oxides of nitrogen = 1.58 pounds

nitric oxide concentration exceeding ERPG-3 levels under 95% meteorological conditions. The NPA

Lead = 4.2 x 10" pound

and MOl exposures at all the fuel examination sites would be expected to be below ERPG-2 levels

Sulfur dioxide = O. \05 pound.

except for Oak Ridge. At this location under 95% meteorological conditions, the NPA and MOl may

For alternate DOE sites, the Barnwell Plant, and shipyards, the airborne release of toxic

be exposed to concentrations of sulfur dioxide and oxides of nitrogen that exceed ERPG-3 and

chemicals occurred at ground level.

concentrations of carbon monoxide that exceed ERPG-2. Under 50% meteorological conditions at

For the ship accident, the airborne release of toxic chemicals occurred at 48 feet above

Oak Ridge, the NPA and MOl may be exposed to concentrations of nitric oxide that exceed ERPG-3

the sea (i.e., at the middle of the flame height above the cargo hatch) for evaluation of

and co ncentrations of sulfur dioxide and nitrogen dioxide that exceed ERPG-2 . Results for the diesel

land-based exposures. For shipboard exposures, a release height of zero was used.

fuel fire at shipyards show that for the worker and NPA categories , the toxic chemical concentrations

For all facilities, standard rural terrain was used and building wake effects were not

for sulfur dioxide and oxides of nitrogen may exceed ERPG-3 levels . For the MOl , however . these

considered .

concentrations are expected to be less than the ERPG-3 levels with the exception that under 95%

For all facilities, wind speeds and atmospheric stability classifications were based on

meteorological conditions the ERPG-3 level for nitric oxide may be exceeded at the Norfolk shipyard.

both 50% and 95% meteorology (Section F. I.3 .5).

Results for the ship diesel fuel fire show that sh ipboard (worker) ,'oncentrations of carbon monoxide,

For all facilities, no evacuation of downwind populations occurred and the biological

sulfur dioxide, and oxides of nitrogen may ex~eed ERPG-3 levels, but the shore (MOl) concentrations

effects of chemical exposure act uniquely and do not affect the individual in a cumulative

are expected to be less than ERPG-3 levels. For the individuals on board th e ship that might be

way.

exposed to toxic chemicals at levels above ERPG-3. it is expected th at actual toxic chemical exposures

For all facilities, to determine the health impacts, the estimated concentrations were

would be much less due to the mitigative measures that would be implemented (Section F .2.4.3).

compared against the Emergency Response Planning Guidelines (ERPG) levels I, 2, and
3 concentrat io n limits or alternates.

Additional info rmation on th e toxic properties for the chemi cals that domi nate the toxic effects
is provided below .

F.2.4 .2.2 .4 Results. The ai rborne co ncentrations. averaged over the duration of each
exposu re, were calculated usi ng EPlcode for the combustio n products resulting from the fire for the

Sulfur dioxide is a colorless gas with a pungent odor. It is a poison. and it is also an eye.

worker. MCW. NPA. and MOl (as applicable fo r the accident site) under both 50% and 95%

skin. and mu cous membrane irritant. It chiefl y affects the upper respiratory tract and bronchi and at

meteorology. The airborne concentrations were compared 10 respective ERPG values where

higher concentrations, sulfur dioxide causes res piratory paralysis (TOXnet 1993) .

available. However. ERPG values have not been derived for some of the constituents listed . The
effects of these constituents were assessed by comparison with other appropriate values for toxic
effects as discussed in Section F .2.3.3.

Nitric oxide and nitrogen dioxide occur together in dy namic equilibrium . Nitric oxide is a
colorl ess gas. and nitrogen dioxide is a reddish brown gas. Both chemicals are eye. ski n. and mucous
membrane irritants and primaril y affect the respi ratory system. Exposure to 47 mg/m' of nitroge n
dioxide can cause respiratory irritatio n and chest pai n. 93 mg/m' can cause lung injur ies. and

187 mg/m' can be fatal (TOXnet 1993).
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In addition to comparing the airborne concentrations to their respective ERPG or other
appropriate values, each substance was evaluated to determine if it has the potential for future

Table F.2.4.2-1S. Summary of chemical concentrations for fire involving diesel fuel at the INEL
Expended Core Facility.

carcinogenic impacts. It was determined that exposure to lead could result in an increased likelihood
for developing cancer. However, sufficient information to quantify this likelihood was not avai lable

CHEMICAL CONCENTRATIONS mg/m' - 501\\ METEOROLOGY

in IRIS. Therefore, the concentrations of lead result ing from the accident were compared against the

Carbon
Monoxide
ERPG-I 29
ERPG-2 172
ERPG-3 1720

NAAQS value for lead. For the lead concentrations provided in Tables F.2.4.2-15 through
F .2.4.2-38, no NAAQS is exceeded.

Sulfur
Dioxide
ERPG-I 0.79
ERPG-2 7.9
ERPG-3 39

Nitric
Oxide
ERPG-I 31
ERPG-2 •
ERPG-3 123

Nitrogen
Dioxide
ERPG-I 5.6
ERPG-2 9.4
ERPG-3 94

lad
ERPG-I 0. 15
ERPG-2 70
ERPG-3 700

F.2.4.3 Miti~tive Me.su,es fo, Toxic Chemic.'s. Mitigative measures for potential releases of

Worker

480

ISO

2000

220

3.9 x 10-'

tox ic materials involve administrative controls for personnel protection and emergency response. For

MCW

0.25

7.7 x 10-'

1.0

0.11

9.5 x 10-'

personnel protection, controls involve safety review commillees for planned activities that establish

MOl

0.15

4.8 x 10-'

0.65

7.3 x 10-'

6.1 x 10-'

requirements, safe work permits, and procedures for required clothing (rubber boots, gloves, face

NPA

0.16

5.0 x 10-'

0.69

7.7 x 10-'

6. 1 x 10-'

shields, eye protection) that can mitigate the effects of potential releases of toxic materials.
Procedures may also require provisions for prestationing mitigative devices such as eyewash stations
and emergency showers. All of the alternate facil ities being evaluated employ emergency response
programs to mitigate impacts of potential toxic chemical accidents to workers and the public.
Emergency planning. emergency preparedness, and emergency response programs are in place and

Table F.2.4.2-16. Summary of chemical concentrations for fire involving diesel fuel at the INEL
Expended Core Facility.

involve established resources such as warning co mmunications, fire departments, and emergency
CHEMICAL CONCENTRATIONS mg/m' - 951\\ METEOROLOGY

command centers. The cargo ships used for naval spent nuclear fuel have smoke detection and fire

Carbon
Monoxide
ERPG-I 29
ERPG-2 172
ERPG-3 1720

fighting equipment on board. They also have fire suppression systems in their holds which use inert
gas to smother fireS. In addition, less freely available oxygen in the ship's cargo hold would tend to
slow the combustion rate of the diesel fuel. Port facilities would also have available additional fire

Sulfur
Dioxide
ERPG-I 0.79
ERPG-2 7.9
ERPG-3 39

Nitric
Oxide
ERPG-I 31
ERPG-2 •
ERPG-3 123

Nitrogen
Dioxide
ERPG-I 5.6
ERPG-2 9.4
ERPG-3 94

Lud
ERPG-I 0. 15
ERPG-2 70
ERPG-3 700

4.6 x 10-'

fighting equipment, p\lblic warning systems, and emergency response programs.
Worker

1200

370

5100

560

MCW

1.45

0.45

6. 1

0.68

3.0 x 10-'

MOl

0.66

0.20

2.7

0.30

4.7 x 10-'

NPA

0.66

0.20

2.7

0.30

4.7 x 10-'

• ERPG-2 level nol assigned since one- Ienlh the IDLH level would be less Ihan the ERPG- I level.
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F.l.4.2-17. Summary of chemical concenlralions for fire involving diesel fuel al
Savannah River.

Table F.2.4.2-19. Summary of r.hemical concenlralions for fire involving diesel fuel al
Hanford .

CHEMICAL CONCENTRATIONS mglm' ·50% METEOROLOGY
Carbon

Nitric
Oxide
ERPG·I 31
ERPG-2 •
ERPG-3 123

Nitrogen
Dioxide

Lead

ERPG·I 29
ERPG-2 172
ERPG-3 1720

Sulfur
Dioxide
ERPG·I 0.79
ERPG-2 7.9
ERPG-3 39

ERPG· I 5.6
ERPG-2 9.4
ERPG-3 94

ERPG - I 0 _15
ERPG -2 70
ERPG-3 700

Worker

200

62

850

94

2.0 • 10-'

Mew

3.6

1.1

15

1.7

3.6 • 10-'

MOl

0. 13

4.1 x 10-1

0.55

6. 1. 10-'

7.5. 10-'

NPA

0.13

4. 1 • 10-'

0.55

6. 1 • 10-'

7.5 x 10-'

Monoxide

Tab~

CHEM ICAL CONCENTRATIONS mgl m' - 50% METEOROLOGY

Nitric
Oxide

Nitrogen

Dioxide

Dioxide

Lead

ERPG -I 0 .79
ERPG-2 7.9
ERPG -3 39

ERPG-I 31
ERPG-2 •
ERPG-3 123

ERPG-I 5.6
ERPG-2 9.4
ERPG-3 94

ERPG-I 0. 15
ERPG-2 70
ERPG-3 700

62

840

94

2 .0. 10-'

1.6

21

2.4

4. 1 • 10-'

2.4. 10-'

0.34

3.7.10-'

2.5 • 10-'

0.44

4.9. 10-'

8. I • 10-'

0.65

7.3. 10-'

7.6. 10-'

Carbon
Monoxide
ERPG - I 29
ERPG-2 172
ERPG-3
1720

Sulfur

Worker

200

Mew

5.2

MOl (New ECF)"

8.3 • 10-'

MOl (FMEF)'"

0. 11

3.3 • 10-'

NPA

0. 16

4.8 • 10-'

F.2.4.2-1 S. Summary of chemical concenlralions for fire involving diesel fuel al
Savannah River.

CHEMICAL CONCENTRATIONS mglm' ·95% METEOROLOGY
Carbon

Worker

Sulfur

Monoxide

Dio}l;ide

Nitric
Oxide

Dioxide

Lead

ERPG-I 29
ERPG-2 172
ERPG-3 1720

ERPG - I 0.79
ERPG-2 7.9
ERPG-3 39

ERPG - I 31
ERPG -2 •
ERPG-3 123

ERPG- I 5.6
ERPG-2 9.4
ERPG-3 94

ERPG - I 0.15
ERPG -2 70
ERPG -3 700

1200

370

5100

Nitrogen

560

4.6. 10-'
6.9 • 10-'

Mew

49

15

200

23

MOl

0.90

0 .28

3.8

0 .42

1.1 x 10-'

NPA

0.90

0.28

3.8

0.42

1.1 • 10-'

• ERPO-2 level

DOt

Table F.2.4.2-20. Summary of chemical concenlralions for fire invo lvi ng di esel fuel al
Hanford .

as.siped since ooe-tenth the IDLH level wou ld be less than the ERPG- J level.

CHEMICAL CONCENTRATIONS mglm' - 95% METEOROLOGY

Volume I. Appendix 0

Sulfur

Nitric
Oxide

Nitrogen

Dioxide

Dioxide

Lead

ERPG-I 29
ERPG-2 172
ERPG-3
1720

ERPG-I 0.79
ERPG -2 7.9
ERPG-3 39

ERPG -I 31
ERPG-2 •
ERPG-3 123

ERPG-I 5.6
ERPG-2 9.4
ERPG -3 94

ERPG-I 0.15
ERPG-2 70
ERPG-3 700

Worker

1200

370

5100

560

4.6 • 10-'

Mew

32

9.7

130

15

3.9. 10'"

MOl (New ECF)"

0 .34

0. 10

1.4

0. 15

4.9. 10....

MOl (FMEF) '"

1.0

0.32

4.3

0 .48

1.5 • 10-'

NPA

0.78

0.24

3.2

0 .36

5.0 • 10-'

•

F-227
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Monoxide
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Table F.2.4.2-21. Summary of chemical concentratio ns for fire involv ing diesel fuel at the
Nevada Test Site.

Table F .2.4.2-23. Summary of chemical concentratio ns for fire involvi ng diesel fue l at
Oak Ridge.

CHEMICAL CONCENTRATIONS mgtm' - 50% METEOROLOGY
Carbon
Monoxide
ERPG-I 29
ERPG·2 172
ERPG·3 1720

Sulfur
Dioxide
ERPG·I 0.79
ERPG·2 7.9
ERPG-3 39

Worker

73

Mew

2.3 x 10-'

MOl

8.0 x 10-'

Nitric
Oxide
ERPG-I 31
ERPG-2 •
ERPG·3 123

Dioxide
ERPG-I 5.6
ERPG·2 9.4
ERPG·3 94

22

300

34

8.3 x 10-'

7.0 x 10-'

9.6 x 10-'

I.I x 10-'

2.2 x 10-'

2.4 x 10-'

0.33

3.7 x 10-'

7.3 x 10-'

CHEMICAL CONCENTRATIONS mgtm' - 50% METEOROLOGY

Nitrogen

Carbon
Monoxide
ERPG- I 29
ERPG-2 172
ERPG-3 1720

Sulfur
Dioxide
ERPG- I 0.79
ERPG·2 7.9
ERPG-3 39

Nitric
Oxide
ERPG· I 31
ERPG·2 •
ERPG·3 123

Nitrogen
Dioxide
ERPG-I 5.6
ERPG-2 9.4
ERPG-3 94

ERPG-I 0. 15
ERPG-2 70
ERPG-3 700

Worker

480

150

2000

220

3.9 x 10-'

MCW

3.8

1.2

16

1.8

3.0 x 10-'

MOl

37

II

150

18

3.3 x 10-'

NPA

54

17

230

26

5.0 x 10-'

Lead

ERPG·t 0. t5
ERPG-2 70
ERPG-3 700

Lead

Table F.2.4.2-22. Summary of chemical concentratio ns for fire invo lving diesel fuel at the
Nevada Test Site.
Table F.2.4.2-24. Summary of chemical concentrations fo r fire involving diesel fuel at
Oak Ridge.
CHEMICAL CONCENTRATIONS mgtm' ·95% METEOROLOGY
Carbon
Monoxide
ERPG·! 29
ERPG-2 172
ERPG·3 1720

Sulfur

Nitric

Dioxide

ERPG-t 0.79
ERPG-2 7.9
ERPG-3 39

Oxide
ERPG·I 31
ERPG·2 •
ERPG·3 123

Ni trogen
Diox ide
ERPG-I 5.6
ERPG-2 9.4
ERPG-3 94

CHEMICAL CONCENTRATIONS mgtro' - 95% METEOROLOGY

Lead

ERPG- I 0. 15
ERPG-2 70
ERPG-3 700

Worker

1200

370

5100

560

Mew

I.I

0.34

4.6

0.52

1.7 x 10-'

MOl

1.4

0.43

5.9

0.65

2.7 x 10-'

Carbon
Monoxide
ERPG- I 29
ERPG·2 172
ERPG-3 1720

Sulfur
Dioxide
ERPG· I 0.79
ERPG·2 7.9
ERPG-3 39

Worker

1200

370

5100

560

4.6 x 10-'

Mew

24

7.3

98

II

2.6 x 10-'

MOl

230

70

950

110

S.) x 10-'

NPA

340

100

1400

160

8.7 x 10-'

4.6 x 10-'

Nitric
Oxide
ERPG·I 31
ERPG·2 •
ERPG-3 123

Nitrogen
Dioxide

Lead

ERPG- I 5.6
ERPG-2 9.4
ERPG -3 94

ERPG· I 0.15
ERPG-2 70
ERPG-3 700

• ERPG·2 leve l not ass igned since one-tc:nth the IOLH level would be less than the ERPG-I level.

• ERPG -2 level not assigned since one-tenth the IOLH level wou ld be less than the ERPG - I level .
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Table F.2.4.2-2S. Summary of chemical concentrations ior fire involving diesel fuel at the
Barnwell Plant.

Table F .2.4.2-27. Summary of chem ical concentrations for fire involving di esel fuel at
Kenneth A. Kesselring Site.

CHEMICAL CONCENTRATIONS mg/m] - 50 % METEOROLOGY

CHEMICAL CONCENTRATIONS mg/m] - 50% METEOROLOGY

I

Sulfur

Nitric

Monoxide

Dioxide

Oxide

Dioxide

ERPG-I 29
ERPG-2 172
ERPG-3 1720

ERPG-I 0.79
ERPG-2 7.9
ERPG-3 39

ERPG-I 31
ERPG-2 •
ERPG-3 123

ERPG-I 5.6
ERPG -2 9. 4
ERPG -3 94

Worker

200

62

B40

94

2.0 x 10-]

W orker

44

13

ISO

20

4.8 x 10-'

MCW

9.5 • 10-'

2 .9 x 10-'

0.40

4.4 I !0'"2

9.3 x 10-'

MOl

0.25

7.7 x 10-'

1.0

0. 11

2 .3 x 10-'

i NPA

0.25

7.7 x 10-'

1.0

0.11

2.3 x 10-'

Carbon

Nitrogen

Sulfur

Carbon
l.ead
ERPG -I 0. 15
ERPG·2 70
ERPG-3 700

MOl

0.65

0.20

2.7

0.30

5.0 x 10-'

NPA

0 .65

0.20

2.7

0 .30

5.0 x 10-'

Table F.2.4.2-26. Summary of chemical concentrat ions fo r fire involving diesel fuel at the
Barnwell Plant .

Monoxide

Dioxide

ERPG-I 29
ERPG-2 172
ERPG-3 1720

ERPG- I 0.79
ERPG-2 7.9
ERPG-3 39

Nitric
Oxide
' ERPG -I 31
ERPG-2 •
ERPG-3 123

Nitrogen

Dioxide
ERPG-I 5.6
ERPG-2 9.4
ERPG -3 94

l.ead
ERPG -I 0. 15
ERPG-2 70
ERPG-3 700

Table F .2.4.2-2S. Summary of chemical co ncentrations for fire involving diesel fuel al
Kenneth A. Kesselring Site.

CHEMICAL CONCENTRATIONS mg/m] - 95% METEOROLOGY
CHEMICAL CONCENTRATIONS mg/m' - 95 % METEOROLOGY
Carbon

Sulfur

Nitric

Monox ide

Dioxide

Oxide

ERPG- I 29
ERPG-2 172
ERPG-3 1720

ERPG-I 0.79
ERPG -2 7.9
ERPG-3 39

W orker

1200

MCW

ERPG-I 31
ERPG-2 •
ERPG-3 123

l.ead
ERPG-I 0. 15
ERPG-2 70
ERPG-3 700

370

5100

560

4.6 x 10-'

MOl

2.0

0.62

8.4

0 .94

5 .4 x 10-'

NPA

MOl

5.8

1.7

24

2.7

3.2 x 10-'

S PA

5.S

1.7

24

2.7

3.2 • 10-'

ERPG-2 level not assigned since one- tenth the IOLH level would

F-231

Ni:rogen
Dioxide

ERPG- I 3 1
ERPG-2 •
ERPG -3 123

ERPG-I 5.6
ERPG-2 9 .4
ERPG -3 94

500

150

2100

230

1.9 x 10-]

3.9

1.2

17

1.8

3. 1.10-'

3.9

1.2

17

1. 8

3. 1 x 10'"

Monoxide

Nitrogen
Dioxide
ERPG- I 5.6
ERPG-2 9 .4
ERPG -3 94

Worker

• ERPG-2 level

•

Nitric
Oxide

ERPG-I 29
ERPG -2 172
ERPG-3 1720

Sulfur
Dioxide
ERPG-I 0.79
ERPG-2 1.9
ERPG -3 39

Carbon

Dot

assigned since one-tenth the IOLH level would be less than the ERPG - I level.

be less than the ERPG-I level.
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l.ead
ERPG - I 0 . 15
ERPG-2 70
ERPG-3 700
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Table F.2.4.2-29. Summary of chemical concentrations for fire invo lving di esel fuel at
Norfolk Naval Sh ipyard .

Table F.2 .4.2-31. Summary of chemical concentrat ions for fire involving diesel fuel at
Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard .

CHEMICAL CONCENTRATIONS mgtm' · 50 % METEOROLOGY
Carbo.
Monoxide
ERPG · I 29
ERPG·2 172
ERPG-3 1720

Sulfur
Dioxide
ERPG· I 0.79
ERPG·2 7.9
ERPG-3 39

Nitric

Nitrogen

Oxide
ERPG· I 31
ERPG-2 •
ERPG-3 123

Dioxide

Lead

ERPG·I 5 .6
ERPG·2 9.4
ERPG· 3 94

ERPG-I 0. 15
ERPG-2 70
ERPG-3 700

Worker

44

13

180

20

4.8 . II}-'

MOl

4.3

1.3

18

2.0

4.7. 10-'

NPA

4.3

1.3

18

2.0

4.7.10-'

Table F .2.4.Z-30. Summary of chemical concentrations for fire invol ving diesel fuel at
Norfolk Naval Shipyard .

CHEMICAL CONCENTRATIONS mgtro' - SO% METEOROLOGY
Sulfur

Nitric

Monoxide

Dioxide

Oxide

D ioxide

Lead

ERPG·I 29
ERPG·2 172
ERPG-3 1720

ERPG-I 0.79
ERPG-2 7.9
ERPG-3 39

ERPG· I 31
ERPG-2 •
ERPG-3 123

ERPG- I S.6
ERPG-2 9.4
ERPG-3 94

ERPG-I 0 . 15
ERPG-2 70
ERPG·3 700

Worker

200

61

830

92

1.6.10-'

MOl

3.3

1.0

J3

J.5

1.7. 10-'

NPA

12

3.6

49

5.4

1.4. II}-'

Carbo.

Table F.2.4.2-32. Summary of chemical concentrations for fire involving diesel fuel at
Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard .

CHEMICAL CONCENTRATIONS mgtm' - 95 % METEOROLOGY
Carbon

Sulfur

Mono xide

Dioxide

ERPG ' I 29
ERPG-2 172
ERPG-3 1720

ERPG- I 0.79
ERPG-2 7.9
ERPG-3 39

Nitric
Oxide
ERPG - I 31
ERPG -2 •
ERPG-3 123

Dio xide

Lead

ERPG-I O. IS
ERPG·2 70
ERPG-3 700

Worker

500

ISO

2100

230

1.9.10-'

MOl

47

14

200

22

2.8. II}-'

14

200

22

2.8. II}-'

NPA

47

• ERPG·2 level not assigned since one-tenth the IOLH level would be less than the ERPG-J level.
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CHEMICAL CONCENTRATIONS mgtm' - 95 % METEOROLOGY

Nitrogen

ERPG· I S.6
ERPG-2 9.4
ERPG-3 94

Volume I . Appendix D

Nitrogen

Carbon
Monoxide
ERPG - I 29
ERPG -2 172
ERPG-3 1720

ERPG - I 0 .79
ERPG-2 7.9
ERPG-3 39

Ni tric
Oxide
ERPG - I 31
ERPG-2 •
ERPG-3 123

Sulfur
Dioxide

Nitrogen

Dioxide
ERPG- I 5.6
ERPG-2 9.4
ERPG·3 94

Lead
ERPG· I 0 . 15
ERPG -2 70
ERPG·3 700

1.9. 10-'

Worker

500

ISO

2100

230

MOl

II

3.4

47

5.3

1.4 • 10- '

NPA

500

ISO

2 100

230

1.9. 10-'

• ERPG -2 level not assigned since one-tenth the lOLH level would be less Ihan the ERPG - t leve l.
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Table F.2.4.2-33. Summary of chem ical concentralio ns for fire involving diesel fuel at
Portsmouth Naval Shipyard .

Table F.2.4.2-35. Summary of chemical concentralions for fire involving diesel fuel at
Puget Sound Naval Shipyard.

CHEMICAL CONCENTRATIONS mg/m' - SO'll METEOROLOGY
Carbon

Monoxide
ERPG - I 29
ERPG -2 172
ERPG·3 1720

Sulfur
Dioxide
ERPG· I 0.79
ERPG-2 7.9
ERPG-3 39

Nitric
Oxide
ERPG - I 31
ERPG -2 •
ERPG·3 123

Nitrogen
Dioxide
ERPG· I S.6
ERPG·2 9.4
ERPG-3 94

lead
ERPG - I O. IS
ERPG·2 70
ERPG·3 700

Worker

33

10

140

IS

3.6 x 10-'

MOl

1.7

O.SI

7.0

0.78

1.7 x 10-'

NPA

2.7

0.83

II

1.2

3.0 x 10-'

Table F.2.4.2-34. Summary of chemical concentralions for fire involvil.g diesel fuel at
Portsmouth Naval Shipyard.

CHEMICAL CONCENTRATIONS mg/m' - SO'll METEOROLOGY
Carbon

Monoxide
ERPG- I 29
ERPG-2 172
ERPG -3 1720

Monoxide

Diox ide

Nitric
Oxide

ERPG -I 29
ERPG-2 172
ERPG-3 1720

ERPG- I 0.79
ERPG -2 7.9
ERPG -3 39

ERPG- I 31
ERPG-2 •
ERPG -3 123

ERPG - I 5.6
ERPG -2 9.4
ERPG -3 94

Sulfur

Nitrogen

Dioxide

Worker

500

ISO

2 100

230

1.9 x 10-'

24

7.2

99

II

3.7 x 10-'

NPA

73

22

300

34

1.7 x 10-'

• ERPG·2 level not &5!iened 5ince one-tenth the IOLH level would be tess than the ERPG- I level.
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Nitrogen

ERPG-I 31
ERPG-2 •
ERPG-3 123

ERPG -I 5.6
ERPG -2 9.4
ERPG-3 94

lead
ERPG-I 0.15
ERPG -2 70
ERPG-3 700
3.6 x 10-'

Dioxide

Worker

33

10

140

IS

I.S

0.47

6.3

0.71

1.5 x 10-'

NPA

13

4.0

S4

6.1

1.4 x 10-'

Table F.2.4.2-36. Summary of chemical concenlrations for fire involving diesel fuel at
Puget Sound Naval Shipyard .

CHEMICAL CONCENTRATIONS mg/m' - 9S 'II METEOROLOGY
Carbon
Monoxide
ERPG - I 29
ERPG -2 172
ERPG -3 1720

lead
ERPG- I 0. 15
ERPG-2 70
ERPG-3 700

MOl

Nitric
Oxide

MOl

CHEMICAL CONCENTRATIONS mg/m' ·95'11 METEOROLOGY
Carbon

Sulfur
Dioxide
ERPG-I 0.79
ERPG-2 7.9
ERPG-3 39

ERPG - I 0.79
ERPG -2 7.9
ERPG-3 39

Nitric
Oxide
ERPG-I 31
ERPG -2 •
ERPG-3 123

Sulfur

Dioxide

Nitrogen
Dioxide
ERPG - I 5.6
ERPG-2 9.4
ERPG -3 94

Lead

ERPG-I 0. 15
ERPG-2 70
ERPG -3 700

W orker

500

ISO

2 100

230

1. 9 x 10-'

MOl

21

6.5

89

9 .8

3.2 x 10....

NPA

200

61

830

92

5.8. 10....

• ERPG-2 level not assigned si nce one-tenth the IOLH level would be less than the ERPG - l level.
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Table F.2.4.2-37. Summary of chemical co ncentrations for fire involving di esel fuel aboard ship in
Puget Sound .

CHEMICAL CONCENTRATIONS mglm' • 50jl; METEOROLOGY
Sulfur
Dioxide
ERPG·I 0.79
ERPG·2 7.9
ERPG·3 39

Nitric
Oxide
ERPG·I 31
ERPG·2 •
ERPG·3 123

Nitrogen
Dioxide

Lead

ERPG· I 29
ERPG·2 172
ERPG·3 1720

ERPG· I 5.6
ERPG·2 9 .4
ERPG·3 94

ERPG· I 0.15
ERPG·2 70
ERPG·3 700

Worker

900

280

3800

420

9.9 x 10-'

MOl

4.0

1.2

17

1.9

4. 1 x 10-'

Carbo.
Monoxide

F.3 AIRCRAFT CRASH PROBABILITIES
F.3.1 Introduction
The probability of an airplane crashing into a fuel storage area or a fuel examination facility
at the various alternate site locations is presented in this section. An airplane crash into these regions
is of concern since it might result in th e release of corrosion products from the stored fuel or the
release of radioactive fission products from the fuel. The method outli ned in "A Methodology for
Calculation of the Probability of Crash of an Aircraft into Structures in Weapon Storage Areas"
(Sandia 1983) has been used to predict the crash probabilities for this analysis. This calculational
methodology takes into consideration the crash probabilities associated with landing and takeoff

Table F.2.4.2-38. Summary of chemical co ncentrations for fire involving d iesel fuel aboard ship in
Puget Sound .

operations at nearby airports and crashes during in· flight operations.

The aircraft crash probability analysis presented herein is based on the examination of large
CHEMICAL CONCENTRATIONS mgl m'· 95jl; METEOROLOGY

civilian aircraft and military aircraft crossing the space withi n a 10·mile rad ius of each site. The
crash probability of general aviation aircraft is not included in this assessment since aircraft of this

Carbo.
Monoxide
ERPG·I 29
ERPG·2 172
ERPG·3 1720

Sulfur

Dioxide
ERPG· I 0.79
ERPG·2 7.9
ERPG·3 39

Nitric
Oxide
ERPG· I 31
ERPG·2 •
ERPG·3 123

Nitrogen
Dioxide

Lead

ERPG·I 5.6
ERPG·2 9.4
ERPG·3 94

ERPG·I 0.15
ERPG·2 70
ERPG·3 700

radiolog ical threat in the event that they crash into a fuel storage area or a fuel examination fac il ity.

Worker

9900

3100

41000

4600

3.8 x 10-'

very small based on the models and conditions used in this analysis, and therefore has been omitted .

MOl

28

8.8

120

13

1.7 x 10-'

type generally do not possess sufficient mass or attain sufficiently high velocities to produce a serious

Further, the crash probability contribution due to air travel beyond 10 miles was determined to be

F.3,2 Methodology

• ERPG-2 level not assigned since one-tenth the IOLH level would be less than Ihe ERPG -l level.

The Sandia report provides the methodology which has been used for this assessment (Sandia
1983). In this report, the following expressions are given for calculating the crash probability
associated with takeoff and landing operations at a gi ve n airport runway, and in· flight operations
al ong a given airway :
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Pit

=L

Nk • Pni! • A • c(if) •

e · j dQ j/l(.l.iO

Table F ,3-1. Crash parameter Pn .

where: subscript "to" refers to airport takeoff operations

Operation

Military High Performance

Large Civilian and Military

to

1.6 x 10-"

0 .6 x 10-"

subscript "I" refers to airpo rt land ing operatio ns
if

3. 1 x 10-"

2.3 x 10"

3.9 x 10"/mile

0.5 x to-'/mile

subscript "if" refers to in-flight operations

Ni

•

the number of runway operat io ns per year

Nt

•

the number of in-flight operations per year

Pn

•

the crash probability per operation given in Table F .3-1

Table F .3-2, Crash dens ity constants.
Military High Performance

Zone

(I)

Operation

I
Xi

x~

•

the perpend icular distance from the centerline of the runway to the target in miles

II
•

the perpendicular distance from the airway to the target in miles

Yi

•

the perpendicular distance from th e end of the runway to the target in miles

c(a)

•

crash density constant given in Table F.3-2

c(if)

•

crash density constant given in Tab le F.3-3

8(x,a)

•

crash dens ity constant given in Table F.3-2

8(y,a)

•

crash density constant given in Table F.3-2

Large Civilian and Military

c(a)

8(x,a)

8(y ,a)

c(a)

8(x ,a)

8(y,a)

to

0.043

3.0

3.0

0.28

0 .7

1.4

I

0. 11

1.0

3.0

0.28

0.7

1.4

to

0

--

-

0

--

--

I

0.006

1.0

3.0

0.014

0.7

1.4

(1) Refer to Figure F.3·1 for crash zones.

Table F,3-3, Crash dens ity constants.

Military High Perfo rmance
Operation
if
8(x,if)

•

crash density constant give n in Tab le F.3-3

A

•

effective crash area in square mi les.
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c(if)
0.5

I
I

Large Civil ian and Military

8(x,if)

c(if)

1.0

0.8

I
I

8(x ,if)
0.63

Y - IoALES FROIoA
END Ck RUNWAY

j I

-- 3
ZONE I

o < IXI

~

0. 1

> 1.0 ,
IX: > 0 . 1
Y>0
Y

-- 2

- -

-

1

X - IoAILES FRO ...
CENTERLINE
Ck RUNWAY

2

1

1

2

I

I

I

I

I
I

I
I

..

ZONE II

IX: >
RU NWAY

0. 1

Y < 0

figure F.3-l. Crash lones.
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Using these relationships, the crash probability for takeoff, landing, and in-flight operations is
the product of the number of operations per year, times th e crash probability per operatio n per year,

ai r traffic along airways within this region was obtained from the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA). Airplane holding patterns and approach and departure routes that were identified by the FAA

times the effective crash area per square mile, times the crash probability density per square statute

were converted into equivalent airways for th is analys is. Info rmation regardi ng the number of takeoff

mile. To determine the crash probability assoc iated with a given site requires th e repeated application

and landing operations at each airport runway was obtained from the cognizant airport officials (i.e .•

of these relationsh ips for each airport runway and for each airway . These individual crash compo-

airport manager or base commander). or from the FAA . Tables F.34 and F .3-5 summarize the

nents are then summed to arrive at a total overall crash probability for a site.

airport and airway traffi c information that was obtained .

In the Sandia report, th e effective crash area is identified as the sum of the effective skid area

Ta ble F 3-4

of the plane, the effective plan view associated w ith the target, and th e effective shadow area of the

Airport landings and takeoffs per site location per year.

Sile Location

Airport

Large Civilian Aircraft
No.
Landings

Takeoffs

Landings

No.
Takeoffs

No.
Landings

Takeoffs

Barnwell Plant

Barnwell

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

156

150

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

crash (Sandia 1983). The following expression relates these terms and is val id for crash anitude
angles greater than zero. If the crash anitude angle is zero, an airplane would be fl ying along parallel
to the ground at an alt itude equal to or greater than the heig t of the target; therefo re, the airplane

Hanford 200 Area
400 Area

~)

target width di mensio n

H

target height

A.

aircraft wingspan

~

crash attitude angle

None
Richland

lNEL

target length dimension

W

No.

County

Kesrelring

where: L

No.

Military High
Performance Aircraft

County

would clear the object and there would be no crash.
A = (L + A. ) • (W + S, + H • cot

No.

Large Mmlary Aircraft

Saratoga
County

Nevada Test Site

No ne

No rfolk

Norfolk
Inti

21200

21200

0

0

0

0

Chambers

850

850

6600

6600

11100

11 100

101300

101300

5750

5750

8650

8650

Barbers
Poinl NAS

0

0

20500

20500

856

850

Ford
Island

0

0

0

0

0

0

Oak Ridge

None

Pearl Harbor

H onolulu
Inti /
H ickam
Air Force

Base

s,.

.

aircraft skid distance .
Portsmout h

F.3.3 Site Specific Information

16400'll

16400"

2450"

2450'"

2450'"

2450'"

0

0

0

0

0

0

4'·'

4,01

4'·'

4,41

.«

.,.

Ape:<

0

0

0

0

0

0

Port

0

0

0

0

0

0

brook

Puget Sound

The existence and location of airports and .. rways with in 10 statute miles of a site have been
obui ned from Sectional Aeronaut ical Maps published by th e Natio nal Ocean ic and Atmospheric

(NOAA 1993a; NOAA 1993b; NOAA 1993c; NOAA 1993d; NOAA 1993e; NOAA 1993f;
NOAA 1993g; USGS 1983a; USGS 1983b). These same sources of info rmation were also used to
obtai n the disUnces from airport runways and airways to the si tes of interest. Information regarding
F-242

4(;f )

Bremerton
Natl

Orchard

Adm inistration (NOAA). and from detailed site specific maps which ide nt ify nearby ai rport~

Volume I. Appendix 0

Pease Inl1

l ittle·

Savan nah River

N one

," FAA lesllng or new commeraal alrcrart at NOAA lower.
SpUI between aircran types is estimated to be equal. Precise breakdown nOI rumishcd by airport .
In Operations based o n tolal civilian aircra rt. Breakdown o r only large aircrart not rumished by airport.
If) Operat ions base~ on this ai rcraft type being available o nly during annual air show.
(2)

F-2 43
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Table F.3-S. Airway air traffic per site location per year.

the combined dry cell , shielded cell , and water pool as identified in Anachment B. For these
facilities, a crash into the building might damage the fuel either by the airplane directly striking it or

Site Location

Large Civilian

Large Military

Military High Performance

Barnwell Plant

5900

2600

3300

Hanford 200 Area
400 Area

2200
3200

0
100

0
0

0

0

0

Kesselring

98600

144

0

Nevada Test Site

22000

9000

19000

Norfolk

17000

350

550

Oak Ridge

86900

5900

4700

0

0

1750

INEL

Pearl Harbor

collapse and strike the fuel. The effective crash area associated with dry storage or shipping
containers waiting to be handled at these fuel examination facilities is based on the height and width
of an existing M- I40 shipping container and the modeling approach that two such containers could be
located outside of the fuel processing facility and separated by a reasonably large distance. The crash
anitude angle that was used was 15 degrees _ For these facilities and containers, airplane skid
distances of 2200 feet for military high performance aircraft and 1600 feet for large military and large

Portsmouth

11000

0

0

Puget Sound

12800

0

0

5900

2600

3300

Savannah River

by the airplane causing sufficient damage to the building to cause part of the building structure to

civilian aircraft were used. These skid distances correspond to the maximum expected skid distance
based o n the informat ion presented in the Sandia report (Sandia 1983)_

F.3.4 Aircraft Specific Information

Aircraft wingspans which are representative of large civilian aircraft. military high perforThe effecti ve crash area associated with various types of fuel storage at shipyards and
prototypes was based on the storage facil ity footprints ident ifi ed in Table 0·1 of Anachment D.
Length and width d imensions assoc iated with the target area were calcul ated from these footprints by
treati ng the storage area as square (i.e .. equ al length and width dimensions). The height of the dry
storage containers was based on that of an existing M·I40 shipping container, and the height of the
water pool facility superstru cture was ba.<od on the approx imate height of the Expended Core Facility
at INEL. For the water pool fac ility, a crash into the building might damage the fu el either by the
airplane d irectly str iking it or by the airplane caus ing sufficient damage to the building to cause part
of the building structure to collapse and str ike the fuel. The crash anitude angle used was 15 degrees ,
based on the recomme nded value identified in the Sandia report (Sandia 1983) . A reduced aircraft

mance aircraft (i.e., tactical fighter and tactical fighter trainer), and large military aircraft (i.e .• cargo,
transport, refueling, and bomber) have been taken into account separately in computing the overall
crash probabilities for each site. Wingspans for these three class of aircraft have been based on
average values computed from individual planes with in each class. Data from " Aviation Week &
Space Technology" served as the basis for determining these wingspans (AWST 1992). The
cal culated average wingspans were: 40 fee t for mil itary high-performance aircraft, 131 fee t for large
military aircraft, and 135 feet for large civilian aircraft. For large military and civilian ai rcraft. an
effective wingspan th at was 75% of the average wingspan was used in the probability calcul at ions .
Th is effective wingspan refl ects the fact th at onl y the region betwee n the most outboard wing-mounted
engines has the potential to seriously damage a fuel storage area or a fuel exami nation facility .

skid distance of 300 feet was used . Th is skid distance is based on a rev iew of the proposed site
locations and refl ects the fact that nearby buildings. dry docks. or retaining walls will ge nerall y limit

F.3.5 Results

the length of the ai rcraft skid to 300 feet or less prior to impact.
Tables F.3-6 and F .3-7 present the crash probabili ty results for the four methods of fue l
The effective crash area associated with fu el examination at the Ex pend ed Core Facility at

storage at shipyards and prototypes and for fuel exami nation fac ilities. The probabilities listed within

INEL o r similar facilities to be constructed at the Barnwell Plant . Hanford . Oak Ridge. the Nevada

these tables represent the combined takeoff. landing. and in-flight crash probabilities assoc iated wi..h

Test Site, or Savannah River was based on the vulnerable part of the fac il ity being 667 feet long, 194

each method of fu el storage at each site. Following the DOE NEPA oversight guidance.

feet wide. and 60 feet high. Th is represents the portion of the Expended Core Faci lity th at contains

consequences for beyond design basis acc idents are calcul ated where th e probability is 10-' or greater
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per year . These consequences are discussed in Section F. 1.4 of this anachment. For cases less likely

water pool facility at Portsmouth, all types of fuel storage at Puget Sound, the fuel examination

than 10"' per year, calculations of consequences are not included .

facilities at Barnwell , Hanford, and INEL, and the fuel examinatio n facility dry storage containers at
the Nevada Test Site.

The prcbability calcul ated for airplane crashes at different facilities located within a panicular
DOE site may vary somewhat. This situation exists at INEL where low altitude testing of commercial

Table F.3-6. Crash probabilities for various fuel storage options per site location per year.

jet airliners has been conducted near the NOAA lOwer. This tower is located about 1.5 miles from

ICPP, and 2.3 miles from ECF. As a result of this difference in distance, the crash probabilities are
expected to be about a factor of two higher atlCPP than at ECF. Further, two different methodologies have been in general use for determination of aircraft accident probabilities . In addition to the
Sandia methodology used in this appendix, a technique developed by the NRC in the 1970's has been
applied at some facilities . Comparison of the two methods has shown that results can differ by a
factor of two to four, with the NRC method generally producing higher probabilities than the Sandia
method . This difference stems from the somewhat more detailed natu re of the Sandia method .

Site Location

Immobile Dry
Storage
Containers

Shipping
Co ,tainers on
C, 'crete Pad

Shipping
Containers on
Railcars

Water Pool
Facility

Kesselring

9 x 10"'

x 10"

Norfolk

6 x 10"'

, x 10"'

I x 10""

Pearl Harbor

I x 10"'

I x \0"

N/A

Portsmouth

6 x \0"

6 x \0"

i

10"

7 x 10"'

Puget Sound

3 x 10"'

3 x \0"

8 x 10"'

3 x 10"'

I

X

X

2 x 10"'

10"'

4

x 10"'

2 x 10"'

Therefore, calculated aircraft crash probabilities at ICPP are expected to be about a factor of four to
eight higher than those calculated for ECF .

Table F.3-7. Crash probabilities for fuel examination facilities per site location per year.

Crash probabilities fall in the design basis range (i.e., probability of occurrence 2. 10"" per
year) at Pearl Harbor for all types of fuel storage, at Norfolk for fuel storage in shipping containers
on railcars, and at Oak Ridge and Savannah River for the fuel examination facility dry cell and water
pool. The radiological consequences associated with an airplane c"lSh into these areas are addressed
in detai l in Section F. 1.4.

Site Location

Sh ielded Cell,
Dry Cell, and
Water Pool
9 x \0"

I x 10"

Hanford 200 Area
400 Area

6 x \0".
4 x \0"

2 X \0".
I x \0"

INEL (ECF)

7 x \0"

2 x \0"
5 x \0"

Nevada Test Site

4 x \0"

5 x \0"

Crash probabi lities fall in the beyond design basis range (i.e., probability of occurrence
between 10"" and 10"' per year) at Norfolk fo r fuel storage in immobi le dry storage contai ners,

Dry Storage Containers

Barnwell Plant

shipping containers on a concrete pad, and in the water pool facility , at Kesselring for fuel storage in

Oak Ridge

I x 10"

3

X

10"

shipping containers on railcars and in the water pool facility, at Portsmouth for shipping containers on

Savannah Ri ver

2 x 10"

3

X

10"

(1)

railcars, at the Nevada Test Site for the fuel examination faci lity dry cell and water p ol, and the fuel
examination facility dry storage contai ners at Oak Ridge and Savannah River. The radio logical
consequences associated with an ai rpl ane crash into th ese areas are also addressed in deta il in Section

( I) Crash probabil ity based on 582 dry storage containers stored in a square array several hundred
yards away from ECF . Array footprint is 168,800 squ are feet.

F . 1.4.

Crash probabilities with a likelihood of occurrence less than 10"' per year are not ev':uated
since it is expected that they would contri bute very very linle to the risk . This is the case for
immobile dry slOrage and shipping containers on a concrete pad at Kesselring and Portsmouth , the
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F.4 FUGITIVE DUST

F.2.2.2) can also be used for this purpose; however, FOM was judged to be superior to the ISC2
Code for this evaluation.

The INEL-ECF is a large laboratory facility used to receive, examine, and ship naval nuclear
fuel and irradiated test specimen assemblies. This section provides the results of an evaluation of

F.4.2 Conditions and Key Parameters

fugitive dust emissions that could be generated during the construction of a similar laboratory facility
at an alternate location (Hanford, Savannah River, the Nevada Test Site, the Barnwell Plant, or Oak
Ridge) .

F.4.1 Computer Modeling to Estimate Fugitive Dust Emissions

•

Construction area was 30 acres.

•

Construction activities occurred over a 3- to 5-year period .

•

An emission factor of 2.0 tons per acre-month was used.

•

Grain sizes used were as follows :

Factors such as locations of affected persons , terrain, meteorological conditions, release
conditions, and grain size distributions are required as input parameters for calculations to determine
particulate concentrations from fugitive dust emissions during construction activities. This section
describes the computer model used to perform fugitive dust concentr.tion estimates. Specific input

Average Diameter

parameters used in this analysis are summarized in Section F .4.2.

~

(urn)

1.25

3

3.75

5

The Fugitive Dust Model (FOM) was the computer code chosen to evaluate fugitive dust

7.5

15

emissions from construction activities at an alternate DOE location. FOM is a computerized air

12.5

10

quality model specifically designed for estimating fug i,tive dust emissions from point, line, or area

20.0

67

sources (EPA 1992c).
•

Meteorological conditions used were the 5-year average STAR data sets.

FOM is designed to work with properly prepared meteorological data such as the EPA
RAMMET program or card Images of meteorological data in either hourly or Stability Array (STAR)
format . FOM is based on the well-known Gaussian plume formulation for computing concentrations,

•

Roughness heights were 2 centimeters for Hanford and Nevada Test Site and
30 centimeters for Savannah River, the Barnwell Plant , and Oak Ridge.

but the model has been specifically adapted to incorporate an improved gradient transfer deposition
algorithm . Emissions for each source are apportioned by the user into a series of particle size

F.4.3 Results

classes . A gravitational settling velocity and a deposition velocity are subsequently calculated by
FDM for each class, and dust concentrations and depositions are then calculated for locations selected
The fugitive dust concentrations were calcul ated using FOM for the worker. MCW. NPA,

by the user.

and MOl using normal meteorology. Table FA- I lists the fugitive dust concentrations at various
FOM is the preferred model for estimating conditions resulting from particulate matter
emissions from fug itive sources such as excavatio n and soil handling . The ISC2 Code (Section
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locations. These airborne concentrations were co mpared against the TL V-TWA concentration for
pm iculates . The TLV-TW A concentratio n of 10 mg /m' was not exceeded at any of the specified
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locations for fugitive dust that could be generated during construction activities at the alternate
locations. Since these concentrations were extremely low, it can also be concluded that similar results
would be expected for the alternate shipyard locations since the facilities to be constructed would be
smaller.
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Table F.4-l. Summary of fugitive dust concentrations for construction activities at alternate Ivr.ations.
Fugitive Dust Concentration mg/m3

Worker

'TI
I

~

<:

o

C
3~

Savannah River

Hanford*

Nevada
Test Site

Oak Ridge

Barnwell Plant

2.7

3.5

1.6

3. 1

2.7

10-2

8.1 x

IO-~

10-3

MCW

3.6 x 10.2

MOl

2.8 x

I~

1.3 x 10"

2_9 x 10"

0.22

3.2 x 10-3

NPA

lAx

l~

2.2 x 10"

Not applicable

1.6

3.2 x 10-3

7.3

X

2.9

X

5.2 x

l~

·MOI shown is for a new spent fuel facility constructed at the 200 Area on the Hanford Site. The MOl concentration is 3.0 x l~ mg/m3
for a new spent fuel facility constructed at the Fuels and Material~ Examination Facility.

F.S OCCUPATIONAL ACCIDENTS

The number of construction workers that would be required to construct or modify each naval
spent nuclear fuel storage and examination fac ility was calculated for every year that construction

Occupational accidents can occur in the workplace during the construction or operation of any

would take place during the period 1995 through 2035. The sum of these workers represents the total

industrial facility . In order to assess the possible extent of occupational accidents during construction

number of construction workers. The 4O-year total of construction fatalities was obtained by

and non-<:onstruction operations at naval spent nuclear fuel facilities. projections of the number of

multiplying the total number of construction workers by the construction fatality rate for DOE and

fatalities and injuries or illnesses were made for each alternative. The projections are presented in

DOE contractors.

th is section. The projections are based on average occupational fatality and injury incidence rate data
published by the DOE (DOE 1993a) for DOE and DOE contractor operations. The incidence rates

The annual average number of construction workers for each facility was obtained by dividir.g

that were used in the analyses are provided below . A more detailed discussion of the basis for these

the total number of construction workers by the number of years that construction would take place.

incidence rates is presented in Volume I.

The product of the annual average number of construction workers and the construction fatality rate
for DOE and DOE co ntractors was calculated to provide the annual average number of construction

Average occupational injury/illness and fatality rates")

fatalities .

All Labor Categories
Total
Injuryllilness

Fatalities

Construction Workers
Total
Injury/Illness

Fatalities

The annual average and 4O-year total co nstruction injuries or illnesses were calcul ated in the
same manner as construction fatalities except that the c nst ruction injury or illness accident rate for
DOE and DOE contractors.

DOE and
Contractors(o'

3.2

0.0032

6 .2

0.011
F. 5. 1.2 Storage and Examination Facili/y Opera/ions. The average number of fatalities and

(. ) All incidence rates are given per 100 worker-years
(0, 1988-1992 averages (DOE 1993a)

injuries or illnesses and th e 40-year total fatalities and injuries or illnesses were calcul ated for
operation of naval spent nuclear fuel storage and examinati on facilities . The methods of calculatin ~
the operational fatalities and injuries or illness are presented below.

The term 'injury/ill ness' as used in th is an alysis corresponds to the DOE defi nition of a
The accident rates for DOE and DOE co ntractor operations other than construction were used
recordable injury illness. Specifically. an inju ry or illness case represents any work-related death,
because examination and storage facility operations would more likely be performed by DOE and
iIIn.... or any work-related injury which would result in !oss of consciousness, restri ction of work or
DOE contractor person nel (o r Navy perso nn el in the case of shipyards). The number of workers th at
motion. transfer to another job. or medical treat ment beyond first aid.
wou ld be required to operate each naval spe nt nuclear fuel storage and examination facili ty was
calculated for eve ry year during the period 1995 through 2035 and summed over th e 4O-year period

F.S.1 Accident Evaluation

to obtain the total number of work ers. The 4O-year IOtal of fatalities was obtained by multiplying the
total number of workers by the DOE fatali ty rate.

F. 5 . t. t Cons/ruction. The average number of const ru ction-related fatalities and injury or illnesses

and the 4O-year total were calculated . The methods of calculating constru ctio n-related fatalities and

The annual average number of workers for each facility was obtained by dividing the total
number of workers by the number of operational years (40 years). The product of the annual average

injuries or illnesses are presented below.

number of workers and the DOE fatality rate represe nts the annual average number of operational
fatalities .
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The annual average and 4O-year total esti mated injuries or illnesses associated with facility
operations were calculated in the same manner as fatalities associated with faci lity operations except
that the DOE injury or illness accident rate was used .

F.S.2 Results
This section presents tabulated results of calculations of construction and operating fatalities
and injuries or illnesses for each alternative. Table F .5-1 provides the proje tions of occupational
fatalities and injuries or illnesses for construction activities and storage and examination operations for
each alternative. Tables F.5-2 through F.5-5 present the results of calculations of occupational
fatalities and injuries or illnesses for construction activities and storage and examination operations at
naval sites. The results of all calculations show that the number of fatalities and injuries or illnesses
for construction activities and storage and examination operations would be low for any alternative.
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Table F.S-l. Occupational fatalit ies and injuries/illnesses by alternative - construction activities and storage and examination
facility operations.
Fatalities
Alternative

Construction

Annual
Average

Construction

4O-Year
Total

Annual
Average

4O-Year
Total

Operations
Annual
Average

4O-Year
Total

3.9 x to-l

6.9 x to·J

2.5 x to·)

9.8 x 10.2

2.2

3.9

2.5

9.8 x 101

No Exam

3. 1 x to·2

2.2 x 10"1

6.6

2.6

1.8 X to l

1.2 x 1()2

6.6

2.6 x 1()2

Limited Exam

4.2 x to·:

2.5 x 10"1

8.3 x to·J

3.3 x to·I

2.4 x 101

1.4 x 1()2

8.3

3.3 x 1()2

Full Exam

3.4 x to-2

2.2 x to·1

2.1 x to-2

8.3 x to· I

1.9 x 10 1

1.3 x 1()2

2.1 x 101

8.3 x 1()2

2.6 x 10')

5.3 X 100J

I. 7 x to-2

6.6 x to·I

1.5

3.0

1.7 x 101

6.6 x 1()2

INEL

2_6 x to-

5.3 x to·)

1. 7 x to-2

6.6 x to-I

1.5

3.0

1.7 x 101

6.6 x 1()2

Nevada Test Site

4.7 x too:

3.3 x to·1

1. 7 x to-2

6.7 x 10"1

2.7 X 10 1

1.9 x 1()2

1.7 x 101

6.7 x 1()2

Oak Ridge

4.7 x to-2

3.3 x 10"1

1. 7 X 10-2

6.7 x to·I

2.7 x 10 1

1.9 x 1()2

1.7 x 101

6.7 x 1()2

INEL

2.6 x IO-J

5.3

10"3

I. 7 x to-2

6.6 x 10"1

1.5

3.0

1.7 x 101

6.6 x 1()2

Hanford

4.7 x to-2

3.3 x to-I

1.7 x to-2

6.7 x to-I

2.7 x 10 1

1.9 x 1()2

1.7 x 101

6 .7 x 1()2

Savannah River

4.7 x 10-2

3.3 x to-I

1.7 x 10-2

6.7 x to·I

2.7 x 10 1

1.9 x 1()2

1.7 x to l

6.7 x 1()2

Nevada Test Site

4.7 x to-2

3.3 x 10"1

I. 7 X 10-2

6.7 X 10"1

2.7 X to l

1.9 x 1()2

I. 7 x 101

6.7 x 1()2

Oak Ridge

4.7 x to-2

3.3 x 10"1

1.7 x to-2

6.7 x 10-1

2.7

1.9 x 1()2

1.7 x 101

6.7 x 1()2

1.

No Action

2.

Decentralization'"

3.

Operations

4O-Year
Total

Annual
Average

•
•
•

Injuriesnllnesses

1992/ 1993 Planning
Basis

X

10')

X

10"1

4. Regionalization

•
•
•

5. Centralization

<

2c:

3C1>
:>

"0
"0
C1>

::l

Q.
)(

o

•
•
•
•
•

The water pool storage mode was used

10

X

the calculalton

Smce

X

10 1

tbe maxImum number ot construclton and 0 pe rahonaJ wor ers would be IOvolved.

<

o

Table F.5-2. Occupational fatalities for construction activities at Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program sites.

C
3C1>

ECF

>

Annual
Average

4O-Year
Total

Pearl Harbor

Portlmouth

Norfolk

Keuelri",

Annual
Average

4O-Yea r
Total

Annual
Average

4O-Year
Total

Annual
Average

4O-Year
Total

Annual
AveralC

4O-Year
Total

Annual
AveralC

4O-Year
Toc.al

I. Railcar Storage

7.7 x 10"

2.3 x 10-'

7.7 x 10"'

7.7 x 10"

7.7 x 10"

7.7 x 10"

7.7 x 10"

2.3 x 10"

7.7 x 10"

7.7 x 10"

2. Shipping
Containera on
Concrete Pads

3 .3 x 10"

6 .6 x 10"

3 .3 x 10"

6 .6 x 10"'

3.3 x 10"

6.6 x 10"

3.3 x 10"'

6.6 x 10"'

3.3 x 10"

6.6 x 10"

3 . Immobile Storage
Containera

3 .3 x 10"

6.6 x 10"

3 .3 x 10"

6 .6 x 10"

3 .3 x 10"

6 .6 x 10"

3 .3 x 10"'

6 .6 x 10"'

3.3 x 10"

6.6 x 10"'

8. 1 x 10"

5.7

5.3 x 10"

3 .7

S.3 x 10"

3.7

7.7 x 10"

5.4

4 .9 x 10-'

3 .• x 10-'

1.1 x 10 '

3 .2 x 10"

"0
"0

Storage

C1>
::l

Q.

Puget Sound

Storage Modes

><

o

4.

W al~ r Pool
Storage

X

10'

Examination Modes
I. Full Exam

2. Limited Exam

2 .6 x 10"

5.3 x 10"

t/4/

X

10-'

X

10-'

X

10-'

Table F.5-3. Occupational fatalities for storage and examination facility operations at Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program sites .
Puget Sound

ECF

Annuli
Average

4().Year
Total

Annual
Average

l. Railcar Storage

1.9 x 10"

7.7 x 10"

1.9 x 10"'

7.7 x

2. Shipping

2.7x 10"

1.1 x 10"

2.2 x 10"

8.8

Storage

Annual
Average

4().Year
Total

Pearl Harbor

Porumouth

Norfolk

Kcaaelrilll

Annual
Average

4(). Year
Total

Annual
Average

4O-Year
Total

Annual
Average

I~

1.9 x 10-'

7.7 x 10-'

1.9 x 10-'

7.7 x 10"

1.9 x 10-'

7.7x

2.0 x 10-'

8.0 x 10""

2.0 x 10"'

8.0 x 10"

3.3 x 10-'

1.3 x 10-'

1.9 x 10-'

7.7 x 10"

10"

1.2 x 10"

4.8

X

10-'

1.3 x 10"

S.O

X

10"

2.6 x 10""

1.0 x 10"'

6.9 x 10"'

2.8 x 10-'

1.0 x 10"'

4. 1 x 10"

8.0 x 10"

3.2

X

10"

8.1 x 10"

3.2

X

10"

9.S x 10""

3.8 x 10"

6.3 x

1.8

7.1

4O-Year
Total

4O-Year
Total

Storage Modes'"
I~

Containera on
Concrete Pads

3. Immobile Storage

X

Containers

4. Water Pool
Storage
Examination Modes

"T1
I
!'oJ

VI

1. Full Exam

1.7

X

10"

6.6

X

10'\

-..J

2. Limited Exam

X

10"

X

10-'

01, Decentralization (No Exam) used for reprexntat;ve cax.

<

£.
c:
3
(tI

>

'0
'0
(tI

::I

Q.
)C

0

I/i/Q

I~

2.S

X

10-'

< Table F.S4.

£.
c
3

Occupational injuries/illnesses for construction activities at Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program sites.

~

ECF

Porumouth

4O-Year
Toe-I

AnnWlI
Average

I. lUilcu Storage

4.3 x 10-'

1.3 x 10"

4 .3 x 10"

4 .3

X

10"'

4 .3 x 10"

4.3

X

10"

4.3

X

2 . Shipping
Containers on
Concrete Psd.

1.9 x 10"

3 .7

1.9

10"

3 .7

X

10"

1.9

X

10"

3.7

X

10"

1.9

3 . Immobile Storage
Containers

1.9 x 10"'

3 .7 x 10"'

1.9 x 10"

3 .7

X

10"

1.9

X

10"'

3.7 x 10"

1.9

4 . Water Pool

4.6 x 10"

3 .2 x 10'

3.0 x 10"

2 . 1 x 10'

3 .0x10"

2 .1 x 10'

5 .9 x 10"

1.8 x 10'

4O-Year
Toe-I

4O-Year
Toe-I

Norfolk

AnnWlI
Average

Storage

Anntal
Average

Pearl H.rbor

PugetSound

AnnWlI
Average

4O-Year
Toe-I

AnnWlI
Average

ICc_Irina

4O-Year
Toe-I

Annu.1
Average

4O-Year
Toe-I

10"'

1.3 x 10"

4.3 x 10"'

4.3 x 10"'

X

10"'

3.7 x 10"

1.9

10"'

3.7 x 10"

X

10"'

3.7 x 10"'

1.9 x 10"'

3 .7 x 10"'

4 .4 x 10"

3.1 x 10'

2.8 x 10"

1.9 x 10'

Storage Modes

X

10"

Storage
EXl mination Mode!

"T1
I

N
VI
00

I. Full Exam

2 . limited Exam

1.5 x 10"

3 .0 x 10"

X

X

Table F.S-S. Occupational injuries/illnesses for storage and examination faci.ity operations at Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program sites.
ECF

P~rI

Puget Sound

Harbor

Portamoulh

ICe_Irina

Norfolk

AMual
Average

4O-Y~r

AMual
Average

4O-Y~r

AMulI

4O-Y~r

TOlII

Average

TOlII

Annual
Average

4O-Y~r

TOlII

AMual
Average

4O-Y~r

TOlII

1. JUilclr Storage

1.9 x 10"'

7.7 x 10"'

1.9 x 10"'

7.7 x 10"'

1.9xlO·'

7.7 x 10"'

1.9 x 10"'

7.7 x 10"'

1.9 x 10"'

7.7 x 10"'

2. Shipping

2.7 x 10"

t.t

2.0 x 10"

8.0

2.0 x 10"'

8.0 x 10"

3.3 x 10"'

1.3

1.9 x 10"'

7.7 x 10"'

2 .2 x 10"'

8.8

1.2 x 10"'

4.8

1.3 x 10"'

S.O

2.6 x 10"'

1.0 x 10"'

6 .9 x 10"'

2.8

1.0

4. 1 x 10'

8.0

3.2

8.1 X 10"

3.2

9 .S

3.8 x 10'

6.3

2.5 x 10'

1.8

7.1 x 10'

Storage

AMual
Average

4O-Y~r

TOll I

TOlIl

Storage Mode . ...

X

10"

Containen on
Concrete Pad.

3. Immobile Storage
Containen

4. Water Pool
Storage
Examination Modes

."
,

1. Full Exam

N
VI
\0

2. Limited Exam

ell

<

~
c

3

(lI

1.7 x 10'

6 .6 x 10'

Decentraliution (No Exam) used for representative case .

X

10"

X

10'

X

10'

X

10"'

X

10"'
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ATTACHMENT G

The alternatives considered in the environmental impact statement also include more potential
sites for management of naval spent nuclear fuel. This provides a wider range of choices, but, as a

COMPARISON OF THE NAVAL SPENT NUCLEAR
FUEL STORAGE ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT
AND THIS ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT

natural consequence, it also increases the number of potential destinations and the miles traveled by
shipments of naval spent nuclear fuel under some alternatives. In the same manner, while the
environmental assessment considered temporary storage of naval spent nuclear fuel at Newpon News
Shipbuilding, storage at Newpon News is not included in the alternatives in the environmental impact
statement because that shipyard is not federally owned.

The Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program has prepared an environmental assessment of shonterm storage of naval spent nuclear fuel until the environmental impact statement, of which this

The alternatives considered in the environmental impact statement also include storage of

appendix is a pan, can be completed and an alternative for management of naval spent nuclear fuel is

naval spent nuclear fuel in water pools and immobile dry storage casks in addition to storage in

selected (Federal Register, Vol. 59, No. 19,4051, January 8, 1994). The environmental assessment

shipping containers. There is also an evaluation of alternatives for examination of naval spent nuclear

considered alternatives for storing, until June 1995, naval spent nuclear fuel removed from nuclear-

fuel in the environmental impact statement. These additional storage modes and examination

powered vessels and reactor prototypes at several naval sites. The environmental impact statement,

alternatives were not considered in detail in the environmental assessment because the period covered

which the appendix including this attachment is a pan, considers alternatives for the examination and

by that document was shon and consequently, the implementation of some of the alternatives would

storage of naval spent nuclear fuel during a 4O-year perind beginning in June 1995.

have been impractical . For example, water pool storage facilities could not be funded and constructed
at the shipyards in a period of less than 2 years.

Occasions may arise when comparison of the impacts for naval spent nuclear fuel described in
Illese two documents may be desired. However, there are some differences between the environmen-

Also, as a natural result of the longer period considered in this environmental impact

tal assessment and this appendix which should be recognized because they make such a comparison

statement, a larger number of naval spent nuclear fuel assembl ies and additional types of naval fuel

complicated. Failure to recognize these differences may lead to an erroneous conclusion that the two

assemblies are included in the analyses . The increase in the amount of naval spent nuclear fuel

documents are inconsistent or contradictory.

occurs since a cenain number of naval reactors are refueled or defueled each year. so in a greater
number of years more fuel becomes available for storage. Similarly, some newer designs for naval

First, and most imponantly, the environmental assessment considered only a limited period,
less than 2 years, needed to conduct the National Environmental Policy Act process required to reach

nuclear propulsion plants will not be refueled for the first time until some time after 1995, so those
types of fuel are not treated in the environmec.!al assessment .

a decision on the long-term management of Depanment of Energy (DOE) spent nuclear fuel. This
process includes preparation of th is environmental impact statement. The environmental impact

The environmental impact statement addresses some impacts of normal operations and some

statement, and therefore this appendix , provides the evaluation of the alternatives to be us>!d for

accidents not discussed in the environmental assessment because the conditions or operation which

managing spent nuclear fuel for 40 years. As a result, ti>is environmental impact statement considers

might cause these effects would not occur under th e alternatives considered in the environmental

a wider range of al ternatives than the enviro nmental assessment , panly because more alternatives are

assessment. The environmental impact statement also addresses several types of impacts for each

possible if a longer time is available to implement them and panly because some decisions which

alternative in greater detail than the environmental assessment. Th is was done hecause more detailed

could be deferred for a shon period such as 2 years should not be deferred for a period as long as

treatment was judged to be appropriate wirh the broader scope of alternatives in the environmental

40 years .

impact statement.
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The methods used to perform the analyses in the environmental impact statement have been

GLOSSARY

refined in the time since the environmental assessment was prepared . This occurred partly because of
the larger number of naval spent nuclear fuel asse mblies analyzed and the wider scope of sites and

activation

The process of making a material radioactive by exposing the material
to neutrons. protons. or other nuclear particles .

activation products

The radionuclides formed as a result of a material being activated.
For example. cobalt-6> is an activation product resulting from neutron
activation of cobalt-59.

activity

A measure of the rate at which a material is emining nuclear
radiation. Activity is usually measured in terms of the number of
nuclear disintegrations which occur in a quantity of the material over a
period of time. The standard unit of activity is the curie (Ci). which
is equal to 37 billion (3 .7 x 10'') disintegrations per second .

aggregates

Sand. gravel. or rock which is used in concrete or mortar mixes to
achieve increased strength .

airborne emissions

Radioactivity in the form of radioactive particles. gases. or both that is
transported by air.

alloy

A mixture of two or more metals.

aquifer

A water-bearing stratum of permeable rock. sand. or gravel located
beneath the surface of the earth . which is capable of yielding water to
a well or spring.

archaeological areas

Areas of or relating to the scientific study of material remains (as
fossil relics. artifacts. monuments) of past human life and activities .

average individual

An iodividual who could consume items or occupy areas at rates
which would be typical for the population of interest.

base fl ood

A flood which has a l·percent chance of occurrence in any given
year. Also referred to as a IOO·year fl ood.

benthic

Pertaining to the bonom of the ocean .

best estimate

An estimate in which the factors used in determining the estimate were
chosen such that the result approximately represents what would be
expeeted .

cladding

A metal casing that surrounds the nuclear fuel.

methods of storage to be evaluated . and partly because additional time was available to implement the
refinements. In addition to refinements in the methods for performing the calculations. some minor
changes in the calculational models were made in order to establish a high degree of consistency with
the analytical methods used for the other DOE sites that are part of the environmental impact
statement. This consistency is appropriate in some cases in order to establish common grounds for
comparison of al ternatives. The changes in the calculational methods make a direet comparison of the
analytical results presented in the environmental assessment for naval sites with those in this appendix
difficult.
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GLOSSARY (Cont)
coastal zone

The region along the shore, adjacent to the ocean. A coastal zone is
usually defined as the region within 3 nautical miles of a shorehne .

concentration factor

A factor which is defined as the concentration of an elen.ent or
radionuclide in an organism or its tissues divided by the concentration
directly available from the organism's environment under equilibrium
or steady-state conditions.

conservative estimate

An estimate in which the factors used in determining the estimate were
chosen such that the result would be unlikely to be exceeded .

containments

Devices as complex as a glove box or as simple as a plastic bag
designed to limit the spread of radioactive contamination to an area as
close as possible to the source, and to break the chain of transfer to
prevent contaminating other material.

GLOSSARY (Cont)
curie (ei)

The curie is the COmmon unit used for expressing the magnitude of
radioactive decay in a sample containing radioactive material .
Specifically, the curie is that amount of radioactivity equal to
3.7 x 10" (37 billion) disintegrations per second. This unit does not
give any indication of the radiological hazard associated with the
disintegration.

defueling

Removal of all nuclear fuel from a nuclear-powered ship.

design earthquake

The maximum intensity earthquake that might occur along the nearest
fault to a structure. Structures are built to withstand a design
earthquake.

diffusion

The process of spreading out or scattering from regions of higher
concentration to regions of lower concentration.

core

The central portion of a nuclear reactor containing the nuclear fuel.

dispersion

The process of scattering or distributing over a large region.

corrosion

The process denoting the destruction of metal by chemical or
electrochemical action.

dose

A general term which denotes the quality of radiation or energy
absorbed; usually expressed in rems for doses to man.

The substances produced by corrosion of a metal . Rust is a common
corrosion product resulting from the corrosion of iron .

dose commitment

The total radiation dose accrued by an individual over a specified
period of time due to the exposure of the individual to radiation during
a given interval of time. This includes the total time the radioactive
material would reside in the body, if ingested or inhaled (usually
expressed in rems).

dose commitment

A factor which converts the quantity of radioactivity taken into the
body to the dose to the individual (usually expressed in rems per
curie).

corrosion products

corrosion· resistant
alloy
critical organ

An alloy which corrodes slowly compared to ordinary alloys.
Stainless steel is an example of a corrosion-resistant alloy.
The limiting organ for evaluating exposure to ionizing radiation . A
critical organ is determined by the following criteria: (I) the organ
that accumulates the greatest concentration of a radioactive material ,
(2) the necessity of the organ to the well being of the entire body,
(3) the organ most damaged by the entry of a radionuclide into the
body, and (4) the organ damaged by the lowest exposure. Usually ,
case (I) is the determining factor for choosing the critical organ .

critical pathways

Those pathways which result in the most significant amount of
exposure to radiation .

cumulative effects

The changes in the health of an individual(s) from the sum of all
yearly exposures to radiation.
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conversion factor
dose equivalent

A quantity used to express all radiations on a common scale for
calculating the effective absorbed dose. It is defined as the product of
the absorbed dose and certain modifying factors and is expressed in
rems.

dose rate

The amount of radiation dose delivered in a unit amount of time; for
example, in rems per hour.

dose rate conversion
factor

A factor which converts the exposure to a given radiation level to the
dose that an individual could receive. It is usually expressed in rems
per hour per curie per cubic meter (or square meter).
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GLOSSARY (Cont)
dredge spoil

ecosystem

element

Bottom sediments or materials that have been excavated from a
waterway.

GLOSSARY (Cont)
fissile

A material whose nucleus is capable of being split (fissioned) by
neutrons of all energies.

A community of plant and animal populations together with their
physical environment. An organizational unit which can maintain its
biological activities independent of other units.

fission

The splitting of a heavy nucleus into two approximately equal parts
which is accompanied by the release of a relatively large amount of
energy and generally one or more neutrons.

A chemical substance that cannot be divided into simpler substances
by chemical means. A substance whose atoms all have the same
atomic number.

fission products

During operation of a nuclear reactor, heat is produced by the fission
(splitting) of "heavy" atoms, such as uranium, plutonium, or thorium.
The residue left after the splitting of these "heavy' atoms is a series of
intermediate weight atoms generally termed "fission products. '
Because of Ibe nature of Ibe fission process, many fission products are
unstable and, hence, radioactive.

floodplain

The lowlands which adjoin inland and coastal waters and relatively flat
areas and floodprone areas of offshore islands which are covered with
water from a I-percent or greater chance flood in any given year.

floodplain/wetlands

endangered species

A species or subspecies which is in danger of extinction throughout all
or a significant portion of its range.

envirolU1lellUl
consequences

Changes to the environment as a result of the effects of radiation or
radioactive materials.

epidemiological study

A scientific study that deals with the incidence, distribution, and
control of disease in a specified population.

exclusion area

An area where access would result in personnel exceeding radiation
exposure limits in a very short time.

assessment

An evaluation which consists of a description of a proposed action, a
discussion of its effects on the floodplain/wetlands , and a
consideration of alternatives.

Expended Core
Facility (ECF)

A lar,e laboratory facility , located at the Naval Reactors Facility in
Idaho, consistinll of water pools and shielded cells used to receive
examine, and ship naval spent nuclear fuel and irradiated test
'
specimen assemblies. Naval spent nuclear fuel is prepared at ECF for
stor..e and shipment to the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant.

flora

Plants.

fuel

Fissionable material used or useable to produce energy in a nuclear
reactor. It may also refer to a mixture, such as natural uranium, in
which only part of the atoms are readily fissionable.

exposure, external

The subjecting of the outside of the body of an organism to ionizing
radiation.

gamma ray

exposure, internal

The subjecting of the inside of the body of an organism to ionizing
radiation.

exposure, occupational

The subjecting of an individual to ionizing radiation in the course of
employment.

[Symbol 'Y (gamma)J High-energy, short wavelength electromagnetic
radiation. Gamma radiation frequently accompanies beta particle
emissions. Gamma rays are very penetrating and are stopped most
effectively by dense materials such as lead or uranium. They are
essentially similar to x-rays but are usually more energetic and
originate from the nucleus. Cobalt-60 is an example of a radionuclide
that emits gamma rays.

geoJogy

The study of the origin, history, materials, and structure of the earth .

exposure. radiation

The subjecting of a material or organism to ionizing radiat ion.
geophysical survey

fauna

Animals.

An examination of the condition, situation, or value of the earth using
the physics of the earth including the fields of meteorology,
hydrology, oceanography, seismology, volcanology, magnetism,
radioactivity, and geology .
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GLOSSARY (Cont)
glaciation

The act of having been subjected to glaciers, extreme cold, and ice.

groundwater

Water that exists or flows beneath the eanh's surface in the rone of
saturation between saturated soil and rock .

half-life, biological

The time required for a biological system, such as an organ or tissue
in an organism, to clear by natural (non-radioactive) processes, half
the amount of a substance that has entered it.

half-life, radioactive

The time required for half of the atoms of a radioactive material to
decay to another nuclear form .

hazardous wastes

Excess chemical material that is dangerous to human health .

health detriment

The sum of all fatal cancers, a fraction of the non-fatal cancers
proponional to the severity of the cancer types, and all genetic
defects.

isotope

One of two or more nuclides which have the same number of protons
but have different numbers of neutrons in their nuclei. Therefore, the
isotopes of an element have the same atomic number but different
atomic weights. Isotopes usually have very nearly the same chemical
propenies but somewhat different physical propenies.

long-lived radioactivity

Radioactive nuclides which decay slowly, therefore having relatively
long half-lives.
A unit used to measure the radiation exposure to an entire group and
to compare the effects of different amounts of radiation on groups of
people. It is obtained by multiplying the average dose equivalent
(measured in rems) to a given organ or tissue by the number of
persons in the population of interest.

maximally exposed
individual (MEl)

A theoretical individual who receives the highest radiation exposure
from the facility or activity in question.

maximally exposed
off-site
individual (MOl)

A theoretical individual located at the point on the DOE site or
shipyard boundary nearest to the facility or activity in question.

health effect

The occurrence of a fatal cancer, a non-fatal cancer, or a genetic
defect.

high-efficiency
paniculate filter

A ventilation system device that can separate a panicle size of
0.3 micron from the air into a filter medium at an efficiency of at
least 99.97 percent.

maximum individual

An individual who could consume items or occupy areas at rates
which would be at a maximum for the population of interest.

The study of the propenies, distribution, and effects of water on the

maximum organ

The organ which receives or could receive the largest amount of
exposure to radiation.

hydrology

eaM'S surface, in the soil and underlying rocks, and in the

atmosphere.
incident-free operations

ion

ionizing radi ation

irradiate
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metric ton
Routine, day-to-day operations without accidents or other unexpected
or unusual occurrences. Synonymous and interchangeable with
normal operations.

[Abbreviation MTJ A unit of mass which is equal to 1000 kilograms
or approximately 2205 pounds.

microcurie

[Abbreviation I'Ci) A unit of activity which is equal to one-millionth
(I x 10"') of a curie.

An atom or molecule which has acquired an electrical charge by
gaining or losing electrons.

mil

A unit of length which is equal to one-thousandth (I x 10") of an
inch .

millicurie

[Abbreviation mCi) A unit of activity which is equal to
one-thousandth (I x 10") of a curie.

millirem

[Abbreviation mrem) A special unit for measuring dose equivalents
which is equal to one-thousandth (I x 10") of a rem.

Any radiation which displaces electrons from atoms or molecules,
thereby producing ions. Examples include alpha, beta, and gamma
radiation. Exposure to ionizing radiation may produce skin or tissue
damage.
To expose to radiation.
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monitoring. environmental

The periodic or continuous determinat ion of lite amount of
radioaClivil}' or radioactive conlamination present in a region.

palltway

The route or course alon, which radionuclides from defueled nuclearpowered ships could reach man.

natural background
radiation exposure

The IOIal amount of radiation from cosmic radiation emined by lite
sun and Ibe radiation emined by natural minerals in Ibe ear!h's crust.
Typically, an average annual exposure of 100 mrem to lite tolal body
occurs from background radiation.

percolate

To drain or seep through a material .

permeabilil}'

The qualil}' or state of being able 10 diffuse or pass Ibrough a
material .

A joint program of Ibe Department of Energy and lite Department of
Ibe Navy which has as its objective lite design and development of
improved naval nuclear propulsion plants having high reliability,
maximum simplicity, and optimum fuel life for inslallation in ships
ranging in size from small submarines to large combatant surface
ships. The program is frequently referred to as lite Naval Reactors
Program.

pH

A measure of Ibe relative acidity or alkalinity of a solution. A neutral
solution bas a pH of 7 , acids have pH's less Iban 7, and bases have
pH's greater Iban 7 .

picocurie

[Abbreviation pCil A unit of activity which is equal to one-triilionllt
(I x 10''') of a curie.

prototype plants

Land-based naval nuclear reaClor plants Ibat are typical of a first
design for a naval warship and are used to test equipment and lite
nuclear fuel prior 10 use on a shipboard nuclear plant. The prototype
plants are also used to train naval officers and enlisted personnel as
propulsion plant operators willt extensive watchstanding experience
and a Iborough knowledge of all propulsion plant systems and lIteir
operating requirements .

radiation

The emission and propagation of energy IItrough maner or space by
means of electromagnetic disturbances which display bollt wave-like
and particle-like behavior. In litis context, lite ·particles· are known
as photons. The term has been extended to include streams of fastmoving particles such as alpha and beta particles, free neutrons, and
cosmic radiations. Nuclear radiation is Ibat which is emined from
alOmic nuclei in various nuclear reactions and includes alpha, beta,
and gamma radiation and neutrons.

Naval Nuclear
Propulsion Program

neutron

An uncharged particle willt a mass slightly greater lItan Ibat of a
proton, found in Ibe nucleus of every atom heavier Iban hydrogen .
Neutrons sustain lite fission chain reaction in a nuclear reactor.

nuclear disintegration

A spontaneous nuclear transformation whi ch is characterized by Ibe
emission of particles andlor energy from lite nucleus of an atom.

nuclear fuel

See fuel.

nuclear reactor

A device in which nuclear fission is initiated and controlled to produce
heat which is Iben used to generate power.

nuclear reactor accident

An accident which results in release of fission products from Ibe
nuclear fuel.

nucl ide

An atomic form of an element which is distinguished by its atomic
number, atomic weight, and Ibe energy state of its nucleus . These
faClors determine Ibe ollter propen ies of Ibe element, including its
rad ioaClivil}' .

radiat ion field

A region where radiation is present.

radiation level

The measured amount of radiation in a region.

organ

A group of tissues which togellter perform one or more definitive
funClions in a living body.

radiation survey

The eval uation of an area or object wilb instruments to detect,
identify, and quantify radioactive materi als and radiation fields which
may be present.

organ ism

Any living plant or animal .
radiat ion worker

overburden

Material overlying a deposit of useful geological materials.

A person specially trained and tested in bas ic information regardi ng
radiation, its effects, and rad iological control techn iques and practices.

particulate

Penaining to a very small piece or pan of a material .
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The deposition of radioactive material in any place where it may harm
persons, invalidate experiments, or make products or equipment
unsuitable or unsafe for some specific use. The presence of unwanted
radioactive maner.

GLOSSARY (Cont)
river stage

The level of the surface of a river in relation to some reference
elevation.

sediment

Panicles of organic or inorganic origin that accumulate in loose form.

The process of spont'neous transformation of a radioactive nuclide to
a different nuclide or different energy state of the same nuclide.
Radioactive decay involves the emission of al pha panicles, beta
panicles. or gamma rays from Ille nuclei ot the atoms . If a
radioactive nuclide is transformed to a stable nuclide, the process
results in a decrease of the number of original radioactive atoms.
Radioactive decay is also referred to as radioactive disintegration.

seismicity

The quality or state of shaking or vibrating caused by an earthquake.

shipping container

A specially designed large, stainless steel or lead-lined, steel-shelled
cask that is transported in the vertical position on a well-type or
depressed center railcar. The container is certified by the Department
of Energy and the Department of Transportation for the shipment cf
naval spent nuclear fuel.

Equipment and materials which are radioactive and for which there is
further use. Radioactive wastes are generally classified as highlevel waste (those resulting from reprocessing reactor fuel or the used
reactor fuel itself), as I"w-Ievel waste, or as low-level waste
containing transuranic elem~nts or uranium-233 .

short-lived radioactivity

Radioactive nuclides which decay rapidly, therefore having relatively
short half-lives.

socioeconomics

The welfare of human beings as related to the production , distribution.
and consumption of goods and services.

radioactivity

The process of spontaneous decay or disintegration of an unstable
nucleus of an atom; usually accompanied by the emission of ionizing
radiation.

special nuclear material

Materials containing nuclides such as plutonium-239, uranium-233, or
uranium enriched to a higher percentage than normal in the
uranium-235 isotope.

radioisotope

An unstable isotope of an element that decays or disintegrates
spontaneously and emits radiation.

specific activity

radiological consequences

The changes to the environment or the health of a person(s) as a result
of the effects of radiation exposure or radioactive materials.

The ratio between the amount of radioactive isotope present and the
total amount of all other isotopes of that same element, both
radioactive and stable. It is usually expressed in microcuries of
radioisotope per gram of total element.

specimen
radionuclides

Atoms that exhibit radioactive properties. Standard practice for
naming radionuclides is to use the name or atomic symbol of an
element followed by its atomic weight (e.g., cobalt-60 or Co-60, a
radionuclide of cobalt).

A small sample of material (fuel or non-fuel) inserted into a reactor
for testing to characterize the material's performance. Test specimens
may be constructed of plant materials, reactor structural materials, or
fuel materials.

steam generator
reactor vessel (or
reactor pressure vessel)

A very strong, thick-walled steel structure which contains the nuclear
fuel and cooling water under high pressure during reactor operations.

The portion of the nuclear power plant where the heat fro m the
primary system is transferred to the secondary system without physical
contact between the water in the two systems .

rem

A unit of measure used to indicate the amount of radiation exposure a
person receives (an acronym for roentgen equivalent man).

survey meter

Any portable instrument which is used to detect radi ation and is
especially adapted for surveying or inspecting an area to establish the
existence and amount of radioactive material present.

risk

The product of the consequences of an event multiplied by the
probability of that event.

tectonic

Pertaining to or designating the rock structures which result from the
deformation of the earth 's crust.

threatened species

Any species or subspecies which is likely to become an endangered
species within the foreseeable future throughout all or a significant
port ion of its range.

radioactive contamination

radioactive decay

radioactive waste
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topography

The detailed physical description of the surface of a region. including
the relative elevations of features. The graphical representation of the
physical configuration of a region on a map .

toxic

Relating to or caused by a toxin which is a poisono~s substance that is
a specific product of the metabolic activities of a living organism and
is usually very unstable when introduced into human tissues .

tritium

A radioactive isotope of hydrogen with atoms that are three t.imes the
mass of ordinary light hydrogen atoms . Tritium is present in the
reactor coolant as the result of neutron interaction with naturally
occurring deuterium present in the water.

uranium

(Symbol UI A natural radioactive element with the atomic number 92
and. as found in natural ores. an average weight of approximately
238 . The two principal natural isotopes are uranium-235 (0.7 percent
of natural uranium) and uranium-238 (99.3 percent of natural
uranium). Natural uranium also includes a minute amount of
uranium-234.

vadose wne

The unsaturated region of soil located between the ground surface and
water table.

water pools

Deep pools of water that are used to inspect and hold spent nuclear
fuel modules. Storage racks are located below the water surface to
support and position the fuel modules in place fo r handling and to
prevent the formation of a critical mass .

water table

The upper surface boundary of an uncontrolled aquifer. below which
groundwater occurs. It is usually defined by the levels at which water
stands in wells that barely penetrate the aquifer.

watershed

The region which drains into a ri ver. ri ver system. or body of water.

wetlands

Those areas which are covered by water with a frequency sufficient to
support a prevalence of vegetative or aquatic life that requires
saturated or seasonally saturated soil conditions for growth and
reproduction. Wetlands generall y include swamps. marshes . bogs.
and similar areas such as sloughs. potholes. wet meadows. river
overflow. mudllats. and natural ponds .
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x-rays

Penet.rating electromagnetic radiations with wavelengths shorter than
those of visible light. They are usually produced (as in medical
diagnostic x-ray machines) by irradiating a metallic target with large
numbers of high-energy electrons. In nuclear reactions. it is
customary to refer to photons originating outside the nucleus as x-rays
and those originating in the nucleus as gamma rays. even though they
are the same.
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AEA

Atomic Energy Act

FWPCA

Federal Water PolI.tion Control Act

AEC

Atomic Energy Commission

HEPA

high-efficiency particulate air

ANL-E

Argonne National Laboratory - East

ICPP

Idaho Chemical Processing Plant

ANL-W

Argonne National Laboratory - West

ICRP

International Commission on Radiological Protection

ATR

Advanced Test Reactor

IDLH

immediately dangerous to life and health

Btu

British thermal unit

INEL

Idaho National Engineering Laboratory

BWR

boiling water reactor

INEL-ECF

Idaho National Engineering Laboratory Expended Core Facility

CAA

Clean Air Act

INGL

Ingalls Shipbuilding

CDE

committed dose equivalent

KAPL

Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory

CEDE

committed effective dose equivalent

KSO

Kesselring Site Operation

CERCLA

Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act

kv

kilovolts

CFA

central facil ities area

kw

kilowatts

CFR

Code of Federal Regulations

kwh

kilowatt hours

cfs

cubic feet per second

LET

linear energy transfer

Ci

curies

MCW

maximally exposed collocated worker

cms

cubic meters per second

MEl

maximally (or maximum) exposed individual

CNS

Charleston Naval Shipyard

mg

milligram

CWRM

Commission on Water and Resource Management

mgd

million gallons of water per day

DEP

Department of Environmental Protection

MINS

Mare Island Naval Shipyard

DOD

Department of Defense

MMI

Modified Mercalli Index

DOE

Department of Energy

MOl

maximally exposed off-site individual

EB

Electric Boat Division of General Dynamics

mph

miles per hour

ECF

Expended Core Facility

MVA

megavolt amperes

EDE

effective dose equivalent

MW

megawatts

EIS

Environmental Impact Statement

MWh

megawatt hours

EPA

Environmental Protection Agency

NAAQS

National Ambient Air Quality Standards

ERPG

Emergency Response Planning Guideline

NEA

Nuclear Energy Agency

FAA

Federal Aviation Administration

NEPA

National Environmental Policy Act

FMEF

Fuels and Materials Examination Facility

NES HAP

National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants

NNPP

Naval Nuclear Prop ulsion Program

AA-I

Volume I, Appendix 0

Volume I. Appendix 0

AA-2

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS (Cont)
NNS

Newpon News Shipbuilding

NOAA

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

NOR

Norfolk Naval Shipyard

NPA

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS (Cont)
TLV-TWA

threshold limit value, time-weighted average

TRA

test reactor area

USFWS

United States Fish and Wildlife Service

nearest publ ic access

VOC

volatile organic compound

NPDES

National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System

WIPP

waste isolation pilot plant

NRC

Nuclear Regulatory Commission

WSO

Windsor Site Operation

NRF

Naval Reactors Facility

NTS

Nevada Test Site

NYSDEC

New York State Department of Environmental Conservation

OECD

Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development

ORNL

Oak Ridge National Laboratory

ORR

Oak Ridge Reservation

PAH

polycyclic (or polynuclear) aromatic hydrocarbons

PCB

polychlorinated biphenyl

pCi

picocuries

PH NS

Pearl Harbor Naval Sh ipyard

PHWMA

Pearl Harbor Water Management Area

PNS

Ponsmouth Naval Shipyard

PS NS

Puget Sound Naval Shipyard

PWR

pressurized water reactor

RCRA

Resource Conservation and Recovery Act

RWMC

Rad ioactive Waste Management Complex

SA PS

Shippingpon Atomic Power Statio n

SARA

Superfund Amendments and Reauthorizatio n Act

SNF

spent nuclear fuel

SRS

Savannah River Site

SRS-ECF

Savannah River Site Expended Core Facility

TEDE

total effective dose equivalent

n

transpon index
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